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MISCELLANEOUS WORKS

OF

THOMAS ARNOLD, D.D.,

LATE HEAD-MASTER OF RUGBY SCHOOL, AND REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

SECOND AMERICAN EDITION.

WITH

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PUBLISHER'S PREFACE.

THE volume of "Arnold's Miscellaneous Works," published in London in June, 1845, having been accurately examined, it was discovered that the London copy was both *defective* and *redundant*. The concise Preface itself, by Mr. Stanley, indeed produced a conviction that the volume might be essentially improved. That notice was almost in these words:—

"This volume consists of a republication of such Miscellaneous writings of Dr. Arnold as appeared to possess any permanent interest, or to illustrate his general views, especially on the subjects of education and of the social and political state of the country.

"It has, therefore, seemed best to exclude from it the articles written in the British Critic, 1819–20; that on Niebuhr's History of Rome in the Quarterly Review of 1825; and on "Letters of an Episcopalian," in the Edinburgh Review of 1826; such publications of his later years as had a local or temporary character, as well as the article on "Dr. Hampden" in the Edinburgh Review of 1836; and such of the Essays appended to his edition of Thucydides, 1830-35, as were confined to questions of purely topographical or historical detail. The Essays on Church and State, which were to have appeared in this volume, have now been published, as Appendixes to the Second Edition of the Fragment on the Church.

"The contents of this volume express Dr. Arnold's deliberate views on the subjects of which he wrote. At the same time it will be obvious that his language would often have been modified by a change of circumstances, and that expressions are occasionally used, which he would subsequently have cancelled."

Exclusive of the Articles in the British Critic which are not specifically designated, there are *five* important disquisitions upon very interesting topics, which are thus distinctly announced as omitted by the English editor. It was, therefore, decided, that those critical Essays should be embodied in the American reprint. There is also a peculiar mention of the "Fragment on the Church," and the "Essays on Church and State;" the latter of which had been promised as a part of the volume of Arnold's "Miscellaneous Works;" but which were withheld, doubtless, for the sole purpose of publishing those two articles in a separate volume. In addition to those discussions, there is a very frequent reference both in the "Life and Correspondence," and in the "Miscellaneous Works of Dr. Arnold," to the Introductory Essay to the volume of Sermons by Arnold, entitled "CHRISTIAN LIFE, ITS COURSE, ITS HINDRANCES, AND ITS HELPS;" and the reader is often at a loss clearly and precisely to apprehend either the subject, or the proposed illustration of it, for want of that article. That preliminary discourse on the greatly agitating modern controversy, with its supplementary Annotations, is also incorporated in this volume.

Notwithstanding the large type, open spaces, and wide margin, it was ascertained, however, that the English copy still would be too thin for the purposes of trade; therefore a variety of articles and letters from *old* newspapers, written many years previous, altogether ephemeral, and of a merely "temporary character," and of an exclusively local application, were added, including nearly one fourth of the London volume, Those are of the identical quality of the superior class of newspaper essays on the social condition of the agricultural and manufacturing classes in Britain, with the analogous subjects; many of which will scarcely be noticed in any future history of that period.

Those pages, with few exceptions, it was determined to exclude; and in their stead to substitute, not only the critical disquisitions expressly mentioned in the Preface to the English edi-

tion, but also to embody the three prominent articles on those themes, to the defence and illustration of which Dr. Arnold consecrated his untiring and energetic labours; and, in which service he acquired his justly merited distinction, and accomplished so much wide spread and lasting good.

It is therefore proper that the purchasers of this volume should be apprised of the additions, changes, omissions, and improvements in this republication.

Additions.—These articles will be found in the table of Contents with these titles: "*Christian Politics; Essays on Church and State; The Church; The Church of England; Early Roman History; Faith and Reason; The Oxford Malignants and Dr. Hampden; The Sixth Chapter of the Gospel by John; Tracts for the Times;* and *Tradition.*" Those nine treatises, it will be perceived, extend to 256 pages, or one half of the present volume, including more than 400 pages of the Anglican works whence they are derived; and containing one entire octavo volume, which alone is sold at a much higher price than this edition.

Changes.—These have been entirely in the order of the articles, which in the English copy are promiscuously jumbled together, without any reference either to the subject, or the length of the discussion.

Omissions.—The articles omitted are altogether restricted to the newspaper discussions, which were so limited both in the trivial nature of the subject, and its short-lived duration, that very few readers in this country would understand the controversial themes, and scarcely an individual would devote the time to peruse those trifling and forgotten articles, although marked with the name of Thomas Arnold.

Improvements.—It was originally designed to arrange the whole volume in two consecutive series; the first to contain those which appertain to ecclesiastical concerns; and the second, the discussions on secular and literary themes. But as the "Essays on Church and State" were not in this country, the

copy of them from London arrived too late to follow the article "Tracts for the Times." It is therefore inserted at the end of the volume.

Four of the articles—"The Bible;" "Education of the Middle Classes;" "Social Condition of the Operative Classes;" and "National Church Establishments;" were originally issued in short successive numbers in the Englishman's Register, the Hertford Reformer, and the Sheffield Courant. They have now been combined in the form of continuous discussions, with the exclusion only of the usual expletives at the beginning and end of occasional disjointed compositions.

This volume, therefore, if we disregard the ephemeral papers in the English edition, includes nearly twice the matter of the London collection, for the *three* longest, and the *seven* most important and valuable dissertations which Arnold ever published, are now first introduced. Those treatises cannot be procured in any other form, without the purchase of six different costly octavo volumes. From these considerations, it is anticipated that this work will be very satisfactory to all those who have read Arnold's "Life and Correspondence;" and "Lectures on Modern History;" who will be gratified to peruse his deliberate judgment in a didactic form, on the numerous complex and interesting topics to which in his Letters there is constant reference, and which demand additional development. To all those readers especially, this volume of the "Miscellaneous Works of Thomas Arnold" is confidently recommended.

New-York, September 6, 1845.

NOTICE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

SINCE the first publication of ARNOLD'S MISCELLANEOUS WORKS, a very important Essay, on the "Right Interpretation and Understanding of the Scriptures," has been discovered at the end of the second volume of his Sermons. This Essay, which Dr. Arnold valued as one of his most edifying illustrations of a cardinal topic, peculiarly adapted to the present period, is extracted from the second volume of his Sermons; to which it was subjoined by the author, expressly to expedite and enlarge its circulation. That American readers might possess in one volume all of the author's disquisitions worthy of preservation, exclusive of his regular Pulpit Discourses, it is now incorporated with his other writings.

New-York, November 19, 1845.

CONTENTS.

Page

Bible, the 146
Genesis, 146.
The Sin not to be forgiven, 157.
Christian Duty of conceding the Roman Catholic Claims, ... 160
Canons of the Church of England, 188.
Christian Politics—Essays on Church and State, ... 435
Ends of the Church, 445.
Letter to Chevalier Bunsen, 491.
Plan of a work on Christian Politics, 435, 442.
The State and the Church, 457.
Church, the 9
Character of the Church, 9.
Errors concerning the Priesthood, 68.
No Priesthood in the Church, 20.
Primitive Writers, 32.
Barnabas, 38.
Clemens Romanus, 40.
Hermes, 44.
Ignatius, 45.
Polycarp, 45.
Church of England, the 213
Condition of the Operative Classes, ... 404
Discipline of Public Schools, ... 355
Early Roman History, ... 378
Education of the Middle Classes, ... 372
Interpretation and Right Understanding of the Scriptures, ... 520
Knowledge, Divisions and Relations of, ... 290
National Church Establishments, ... 497
The State and The Church, 499.
What can and ought to be done by the Church? 512.
Oxford Malignants and Dr. Hampden, ... 131
Poetry of Common Life, ... 367
Preface to Thucydides, Volume III., ... 328
Principles of Church Reform, ... 73
Rugby School—Use of the Classics, ... 340
Social Progress of States, ... 306
Tracts for the Times, ... 236
Faith and Reason, 265.
Sixth Chapter of the Gospel by John, 270.
Tradition, 272.

THE CHURCH.

I. CHARACTER OF THE CHURCH.

The language of prophecy leads us to hope for more than the salvation of a certain number of individuals through the gospel. It speaks of a general restoration, so complete as to repair altogether the mischief which had been introduced into the world by sin. And the language of St. Paul, when declaring the great mystery of his preaching, namely, the admission of the Gentiles into the kingdom of God, seems also to go beyond the redemption of a few individuals, comparatively speaking, out of the multitude of all nations. Christ was to present unto himself a Church holy and without blemish; and the distinction made by some between the visible and invisible Church, seems only a later refinement of interpretation, suggested by the fact that the Church in the obvious sense of the term, was not pure and spotless. Now ought we to lower the language of prophecy, in order to make it agree with the existing state of things? or to be anxious to amend the existing state of things, for the very reason that it does not correspond with the promises of Scripture?

The spread of Christianity, speaking of the geographical extent of its mere nominal dominion, has been partial;—its real moral effects have been still more partial. The largest part of the world does not acknowledge Christ so much as in name; and where he is acknowledged in name, he is yet denied in many instances in works. The perfect work of the Gospel has been seen only in individuals: Christ has laid his hands on a few sick folk and healed them; but he has done no mighty work of spiritual healing on a whole church. It is still most true, that we see not yet all things put under him.

Now are we prepared to say that, whereas the world was lost by one man's sin, it was only to be in a small part recovered by one man's righteousness?—that, whereas through Adam all died, only a very small number were through Christ to be made alive? This is directly contrary to the language of Scripture, which represents the redemption as designed to be a full reparation of the evil occasioned by the fall.

Or are we prepared to say that God's purposes have been defeated by the greater power of God's enemy?—that sin has been stronger

than grace, Satan mightier than Christ?—that the Church with its divine Head and its indwelling Spirit has been unable to overcome the powers of evil?—that the medicine was too weak to overcome the disease?

If neither of these alternatives be true; if the Scripture will not allow us to doubt of God's gracious will towards us all; and if to doubt his power be blasphemy,—what remains, but that we have weakened and corrupted that medicine, which was in itself sufficient to heal us? —that we have not tried, and are not trying Christianity, such as Christ willed it to be?—that the Church, against which the powers of hell have so long maintained an advantageous conflict, cannot be that same Church against which Christ declared that they should not prevail?

Now here it is necessary, in order to prevent much confusion and very much uncharitableness, to distinguish carefully between what I may be allowed to call Christian religion and the Christian Church. See Serm. xxxix. in vol iv.; Lect. on Modern Hist. vi.

By Christian religion, I mean that knowledge of God and of Christ, and that communion of the Holy Spirit, by which an individual is led through life, in all holiness, and dies with the confident hope of rising again through Christ at the last day. This knowledge being derived, or derivable at any rate, from the Scriptures alone, and this communion being the answer to our earnest prayers, it is perfectly possible that Christian religion may work its full work on an individual living alone, or living amongst unbelieving or ungodly men,—that here, where the business rests only with God and the individual soul, God's glory may be exalted and the man's salvation effected, whatever may be the state of the Church at large.

But, by the Christian Church, I mean that provision for the communicating, maintaining, and enforcing of this knowledge by which it was to be made influential, not on individuals, but on masses of men. This provision consisted in the formation of a society, which by its constitution should be capable of acting both within itself and without; having, so to speak, a twofold movement, the one for its outward advance, the other for its inward life and purification; so that Christianity should be at once spread widely, and preserved the while in its proper truth and vigour, till Christian knowledge should be not only communicated to the whole world, but be embraced also in its original purity, and bring forth its practical fruit. Thus Christian religion and the Christian Church being two distinct things, the one acting upon individuals, the other upon masses; it is very possible for the former to continue to do its work, although the latter be perverted or disabled.

But then the consequence will be such as we see before us, that Christianity, being designed to remedy the intensity of the evil of the fall by its religion, and the universality of the evil by its Church, has succeeded in the first, because its religion has been retained as God gave it, but has failed in the second, because its Church has been greatly corrupted.

Christianity, then, contains on the one hand a divine philosophy, which we may call its religion, and a divine polity which is its Church.

But it is precisely from an acknowledgment of this last truth, accompanied with a misunderstanding of its real nature, that the greatest part of the actual mischief has arisen. When we say, therefore, that Christianity contains a divine polity, namely its Church, it is of the utmost importance that we have a clear notion of the Christian Church, according to what we may gather from the Scripture to have been the mind of its divine Founder.

Now, that religion should be a social as well as an individual concern, is nothing peculiar to Christianity, if by religion we mean the outward and visible worship of God. The act of sacrifice, almost of necessity, involves the cooperation of more than a single person; festivals and solemn processions, even hymns of thanksgiving and praise, can scarcely be performed by one alone. Religion, then, in that sense in which the ancient world generally understood it, that is, public and visible worship, has always been, and must always be, the business of several persons together;—the religion of a single individual must, in this sense, be something imperfect, and only in a very small degree possible.

But the peculiarity of Christianity consists in this, that while it takes religion in another sense, and means by it not the visible worship of God, but the service of the heart towards him; and whilst it would thus appear that religion could exist perfectly in one single individual, and required no cooperation of more persons, yet still it is made the business of a number or multitude, and our spiritual relations to God are represented as matters of a joint interest, no less than that visible worship which, in its very nature, must be more than individual.

Now it is seen and generally acknowledged, that men's physical welfare has been greatly promoted by the cooperation of a number of persons endowed with unlike powers and resources. One man having what another wants, and wanting what another has, there is an obvious wisdom in so combining their efforts, as that the strength of one should supply the weakness of another, and so the weakness should in no case be perceptible.

This cooperative principle, founded on the great dissimilarity which prevails amongst men, was by Christianity to be applied to moral purposes, as it had long been to physical ; (See Introduction to Sermons on Christian Life, its Course, its Hindrances, and its Helps, p. 48 ;) each man was to regard his intellectual and moral gifts as a means of advancing the intellectual and moral good of society ; what he himself wanted was to be supplied out of the abundance of his neighbour ;—and thus the moral no less than the physical weaknesses of each individual, were to be strengthened and remedied, till they should vanish as to their enfeebling effects both with respect to himself and to the community.

Nothing could be more general than such a system of co-operation. It extended to every part of life ; not only going far beyond that co-operation for ritual purposes, which was the social part of the old religions, but, so far as men's physical well-being had been the sole object of existing civil societes, it went far beyond them also. For though it is possible, and unhappily too easy, to exclude moral considerations from our notions of physical good, and from our notions of ritual religion, yet it is not easy, in looking to the moral good of man, to exclude considerations of his physical well-being. Every outward thing having a tendency to affect his moral character, either for the better or for the worse, and this especially holding good with respect to riches or poverty, economical questions, in all their wide extent, fall directly under the cognizance of those whose object is to promote man's moral welfare.

But while thus general, the object of Christian cooperation was not to be vague. When men combined to offer sacrifice, or to keep festival, there was a definite object of their union ; but the promotion of man's moral welfare might seem indistinct and lost in distance. Something nearer and more personal was therefore to be mixed up with that which was indistinct from its very vastness. The direct object of Christian cooperation was to bring Christ into every part of common life ; in scriptural language, to make human society one living body, closely joined in communion with Christ, its head. And for this purpose, one of the very simplest acts of natural necessity was connected with the very deepest things of religion :—the meal of an assembly of Christians was made the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ. And the early church well entered into the spirit of this ordinance, when it began every day by a partaking of the holy communion. For when Christ was thus brought into one of the commonest acts of nature and of common society, it was a lively lesson, that in every other act through the day, he should be made present also: if Christians at

their very social meal could enter into the highest spiritual communion, it taught them that in all matters of life, even when separated from one another bodily, that same communion should be preserved inviolate; that in all things they were working for and with one another, with and to Christ and God.

Such appears, even from the meagre account of a stranger, to have been the manner of living of the Christians of Bithynia, about a hundred years after the birth of our Lord, and about seventy therefore from the first preaching of Christianity. They met before day, and sang together a hymn to Christ: then they bound themselves to one another by oath,—according to Pliny's expression, "sacramento," but in reality, we may be sure, by their joint partaking of the communion of Christ's body and blood, that they would neither steal, nor rob, nor commit adultery, nor break faith, nor refuse to restore what had been entrusted to them. Then they went to their day's work, and met again to partake their meal together; which they probably hallowed, either by making it a direct communion, or by some prayers, or hymns, which reminded them of their Christian fellowship.

Now in this account, short as it is, we see two great principles of the Christian Church: first, cooperation for general moral improvement, for doing the duties of life better; and secondly, the bringing Christ as it were into their communion, by beginning the day with him, and deriving their principle of virtuous living directly from his sacrament. The church of Bithynia existed on a small scale, in a remote province; but here are precisely those leading principles of the Christian Church exemplified, which were fitted for all circumstances and all places, and which contain in them that essential virtue which the Church was to embody and to diffuse.

It is obvious, also, that the object of Christian society being thus extensive, and relating not to ritual observances, but to the improvement of the whole of our life, the natural and fit state of the Church is, that it should be a sovereign society or commonwealth; as long as it is subordinate and municipal, it cannot fully carry its purposes into effect. This will be evident, if we consider that law and government are the sovereign influences on human society; that they in the last resort shape and control it at their pleasure; that institutions depend on them, and are by them formed and modified; that what they sanction will ever be generally considered innocent; that what they condemn is thereby made a crime, and if persisted in becomes rebellion; and that those who hold in their hands the power of life and death must be able greatly to obstruct the progress of whatever they disapprove of, and those who dispose of all the honours and rewards of society must, in the same

way, be greatly able to advance whatever they think excellent. So long, then, as the sovereign society is not Christian, and the Church is not sovereign, we have two powers alike designed to act upon the whole of our being, but acting often in opposition to one another. Of these powers, the one has wisdom, the other external force and influence; and from the division of these things, which ought ever to go together, the wisdom of the Church cannot carry into effect the truths which it sees and loves; whilst the power of government, not being guided by wisdom, influences society for evil rather than for good. See Lecture on Modern History, Inaug. Lect. and Appendix.

The natural and true state of things then is, that this power and this wisdom should be united; that human life should not be pulled to pieces between two claimants, each pretending to exercise control over it, not in some particular portion, but universally; that wisdom should be armed with power, power guided by wisdom; that the Christian Church should have no external force to thwart its beneficent purposes; that government should not be poisoned by its internal ignorance or wickedness, and thus advance the cause of God's enemy, rather than perform the part of God's vicegerent.

This is the perfect notion of a Christian Church, that it should be a sovereign society, operating therefore with full power for raising its condition, first morally, and then physically: operating through the fullest development of the varied faculties and qualities of its several members, and keeping up continually, as the bond of its union, the fellowship of all its people with one another through Christ, and their communion with him as their common head.

With this notion of a perfect Church two things are utterly inconsistent:—first, the destroying of the principle of cooperation through the varied talents and habits of the several members of the society, and substituting in the place of it a system in which a very few should be active and the great mass passive; [Introd. to Sermons on Christian Life, its Course, its Hindrances, and its Helps, pp. 48, 49,] a system in which vital heat was to be maintained, not by the even circulation of the blood through every limb, through the healthy cooperation of the arteries and veins of every part, but by external rubbing and chafing, when the limbs from a suspension of their inward activity, had become cold and paralyzed.

Secondly, the taking of any part or parts of human life out of its control, by a pretended distinction between spiritual things and secular; a distinction utterly without foundation, for in one sense all things are secular, for they are done in time and on earth; in another, all things are spiritual, for they affect us morally either for the better or the

worse, and so tend to make our spirits fitter for the society of God or of his enemies. The division rests entirely on principles of heathenism, and tends to make Christianity, like the religions of the old world, not a sovereign discipline for every part and act of life, but a system for communicating certain abstract truths, and for the performance of certain visible rites and ceremonies.

These two notions, both utterly inconsistent with the idea of a true Christian Church, have been prevalent, alternately or conjointly almost from the very beginning of Christianity. To the first we owe Popery in all its shapes, Romanist or Protestant; the second is the more open form of Antichrist, which, by its utter dissoluteness, has gone far to reduce countries nominally Christian to a state of lawlessness and want of principle worse than the worst heathenism.

But these two Antichrists have ever prepared the way for each other; and the falsehood of the one has led directly to the falsehood of its apparent opposite, but real ally and cooperator.

I begin, then, with the first of these two evils: the substitution of the activity of some in place of the activity of all; the distinction of the grand characteristic of the Christian Church, the cooperation, namely, of society through the several faculties and qualities of its members, for the attainment of the highest moral good of all.

This life, as it may well be called, of the Church, may be injured by an extreme predominance of the activity of some members, by which the others are necessarily rendered less active. A mere exaggeration of the principles of government may effect this, and it may arise out of the most benevolent feelings. Kind and earnest teachers commit this very mistake when they assist their pupil too much; they feel that they can do the work better than he can, and that their assistance will enable him to accomplish his task in a shorter time, and more effectually. But they really injure him; because the greater completeness and clearness of any one particular piece of knowledge is a far less benefit than the strengthening of his own faculties by exercise: the knowledge thus given is not power, but is gained at the cost of power, and is a hindrance rather than a help to the wholesome acquisition of knowledge hereafter. Even so benevolent governments, seeing the ignorance and mistaken notions of their people, are eager to fence them in on every side by their own care, and act for them, because they were likely of themselves to act wrong. But unhappily with the tares they thus pluck up the good seed also; the people get accustomed to let the government act for them; they thus may acquire the innocence of infancy or death, but they acquire also the incapacity of those states for good; and the result is not a living spirit but a lifeless corpse.

Still, it must not be forgotten that with government the error is only in the excess or in the unseasonableness of its activity. In itself it is beneficent and necessary. Its abuses are no argument against its existence; it is founded on truth, and is indispensable in every state of society. But the life of the Church was impaired far more fatally by the introduction of another principle very distinct from that of government, the principle of priesthood. Persons unaccustomed to examine the subject thoroughly have often very confused ideas about priesthood; they profess utterly to disclaim it, while in fact they are zealously maintaining it. But the essential point in the notion of a priest is this, that he is a person made necessary to our intercourse with God, without being necessary or beneficial to us morally. His interference makes the worshipper neither a wiser man nor holier than he would have been without it; and yet it is held to be indispensable. This unreasonable, unmoral, unspiritual necessity is the essence of the idea of priesthood.

Priesthood, then, is properly mediation, taking this last word in its etymological rather than in its common meaning. When the act on the worshipper's part is already complete, whether the worship be ritual or spiritual, the presence or interference of a priest is made a necessary medium through which alone the act can be presented to God. For instance, suppose that the worshipper has a right belief concerning God, and knows what he desires to ask of God, the act of prayer on his part is complete; but if it be said that his prayer must be offered to God by another, and that otherwise God will not accept it, then here is the exact notion of priesthood. It ceases to be priesthood, and becomes teaching or assistance, if the act on the worshipper's part cannot be morally or reasonably complete without the aid of another. He who knows not what to pray for, cannot by himself complete the act of prayer, but requires to be taught in order to do it. This teaching, however, is not priesthood, because the necessity for its interposition is reasonable, moral, and spiritual.

A priest, therefore, as he does not make the worshipper more fit to worship in himself, implies necessarily that man cannot approach God. The necessity for his mediation arises out of this: man cannot approach God, but he may approach to some other being, and this other being may approach God. Thus this intermediate being stands to man in the place of God, and man's direct relations towards God himself are declared to be an impossibility.

We have arrived at a great and divine truth; the very foundation stone, indeed, of Christianity. We cannot come to God directly; we require one to be to us in the place of God. But one in the place of God and not God, is as it were a falsehood; it is the mother-falsehood

from which all idolatry is derived. The mystery of Christianity has met this necessity of our nature, and at the same time has avoided the evil of the falsehood. We have one who is to us in the place of God, but who is also God truly;—we have one whom we may approach, although we cannot approach God, for he is also truly man.

It has been well said, that no error is mere error; something there is of truth ever mixed with it. So the error of human priesthoods does indeed but express a great truth, that man cannot come to God without a mediator. But this truth is to man, when left to his own devices, either useless or mischievous. He attempts to act upon it by devising for himself a human mediator, and he falls at once into superstition and idolatry.

Again, the human mediator, as I have said before, does nothing to bring us in ourselves really nearer to God. His interference at all, implies that we are separated from God; this separation is a moral thing, arising out of our unlikeness to God. But the human mediator does nothing to restore to us God's likeness. It is strictly true, therefore, that his interposition has no moral value: it makes us neither better nor holier; it therefore shows the falsehood of its own claim; for while professing to bring us to God, it leaves us as far from him as ever.

But the true Mediator does not so: while he reconciles God to man, he also reconciles man to God. He works by his Spirit upon our own nature, and weeds out from it the seeds as it were of our alienation from God. Thus he does bring us near to God, for he makes us like God. And he is our one and only Priest, our one and only Mediator.

Some there are who profess to join cordially in this doctrine, and ask who disputes it. So little do they understand the very tenets which they uphold. For they themselves dispute and deny it, inasmuch as they maintain that the sacraments are necessary to salvation, and that they can only be effectually administered by a man appointed after a certain form. And thus they set up again the human mediator, which is idolatry, and they show the falsehood of his claim, because they make a man like ourselves necessary to bring us near to God, and this man, who is to complete Christ's work, and reconcile to God those whom Christ had left alienated, cannot touch the slightest part of the soul or mind of any one. If we were separated from God, he cannot bring us to him; for we remain in ourselves, when his ministration is over, just the same as we were before.

This dogma, then, of a human priesthood in Christ's Church, appointed to administer his sacraments, and thereby to mediate between God and man, from no reasonable or moral necessity, is a thing quite dis-

tinct from any exaggerated notions of the activity of government: it is not the excess of a beneficent truth, but it is, from first to last, considering that it is addressed to Christians, who have their Divine Priest and Mediator already, a mere error; and an error not merely speculative, but fraught with all manner of mischief, idolatrous and demoralizing, destructive of Christ's Church; injurious to Christ and to his Spirit; the worst and earliest form of Antichrist.

This error is demoralizing, because it has led to the false distinction between secular things and spiritual, and has tended to bring back Christianity to the likeness of a heathen religion, by changing it from a law of life to a matter of rites and outward observances; from which the care of the general moral character of every man is a thing altogether different.

It has led to the false distinction between secular things and spiritual. For in all the acts of life into which it was the design of Christianity to bring God and Christ, the priest is altogether excluded. In the works of justice and mercy, in the feelings of devotion, of hope, of fear, of love, the priest can find no place, for what is real and moral repels him. His element is only what is formal, shadowy, ceremonial; and in order to make himself of importance, he must raise what is shadowy and ceremonial into the place of what is real and moral. Men can act in life without him, and feel without him; but he tells them that certain ceremonial acts cannot be performed without him, and then he goes on and teaches that these ceremonial acts are the essence of religion.

But in Christianity his task was hard, because even in its very ceremonies the essence was something real and moral. When Christians met together and received the bread and wine of their common living as the body and blood of Christ, such an act had a real tendency to strengthen and confirm their souls, and the Holy Spirit made such a communion a constant means of grace to those who partook of it. But here there was no place for the priest; on the one side there was Christ's Church assembled, on the other there was Christ and his Spirit to bless them. The priest then steps in, diverts attention from the moral part of this communion, from its peculiar union of things divine and human, of social feelings and religious, from its hallowing of common life, by making us even eat and drink to God's glory and our own salvation, and fixes it upon a supposed mystical virtue conveyed to the bread and wine by the pronouncing of certain words over them by a certain person. The bread and wine became the sacrament of Christ's body and blood according to Christ's ordinance, by the assembled church receiving them as such; by their converting an act of nature into an act of religion; by their agreeing to partake together as of their earthly

food, so also of their spiritual, and thus being joined to one another in Christ. The agreement, therefore, of those communicating their common faith and love constitute the real consecration of the bread and wine; it is this which, through Christ's Spirit, changes the supper into the sacrament.

But the priest says, "Not so: it is not your common faith and purpose to celebrate the communion: it is not the fact of Christ having died and risen again which can bring him to you or you to him: I must interpose, and pronounce certain words over the bread and over the cup; and then what neither your faith nor Christ's redemption of you had made other than common food, becomes now, through my mediation, a thing endowed with a divine virtue, nay, it is become Christ himself. Whether there be any communion of yourselves or no, whether you are alone or with one another, whether you are concurring in spirit or no, still, because I, the priest, have pronounced certain words over it, it has acquired a miraculous power, and unless you are partakers of this you cannot be saved." So the communion of the Church, which morally was so essential, is thus made unessential; and the uttering certain words by a particular person, of which neither Christ nor his apostles had said anything, and which morally can have no virtue at all, is made essential. And thus was the Church supplanted by the priest; and the communion which is the very life of the Church, became the mass, with all its superstitions and idolatries.

The Church being set aside, and the principal part in the communion being transferred from it to the priest, his office grew in importance, and the Church in the same proportion, became removed from Christ, and desecrated. Then the priest was regarded as the minister of Christ in spiritual things, the Church only in temporal. For not only in the communion, but in the public prayers and exhortations of the Church, the Church itself was reduced more and more to a passive condition,—the priest alone was active. Thus there were some whose business was religion, and others whose business it was not. Religion and life were separated; the one was called spiritual, when it was in reality become less so; the other was called, and became truly secular. The salt which Christ had given to the Church, that each man might by it render the world and worldly things pure and holy to him, the Church had now to seek from the priest; and because it was to be sought from another, it in great measure lost its savour.

II. NO PRIESTHOOD IN THE CHURCH.

It has been stated generally that the efficacy of the Church has been destroyed by the excess of a good and necessary principle, that of government, and the introduction of another principle, wholly false and mischievous, that of priesthood. The first in itself, the Church recognises, and must ever recognise; the second she wholly repudiates. And thus we shall find that, while there is much said in Scripture in commendation of the one, the other is altogether omitted, as an element belonging to Heathenism, and not to Christianity.

Now, omitting all the commandments given us to obey government in general, and all such passages as claim obedience to the Apostles personally, we find several injunctions to submit ourselves to the rulers of the Church, being Christians, and yet not being Apostles;—and all these injunctions are a proof of our first position, that the principle of government in the Christian Church is recognised and sanctioned in the Scriptures.

I. St. Paul, in the earliest of all his Epistles, the first to the Thessalonians, entreats the church of Thessalonica to acknowledge or recognise, *εἰδέναι*, those that laboured among them, and were over them in the Lord, and who admonished them, *νουθετοῦντας ὑμᾶς*. And he calls on the church to "esteem them very highly in love for their work's sake." 1 Thess. v. 12, 13.

II. In two passages, Galatians vi. 6, and 1 Timothy v. 17, he asserts the claim of the governors of the church to be maintained by the church. In the first, indeed, he speaks only of such governors of the church as are instructors; *κοινωνείτω δὲ ὁ κατηχούμενος τὸν λόγον τῷ κατηχοῦντι ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς*; but in the second passage, while he acknowledges the especial claim of such, he extends the right to all rulers of the church generally, whatever may be their particular functions: *οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες πρεσβυτέροι διπλῆς τιμῆς ἀξιούσθωσαν.*

III. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews says also, "Obey your rulers and submit to them;—and that this means the Christian rulers of the church is evident by what follows, "for they watch as men who are to give an account for your souls;" which of course could not be said of Heathen authorities.

IV. To these may be added all that is said of the qualifications of an *ἐπίσκοπος* in the first Epistle to Timothy and in that to Titus;

and which implies that government in the church was a thing essential and recognised from the beginning.

V. St. Peter, as if writing under the liveliest recollection of our Lord's charge to himself, and of the strong contrast which Christ had drawn between the common practice of heathen government and that which should prevail among Christians, thus writes in his first Epistle, v. 2, to the elders of the several churches: Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof," ἐπισκοποῦντες, "not by constraint, but willingly;" Lachman adds κατὰ Θεόν 'as becomes a servant and child of God;' "not for filthy lucre," which implies that lucre *might* be a motive, that is, that the rulers of the church were maintained by the church, "but of a ready mind."

VI. We read also in the Acts, that Paul and Barnabas appointed elders to govern the churches which they founded in Lycaonia and the south of Asia Minor, xiv. 23; and St. Paul addresses the elders of the church of Ephesus, xx. 28, in the same language as St. Peter, charging them "to feed the church of God." Now this term of "feeding as a shepherd feeds his flock," is one of the oldest and most universal metaphors to express a supreme and at the same time a beneficent government.

It is needless to multiply other passages, as those already quoted are abundantly sufficient to show that Christianity supposes and sanctions the principle of government in the church, and reciprocally the principle of obedience; that in this respect the church was to resemble all other societies; some of its members were to rule and others were to be subject.

But of the principle of priesthood, by which one man or set of men, are declared to be necessary mediators for their brethren, so that without them their brethren cannot worship God acceptably or be suffered to approach him, the Scriptures contain not one word, except as rejecting and condemning it. This of course cannot be shown by extracts as to the negative part of it: it will be sufficient to show that the passages usually quoted by the advocates of the priesthood as sanctioning their notions are all misinterpreted, or misapplied; and then to give some passages which assert the contrary to the doctrine of the priesthood, and describe it as one of the great privileges of the Christian Church, that its one great High Priest, Jesus Christ, has given it full access to God for ever, so that there is nothing for priesthood to do, or rather for human priesthood to pretend to do for it, any more, so long as earth shall endure.

The principle of priesthood unmixed with any other, is seen in the Christian Church most plainly in the claim to administer the Lord's Sup-

per. I say this rather than, in the claim to administer the sacraments generally, or in the so-called power of the keys, because although something of the notion of priesthood has undoubtedly been mixed with both these, and especially with the latter; and although in practice absolution has come to be a proper priestly act, yet in their origin both the power of baptizing and that of absolving were in a great degree acts of government; being in fact the power of admitting or of restoring members to the privileges of the Christian society. But the claim of administering the Lord's Supper is the assumption of a power exclusively priestly; it interposes in an act with which government has nothing to do, and its supposed object is merely inward and spiritual—to give a spiritual efficacy to that which without its interference would have been common food. The Scripture, then, might recognise an exclusive power of baptizing or of excommunicating and absolving, without at all countenancing the notion of a priesthood, because it might view such a power as one naturally belonging to the rulers of any society, and as connected therefore with government only. But if it be found to recognise an exclusive claim of administering the Lord's Supper, then no doubt it must be allowed in the strictest sense to recognise in Christianity a human priesthood.

This power is said accordingly to be recognised by the Apostle Paul in two passages, 1 Corinth. iv. 1, and again in the same Epistle, x. 16.

I. In the first passage St. Paul says, "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and *stewards of the mysteries of God.*" It is contended that by this last expression, St. Paul means to say that himself and his fellow ministers were "dispensers of the sacraments."

But, in the first place, Baptism and the Lord's Supper are not in the Scripture sense mysteries at all. A mystery, in the Scripture, is a hidden truth; almost always it signifies a truth hidden generally from men, but revealed to the people of God. By a figure, Christ himself is twice called "the mystery of God," or "of godliness," Coloss. i. 27, 1 Tim. iii. 16, because his manifestation in the flesh is the great truth which Christianity has revealed to us. Baptism and the Lord's Supper are actions connected with the Christian mysteries, but they are not mysteries themselves; much less are they so especially deserving of the term as to engross it to themselves, and to become the prominent idea expressed by it.

Again; by whatever name St. Paul might have called himself, it certainly would not have been "a dispenser of the sacraments." He had just before said that his business was not to baptize, but to preach the gospel; that, so far from it being his office to "dispense the sacraments," he had only baptized three or four individuals in the course of

his whole ministry at Corinth. He who thus studiously devolved on others the ministration of one of the sacraments, could scarcely have desired the Corinthians to regard him as being appointed especially to dispense them.

On the other hand, we find him saying, a little before, that he and his fellow ministers were in the habit of speaking of "the wisdom of God in a mystery," or rather "God's secret or hidden wisdom," the wisdom hidden from men, which God fore-ordained before the world unto our glory. And again further on in the Epistle, he uses the expression "I have had a dispensation," or 'stewardship,' if οἰκόνομος in the former passage be translated 'steward,' "entrusted to me." Now this dispensation is so certainly the "dispensation of the Gospel," by preaching, that the gloss εὐαγγελίου has actually found its way into the text, and is expressed in the common editions, and in our translation. It is shown by the whole context, in which he repeatedly says that his business is "to preach the Gospel." There can be no doubt, therefore, that when he describes himself as "a steward or dispenser of the mysteries of God," he means that very same "speaking of the wisdom of God in a mystery," that very same "dispensation of the Gospel by preaching," which, in other parts of this Epistle he declares to have been his business as an Apostle; just as he declares also, that "to dispense the sacraments" was not his business; for he says, "God called me not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel."

II. The second passage is as follows: "the cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not a communion of the body of Christ?" This shows, it is argued, that it belonged to the Apostles to bless the cup at the communion, and to break the bread: in other words, to consecrate the elements, and so to give to them their sacramental character and virtue.

It is evident that the whole force of this passage depends on the meaning of the word "we." If "we" means "we Apostles," as distinguished from other Christians, then the argument would have some plausibility; but if "we" means not "we Apostles," but "we Christians," then the whole argument falls to the ground at once. Now the very next verse goes on as follows: "For we being many are one bread and one body, for we are all partakers of that one bread." It is then, not "we the Apostles," but "we Christians," "we being many," "we all," "who bless the cup of blessing, and break the bread." So far from proving that there exists in Christianity a priestly power in the administration of the communion, this passage shows the contrary.

The contrary also fully appears from the general language of the New Testament. It is declared as plainly as words can speak, that, in a religious sense, all Christians are equal before God, and that all are brought near to him, have access to him, are reconciled to him, are his heirs, and his children. Now some of these terms were applicable to the whole Jewish church, and yet in that church there was undoubtedly a human priesthood. But the Epistle to the Hebrews shows the great distinction, when it says that we are sanctified by the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all; that sacrifices must therefore cease to be offered; and that as the especial object of the Jewish priesthood was to sacrifice, so it may be presumed, that where no sacrifice remains to be offered,* so neither should there be any priest. It is not pretended that all Christians are equal socially; for some are governors and others are governed: nor are they so equal as to render distinctions for order's sake in their public meetings unnecessary; for women are not allowed to speak in the congregation: but they are equal religiously, as being all alike redeemed by Christ, and brought by him near to God; that is, put into a condition to offer to him acceptably all religious offices; and in the only remaining kind of sacrifice, the spiritual offering of themselves to God, commanded to be, every man his own priest; inasmuch as by ourselves alone can our own hearts and bodies be devoted as thank-offerings to him who made them and redeemed them.

We find, then, no place in Scripture for the notion that any human mediation is required in order to perfect the purely religious acts of Christians. As all Christians can pray acceptably through Christ's mediation, so can all communicate acceptably in the signs of his body and blood; such communion being manifestly not an act peculiar to the rulers of the society, but belonging to all the members of it; and therein differing from baptism, which is an act of government, so to speak, as well as an act of religion; and may, therefore be fitly appropriated to one particular order of society, not as priests but as governors.

It will be understood in what sense I call baptism an act of government, if it be considered that it is, amongst other things, the admission of a new member into the Christian society, and that, as such, it belongs properly to those who have authority given to them in that society; for where is the private individual, who is allowed at his own choice to admit strangers to the rights of citizenship in the commonwealth? It does not follow that baptism is nothing more than an act of government; but because it is clearly this, whatever it may be be-

* For his own view of what was the true Christian sacrifice still continued, see Introd. to Serm. vol. IV. p. 1; Serm. vol. V. p. 273.

sides, therefore it is at least possible that when the power of administering it is ascribed exclusively to one particular order in the church, there should be in this no allowance of any priestly power, but simply of the power of the magistrates or rulers of a society. We shall see, by and by, that this distinction is not unimportant.

Farther; it may appear on examination, that the very power of the keys itself, when rightly understood, implies nothing of a priesthood, but only the legitimate power of government.

It will be asked, however, what is the right understanding of this well-known expression, "The power of the keys?" And the answer must not be given lightly; for we are here concerned not with the careless words of fallible men, but with a solemn promise to the Church, made at three several times by Christ our Lord. Undoubtedly, therefore, the power of the keys means something, and that meaning cannot be a matter of indifference.

The promise was made by our Lord on three several occasions:—

1. To St. Peter, apparently as a reward to that Apostle for his confessing his Master to be the Christ. Matthew, xvi. 19.

2. To the whole body or church of Christians, as a sanction to their sentence, when he had ordered that all quarrels between Christian and Christian should in the last resort be referred to the decision of the Church. Matthew, xviii. 18.

3. To the eleven Apostles, when our Lord, after his resurrection, was giving them their commission to found and govern his Church. John, xx. 23.

In the first two of these promises the words are identical, and they are figurative. They run, "Whatsoever thou," or 'ye,' "shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou," or 'ye' "shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." In the third the words are different, although the sense is generally supposed to be nearly the same. They are, "Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained."

"To bind and to loose" are metaphors certainly, but metaphors easy to be understood. They express a legislative and a judicial power. To bind, legislatively, is to impose a general obligation; to say that a thing ought to be done or ought not to be done: to bind men's consciences either to the doing of it or to the abstaining from it. Thus, St. Paul speaks of a woman being bound so long as her husband lives; but of being free to marry whom she will, if her husband be dead. In the one case there was a binding of the conscience, in the other a loosing of it. And this is one part of the sense of the ex-

pression. Again; to bind judicially, is to impose a particular obligation on an individual, to oblige him to do or to suffer certain things for the sake of justice, which, if left to himself, he would not choose to do or suffer. And to loose judicially, is to pronounce a man free from any such obligation; to declare that justice does not require of him, in this particular case, to do or to suffer anything for its satisfaction. Justice has no claim upon him,—she leaves him free. This is the second part of the expression.

It is to this second part, to the binding and loosing judicially, that the third promise of our Lord belongs. For the retaining and remitting of sins is clearly a judicial power: the retaining of sin is the pronouncing that a man is bound to do or suffer something as a satisfaction for it; the remitting of sin is the pronouncing that justice has no hold upon him, that he is acquitted, loosed, freed from all her demands on him.

But such a legislative and judicial power is a power of government; government in fact consisting mainly of these two great powers, the legislative and judicial. We do not as yet find any thing then in the power of the keys that bears any relation to priesthood, according to that definition of it which was given above—that it is an interposition between God and man supposed to be necessary to our acceptance with God, yet without being necessary or beneficial to us morally. And this is strictly the idea of priestly absolution. For whether it be said that he who is absolved is forgiven by God, or that he who is not absolved is not forgiven by God; there is in either case an act made essential or beneficial to our salvation, which yet makes us morally neither the better nor the worse. Absolution then so understood is a a proper act of priesthood. But does such a power of absolution form any part of the Christian power of the keys?

It has been contended that it does, and our Lord's words to his Apostles are appealed to as the proof of this:—"Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained." Now here there are two questions:—First, What was the meaning of our Lord's promise as addressed to the Apostles? Secondly how much of this meaning was intended to any except the Apostles?

1. It is allowed that this promise conferred on the Apostles a judicial power, as distinct from a legislative one; it gave them authority to decide on individual cases; to pronounce that such or such a man was forgiven, in some sense or other; and that such or such a man was not forgiven. But the great question is, whether this power can be shown to be distinct from a power of government; that is, were

the forgiveness or refusal of forgiveness here spoken of distinct from some outward sentence passed upon a man with reference to the Christian society: and were they grounded upon any thing more than actions cognizable by human perception, and therefore the fit objects of human reward or censure. For the peculiarity of a priestly power consists in this: that its sentence, in its essence, is not outward but inward; affecting a man not in his relations to the Christian society, but in his relations towards God, and grounded therefore upon a knowledge of more than actions cognizable by human perception, of the thoughts and motives of the heart. For there is no doubt that our state towards God depends mainly on the state of our hearts, so that a judgment of the former cannot be passed without a knowledge of the latter.

We must separate, then, all such judicial acts as the declaration of forgiveness implied in the admission of new converts to baptism; and as the declaration of the retaining of sins implied in the striking of Elymas with blindness, in the visiting the incestuous Corinthian with some bodily punishment, in excommunication, and in the deaths of Ananias and Sapphira. In all these cases there was an outward sentence, affecting men outwardly and visibly in their earthly condition; and this sentence was grounded on some outward action; in baptism for instance, on the *profession* of repentance and faith; and in the other instances on acts of a similar character to those which human law habitually punishes.

But can we find, over and above such instances as these, any cases in which the Apostles, without any visible or outward sentence, passed a judgment simply on the state of an individual towards God; and a judgment founded, not on outward and tangible acts, but on a knowledge of the sincerity or insincerity of his feeling? We read of no such cases; but we find such language used respecting Christ's judgment, and God's knowledge of the thoughts of the heart, as is agreeable to our common impression, that of the state of a man's heart with respect to God, God is the only judge. 1 Sam. xvi. 7. 1 Kings, viii. 39. Jerem. xvii. 9, 10. Luke, xvi. 15. 1 Cor. iv. 4, 5.

It may seem that in one instance an Apostle did possess a power of reading the heart, when Paul is said to have perceived that the cripple who steadfastly listened to his speech at Lystra, "had faith to be healed." It is not certain, however, that there was in this case any reading of the heart; "the steadfast listening," the expression of deep interest in Paul's words manifested in the whole countenance and attitude of the hearer, were an evidence not to be mistaken that he was thoroughly convinced by what he heard. But admitting for a moment that the

Apostle's was a deeper judgment than he could have formed by his mere faculties ; yet in this case we have God's warrant that he had judged rightly, inasmuch as the man's faith was proved by his being cured of his lameness at Paul's word. So that even if there was a sentence grounded on such things as man cannot naturally discern, yet the proof was given that the judgment was right, by its being followed by an outward consequence, greater than man alone could have effected.

2. So much of the power given by our Lord to his Apostles, as depended on their possessing a greater than human knowledge, would not, of course, be given to those who do not possess that knowledge. And if any man says that he does possess such knowledge, and if the claim does not prove itself, as in prophecy or in telling to a man what was in his thoughts, then we may call upon him for some sign that he does possess it. If he says positively that such a man has his sins forgiven in the sight of God, then he should tell him as St. Paul did, to stand upright on his feet, or should relieve him from some trouble or infirmity by which he is manifestly afflicted. If he says as positively that such and such a man is not forgiven, then let him also show his power of delivering such an one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord.

It does not appear that the Apostles ever exercised what was properly a priestly power. Admitting however, for the moment, that they had exercised it, yet as such a power is of an extraordinary character, and requires more than the ordinary attributes of human nature to exercise it properly ; and as the Apostles were endowed with certain extraordinary gifts, such as are not possessed by men in general ; we should be justified in assuming some connexion between their power and their gifts, and might safely conclude that those who had not the latter could not enjoy the former. But the case is stronger, now that it cannot be shown that even the Apostles possessed a priestly power. If such a power was too great even for them to wield, how can it be supposed that others can wield it, on whom none of their extraordinary qualifications have descended ?

The nearest approach to a priestly power recognised in the New Testament is in the effects of intercessory prayer ; for if we pray for grace for our brother, and God grants our prayer, we seem to be in some sort the channel of God's mercy to him, without producing any effect upon him morally ; and this was laid down to be the characteristic of a priestly power as distinct from a ministry or cure of souls, which acts on those committed to its charge through moral means.

However, the virtue of intercessory prayer is in itself widely differ-

ent from the pretended priestly power to give a virtue to the sacraments. The peculiarly unchristian part of this latter claim is this, that it makes a human mediator necessary to those who are actually acknowledging, trusting in, and earnestly desiring to enjoy the fruits of Christ's mediation; whereas no one would say that our own prayers, offered up according to Christ's Spirit, and in Christ's name will not be accepted, unless others will also pray for us. The prayers of others in our behalf are not made the condition on which alone our own earnest prayers shall be accepted.

Intercessory prayer in its highest cases supposes that a man has not the grace of repentance and faith; that he is not at present morally in a state of acceptance with God. It is the very worst part of his condition, that he will not pray for himself. Under these circumstances that God should have graciously left a way open by which his friends may labour with hope in his behalf; that over and above the secret and inscrutable ways by which he, according to his own pleasure, sometimes touches the heart of the impenitent sinner, he should have also revealed one way in which the love of his friends may work for him; this would be a very different thing from declaring that a man's own faith, and love, and prayers, shall be of no use unless other men shall also interpose for him. It is one thing to enable human charity to be serviceable to him who, if left to himself, would be lost; and another to allow human presumption to declare its aid necessary to him, who having received Christ's grace through faith, is already saved.

But there is yet another great difference which effectually separates the intercessory prayer of Christians from the mediation of a priesthood; namely, that its efficacy is not limited, or given especially, to the prayers of any one order of men: it is not the priest who is to pray for the people, but the ministers and the people who are to pray for each other; nay a peculiar stress is laid on the efficacy of the united prayers of many; so that we may assume that the prayers of the people are at least as important to the minister, as his prayers are to them.

Here, however, we shall be referred to that well-known passage in the epistle of St. James, which directs the sick to call in the elders of the church, and speaks of the elders praying over them and anointing them with oil in the name of the Lord, and of their being raised up by virtue of this prayer. Now here again a manifest distinction must be taken, between those elders who possessed the gift of healing, and others who have it not; it cannot be maintained that with regard to the especial subject there spoken of, the recovery, namely, of a sick person, a general conclusion follows as to the peculiar efficacy of the prayers of presbyters in all times, because they were peculiarly efficacious when

combined with the gift of healing. But I should be unwilling to limit the words of the Apostle entirely to bodily cures, or to the circumstances of the early church. I would allow, most readily, that they are of general and perpetual application, but their meaning makes against any priestly power in the clergy, rather than establishes it.

The object of the passage is to encourage the exercise of those mutual spiritual aids rendered by Christians to each other, which are one of the great objects and privileges of the institution of the Church. The body was to sympathize with its several members. If a man was in trouble, he was to pray; if in joy, to sing hymns: in neither case is the Apostle speaking of private prayer or private singing; but of those of the Christian congregation: there every individual Christian could find the best relief for his sorrows, and the liveliest sympathy in his joy. St. Paul's command, "Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep," applies to this same sympathy, which the prayers and hymns of the church services were a constant means of expressing. But if a man were sick and could not go to the congregation, still he was not to lose the benefit of his Christian communion with them; he might then ask them to come to him; and as the whole congregation could not thus be summoned, the elders were to go as its representatives, and their prayers were to take the place of the prayers of the whole church. Care, however, is taken to show that the virtue of their prayers arises not from their being priests, but from their being Christians, and standing in the place of the whole church. For these words immediately follow; "confess therefore to one another your sins, and pray for one another, that ye may be healed; there is much virtue in a just man's prayer, when it is offered earnestly." Now this most divine system of a living church, in which all were to aid each other, in which each man might open his heart to his neighbour, and receive the help of his prayers, and in which each man's earnest prayer, offered in Christ's name, had so high a promise of blessing annexed to it, has been most destroyed by that notion of a priesthood, which claiming that men should confess their sins to the clergy, not as to their brethren, but as to God's vicegerents, and confining the promised blessing to the prayers of the clergy as priests, not as Christians, nor as the representatives of the whole church, has changed the sympathy of a Christian society into the dominion of a priesthood and the mingled carelessness and superstition of a laity.

John's language agrees with that of James: "If any man see his brother sinning a sin which is not unto death, he shall pray, and Christ shall give him life, for those who are not sinning unto death. There is a sin unto death;—it is not for that that I am bidding him to pray."

Here the very same blessing which James speaks of as following the elder's prayers, is said by John to follow the prayer of any Christian: —a clear proof that the elders were sent for as the representatives of the church, and not as if their prayers possessed a peculiar virtue, because they stood as priests between God and the people.

Thus then we find much in Scripture which recognises high powers of government in the Christian church; but nothing which acknowledges a priesthood. The distinction is of immense importance, for from the covert intermixture of priesthood with government has followed the great corruption of the divine plan of the Christian church.

III. THE PRIMITIVE WRITERS.

THE chapter which I am now going to write is in truth superfluous. Although its particular object were proved ever so fully, yet this would be a less gain than loss, if any were by the nature of the argument encouraged to believe that we are to seek for our knowledge of Christianity any where else but in the Scriptures. What we find there is a part of Christianity, whether recognised as such or no in after ages ; what we do not find there is no part of Christianity, however early or however general may have been the attempts to interpolate it. If this be not so, we must change our religion and our Master: we can be no longer Christians, servants of Christ, instructed by him and his own Apostles; but Alexandrianists, Syrianists, Asianists, following the notions which happened to prevail in the Church according to the preponderance of particular local or temporary influences, and following as our master neither the wisdom of God, nor even the wisdom of men; but the opinions of a time and state of society, whose inferiority in all other respects is acknowledged,—and the guidance of individuals, not one of whom approaches nearly to that greatness which in the case of the great Greek philosophers made an implicit veneration for their decisions in some degree excusable.

If it could be shown that the unanimous voice of men eminent alike for goodness and for wisdom, had from the earliest times insisted upon some doctrine or practice not taught or commanded in the New Testament as an essential part of Christianity ; if it should appear that this doctrine or practice were in no way favourable to their own importance or interest; and if it could be shown, also, that it was not in accordance with the way of thinking prevalent in their age and country,—but could have commended itself to their minds by nothing but its intrinsic excellence,—then, indeed, the doctrine might be concluded to be reasonable, and the practice good: but the omission of all notice of them by our Lord and his Apostles would be a fact so unaccountable and so staggering, that the triumph of ecclesiastical tradition would be the destruction of all well grounded faith in the authenticity of our records of Christianity, nay it would involve in the most painful uncertainty the very truth of the Christian revelation. For if Christ and his Apostles

omitted any essential part of Christianity; if their revelation was not perfect; then the dispensation of the fulness of times must be sought for elsewhere: and the claim of Mohammedanism, that it is the perfecting of the earlier dispensations, the Jewish and Christian, ceases to be blasphemous. Or if it be said that the doctrine or practice in question were inculcated by Christ and his Apostles, although they are not noticed in the New Testament, then what is our security that other vital points have not been omitted in like manner in our epistles and gospels? And when we consider what the New Testament is; that it contains four detailed accounts of our Lord's life and teaching, one of which was written by his beloved disciple St. John; that it contains an account of the first propagation of Christianity by our Lord's Apostles; that it contains, farther, thirteen or fourteen epistles of St. Paul, written some to churches, some to individuals, and comprehending systematic views of what Christianity is; appeals innumerable to its motives, its hopes, and its consolations; exhortations innumerable to cling to its truths and to walk in its precepts, with specific mention of these truths and precepts;—when we consider, farther, that we have in the same Scriptures an epistle from St. James, the head of the church of Jerusalem, whose mind and views, humanly speaking, were least like those of St. Paul; and that we have epistles also from St. Peter and St. John, two of our Lord's very chiefest Apostles, and that these epistles are addressed to Christians generally, and dwell on those points of Christian faith and life which it was most essential to bear in mind; then if all these writers, all these great Apostles, in these long and varied writings, have omitted with one accord themselves, and have represented our Lord as omitting, any essential doctrine or practice of Christianity, how can we believe that they were indeed partakers of that Holy Spirit which was to guide them into all truth? How can we think that they were really empowered by God to be the preachers and authoritative teachers of his revelation?

Or, it may be said, that the New Testament refers only to the beginnings of the Gospel; that the new converts received, indeed, *τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα τῆς παιδείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ*,—such truths as were most indispensable, and without which they could not have been Christians at all; but that the full development of the system of Christianity was reserved for a later season; that the Scriptures themselves imply this, inasmuch as, in the epistle to the Hebrews, a distinction is expressly drawn between the first principles of the doctrine of Christ and the going on unto perfection, and the writer of that epistle complains that they whom he was addressing were not yet fit for this more perfect truth. That in this manner the doctrine of the Christian priesthood and of the mystic

virtue of the sacraments is not, indeed, fully developed in the New Testament, but was taught by the Apostles at the very close of their career, and received by the Church as their last and most perfect instruction, which was to complete the revelation of Christianity.

It has pleased God that of the peculiar teaching of the great majority of the Apostles we should know nothing; we cannot say with certainty what they taught individually at any period of their lives. But we can say positively that the latest teaching of St. Paul, St. Peter, and St. John, contained in it no more perfect revelation concerning the priesthood and the sacraments than they had made known at the beginning of the gospel. St. Paul's second espistle to Timothy must surely be considered as containing his latest views of Christianity; and as being addressed to one who was himself a teacher, it must have contained those views fully; it cannot be pretended that St. Paul had any doctrine too esoterical to be communicated to Timothy. But his latest epistle, amidst many differences of expression from his earlier writings, such as the lapse of years brings to all men, contains in substance the very same view of Christianity which we find in the epistles to the Thessalonians. Paul's gospel is still Christ's resurrection, God's free salvation, Christ's coming to judgment. He is still as averse as ever to strifes about words; he warns Timothy that the time will come when Christians shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables. He refers him to his past doctrine ever since Timothy first knew him, not as to an imperfect system, to which he was now going to add some great truth hitherto suppressed, but as that very system which he earnestly wished to save from corruption and interpolation. This was Paul's language at a period when he declares that he had finished his course on earth, and had only to enter into his reward.

As we learn Paul's latest sentiments from his second epistle to Timothy, so we learn those of Peter from his second epistle general. He too speaks of himself in that epistle as leaving to the church his dying admonition, as telling them the things which they might have always in remembrance after he was gone. Does this epistle contain that great doctrine of the priesthood and sacraments which, when he wrote his first epistle, the Church was too weak to bear? In that first epistle, having used the expression "that baptism saved Christians," he hastens at once to explain his meaning, lest any should understand him superstitiously; and says that he does not mean by baptism's saving us, that the bodily washing with water saves; but the answer of a good conscience towards God, when men in repentance and faith were admitted into the fellowship of Christ's redemption. His explanation is

clearly intended to draw off our attention from the outward rite to the moral state of the person receiving it: it was the repentance and faith of the person baptized, which through God's mercy in Christ, saved him; and not the outward rite of immersion in water. Now nothing is to be found in the second epistle which in any degree qualifies this: every word of his latest charge turns upon moral points; upon growth in all Christian graces, on improving to the utmost their knowledge of Christ. He speaks, indeed, of some who would soon introduce grievous heresies and corruptions of Christianity; but for himself he has nothing to add to his former teaching; he is only anxious that it should be remembered, and practically turned to account.

Christ's beloved disciple; he who lived so long that some of the brethren supposed that he was never to die at all; he who in an especial manner connects the first age of the Church with the second:—do his epistles, written evidently late in his life,—does his revelation, which so emphatically bears the character of a final declaration of God's will,—contain this supposed perfect doctrine of the priesthood and the sacraments? Not one word of either. Written to those who had an unction from the Holy One, and knew all things, to the Church of Christ, with no distinction of priest and layman, St. John's epistle contains no new commandment, but the same which the Church had received from the beginning: his gospel is Paul's gospel also; God's infinite love in Christ, Christ dying for us; faith working by love; holiness being the mark of God's people; sin the mark of false brethren. Of priesthoods, of one body of men ministering grace to the rest through certain outward rites which, unless administered by them, lose their efficacy, St. John, like St. Peter and St. Paul, says nothing. Something, indeed, he does say of the spirit of priestcraft, in order to condemn it; there was one Diotrephes who loved to exercise authority, and to cast out of the Church those of God's people who were strangers to his particular portion of it; and reproved those who knew better the largeness of Christian charity. But Diotrephes, the true prototype of priestly and fanatical presumption, is condemned by Christ's beloved Apostle, as prating against him with malicious words; as disobeying by his bigotry the authority of the loving apostles of Christ Jesus.

The latest writings, then, of these three great Apostles—Paul, Peter and John—contain no traces of any other more mysterious doctrines than they had received from our Lord, and taught to their first converts at the beginning of the gospel. And the expressions already alluded to in the epistle to the Hebrews, like the whole of that epistle, are, in fact, directly opposed to the notion of a more mystical Christianity, which was to be the reward of a due improvement of the first principles of

Christian knowledge already communicated. The "perfection" of which the writer speaks as opposed to the principles or the elementary doctrine of Christ, is an understanding that the law, its priesthood, and its sacrifices were no longer necessary, inasmuch as Christ, by his eternal priesthood and one sacrifice, had done effectually that work which they could but typically foreshadow. It is well known that the Jewish Christians still observed the ceremonial law; and the Apostles sanctioned this, not only to avoid unnecessary offence to the unbelieving Jews, but also because the converts themselves would have been shocked at the notion of renouncing it. Paul, however, and those who followed him, were well aware that this observance of the law was very apt to be coupled with a belief of its necessity in a spiritual point of view, and therefore they represent the full grown Christian as one who feels the unimportance of all Jewish ceremonies, and who places his whole reliance upon Christ. "Let us, as many as are perfect," says St. Paul to the Philippians, "be thus minded;" where his meaning is exactly the same with that of the epistle to the Hebrews, where he speaks of going on unto perfection. So far, then, was the perfection of Christian doctrine from consisting in the belief in a human priesthood, and in the mystic virtue of outward ordinances, that it was the very opposite of this, and consisted in clearly understanding that Christ's death and resurrection had rendered all priesthoods, sacrifices and ceremonies, for the time to come, unimportant. It was because this perfection was not generally attained to, because the minds of so many Christians could not embrace principles so pure, that the doctrine of the priesthood and the sacraments gradually made its way into the church, as the natural successor of Judaism. For when the Jewish temple and sacrifices were destroyed, those Christians who had till then regarded them as important parts of Christianity, were naturally led to substitute another priesthood and another sacrifice of the same sort in the place of those which they had lost: and as they had joined the Levitical priesthood with that of Christ, and the daily sacrifices of the law with his sacrifice, so afterwards, in the same spirit, they made a new priesthood out of the Christian ministry, and a new sacrifice out of the communion of the Lord's Supper.

It may be safely said, that whatever we find in the New Testament, as to a gradual communication of Christian truth, relates to this one point: that the disciples were to be led on gently to a full sense of the unimportance of the ceremonies of the Jewish law. Christianity was given complete, as to its own truths, from the beginning of the gospel: but the absolute sufficiency of these truths, and the needlessness of any other system as joined with them, was to be learned only by degrees;

and, unhappily, it never was learned fully. The perfection of which the epistle to the Hebrews speaks as not having been yet reached by those to whom the author was writing, was, by the great mass of the Church, never reached at all. The errors of the Judaizers continued, and assumed a shape far more mischievous; because the Judaism of the succession priesthood, and the sacrifice of the communion, did not, like the older Judaism, simply exist by the side of pure Christianity, but incorporated itself with Christianity, and destroyed Christian truths to substitute in the place of them its own falsehood.

Thus, then, as the Scriptures wholly disclaim these notions of a human priesthood, and as the perfection of knowledge to which they would have us aspire consists in rejecting such notions wholly; it is strictly superfluous to inquire into the opinions of early Christian writers, because, if these upheld the doctrine of the priesthood ever so strongly, it would but show that the state of mind of which the epistle to the Hebrews complains, was afterwards more universal and more remote from Christian perfection. But it is satisfactory to find that this was not so; that although the germs of the mischief may be here and there discernible, yet that the doctrine of the Apostles was in the main faithfully taught by those who, in point of time, came nearest to them; that it needed more than one generation to corrupt so deeply the perfect purity of Christian truth.

When that favourite expression with some, "the voice of Christian antiquity," is analyzed, it appears that, besides the writers of the New Testament, the first century and a half of the Christian era produced no more than ten writers, or, if we include Justin Martyr, eleven. These were all whom Jerom could discover, although he professes to give a complete list of the Christian writers from the earliest times, and even swells it with the names of Josephus, Philo-Judæus, Justus of Tiberias, who was also a Jewish writer, and L. Seneca.

The ten writers of Jerom's list are the following: Barnabas, Hermas, Clemens of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, Papias, Quadratus, Aristides, Agrippa, and Hegesippus. Of this number the works of the five last have perished, with the exception of a few passages preserved in quotations by other writers. But Quadratus and Aristides were only known to Jerom himself as the authors of two apologies in behalf of Christianity, addressed to the emperor Hadrian; and Agrippa's works were an answer to the heretic Basilides, of which it is not certain that it was extant in the time of Jerom. Of Polycarp and Ignatius, Jerom knew no other works than those which we still possess under their names; that is, Polycarp's epistle to the Philippians, and the seven epistles of Ignatius: 1, to the Ephesians; 2, to the Magnesians; 3, to

the Trallensians; 4, to the Romans; 5, to the Philadelphians; 6, to the Smyrnæans; 7, to Polycarp. Barnabas, also, and Hermas were known to Jerom only by the Epistle of the former, and by the Shepherd of the latter; both of which we possess. And the only undisputed work of Clemens, his epistle to the Corinthians, is also still in existence. The only important remains of Christian antiquity which Jerom possessed, and which are lost to us, are therefore the Apologies of Quadratus and Aristides, the Ecclesiastical History of Hegesippus, and Papias's five books, entitled "A setting forth of the Words of the Lord." *Εκθεσις λόγων Κυρίου.*

It is not my present purpose to inquire into the genuineness of the epistle of Barnabas, or of the other writings of the so-called Apostolical fathers. I am willing for the present to assume that they are genuine, because I wish to meet the advocates of the priesthood on their own ground; and I contend that their system can no more be derived from the reputed works of the earliest Christian writers, than from the Scriptures themselves. If there be no works remaining of the Christian writers of the first century and a half, it is idle to talk about a tradition running back to the very times of the Apostles; the links of the chain are wanting in the very most important part, and the wide gap between the Apostles and Justin Martyr must resist every attempt to connect the opinions of the end of the second century with the Christianity of the Apostolical age.

I. The epistle of Barnabas is directed mainly against the notions of the Judaizers. The writer is so earnest against the observance of the Jewish law by Christians, that he ascribes a figurative and spiritual meaning to all those passages in the Old Testament which enjoin the several ceremonies of the Jewish ritual. Even circumcision, he contends, meant the circumcision of the heart, and not the outward rite; and after stating an objection to this view of it, in the words of a supposed opponent, who observes, "that the Jews were circumcised as a seal of their covenant," he replies, "But the Syrians and Arabians, and the idol priests generally, use circumcision. Are they, also, then partakers of God's covenants?" A writer who would so little admit outward ceremonies as an essential part of the Jewish religion, was not likely to regard them as essential in Christianity. There is, accordingly, not a single word about any Christian ceremonial, whether of temple, priesthood, or offering; he knows nothing of the Eucharist as the unbloody sacrifice of the new law, to be offered only by the new priesthood; he only knows of the sacrifice once offered by Christ, of the whole Church as the spiritual temple of God. It is true he speaks of baptism under the name of "water," and applies it to several passages in the Old

Testament, which speak of "streams of water," "living springs," &c. And from these expressions, it might be supposed that he was laying a stress on the outward act of baptism. For instance, the following words might be quoted as identifying baptism with regeneration:— "We go down to the water full of sins and filthiness, and we come up with our hearts bringing forth fruit; having fear and hope towards Jesus through the Spirit." This, and other such passages serve admirably well, when quoted separately, to make it appear that Barnabas held the Judaizing notions of the mystical virtue of the sacraments; but when we compare his strong language, as to the utter worthlessness of the outward act of circumcision, and as to the circumcision of the heart being the only thing intended by the commandment, it is quite clear that, by parity of reasoning, the whole importance of baptism in his eyes must have consisted in the real change of heart which it implied, and the change of life of which it was the beginning; and that the ceremony of baptizing with water was merely a symbol of the great and important change which a man underwent in passing from a state of heathenism to Christianity. In this sense, baptism, as synonymous with an admission to the benefits and promises of the Christian Church, could not be spoken of too highly; it was truly the turning point of a man's whole existence from evil to good. And in the time of Barnabas, when the real change involved in the act of baptism was so striking, and the superstitions connected with it had not as yet had full time to grow up, any one might speak of it as Barnabas had spoken, without suspecting that his words could be misinterpreted. St. Peter himself says, "Baptism does now save us;" and it seems to me rather an instance of God's abundant goodness, to hinder the Scriptures from giving any countenance to the Judaizing superstitions, than a necessary caution on the writer's part to save himself from misinterpretation, when he adds expressly, "not the putting away the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God."

It should be always remembered, that the superstition of the Judaizers consists not in their reverence for the sacraments, which Christ appointed as great instruments of good to his Church; but in their having drawn off men's attention from the important part of both Baptism and the Lord's Supper to that which is external: to regard God's grace not as conveyed by them morally, because the joining Christ's Church in the first instance, and the constantly refreshing our communion with it afterwards, are actions highly beneficial to our moral nature; but as conveyed by them after the manner of a charm, the virtue being communicated by the water and the bread and wine, in consequence of a virtue first communicated to them by certain words of consecration pro-

nounced by a priest. It is the famous "accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum," which contains the essence of the unchristian and most mischievous view of the sacraments entertained by the Romish and Anglican popery. And, in order to show that the early Christian writers favour this notion, it is not enough to show that they speak strongly of the benefits of the sacraments; for in this the Scriptures and almost all true Christians would agree with them: but it must farther be made evident that they lay the stress on the virtue communicated by the outward elements, after those elements have been first consecrated by certain formal words repeated by a priest. Unless they can be proved to hold this, we may interpret their language rather as agreeing with that of Christ and his apostles, than as countenancing the superstition of the Judaizers.

From the epistle of Barnabas, I pass to that of Clemens Romanus.

II. There is nothing in Clemens, either on the subject of Baptism or of the Lord's Supper, or of a priesthood. But there are one or two passages which have been often quoted as asserting what is called apostolical succession; and these, therefore, it will be proper to examine. As before, in the case of the epistle of Barnabas, I am assuming the genuineness of the epistle of Clemens, and also its freedom from interpolation.

It is difficult, unfortunately, notwithstanding the length of this work, to learn from it with any clearness the exact nature of the circumstances to which it refers. It complains, indeed, largely of the mischiefs of quarreling and pride; but it does not state what was the occasion of quarrel, nor what were the views and objects of the party which disturbed the peace of the church. They are spoken of as a "few," ὀλίγα πρόσωπα; and they are blamed as "lifting themselves up over Christ's flock," ἐπαιρομένων ἐπὶ τὸ ποίμνιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, at the same time that they were disparaging the authority of the lawful elders of the Church. Some of the elders had been actually displaced, and for no fault of theirs; and those through whom they had been expelled had gained a great authority in their room. These last Clemens exhorts to give up their power, to do the bidding of the congregation, τὰ προστασσόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους, and to imitate the example of many worthy kings and rulers of the Gentiles, who had left their own countries, rather than be the occasion of contention or civil war.

All this is to us exceedingly vague, it reminds us something of the tyrants of the old Greek commonwealths, establishing themselves on the overthrow of the old aristocracies. It bears some resemblance to the picture drawn by St. Paul of his Judaizing opponents in this very church of Corinth, who depreciated or denied his authority, and tram-

pled themselves upon the mass of the congregation with the utmost insolence, II. Corinth, xi. 20. It would perfectly suit an attempt made on the part of one or two ambitious individuals to establish the despotism of a single bishop, instead of the mild authority of the whole body of elders: for certain it is that Clement, like St. Paul, recognises no one bishop, in the later sense of the term, as ruling the church of Corinth; the government is vested in a certain number of bishops or elders, called indifferently by either name, who, together with the inferior ministers, *διάκονοι*, or in the language of the Athenian constitution, *ὑπήρεται*, constitute all the officers of the Christian society.

With this uncertainty as to the precise nature of the disturbance in the Corinthian church, we cannot tell with what extent or with what limits to understand the particular passage of Clement's epistle, which is supposed to uphold the doctrine of the so-called apostolical succession. He refers to the minute rules of the Jewish Church; to its division of offices, and its stated seasons and places of worship; and he infers from this, that each man in the Christian Church should keep his own station and order with equal strictness. The Apostles, he says, appointed everywhere the first bishops and deacons, *ἐπισκόπους καὶ διακόνους*, in the several churches which they founded. They wished to obviate disputes about the government, and therefore they not only appointed the first bishops and deacons, but also appointed a succession, *ἐπινομήν*, that when the first bishops were dead, other tried men should succeed to their office. "Those, then," proceeds Clement, "who were appointed by the Apostles, or afterwards, *μεταξὺ*, by other tried and approved men, *ἐλλογίμων*, with the consent of the whole church; those who ministered unblamably to Christ's flock with humility, gently, and in no spirit of sordid gain, *ἀβαναύσως*, and whose worth has many times been attested by the whole Church, these we think are not justly expelled from their ministry; for it will be no small sin to us, if they who unblamably and holily offered their gifts to God, be cast out from their bishoprics." Such is the famous passage in which Clement is supposed to maintain the indefeasible right of bishops appointed by apostolical succession to exercise government over the Church for ever.

It is manifest, in the first place, that Clement's words are not general and prospective, but had reference to a particular case actually before him. He was thinking of something present and special, and had evidently no thought of laying down a general law for all times and places. Now, I am very far from saying that the words of a wise man, on a particular case, cannot contain any truth of general application; of course they can and generally do: but as he did not utter them as ge-

neral, their bearing on any universal truth is indirect rather than direct; that is, we may conclude that he would have applied them generally, so far as the particular case before him was a faithful representative of all future cases; but if it differed in any remarkable points from future cases, then we have no right to make them general; in other words, we have no right to make him draw the same conclusion, where the premises are manifestly different.

Now the premises in Clement's case lead justly enough, assuming them for the present to be true in fact, to his conclusion. Good elders appointed by worthy men, who had themselves been appointed by the Apostles, appointed with the consent of the whole church, whose worth the whole church had often attested, and who had discharged their ministry unblamably, gently, and uncorruptly, ought not to be deprived of their office. I am not aware that the strongest opponent of priestly tyranny would refuse his hearty assent to this proposition of Clement.

But now, instead of Clement's own premises let us substitute others. "Bad and foolish elders, appointed by others neither wiser nor better, which others derived their own appointment from no purer source—proud and foolish elders, in whose appointment the whole church had had no voice at all, nor had ever attested their worth, but felt their evil—elders who had discharged their office offensively, arrogantly, rapaciously,"—shall there be no power in the church to deprive such of their office, and to commit the power which they abuse, and have long abused, to other hands? Or, is Clement's conclusion still to hold, although of the premises from which he derived it, there is not left in this new case a single one remaining?

It must not be denied, however, that a comparison which Clement uses in this part of his epistle, may seem to imply that he regarded the government of the Church as a thing fixed once for all, and not to be altered under any circumstances. He refers to the selection of the family of Aaron to hold the priest's office, as a parallel case to the appointment of the first bishops by the Apostles; and as the priesthood remained in Aaron's family to the end of the Jewish dispensation, without any reference to the worthiness of the individuals of that family in any one generation, so it might be argued that, in Clement's notions, the personal worthiness or unworthiness of the individual bishops had nothing to do with the question; their right to govern the Church was derived solely from their Apostolical succession.

Now if Clement had been arguing in the abstract against the right of deposing any bishop or elder, and had then referred to the law of the Jewish priesthood, there could have been no doubt as to his meaning. But this is precisely one of those points in which the particular

occasion of his argument makes his meaning, as to the general applicability of his comparison, doubtful. If he felt that bishops or elders had been factiously and unjustly deposed, when they had been appointed to their office either immediately by the Apostles, or at only one remove, by those who had themselves received their office from the Apostles, the deposition of such men so appointed could not but seem to him an interference with a divine authority; and he would have looked upon their power, so unjustly assailed, as resting on God's ordinance, as much as the exclusive possession of the priesthood by the family of Aaron.

But it is impossible to argue justly from this passage, that if Clement had lived fifteen or sixteen centuries later, and had seen the bishops of the Church in a wholly different position from that of the bishops of the church of Corinth, he would have equally maintained their indefeasibility, and considered the Levitical priesthood an exactly parallel case. For the continuance of the priesthood in the same family was not a consequence simply of the original divine appointment of Aaron, but followed from the universal notion of the eastern world, and of much of the western, that priesthoods must be hereditary. God appointed Moses to be the prophet and ruler of his people, and Moses after him appointed Joshua; but the divine appointment went no farther, because the prophets' and judges' offices were not necessarily to depend upon succession, and the Israelites were not bound to choose for their judges the posterity of either Moses or Joshua. Now the Christian ministry would undoubtedly resemble the judges and prophets of the Israelites rather than their priests: and therefore an original divine appointment would not imply the necessity of a perpetual succession. The succession here would, as to its divine authority, die out naturally in the course of time, just as the Roman lawyers held that collateral consanguinity expired in the eighth generation; it being impossible to suppose that the virtue of the original descent from a common ancestor could exist beyond that period. Thus, the elders appointed immediately or at one or two removes, by the Apostles, might truly be said to hold their offices, like Joshua, by divine appointment; and they might as truly be said to have been chosen by God, as Aaron was chosen to be the priest, rather than a man of any other family or any other tribe. And the reason why the succession was not to be perpetual in the case of the judge of Israel and the Christian bishops was this, that unless each generation was as highly gifted by God as Moses and Joshua, or as the Christian Apostles, the wisdom of their original choice of successors would be impaired continually by fresh mixtures of human folly or passion; so that, as in the case of collateral consan-

neral, their bearing on any universal truth is indirect rather than direct; that is, we may conclude that he would have applied them generally, so far as the particular case before him was a faithful representative of all future cases; but if it differed in any remarkable points from future cases, then we have no right to make them general; in other words, we have no right to make him draw the same conclusion, where the premises are manifestly different.

Now the premises in Clement's case lead justly enough, assuming them for the present to be true in fact, to his conclusion. Good elders appointed by worthy men, who had themselves been appointed by the Apostles, appointed with the consent of the whole church, whose worth the whole church had often attested, and who had discharged their ministry unblamably, gently, and uncorruptly, ought not to be deprived of their office. I am not aware that the strongest opponent of priestly tyranny would refuse his hearty assent to this proposition of Clement.

But now, instead of Clement's own premises let us substitute others. "Bad and foolish elders, appointed by others neither wiser nor better, which others derived their own appointment from no purer source—proud and foolish elders, in whose appointment the whole church had had no voice at all, nor had ever attested their worth, but felt their evil—elders who had discharged their office offensively, arrogantly, rapaciously,"—shall there be no power in the church to deprive such of their office, and to commit the power which they abuse, and have long abused, to other hands? Or, is Clement's conclusion still to hold, although of the premises from which he derived it, there is not left in this new case a single one remaining?

It must not be denied, however, that a comparison which Clement uses in this part of his epistle, may seem to imply that he regarded the government of the Church as a thing fixed once for all, and not to be altered under any circumstances. He refers to the selection of the family of Aaron to hold the priest's office, as a parallel case to the appointment of the first bishops by the Apostles; and as the priesthood remained in Aaron's family to the end of the Jewish dispensation, without any reference to the worthiness of the individuals of that family in any one generation, so it might be argued that, in Clement's notions, the personal worthiness or unworthiness of the individual bishops had nothing to do with the question; their right to govern the Church was derived solely from their Apostolical succession.

Now if Clement had been arguing in the abstract against the right of deposing any bishop or elder, and had then referred to the law of the Jewish priesthood, there could have been no doubt as to his meaning. But this is precisely one of those points in which the particular

occasion of his argument makes his meaning, as to the general applicability of his comparison, doubtful. If he felt that bishops or elders had been factiously and unjustly deposed, when they had been appointed to their office either immediately by the Apostles, or at only one remove, by those who had themselves received their office from the Apostles, the deposition of such men so appointed could not but seem to him an interference with a divine authority; and he would have looked upon their power, so unjustly assailed, as resting on God's ordinance, as much as the exclusive possession of the priesthood by the family of Aaron.

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guinity, all its virtue must necessarily be lost after the lapse of a certain interval of time. This is the plain analogy and reason which makes it probable that Clement would not have considered any bishops of the Church, after the lapse of a century, to be the successors of the Apostles, except so far as they resembled them in their lives and doctrine.

Nothing is less satisfactory than an argumentum ad hominem; and therefore I have chosen to consider this passage of Clement with a view simply to the truth of the case, and not merely to the silencing or embarrassing an adversary. Otherwise it is most true that the actual episcopacy of the Christian Church, for many centuries, can derive no support from the epistle of Clement. An aristocracy and a monarchy are not so precisely identical that the government of a single bishop can claim to be of divine authority, because the Apostles appointed in each church a certain number of bishops or elders. Nor can it be shown that if the ordination by bishops, one or more, be necessary, the consent of the whole church, which was no less a part of the primitive appointments, may be laid aside, as a thing wholly indifferent. But it is a poor triumph merely to expose an opponent's inconsistencies: it is far better to show simply that Clement's words—1, grew out of a particular occasion; 2, that the bishops to whose deposition he objected were good men, who had discharged their office well, and who had been appointed with the consent of the whole church; 3, that they were really and bona fide the Apostles' successors, being no farther removed from them than the virtue of the Apostles' original choice might fairly be supposed to reach; 4, that the virtue of that choice necessarily dying out in time, it can never be proved that he who upheld its authority when it really existed, would therefore imagine it to exist when it was really lost; and 5, that the cases of Moses and Joshua, and the essential difference between a priesthood and an office of prophet or ruler, make it clear that indefeasible succession does not flow from an original divine appointment in the latter case, because it accompanied it in the former.

Finally, it must be remembered that Clement speaks of the Christian ministers as bishops and elders, not as priests. It is not a little curious that, just at that period when the notion of original Apostolical appointment could no longer be applied to make out a virtual succession for the Christian ministers as prophets or rulers, their office began to be represented as a priesthood; that so the succession which was inapplicable to them in their real character, might be claimed for them under this new and unchristian title.

III. The "Shepherd" of Hermas contains no mention of the Lord's

Supper, nor of a priesthood, nor of a succession of ministers, nor of a mystical virtue communicated to the elements in the sacraments by a certain form of words. Baptism, as the admission into the Christian Church, and as equivalent to the obtaining a knowledge of Christ, is indeed strongly insisted on in a remarkable passage, in which Hermas says that the Apostles after their deaths went down into the place of the dead, and preached there to the good men of former ages, and taught them the name of the Lord Jesus, and baptized them; and that then, having received the seal of the Son of God, they arose perfect and fit for God's kingdom. "For," says Hermas, "they had died full of righteousness, and in a state of great purity, only they had not received this seal." I am far from saying that there is not some superstition involved in this; but still the notion is, that the knowledge of the name of Christ was necessary, the seal of which is baptism: the stress is laid on the knowing Christ, and belonging to his Church, not on the mere outward rite of baptizing by water.

IV. The pure and simple epistle of Polycarp is as free from all taint of the corrupt doctrine of a priesthood, and the mystical virtue of the sacraments as those of the Apostles themselves. He dwells on the relative duties of the several members of the Christian Church, and calls upon the younger men to abstain from all evil lusts, and to be subject to their elders and deacons as unto God and Christ. So St. Paul had desired slaves to obey their masters, and wives to be subject to their own husbands, as unto the Lord. But this is very different from the exaggerated language of Ignatius, and the pretended Apostolical constitutions; and the obedience to the elders and deacons is clearly connected, in Polycarp's mind, with the obedience to the law of Christ which they taught, as opposed to the evil lusts from which he wishes all Christian people to turn aside.

V. The epistle of Ignatius to the Romans, assuming as before its genuineness, and not entering into the question whether the longer or the shorter version of it be the original, contains nothing that bears directly on our present subject. One passage, however, may be noticed, as showing that Ignatius understood aright the language of our Lord recorded in John vi., respecting the eating his flesh, and the drinking his blood. "I have no pleasure," says Ignatius, "in corruptible food, nor in this life's pleasures: my wish is for the bread of God, the bread of heaven, the bread of life, that is, the flesh of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who became afterwards of the seed of David and of Abraham. And the drink which I desire is his blood, which is love incorruptible and life eternal."

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Now it should be remembered that Ignatius, in the whole of this

epistle, is breathing an earnest desire for martyrdom. He is impatient to arrive at Rome that he may be torn to pieces by the wild beasts, and so may be for ever with Christ. It is impossible then that he can have thought of the communion of the Lord's Supper, when he speaks of the body and blood of Christ: he speaks rather of that perfect communion with Christ in heaven, of which the Lord's Supper was intended, amongst other things, to be the symbol.

It has been one of the most pernicious of all corruptions of Scripture, to understand certain passages as referring to the sacraments, which refer really to those things of which the sacraments are the signs. They are therefore coordinate with the sacraments, pointing in word, as the sacraments do in emblematic action, to the same reality; but not subordinate to the sacraments, nor by any means pointing to them as to the reality, which is something distinct from them and above them.

When our Lord declares, "Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day; for my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed," it is evident that here is the self-same truth contemplated which our Lord had also in view when he said, "Take eat, this is my body:" and, "Drink ye all of this, for this is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." There is the self-same truth contemplated, namely, that the closest possible communion of the soul with Christ, and the making him, in all his various relations of Prophet, King, Saviour, and Lord, the soul's daily food, was essential to man's salvation. This great truth our Lord expressed, according to his usual manner, in figurative words; he expressed it also in figurative action. He not only said, "My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed," but he embodied the words in action; he commanded us to eat as it were his flesh, and to drink his blood, in the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper. But to suppose that the stress was laid on the literal eating of the bread and drinking of the cup, that by that figurative act the great moral reality which it imaged forth symbolically would be ipso facto attained, is a misrepresentation precisely of the same kind as that which he so strongly condemns in his disciples, when they understood his words, to beware of the leaven of the Pharisees, as a charge to beware literally of a particular sort of bread.

Thus again, the summary of the tenth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians, as given in our English Bibles, runs thus: "The Jews' sacraments types of ours." Here is the self-same error, of making the outward rites or facts of the Jewish religion *subordinate* to the outward rites of ours, instead of regarding them both as *coordinate with one another*, and *subordinate* to some spiritual reality, of which

both alike are but signs. In the passage referred to, St. Paul is showing that outward rites are no security for the existence of the real thing which they typify. Christians have been baptized with water, as an introduction into Christ's service; the Israelites passed through water also, as an introduction to their becoming God's people and receiving his law. Christians eat bread and drink wine, in token of their being united to their Lord and Saviour; and so the Israelites ate manna and drank of the rock, that manna and rock representing Christ their Lord, who was with them on all their way, just as the bread and the wine of the Lord's Supper represent him now. But Israel, notwithstanding these outward tokens of their belonging to God and depending on him, sinned and fell; and notwithstanding our outward tokens, the same may be our case if we are not watchful. It is altering the whole scope of the passage to say that it represents the Jews' sacraments as types of ours; as if our sacraments, any more than theirs, were necessarily or in themselves a reality. The drift of the passage is not to magnify the sacraments, but to prevent us from superstitiously trusting to them. The Jews had their sacraments, as we have ours, and both are types of the same thing; but the type in their case did not prevent them from forfeiting the substance, neither will it in ours.

So again, when St. John records so earnestly his beholding the blood and water flowing out from Christ's side, and when in his epistle, in manifest allusion to the same thing, he says, "This is he who came by water and blood, even Jesus Christ; not by water only, but by water and blood:" it makes the whole difference between Christianity and the great corruption of it, whether we understand these words as *coordinate with* Baptism and the Lord's Supper, or as *subordinate to* them; whether we say that they refer to the two sacraments, or that they refer to those great truths which the two sacraments also were designed to image forth in emblematic action; that repentance towards God, and faith in the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, are the sum and substance of Christianity.

Finally, the memorable words of our Lord himself to Nicodemus, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God," contain, perhaps, the same figure in words that Baptism contains in action, although even this is not certain, but are not meant to refer to the outward rite of Baptism as the thing *indispensable*. They are coordinate with Baptism, it may be, but not subordinate to it. The same obvious reason which led the Jews, in common with many other people, to adopt the right of washing the body as symbolical of the washing or cleansing of the soul from sin, led our Lord to express this cleansing of the soul by the term "water." A man

must repent of his past evil life, and receive the grace of the Holy Spirit to enable him for the future to lead a new life, before he can enter into the kingdom of heaven. And if I am asked why I do not take the word "water" literally, according to Hooker's canon of criticism, when he says that "in the interpretation of Holy Scripture, that sense which is nearest the letter is commonly the safest," I answer, that such a canon, as applied to a collection of works, so different in point of style as those of the Scriptures, is at once ridiculous. In the simple narratives of the historical books, Hooker's rule will hold; in the prophetical and poetical books, it would be the very worst rule that we could follow. Now, our Lord's discourses, as recorded by St. John, are eminently parabolical; his language, both when speaking to the Jews and to his own disciples, is continually figurative. Hence the mingled surprise and pleasure of his disciples, when, towards the close of his last conversation with them, he dropped his usual style, and expressed himself without any figure. "Lo! now speakest thou plainly, and speakest no proverb." He spake of water to the woman of Samaria, and she adopting Hooker's rule, understood him literally: "Lord, give me this water, that I thirst not neither come hither to draw." Was this, indeed, the true sense of his words; or was it so utterly mistaken as to lead to the extreme of folly and profaneness? And yet, some think, that to interpret in a similar manner his words to Nicodemus is neither foolish nor profane, but rather that to interpret them otherwise is to explain away the words of Scripture! Explaining away the words of Scripture! when we make them refer to something spiritual and not bodily; to a reality, not to a symbol; to a moral act, not to a ceremony!

But why should we scruple to understand our Lord's words of water, literally, when we know that he did on one occasion tell a blind man to go and wash in the pool of Siloam; and that the man went, and washed, and came seeing? This, too, is one of Hooker's comparisons, in that same fifth book of his Ecclesiastical Polity from which so many unwise and unfair arguments have been quoted as the words of impartiality and wisdom. Is it in the slightest degree a parallel case, that because a bodily application was prescribed as a cure for a bodily disease, it should therefore cure a disease of the soul? It is idle to say that we do not understand the laws of body and spirit, and that God can affect both our bodies and spirits by whatever kind of instruments he chooses. The argument from human ignorance, most just and useful within certain limits, is by fanatics often used so awkwardly as to lead to the conclusions of the wildest scepticism. It is true that we understand very little of the laws of body and spirit, still the very notions of body and spirit imply a wide difference between them; and so far as

we do know or understand of either, our knowledge is derived from different sciences, and we find them to be subjected to different laws. If there is no truth in all this; if we do not know enough to warrant us in saying that wisdom is not to be gained by bodily exercise, nor charity, by eating any particular kind of food, then we have no grounds for knowing or believing anything; least of all can we think that we are living in the world of the God of truth and love, if we have no grasp upon truth whatsoever, and have no means by which we may reasonably assure ourselves even that God is.

But not to wander into any more remote inquiry, it is sufficient for the present to say that the Scriptures fully recognise the authority of what may be called our common-sense notions of good and evil, of reasonableness and absurdity. And when fanaticism, striving to render all truth uncertain, that so its own falsehoods may have the better chance of being received, and pushing to extravagance the famous sentiment of Pascal, "La raison confond les dogmatistes," would endeavour to persuade us, that we can have no sure reliance either on the evidence of our senses or of our reason, that we do not know what is or what is not; our answer will be, that our convictions do not rest on any fond presumption as to our own power of discerning truth, but on our faith that God will not suffer us to be deceived by trusting to his appointed witnesses. Truth in itself we have, it may be, no power to grasp: it may be possible, if you will, that in another state of being, the surest conclusions of our senses and of our reason may be found to have been abstractedly erroneous. But in the meanwhile, in this our present state of being, they are true to us; they are the language to which God has adapted our present nature. By distrusting it, we shall disobey him and be lost in endless error; by believing it, we shall resign ourselves to his guidance, and shall attain, if not truth in itself, yet that only image of truth of which we are capable here, and by which alone we can be made capable of arriving at real truth hereafter. It is not rationalism, then, but reason resting on faith, which assures us of the utter incapability of any outward bodily action to produce in us in an inward spiritual effect.

1. Epistle of Ignatius to the Ephesians.—In this epistle, we find a marked distinction between the bishop or superintendent, ἐπίσκοπος, and πρεσβυτέριον, or the body of elders; whereas, in Clement's epistle, as well as in those of St. Paul, ἐπίσκοπος and πρεσβύτερος are synonymous terms. There are also several passages, enjoining obedience to the bishop and to the body of elders; and in one place Ignatius says, "Ye should regard your bishop as the Lord himself." Ignat. ad Ephes. vi. But our Lord had said to his disciples, "He that receiveth you re-

ceiveth me;" and St. Paul had said, even with regard to the Heathen magistracies, "Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." St. Paul, also, as we have seen, enjoins Christians no less earnestly to obey those who were set over them; and that Christianity recognises a power of government in the Church, and requires of all individual Christians that they should be obedient to those invested with this government, we have already shown at large. But government is not priesthood, and neither these passages of Ignatius, nor those quoted before from St. Paul, contain one word to show that the bishops and elders of the Christian Church were priests as well as rulers.

It may be worth our while, however, to see what it was which induced Ignatius thus strongly to urge the duty of obedience to the bishop and the elders; because, if we understand this rightly, we shall find much excuse, at any rate, for certain strong expressions, which otherwise, taken apart from the context, and as meant merely to convey a high notion of the episcopal dignity, breathe a language very different from that of St. Peter and St. Paul. Every great reform which has taken place in human society has contained, among its nominal advocates, men who are morally the extreme opposites of each other; some being the very best and noblest of their kind, and others the vilest. And it is these last who explain the otherwise monstrous fact, that among the opponents of every reform, there are to be found also, along with the lowest and most wicked of mankind, some few of the loftiest and the purest; men who look at the evil supporters of the reform, and for their sakes dread it and abhor it. Now even Christianity itself shared this common lot of all great moral changes; perfect as it was in itself, its nominal adherents were often neither wise nor good, but took part with it for its negative side, not for its positive: advocating it so far as it destroyed what was already in existence, but having no sympathy with that better state of things which it proposed to set up in the room of the old. For when the Church began to show its wide range of action, and its singular efficacy, all who longed to see the existing system overthrown, rallied themselves round its assailant. Here they thought, was a power which they could use for the accomplishment of their purpose; when this should have first cleared the ground of the thickets which encumbered it, it would be for them to sow in the vacant soil their own favourite seed.

Now, let any one who knows what the Roman empire was in the first century of the Christian era, imagine to himself the monstrous forms of opinion and practice which a state of society so diseased could not fail to engender. All varieties of ancient and foreign super-

stition existed, together with the worst extremity of unprincipled scepticism; while in practice the unequalled barbarism of the ruder provinces, and the selfish cruelty fostered by long and bloody civil wars, had provided a fearful mass of the fiercer passions; and the unrestrained dissoluteness of a thoroughly corrupt society was a source no less abundant of everything most shameless in sensuality. These seemingly incongruous evils, superstition and scepticism, ferocity and sensual profligacy, when, from any particular circumstances, they turned against the monster society which had bred them, and began to seek its destruction, often sheltered themselves under the name of Christianity, and were the heresies of the first age of the Christian Church.

That this was so would be, I think, sufficiently proved by that well-known passage of Tacitus in which he describes the Christians as "per flagitia invisos," and their system as one amongst things "atrocia et pudenda." Tac. Ann. xv. 44. We know full well that Tacitus would not have applied such language to true Christians, and to true Christianity. We know that no wise and good heathen ever did apply such terms to either. But Tacitus's testimony, and the very fact itself that the Christian name was generally odious, as connected with all manner of wickedness, are quite sufficient to prove that there were nominal Christians, whose rites and whose practices were at once licentious and dangerous to public order; who formed a secret society, fraught with mischief to the morals of individuals, no less than to the tranquility of the state.

We are not left, however, to the mere testimony of Tacitus; the highest Christian authorities confirm the same thing. These combined features, sensual profligacy and lawless turbulence, appear exactly in the portraits of the heretical Christians drawn by St. Jude, and by St. Peter in his second epistle. Nor does the disputed genuineness of these two writings affect the question, for whether written by Apostles or no, it has never been doubted that they are the works of Christians in the first century; and that is sufficient for our purpose. The account given by Eusebius of the gross licentiousness of the Nicolaitans, agreeing with the strong language used concerning them in the Revelation, is another evidence to the same effect. I think also that the same thing is implied in the first epistle of St. Peter. Twice in that epistle he admits that the heathens spoke against Christians as evil doers; and he by no means denies altogether the truth of the charge, but rather urges those to whom he was writing to show that in their case it was false. His question, "Who is he that will harm you, if ye become γένησθε, followers of that which is good?" and his saying, "Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or thief, or evil doer," 1 Peter,

iii. 13; iv. 15.; appear to show that a portion at least of the sufferings of persons calling themselves Christians, had been really the just consequence of their crimes: and it is remarkable that here, too, the command "to abstain from fleshly lusts," is followed immediately by the command "to obey the laws and government," 1 Peter ii. 11, 13; as if the Apostle was regarding the very same characters who are described in his second epistle,—men at once licentious and anarchical.

In Paul's epistles, we find no less frequent indication that there existed many within the Church, whose principles and lives were altogether unchristian. The well-known passage in 2 Timothy iii. 1—8, refers, indeed, rather to a time immediately following than to one past or present; still it was verified before the close of the first century. But the union of superstition and profligacy is described as a thing actually existing in the Church in the epistle to the Philippians, iii. 18, 19, and again in the epistle to the Galatians, vi. 12, 13; and it appears above all in the Judaizers, so often referred to in the epistles to the Corinthians. It is evident, too, from the peculiar language twice used in declaring the sinfulness of licentious pleasure, "Be not deceived,"—"He therefore that despiseth, despiseth not man but God," 1 Corinthians, vi. 9; 1 Thessalonians, iv. 8; that there were some who would not listen to the Apostle in this matter, and who tried to persuade their fellow Christians that he was imposing on them a yoke needlessly rigid. Finally, the corrupters of true Christianity, whom Titus was sent to Crete to check, were vain talkers and deceivers, giving heed to Jewish fables and human traditions, and at the same time denying God in their lives, and being "abominable," βδελυκτοί, "and to every good work reprobate," ἀδόκιμοι,—"of no account and worthless." Titus, i. 10—16.

These passages might be greatly multiplied, but what has already been quoted is sufficient for our purpose. A great point is gained, when we understand that the heresies condemned by the Apostles were not mere erroneous opinions on some theoretical truth, but absolute perversions of Christian holiness; that they were not so much false as wicked. And further, where there was a false opinion in the heresy, it was of so monstrous a character, and so directly connected with profligacy of life, that it admits of no comparison with the so-called heresies of later ages. What should we think of men professing themselves to be Christians, and yet maintaining, as did the Docetæ, that Christ never really died or really rose, or asserting that the resurrection was past already; that is, that in the sense of a rising from the grave to eternal life there was no resurrection at all?

These opinions and principles, and this practice, existed in the early

Church, in open defiance of the authority of the Apostles. In the Arian controversy, and in all others which have since arisen among Christians, the question has turned upon the true interpretation of the Apostles' words; but both parties have alike acknowledged that what the Apostles taught was to be received as the undoubted rule of faith and of action. Not so, however, the real heretics of the first century. St. Paul is continually arguing against adversaries, with whom his bare authority, it is evident, would have weighed nothing. How strong is his expression to Timothy, "All they that are in Asia are turned away from me," 2 Tim. i. 15: they have followed another view of Christianity as better than mine. And again, in matters of government, we see that Diotrephes, a man evidently of no mean rank in the Church, openly set at nought the authority of St. John, 3 John, 9. Thus it appears that we were in danger, humanly speaking, of having a Christian Church, a society of men baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus, who yet did not acknowledge the authority of Christ's Apostles, and who believed and practised things most opposite to the principles and revelations of true Christianity.

It was therefore no vain superstition, and no wish to establish a priestly dominion, which led Ignatius to insist strongly on agreement with and obedience to the bishop, or which had induced Clement to press the importance of not displacing those elders who had been appointed directly or at one remove by the Apostles themselves. And the view here taken will also account for the otherwise irrelevant language which accompanies such exhortations to obedience. It explains why Polycarp should speak of being subject to the elders and deacons in close connexion with his charge to abstain from fleshly lusts. *Καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀνακύπτεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ὅτι πᾶσα ἐπιθυμία κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος στρατεύεται . . . . Διὸ δέον ἀπέχεσθαι ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων, ὑποτασσομένους τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις καὶ διακόνοις, ὡς Θεῷ καὶ Χριστῷ.* Polycarp, ad Philipp. v. Compare our Lord's words with regard to the Scribes and Pharisees:—"The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat: all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do." Matthew, xxiii. 2, 3. That is, "they are teachers of a true revelation from God, and whatever they bid you observe in their teaching, that do, without regard to the bad characters of those who so teach you." That our Lord directed obedience to them only so far as they taught the commandments of Moses, is clear from this, that he did not obey them himself in those usages which they had engrafted on the law of Moses by their own sole authority. And so Polycarp's command to the young Christians to be subject to their elders and deacons, and to abstain from fleshly lusts, has a direct reference to

them as teachers of genuine Christianity, which condemned such indulgences, in opposition to many heretical teachers, and to the general opinion of the heathen world, which regarded them with indifference.

The same reason for enforcing obedience to the bishop appears in the epistle of Ignatius to the Ephesians. The bishop of that church, at the time when this epistle was written, was Onesimus, of whom, personally, Ignatius speaks in very high terms. He commends also Burrhus, a deacon of the same church, together with Crocus, Euplus, and Fronto, all of them probably holding some station in the government of it. Now, if Ignatius remembered how Paul himself had complained that all they who were in Asia (i. e., the Roman province so called, of which Ephesus was one of the principal cities) were turned away from him, and how especially he had commissioned Timotheus to purify the government of the Ephesian church, in order to stop the spreading of false and mischievous principles; what wonder is it that, seeing now such a bishop and such a government as he thoroughly approved of, he should urge the church to the closest union with them, and the strictest obedience to their instructions, as the readiest way of abiding and advancing in the true path of Christian holiness?

Thus, when he speaks of Onesimus as praising the orderliness of the Ephesians,—that they lived according to truth, and that no sect following falsehood dwelt among them, he adds, Ignat. ad Ephes. vi., "For some are wont to carry about their name," (their name of Christians), "falsely and deceitfully, doing deeds unworthy of God: these ye should shun as wild beasts; for they are mad dogs, biting before men are aware: and ye should beware of these, for their madness is hard to cure." And again, "Even your deeds of a fleshly sort are all spiritual, for ye do all things in Jesus Christ; but I know that some have gone aside from that right way, and have an evil doctrine." Ignat. ad Ephes. vii. viii. ix.

This also explains the earnest desire manifested by Ignatius, that the Church should go on in unity. Parties existed bearing the name of Christians, but only serving by their monstrous principles and evil lives to bring that name into dishonour. How closely, then, ought all real Christians to hold together, lest their whole society should fall to pieces. But to the Church, or society of Christians, God's promises were given; Christianity was not meant to be held by a multitude of isolated individuals, but where the lawful government and the majority of a society are, there is the society itself. Hence the strong expression of Ignatius: "Let no man be misled: if a man be not within the altar, he fails of obtaining the bread of God. For if the prayer of one or two be of such force, how much more that of the bishop, and of the

whole church? He, then, who joins not with the rest of the church, he, we may be sure, is proud; . . . . . for it is written, 'God resisteth the proud.' Let us be careful then not to resist our bishop, that we may be subject to God." Ignat. ad Ephes. v. We should particularly observe the stress here laid on the prayers of a great number, which is just like the language of St. Paul. 2 Cor. i. 11; iv. 15. But it is quite inconsistent with a system of priestcraft, where the numbers of the people signify nothing, but the virtue is supposed to reside in the prayers of the priest. And although the language here used by Ignatius was very liable to abuse, and although Cyprian, and still more the Church writers of later times, have abused it most palpably, yet still as used by Ignatius himself, it really contains nothing objectionable, if we only take the pains to understand the circumstances of the case. He saw the Church falling to pieces by the formation of various parties whose principles and practice were alike unchristian. The bishops appointed either immediately or at one remove by the Apostles were upholding the authority of the Apostles' doctrine, and endeavoring to enforce it. Around them, therefore, was the true Church gathered. Here was a genuine apostolical succession; and to this Church, governed by these bishops, Ignatius earnestly exhorts all Christians to adhere, as separation from it was either abandoning Christianity altogether, and substituting in the place of it some monstrous system of error and wickedness; or else it was the indulgence of individual pride or unsocial temper, in separating from the Christian society, and forming a religion for themselves individually. And if the bishops now had been virtually selected by the Apostles, as men on whom they could depend; or if they were the only teachers who taught true Christianity now, while other ministers, instead of preaching the gospel, taught Manicheism or Mohammedanism; or again, if the bishops and their churches formed such a living Christian society, that separation from them could only be the pride or fantastic spirit of a few individuals; then the sentiments of Ignatius, although expressed, according to the temper of the man, with too little qualification, would yet in the main be just and applicable now.

2. Epistle to the Smyrnæans.—In this epistle, Ignatius is earnestly writing against those who have been called "Docetæ;" those who contended that our Lord did not really die and rise again, but only seemingly. δοκεῖν αὐτὸν πεπονθέναι. These persons also, he says, were unchristian in their spirit and life: "They have no care for charity, nor for widow nor for orphan, nor for the distressed, nor for the prisoner, nor for the hungry nor the thirsty. They abstain from the Eucharist, and from public prayer, because they do not allow that the Eucharist is

the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, the flesh which suffered for our sins, which in his goodness the Father raised up." Ignat. ad Smyrn. vi.

Now, it is manifest that if this passage bears at all upon the priestly notions of the communion, it goes the whole length either of transubstantiation, or at least of consubstantiation. If Ignatius meant to condemn the Docetæ for not thinking highly enough of the elements, as they are called, used in the communion; then undoubtedly his words were very incautiously used, if he did not intend his readers to believe that the bread and wine *were* actually the body and blood of Christ. In this case, his authority may be of use to the members of the Church of Rome, in their disputes with those of the Church of England, but cannot be pleaded consistently by us, so long as we profess to abide by our present Articles and Liturgy. But in truth Ignatius objects to the practice of the Docetæ on a very different ground. He complains of their rejection of the symbol as showing that they rejected that reality which it signified. The Communion was intended to keep in memory the death of our Lord, and through our memory to strengthen our faith, and so to make us actually and personally partakers in the benefits of his death. But the Docetæ said that he had not really died, and had made therefore no real sacrifice for us. Faith in what had no real existence must be vain; and the memory of an unreal event must be vain also. Therefore they rejected the Communion, and in so doing they showed that their notions were not the notions of Christ and his Apostles, and his Church. For the Communion had been instituted by Christ to keep alive for ever the remembrance of his death; and this showed that his death was a reality. Now, as the rejection of the Communion followed consistently, from their principles, and indeed was required by them; and as they rejected it for the very reason for which Christ had notoriously instituted it, their rejection of it was an evidence that their principles were not the principles of Christianity. This is the drift of Ignatius's argument, and so understood, it is of validity: otherwise, taken as a mere argument upon the nature and inherent virtue of the Eucharistic symbols, it has nothing to do with the opinions of the Docetæ; for it is most certain that thousands of Christians have held the most various notions as to this point, and yet have steadily agreed in celebrating the Communion, and have believed most firmly in the reality and saving effects of that death of Christ which it was appointed to commemorate.

A remarkable passage follows:—"Flee divisions, as the beginning of evils. Follow all of you the bishop, as Jesus Christ followeth his Father; and the estate of the elders as the Apostles; and reverence

the deacons as God's ordinance. Let no man do any thing of matters pertaining to the church apart from (or separate from) his bishop. Let that be counted a valid Eucharist, (*βεβαία*,) which is celebrated under the bishop, or under one who shall have received his permission to celebrate it. Wherever the bishop shall appear, there let the people be; in like manner as wheresoever Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church. It is not lawful without the bishop either to baptize, or to celebrate the feast of love; but whatsoever the bishop shall have approved, this is well pleasing to God, that whatever is done may be sure and valid." Ad Smyrn. viii. *ἀσφαλὲς καὶ βέβαιον*. And then he goes on:—"It is good to acknowledge God and the bishop. He who honours the bishop is honoured by God; he who does any thing without the knowledge of the bishop, serves the Devil." Ad Smyrn. ix.

The first sensation which we ought to have on reading such a passage as this, is one of gratitude to God, who has not permitted any such language to appear in the writings of the Apostles. In fact, the striking difference between the Scriptures and the early Christian writers, is more observable in what the Scriptures do not contain, than in what they do; for their divine truths are for the most part faithfully copied by the writers who so carefully studied them; but in their freedom from all foolishness and error, they stand altogether alone. Doubtless God's Spirit would not have permitted any Scriptural writer to cast such a snare upon men's consciences as must have been cast by this passage of Ignatius, if it came to us with divine authority. Judged as a mere human writing, there is enough of truth in it, and enough of justification in the circumstances under which it was written, to prevent us from passing a harsh sentence on its author; but blessed be God a thousand times, that no language so exaggerated, and so much more vehement than wise, is to be found in that Word which was designed to be our souls' guide.

I believe fully that Ignatius's horror of divisions in the Christian Church originated in the odious character which those divisions then wore; inasmuch as the separating sects actually separated themselves from the principles of Christianity. I believe also, that he exalted the authority of the bishops, because he believed that they had been wisely chosen, and that their influence was alone capable of preserving the Church from the evils which surrounded it. It is true, farther, that he was laying down no general and perpetual principle, but speaking to the Christians of Smyrna of his own time, with reference to their own particular bishop. But still the language is unguarded and exaggerated; it forgets that the bishop, like his people, was fallible; that man is not a sufficient stay for other men to rest upon; that if anarchy and

faction be evils on the one hand, idolatry of human authority is no less an evil on the other. Compare the tone of this passage with the spirit in which St. Peter expresses himself on the same subject:—"The elders who are among you, I exhort, ... to feed the flock of God, ... taking the oversight thereof not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind; neither as being lords over God's heritage, but being ensamples to the flock. . . . . Likewise, ye younger, submit yourselves unto the elder. Yea, all of you be subject one to another, and be clothed with humility; for God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble." Peter, v. 1—5. No defence of a priestly dominion *could* be extracted from this passage; so perfectly has God's Spirit fenced it round on every side, and tempered one view by its opposite. But the words of Ignatius, taken as they stand, have a tendency to establish in the Christain Church tyranny in the rulers, and idolatry in the people; although I quite believe that if Ignatius had been questioned as to his meaning, he would earnestly have disclaimed the consequences of his language, and would have expressed himself more guardedly.

As to the general position, "that a fraction of any society cannot perform such acts as belong to the society itself," it is indisputably true. No individual, or small party of individuals, could be authorized to do any worldly act in the name of their society, unless they were commissioned by its acknowledged governors. A private man could not sell the church's property, nor give it away in alms; and so baptism, which is the admission of a new member into the church, requires to be performed by the church itself or with its sanction. And if it be essential to the Communion that it should be shared by all the members of the church, then it too becomes a public act, and requires of course the sanction of public authority. All this is true if we regard the church as a mere human society, and it leads to no tyranny, because it wholly leaves untouched the great question, "What is to be done when the public authorities do not speak the sense of their society, but act wholly in opposition to it?" and merely goes upon the general and ordinary rule, "that the public authorities do represent their society, and are therefore justly considered to possess the exclusive power of acting in its name."

Yet, when we consider the tendencies of power to encroach more and more upon the rights of others, and the immense mischief of draining off as it were the whole vital activity of society into that small portion of it which exercises the supreme government, there is always a danger in making the individual ruler or rulers so completely the representatives of the body, as to sink the body itself into complete insignifi-

cance. What the fiction of the Lex Regia had made the emperors of Rome, that the words of Ignatius would make the bishops of the Christian Church; and when we hear him say, "wherever the bishop shall appear, there let the people be," we are reminded of a later declaration of the most imperious despotism, "L'état, c'est moi." But most especially dangerous is such language in a religious society; for there despotism is apt soon to become priestcraft, and priestcraft is at once idolatry. And, therefore, our Lord and his Apostles, although they certainly did not wish to encourage turbulence and disobedience to lawful authority amongst Christians, yet have shown themselves no less careful in shutting the door against an excessive reverence for any human teacher or governor. And nothing can be more opposite than the impression likely to be produced by the words of Ignatius, "Follow all of you the bishop, as Jesus Christ followeth his Father: wherever the bishop shall appear, there let the people be; as, wheresoever Christ is, there is the Catholic Church," and especially that most rash expression, "He who does anything without the knowledge of the bishop serves the Devil;" and by the words of Christ on the other side,— "Call no man your father upon earth; for one is your Father, who is in heaven:" and, "Be not ye called rabbi, for one is your master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren." Matthew, xxiii. 8, 9.

Still, unguarded as is the language of Ignatius, and though it had a direct tendency to bring in priestcraft, and has been quoted repeatedly in support of the notion of a priesthood; yet it is only just to confess, that Ignatius himself appears to have had no such meaning. His words exaggerate unwisely the power and importance of Christian governors; they make them too universally and without exception the representatives of the church; but they acknowledge in them no priestly character. It is to avoid divisions that Ignatius will have no separate worship and no separate sacraments; he invests the bishop with the full character of the church, and so regards him as the appointed channel of God's gifts to the individual members of it; but it is to the body of the whole church, and not to an order of priests distinct from it, that he believes Christ's promises to have been given, and his authority conveyed. And although the two systems but too often lead practically to the same results, yet, in principle they are widely different. A priesthood supposed to be of divine appointment is a hopeless evil; it requires nothing less than a new revelation to remove it. But the degree to which the governors of a society may be supposed to represent it, naturally varies according to times and circumstances. There are seasons of peril when a dictatorship affords the only means of safety; that is, when the rulers must wield the whole authority of society, and

the rights and powers of the society must be merged in their persons altogether. But, in quieter times, society deputes far less of its authority, and it is most desirable that it should retain in itself no small portion of life and activity, lest it sink into utter helplessness. It may be that, in the days of Ignatius, the Church did wisely in committing to its rulers an almost absolute authority; it is most certain that it would act most unwisely if it were to do the same thing now.

3. Epistle to the Magnesians.—In this epistle there occurs again much of the same sort of strong language which has been already noticed, as to the necessity of being closely united to the bishop and the elders. But there is nothing connected with our present subject which seems to call for any separate notice:—

4. Epistle to the Trallians.—In this epistle we find the following passage, which I copy from the text of Mr. Jacobson's edition:—

Δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς διακόνους, ὄντας μυστηρίων Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον πᾶσιν ἀρέσκειν· οὐ γὰρ βρωμάτων καὶ ποτῶν εἰσιν διάκονοι, ἀλλ' ἐκκλησίας Θεοῦ ὑπήρεται. Ad Trall. ii. "Illos enim," so Vossius interprets, "non esse ministros esculentorum et poculentorum, sed ministros mysteriorum Dei, *sive sacramentorum.*" "The *μυστήρια Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* are the sacraments." This is with some a favourite doctrine, and we have seen already that they have not scrupled to ascribe it even to St. Paul, when he calls himself a steward of the mysteries of God. But here is the gradual growth of the corruption of Christianity. In St. Paul's language, "the mysteries of God" mean something quite different from the sacraments; in Ignatius, the expression probably includes the sacraments, but not as the principal part of the idea; in later writers, it would mean the sacraments principally, if not exclusively.

It may be observed, however, that the actual reading in Ignatius is not *μυστηρίων* but *μυστήριον*: the text runs thus in the single MS. now known to be in existence, *τοὺς διακόνους, ὄντας μυστήριον Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. But the old Latin translation, and the longer version of the epistles of Ignatius, agree in reading *μυστηρίων*, and it is also plain, from the corrupt state of the text in many places, that our single MS. is a very bad one. Arndt, of Ratzeburg, however, in an able paper on the genuineness of the epistles of Ignatius, in the 1st Number of the twelfth volume of the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, defends the reading *μυστήριον*, and interprets it in the sense of "likeness," "copy,"—referring to Polycarp's epistle to the Philippians, chap. v., where Christ is said to have been *διάκονος πάντων*. There seems, therefore, on the whole, no reason to interfere with the actual reading of the MS. At any rate if we adopt the reading *μυστηρίων*, the passage is not to be read as Mr. Jacobson has edited it, with a comma after *διακόνους*, but,

τοὺς διακόνους ὄντας μυστηρίων, κ. τ. λ. "It befits those who are ministers of Christ's mysteries," &c. It now remains to be seen what Ignatius meant by διακόνους μυστηρίων Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

Now it may be true that Ignatius amongst the other μυστήρια of Christ would have included the sacraments: but the question is, whether the term express the sacraments either exclusively or principally. It cannot be too often repeated, that the whole question with which I am concerned regards the *prominence* of the sacraments in the scheme of Christianity, and by no means their *existence* in that scheme, which I am as ready to allow as any of those who esteem of them most highly. But did Ignatius regard the ministration of the sacraments as the principal part of the deacon's office, or did he include it merely as one out of many parts, and that not a prominent one? So that when he spoke of μυστήρια Χριστοῦ, he was thinking principally of other things than the sacraments, although, if he had been asked whether he meant the term to include the sacraments also, he might probably have answered in the affirmative?

α. The word μυστήριον occurs several times in the New Testament, but in no one place is there the least pretence for supposing that it so much as includes the sacraments, far less that it speaks of them principally. I have already noticed the palpable misinterpretation of St. Paul's words, 1 Corinth. iv. 1, where some have fancied that St. Paul meant to call himself a "dispenser of the sacraments." But with this exception, I do not know that any one has ventured, even wrongly, to ascribe this sense to the word, The confusion as to the meaning of the Latin word "sacramentum," which is the old translation of μυστήριον, in Ephesians v. 32, needs scarcely to be noticed; because neither does "sacramentum" in the language of the old Latin Christians mean what has been since technically called a "sacrament," nor is it applied to any rite or institution in which men can partake on earth, but to the wonderful incarnation of our Lord, in that he left his Father to join himself to our nature, and so to become one with us.

β. Ignatius himself twice uses the word μυστήριον, in the scriptural sense; that is, "a truth or doctrine not discoverable by man but revealed to him by God." Thus the three truths, that Christ should have been born as a man, and born of a virgin, and that he should have died for us, are called by Ignatius "three mysteries," Ephes. 19; and Christ's life and death are again called a "mystery," Magnesians, 9; and he adds, "through this mystery we received our faith, and for the sake of this we wait patiently, that we may be found Christ's disciples." The probability is, therefore, that if Ignatius called the deacons "ministers of Christ's mysteries," he meant to call them "ministers of

the great truths of Christianity," and not merely "ministers to distribute meat and drink to the poor in alms."

γ. Even in Cyprian's time the word "sacramentum," which was from the earliest period of the Church the corresponding Latin term to the Greek *μυστήριον*, is applied generally to the solemn and deep things of Christianity, without any especial reference to what are now called "sacraments." In Cyprian's 63rd letter, which contains a long argument on the necessity of using both water and wine in the cup at the Communion, the term "sacramentum" is applied, as we might expect, several times to various points in the institution of the Lord's Supper. So again, in the 72nd letter, we find it applied both to baptism and to the laying on of hands, or confirmation. But in like manner, Cyprian speaks also of the many "sacramenta," "deep truths of God," which are contained in the Lord's Prayer. De Oratione Dominicâ, 142. So he speaks also of the "sacramentum Trinitatis," in his 73rd letter; of the "sacramentum vitæ æternæ," in his Treatise on the Lord's Prayer, p. 151; of the "sacramentum unitatis," or mystery of the unity of the Church, and of the "sacramentum divinæ traditionis," letter 74th, where it means little more than "the sacredness of the lessons taught us by Christ and his Apostles." Thus it appears that, in the middle of the third century, and in the writings of a man sufficiently inclined to exalt the ordinances of the Church, the term sacramentum was not even yet exclusively applied to what have been since called sacraments.

5. Epistle to the Philadelphians.—This epistle, besides various other passages, insisting on the necessity of uniting with the bishop, as in the other epistles, contains also the following:—

Σπουδάσατε οὖν μιᾷ εὐχαριστίᾳ χρῆσθαι· μία γὰρ σὰρξ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἓν ποτήριον εἰς ἕνωσιν τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ· ἓν θυσιαστήριον ὡς εἷς ἐπίσκοπος, ἅμα τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ καὶ διακόνοις τοῖς συνδούλοις μου, ἵνα ὃ ἐὰν πράσσητε κατὰ Θεὸν πράσσητε. Ad Philadelph. iv. There is nothing here in what is said of the Communion deserving of remark, except the use of the word *θυσιαστήριον*. Did Ignatius mean to call the communion table an altar, and the bishop who administered the Communion a priest sacrificing at the altar?

The answer is, that he did not: but that by the term *θυσιαστήριον* he meant the Church of Christ, and the sacrifice to be offered on that altar was the sacrifice of prayer and praise, and of the bodies and souls of every Christian; and by combining together the words "one altar and one bishop," he meant that there should be only one Church and one government of it; not a multitude of separate bodies of Christians with their separate rulers: for that then the sacrifice of the Christian law would no longer be offered in unity.

That *θυσιαστήριον* in the early Christian writers signifies the Church of God, as St. Paul also calls the Church the *ναός*, or temple of God, may be shown from various instances. The earliest and best example of this is to be found in the New Testament itself, in the epistle to the Hebrews. There, in the 13th chapter, v. 10—15, we have the following remarkable words: *Ἔχομεν θυσιαστήριον, ἐξ οὗ φαγεῖν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν οἱ τῇ σκηνῇ λατρεύοντες. κ. τ. λ.* Where the argument runs thus: our sacrifice, as an atoning sacrifice must have been, was offered without the camp; that is, away from and out of the pale of the earthly Israel. We follow him without the camp also; our altar is no longer in the temple at Jerusalem, but without its precincts; it is where Christ was offered; that is virtually everywhere, where Christ's people are gathered together. There is their altar in the midst of their own company, and on that altar they offer up their sacrifices, now rendered acceptable through His atoning sacrifice, their spiritual sacrifice of prayer and praise and acts of charity. Of this altar the Jews have no right to eat; that is, as they would in the like case have no right to eat of the actual sacrifices offered on a literal altar which was quite distinct from their own temple, so they have no right to partake in the spiritual sacrifices of prayer and praise offered on the Christian altar, or in the spiritual bread of life, communion with Christ, which is there for ever present.

Thus also Polycarp, in his epistle to the Philippians, bids the widows of the Christian Church to remember that they are God's altar,* and that every offering offered upon that altar must be without blemish. Ad Phillip. iv. That is, Christians themselves are God's spiritual altar, and their prayers, praises, and holy actions are the proper sacrifices to be offered upon it.

Thus also Ignatius himself, in his epistle to the Ephesians, says, "If a man be not within the altar, he fails to obtain the bread of God;" Ad Ephes. v. and again, in the epistle to the Trallians, "He that is within the altar, he is clean." Ad Trall. 7. In the latter passage there follows immediately this explanation: "that is, he who does anything apart from the bishop, and the company of elders, and the deacon, he is not clean in his conscience." And after the former passage the writer goes on, "For if the prayer of one or two persons has so great force, how much more is the force of the prayer of the bishop and of

* So in the Apostol. Constitut. II. 26 ad fin., we find the same notion, *αἱ χῆραι καὶ ὀρφανοὶ εἰς τύπον τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου λελογίσθωσαν ὑμῖν· ὧν τὸ παρθένιον εἰς τύπον τοῦ θυμιατηρίου τετιμήσθωσαν, καὶ τοῦ θυμιάματος.* Is this upon the notion that offerings were given for the widows, &c., and paid to them as on an altar?

the whole Church ?" It appears, therefore, from both these passages, that the altar is the Church of Christ, and that the sacrifices offered on it are prayers. And as it is said in the epistle to the Hebrews, that "the Jews have no right to eat of our altar," so Ignatius says, "that he who is without the Church cannot obtain the bread of God;" that is, as the shewbread under the law might be eaten only by the priests, so Christ, who is our Bread of life, is only to be enjoyed by those who are his priests, ministering at his altar, that is, by his people, who on the altar of his Church offer to him their prayers and themselves.

6. Epistle to Polycarp.—In this epistle, I may notice the passage in which Christians proposing to marry are recommended to do it with the sanction and approbation of the bishop, in order that their marriage may be according to God, and not according to mere passion. This advice is remarkable, as it shows to what a length Ignatius carried his notions of unity, and what a Spartan discipline as to the merging the individual will in the will of the society, or of its representative, he would fain have introduced into the Christian Church. Regarding the bishops of the several churches as men eminently fitted to bring their people to the purest state of Christian perfection, and considering that amongst their people, their subjects I might almost call them, there existed the greatest varieties of wild opinion and licentious practice, he saw no other remedy than to invest the rulers of the Church with absolute authority. Hence, he not only wished to unite in their persons every power of government, and to subject to their absolute control every thing that might be called a public or social act of the Church as a body; as when he would have no Communion celebrated without the bishop's authority; but he would even give them dominion over acts most strictly belonging to the individual Christian; even for marriage he would require their sanction, as being the fathers of the Christian family: they were to judge whether the proposed union was entered upon in a Christian spirit, or whether it was desired from mere youthful passion. Now this subjection of the individual to the society, even in the most private relations of domestic life, was very agreeable to the spirit of many of the ideal commonwealths of the Greek philosophy; and, in the famous constitution of Sparta, it had been actually established in practice. Much was to be said in its behalf, by those especially who were most aware of the evils of the opposite extreme, of leaving the individual will wholly uncontrolled, except if it should attempt to offer a direct injury to another. Nor can we doubt that Ignatius recommended pure despotism as sincerely and as conscientiously as ever men of different views and under different circumstances have protested against it. But instead of seeing in the letters of Ignatius a strong display of

views which have been often entertained by wise and good men, and which in this particular case were more than ordinarily justified by the peculiar circumstances of the Church, men have sought to find in him a perpetual law of Church government, and have taken his most vehement expressions as an authoritative definition of the powers which ought to be always exercised by the rulers of the Christian society. Nor is this all; but as persons who have been capable of so misusing him were not likely to have very clear notions of government and the questions connected with it, so it has happened that confounding different times and usages, and being the slaves of a name, they have transferred what Ignatius says of the necessity of an absolute government in the hands of the bishop, to the later system of the mystical power of the priesthood; and where he would acknowledge nothing as an act of the church which was not done by the authority of the bishop, they have quoted him as sanctioning their doctrine of the necessity of a priestly consecration of the elements to the sacramental virtue of the Lord's Supper: where he would have the bishop's consent obtained for all marriages, that they might be such as a Christian ought to contract, he has been quoted as enforcing the necessity of the priestly benediction to give to the rite of marriage any validity.*

Here then we close our present inquiry: but one or two points seem naturally to arise from it, and with some notice of these I will conclude this chapter.

1. We do not find in these early Christian writers the doctrine of the priesthood and sacraments which was afterwards prevalent in the Church; but we find language which will sufficiently account for the subsequent introduction of that doctrine; whereas the Scriptures not only do not contain it, but absolutely repel it: between them and it there is a great gulf fixed, over which no art of man can cast a bridge.

2. A full consideration of this language in the early uncanonical writers, will lead to three conclusions. While, in the first place it marks the wide distinction between them and the Scripture, and should lead us to thank God that the scriptural writers were so secured by his

* "Hinc clare patet," says Smith, "nuptias non fuisse habitas justas et legitimas absque sententiâ episcopi, *et benedictione sacerdotali*, in primis Christianismi seculis." Smith is confounding two ideas perfectly distinct, one of which Ignatius had, while of the other not the slightest trace is to be found in him. He did wish that the bishop should have the power of a father over the whole church, that his consent should be obtained before any Christian could marry. This is a power of government, and this he undoubtedly wished to give to the bishop of every church. But to require a priestly blessing in order to hallow the rite of marriage is a very different notion, and one of which Ignatius says nothing whatever.

Spirit, not from error only, but from such unguarded and one-sided language, if I may so speak, as might readily become the occasion of error; we shall, in the second place, be spared the pain of believing that Christianity was grossly corrupted in the very next generation after the Apostles by the men who professed themselves to be the Apostles' true followers. We shall rather have reason to believe that their language, taken in their own meaning, and as applied to the circumstances of the Church in their own times, was substantially true. We shall be able to sympathize with Ignatius in his earnest desire to keep the Church in unity with its bishops, and with Clement in his sense of the value of their Apostolical succession; we shall readily confess that to this unity, and this real Apostolical succession of the early bishops, we owe the general acknowledgment of the authority of the Apostles and of their writings;—we owe it, in fact, that our Christianity at this day is that of St. John, and not of Cerinthus; of St. Paul, and not of his Judaizing adversaries. And comparing these early Christian writers with the Scriptures on the one hand, and with the later Church system on the other, as developed in the forged Apostolical constitutions, we shall be able to trace three stages through which Christianity passed, and which, indeed, exhibit what may be called the law of decay in all institutions, whether administered by men only, or devised by them as well as administered. The first and perfect state exhibits the spirit of the institution not absolutely without all forms, for that is impossible, but regarding them as things wholly subordinate, indifferent in themselves, and therefore deriving their value from particular times and circumstances; and as such particular times are not yet come, the spirit of the institution is as yet wholly independent of them; it uses their ministry, but in no way depends upon their aid. Then comes the second stage, when from particular circumstances the existence of the spirit of the institution depends on the adherence to particular outward regulations. The men of this generation insist, as well they may, on the necessity of these forms, for without them the spirit would be lost. And because others profess to honour the spirit no less than they do, therefore they are obliged to make the forms rather than the spirit their peculiar rallying word. Around and for these forms is the stress of battle: but their defenders well know that they are but the husk in which the seed of life is sheltered; that they are but precious for the sake of the seed which they contain, and to the future growth of which they, under the inclemencies of the actual season, are an indispensable condition.

Then the storm passes away, and the precious seed, safely sheltered within its husk, has escaped destruction. The forms have done their

appointed work, and, like the best of mortal instruments their end should be, that after having served their own generation by the will of God, they should fall asleep and see corruption. But in the third stage men cannot understand this law. Their fathers clung to certain forms to the death ; they said—and said truly—that unless these were preserved, the spirit would perish. The sons repeat their fathers' words, although in their mouths they are become a lie. Their fathers insisted on the forms even more earnestly than on the spirit, because in their day the forms were peculiarly threatened. But now the forms are securely established, and the great enemy who strove to destroy them whilst they protected the seed of life, is now as ready to uphold them, because they may become the means of stifling it. But the sons, unheeding of this change, still insist mainly on the importance of the forms, and seeing these triumphant, they rejoice and think that the victory is won, just at the moment when a new battle is to be fought, and the forms oppress the seed instead of protecting it. Still they uphold the form, for that is a visible object of worship, and they teach their children to do the same. Age after age the same language is repeated, whilst age after age its falsehood is becoming more flagrant; and still it is said, "We are treading in the steps of our fathers from the very beginning; even at the very first these forms were held to be essential." So when the husk cracks, and would fain fall to pieces by the natural swelling of the seed within, a foolish zeal labours to hold it together: they who would deliver the seed, are taxed with longing to destroy it; they who are smothering it, pretend that they are treading in the good old ways, and that the husk was, is, and ever will be, essential. And this happens because men regard the form and not the substance ; because they think that to echo the language of their forefathers is to be the faithful imitators of their spirit; because they are blind to the lessons which all nature teaches them, and would for ever keep the egg-shell unbroken, and the sheath of the leaf unburst, not seeing that the wisdom of winter is the folly of spring.

So it has been with the unity of the Church under its bishops, and with their apostolical succession. In the second stage of the Church, these were really essential to the protection of Christian truth: in its third stage, through many generations, they have been a mere empty name, powerless to preserve or to increase the spirit of Christianity, but often only too powerful in stifling and in corrupting it.

IV. SOURCE OF THE ERRORS CONCERNING THE PRIESTHOOD.

In the inquiry which has been pursued through the last two chapters, we have seen that the doctrine of the priesthood is repelled by the Scriptures, and not acknowledged by the earliest uncanonical Christians. The first of these results ought to be abundantly sufficient for our practice : the doctrine which the Scripture not only does not teach, but which it virtually condemns, must be inconsistent with Christianity. The second result, although not needed practically, is yet on two accounts interesting. It is satisfactory to find that the Church in the very first century had not grossly corrupted Christian truth. It is also satisfactory to find in the peculiar circumstances and language of these early writers, an explanation, and something of a palliation for the grievous errors of the subsequent age. Had any generation of Christians fallen at once from the perfect spirit of Scriptural truth into the doctrine of the priesthood, it would have seemed hardly less than apostacy from the faith ; but Ignatius and his contemporaries exhibit the Church in a sort of transition state, which, although not one of error, yet rendered the actual errors of the following period more excusable. We now proceed to see how the errors themselves came in ; how government was converted into priesthood, and how Judaism, driven from its own ceremonies, and obliged to abandon circumcision and the distinction of clean and unclean meats took possession of the Christian sacraments, and held with effect under their names the very same mischievous doctrines which, when connected with the names of Jewish ceremonies, the Church had been so earnestly warned to avoid. So what took place with regard to the sacraments, was the exact converse of what happened with respect to Apostolical succession ; each instance equally confirming the truth, that men are ruled by names and not by things. On the one hand, the benefits of a real Apostolical succession were supposed to be retained, because there was still an Apostolical succession nominally : on the other hand men thought that they were safe from Judaism, because they put the word baptism in the place of circumcision, and talked of the mystic virtue of the elements in the Communion, instead of the purifying nature of clean meats, and the defiling character of such as were unclean.

Let us now see in what respects the Church, early in the second century, was ready to slide into the doctrine of a priesthood, with all its accompanying corruptions of Christian truth.

The beginning of the second century found the Church under the government of bishops, many of whom had derived their appointment from the Apostles themselves, at only one or two removes; that is to say, they had been chosen by men who had themselves been chosen by an Apostle, or by persons such as Timotheus, in whom an Apostle had entertained full confidence. They were engaged in an arduous struggle not only against heathenism, but against various monstrous forms of error which claimed to themselves the name of Christianity; and as happens naturally in such times of danger, they drew to themselves more and more, not through ambition, but by the necessity of the case, the whole power of the Christian society. They were the representatives of the Church, and without them the Church had no existence; those were not the prayers of the Church, that was not her Communion, which the bishop did not either preside at or sanction. Here, then, was a government of a religious society, whose sanction was considered necessary to the religious acts of that society, and which grounded its claim to obedience mainly on the fact that it derived its authority all but immediately from the Apostles, and so might be supposed to represent them faithfully. We see here at once two facts, which, with a very little corruption, might become two of the most essential elements of a priesthood; we see the germ of the necessity of a priestly consecration of the elements in the sacraments, and of the transmission of the priestly character by a sort of elective succession.

Now, if it had pleased God that the Church at this period should have become a sovereign society, as it did two centuries later, it might have been more easy to prevent the government of the bishops from being confounded with the notion of a priesthood. Had they been able, that is, to exercise the full powers of government, to control society in the last resort, and to exercise jurisdiction over life and property, the largeness and outward greatness of their functions would have so satisfied men's minds, that none would have sought for them any higher or nobler office than that which they were manifestly seen to exercise. But government in a subordinate society, and divested consequently of its sovereign character, is of necessity far less imposing. As a government, it is wholly eclipsed, to the vulgar eye at any rate, by that greater government of general or sovereign society, to which it must be itself subject. Considered as a ruler, the bishop of a Christian church appeared a far less important person than the Proconsul of a province; the most numerous synod was as nothing when compared with the sovereign of the Empire. Yet there was in the Church a greatness more than the Empire could boast of; there was a sense in which its bishops were greater

than Cæsar. For a time this was even outward and tangible; so long as the Apostles possessed and conferred those extraordinary gifts of the Holy Spirit which no wealth of man could purchase, nor power compel. When these were withdrawn, the real greatness still remained, but it was such as common minds can with difficulty appreciate. The moral elevation conferred by truth and holiness; the willing obedience of good men; the task of guiding a society whose members spiritually considered were privileged far above the rest of mankind, to be as it were the salt of the very salt of the earth itself; these were points of greatness most real and most exalted. But the mind of man, disappointed of what is outward and sensible, turns not to what is spiritual, but to what is mystical; unsatisfied with the real excellence of the office of a Christian bishop, it coveted the mystical and false dominion of a priest.

According to Christ's ordinance, the rulers of the church were distinguished above their brethren in all that may be called the human relations of the Christian society; they had authority both to teach and to govern. The one only occasion on which this distinction was to cease, was when the church as a body came into direct relation with God and Christ; that is to say, in its public prayers and in the Holy Communion. Rulers and teachers cease to be distinguished from the people, exactly in those acts in which the priest's distinction is greatest. Others may teach, and others may govern; for these are human relations; but in direct relation with God, the priest's mediation is wanted; he must pray for the people, and their communion with God can only be carried on through him. But as prayer and the Holy Communion were the church's most solemn acts, as a body, if its rulers here were on a level with other Christians, it seemed to lessen the dignity of their office. It was not enough that the presence or sanction of the bishop was required to render the Christian supper a true Communion of the church; nor that, in the celebration of it, the bread and wine were, to prevent confusion, distributed by the principal members of the society, either by the bishop himself or by the elders. The priestly mystical power, which seemed so much greater than the mere government of a subordinate or municipal society, was not here to be found. Another step was to be taken, not only that the bishop's authority as head of the church should be required in order to invest any meeting of Christians with the public character of the church, but that religiously the church itself could not communicate with Christ without the mediation, not of the bishop alone, but of the bishop or some one of his presbyters, all of whom were to possess equally with him this mediatorial character. Nor was it to be a mere matter of order that the bread and wine were distributed by those who presided at the meeting to the several com-

municants, after the usual form of thanksgiving before meat, had been uttered; but from this distribution and this form of thanksgiving they were to derive their sacramental virtue, and having been before mere common bread and wine, they became immediately through the virtue of the words so uttered, and of the priestly character of him who uttered them, changed into the body and blood of Christ. It could not but follow from this, that the Communion should be represented as an actual, not a spiritual sacrifice, in which there was a visible offering made, and which therefore required a priest.

But one of the oldest representations now extant, of the celebration of the Communion in the ancient Church, seems in a remarkable manner to avoid these corruptions. I allude to the famous fragment of Irenæus first published by Pfaff, from a MS. in the library of Turin, and given in the Benedictine edition of the works of Irenæus, Venice, 1734. In this famous passage, Irenæus contrasts the spiritual sacrifices of Christianity with the carnal sacrifices of the Jewish law. He divides the Christian sacrifices into two kinds; those of prayer and thanksgiving, and those which consist in the offering up of ourselves to God, to do him service. "Wherefore," says he, "the offering also of the Eucharist is not carnal but spiritual, and thereby it is clean, καθαρά. For we offer to God the bread, and the cup of blessing, rendering thanks to him, for that he has bidden the earth to bring forth these fruits for our nourishment. And here, having completed our offering, we call upon the Holy Spirit, that he may render ἀποφήνῃ, this sacrifice to be, both the bread the body of Christ, and the cup the blood of Christ, that they who have partaken of these symbols, ἀντιτύπων, may obtain forgiveness of their sins, and life eternal. They, then, who bring these offerings in remembrance of the Lord, do not join themselves to the ordinances of the Jews, but worshipping, λειτουργοῦντες, spiritually, shall be called the children of wisdom."

Now this most remarkable passage exhibits in a surprising completeness that notion of the Communion which has been given in the first chapter of this work. The sacrifices or offerings of Christians must be spiritual, for we must worship God in spirit and in truth; and the offering of the Eucharist is *therefore* a clean and accepted offering, because it is *spiritual*. How then is the Eucharist a *spiritual* sacrifice? Not because of the offering of bread and wine, but because of spiritual acts accompanying or following that offering; the acts, namely, of thanksgiving and prayer. Of thanksgiving, when we thank God while offering the bread and wine before Him, that He has given us these things for our bodily sustenance: of prayer, when, after having completed the offering, and partaken of the bread and wine, we pray to God

the Holy Spirit, that he will make that temporal food also a spiritual food; and that as bread and wine support our bodies, so, whilst in eating that bread and drinking that wine, we remember Christ's body and Christ's blood, His body and blood may be the redemption and the strengthening of our souls to everlasting life. Thus, the bread that perisheth is changed by the Holy Spirit into the bread of life; having eaten bodily for our bodily good, the Holy Spirit guides us to eat spiritually for our spiritual good. But the soul feeds itself not with the mouth and teeth, but by thoughts and love. To eat spiritually, is to assimilate an object to our spirits by drawing it to them by thought, and embracing it by love. He, therefore, who eateth Christ shall live by him; because, by believing in Christ and loving him, he takes Christ into his spirit, and his nature becomes assimilated to that of Christ, and so he lives and must live forever. Truly, therefore says Irenæus, that they who offer the bread and wine to God, in remembrance of the Lord Jesus; that is, who, after having partaken of their bodily food, and therefore, *every day*, do pray to the Holy Spirit that their souls may feed upon Christ no less as their spiritual food; they by that prayer convert what else would be a formal and Jewish sacrifice into one that is Christian and spiritual. Their service to God, *Λειτουργία*, is a spiritual service, and they who so serve Him have no fellowship with the ordinances of the Jews, but shall be called the children of wisdom.

But observe that here, in this description of the Christian Communion, there is no mention of a priest's words of consecration changing the bread and wine *beforehand* into the body and blood of Christ, and so giving occasion to all manner of superstitions and profaneness. The bread and wine are received with thanksgiving, *as bread and wine*, as fruits of the earth, which God our Creator has commanded the earth to yield for our bodily support. Then, *after they have been received*, comes not a form of consecration by an earthly priest, but a prayer to God the Holy Spirit, to Him who communes with us only as spirits, dealing not with our natural life, but with our spiritual; that He may render to each of us the bodily and outward offering a spiritual and inward offering; that by eating bread and drinking wine, not simply as fruits of the earth, but in remembrance of Christ's death, our spirits may feed upon Christ himself, in all his manifold relations to us, and so be strengthened by him and become like to him more and more. In other words, we pray to the Holy Spirit to keep alive in us daily our spiritual appetites and powers, that they may desire Christ and receive him into themselves, as naturally—naturally, I mean, according to our renewed nature—as the healthy body, according to its nature, desires and digests its bodily food.

PRINCIPLES

OF

CHURCH REFORM.

PREFACE.

I HAVE called the following pamphlet, "Principles of Church Reform," because I thought it better to try to establish these, than to lose myself and my readers in a mass of minute details. For if the principles be true, there are persons of much greater experience and knowledge than myself to contrive the best way of carrying them into effect; while, had I proposed any particular arrangements which might have been ill-judged or impracticable, this error in the details might have been transferred by unfairness or ignorance to the main principles of the argument, and they would have been called impracticable also. These principles I believe to be irrefragable; that a Church Establishment is essential to the well-being of the nation; that the existence of Dissent impairs the usefulness of an Establishment always, and now, from peculiar circumstances, threatens its destruction; and that to extinguish Dissent by persecution being both wicked and impossible, there remains the true, but hitherto untried way, to extinguish it by comprehension; that different tribes should act together as it were in one army, and under one command, yet should each retain the arms and manner of fighting with which habit has made them most familiar.

But as to the manner of carrying these principles into effect, I am far from proposing any thing with equal confidence. Nor am I anxious about any particular measure, which I may have ventured to recommend, if any thing can be suggested by others, which may effect the same great object more completely. But practical ability, of which we have no lack in the country, must labour not merely for no good, but for absolute mischief, unless it clearly understands the principles of the question. And the numerous plans of Church Reform already before

the public, have also the same bad effect, that they lead their readers off on a false scent, and make them fancy, that by their adoption the Church would be reformed and secured, when its great defects and dangers would remain in fact untouched. But the natural tendency of mankind to reform by patching rather than effectually, gives great reason to fear that some one or other of these plans will be adopted; and that the matter will then be considered by the Government to be set at rest. Whereas, in fact, it will not be at rest; but will be agitated with more violence than ever, and with less hope of a favourable settlement;—because one party will be exasperated at what they will call a mere mockery of Reform, and the other will complain that their concessions have given no satisfaction, and will therefore be disposed, for the time to come, to fight out the battle to the last.

RYDAL,
January 9, 1833.

PRINCIPLES

OF

CHURCH REFORM;

Every man who talks, writes, or votes in favour of Church Reform, would do well to ask himself, why he wishes for it. And in like manner the Government, when legislating to satisfy the general call for Church Reform, would do well to consider with what motives it is called for; to see, first, whether they who call the loudest are persons who ought to be satisfied; and, secondly, what it is that truth and wisdom demand; for their call ought certainly to be listened to, though it is generally preferred in a voice so gentle, that they who care not for it may easily avoid hearing it at all.

Now Church Reform being a very vague term, it is of great consequence to know what they, who use it, mean by it. It is impossible that a man can care, properly speaking, about the reform of any institution, if the objects of the institution are of no interest to him. If then a man, without being a Dissenter, is one who seldom or never goes to Church, and appears to have very little value for Christianity personally; the main object of the institution of the Church is clearly of no interest to him; and his anxiety for its reform can only be for the sake of certain subordinate objects which he may suppose to be promoted by it. Still, if he be a man of enlarged and liberal views, and capable of desiring the intellectual welfare of his countrymen, and their moral improvement also so far as it affects society, he may sincerely wish to see the Church reformed in the proper sense of the term, although he may not be a religious man; because the social improvement of man is one of the direct objects of a Church establishment, although not its highest object; and it is properly to wish an institution reformed, if we wish it rendered more capable of affecting any of its proper objects. But men of another stamp, who neither value the social nor the religious benefits conferred by an establishment, cannot rightly be said to desire its reform; they merely wish to see it de-

stroyed; and destruction is so very different from reform, that it is a gross fraud to call ourselves friends of the one, when what we really desire is the other.

Here then is one class of Church Reformers, and another class who call themselves by the same name, but whose proper title is Church Destroyers. A third, and a very numerous class, must however be added; men who have no value for the objects of the Church, nor yet any antipathy to it; who in point of fact neither wish for its reform nor for its destruction. They merely look upon its revenues as affording the means of lessening their own outgoings in money, by being made in part available to public purposes. These men are in truth Church destroyers, only they are restrained by temper or by some scruple of conscience from going the full length of their own principles. Their object in short is wholly and entirely selfish, and if we might borrow the language of the seventeenth century, we might fitly distinguish them by the name of the "Self-seekers."

The avowed Dissenters join also in the call for Church Reform; and they again use the term with singular impropriety. They can hardly care about the reform of an institution from which they have altogether separated themselves. They belong, in fact, either to the class of Church Destroyers, or of Self-seekers: to the former, if being convinced that an establishment is an evil, they wish to see it altogether put down: to the latter, if their object be simply to be relieved from Church rates, Easter dues and tithes, because they support a ministry of their own. But I have heard as yet no language from the Dissenters which could entitle them justly to the name of Church Reformers. That they may, and ought to become so, I shall endeavour to show hereafter.

Now it is manifest, that if we take all these classes of persons to the letter of their present,—perhaps I ought to say, their yesterday's language,—if we do reform the Church, by ridding it of the evils most loudly clamoured against, three out of four of them will still be unsatisfied. It is quite idle to think that the Destroyers, or the Self-seekers, really care about pluralities and non-residence, and the inequality of Church benefices: still less are they concerned about alterations in the Liturgy, or the introduction of a more effective clerical discipline. The real question with them is one of money,—they want a cheap religion,—and they lay the more stress upon the epithet, in proportion to their ignorance of the value of the article for which they are bargaining: about religion they know and care little,—about money they know and care much.

We are told that there is now an universal wish for Church Reform. This as I have shown, is not true; on the contrary, I doubt exceeding-

ly, whether the friends of Reform are powerful enough to get their object effected. There is on one side a great wish for Church destruction and Church robbery; and on the other side a great unwillingness to correct Church abuses; but the generality of the wish for Church Reform is a fact which I should exceedingly rejoice to see established.

It is not enough, in times like these, to stand battling about a few points of detail. We must take up the whole question from the beginning, that we may know on what grounds we are going to legislate. Before I discuss any scheme of Church Reform, I must state why I am utterly opposed to all schemes of Church destruction.

I will not insult even the most violent Church destroyer, so far as to suppose him to contemplate the ejectment of the present holders of benefices. As the law declares that a man's benefice is his freehold, it is precisely the same thing to deprive an incumbent of the income arising from his church preferment, as to deprive any other individual of the rents of his land, or of the profits of his trade. If, therefore, such an act could be committed, it would be neither more nor less than literal robbery; and we should be far advanced on our way towards that happy consummation, when every man will keep what he can, and take what he can.

But, saving all existing interests, why should not the Establishment expire with the present generation? Why should not the tithes, in every parish, revert, on the next vacancy, to the several owners of the soil; and all Church lands be sold for the payment of the national debt; leaving the next generation of ministers, if there be any, to be maintained by the voluntary contributions of their hearers?

I am so anxious to get to the very principles of the whole question, that I am contented to pass over all the particular and practical objections which might be made to such a scheme;—such as its invasion of the rights of the patrons of Church benefices; and the question how far episcopal or chapter lands, which certainly were never granted by the state, could justly be taken by the state for its own purposes. These are all very substantial objections, and would, I hope, be fully insisted upon by all friends to law and right, if ever the proposal of church destruction should come before the lagislature in its plain form; but I hold it much more satisfactory, to rest the case simply on general principles; and to show that if the Establishment could be subverted, without the least individual injustice, or illegality, still it would be the greatest possible folly in the nation to subvert it.

It is quite manifest, that the whole amount of Church property in England, including under that name, both tithes, so far as they are in clerical hands, and Church lands of every description, is so much sav-

ed out of the scramble of individual selfishness, and set apart for ever for public purposes. Now there are few things from which society in England has suffered greater evil, than from the want of property so reserved: it is apparent in every town, and in every village, in the absence of public walks, public gardens, public exercise grounds, public museums, &c., in the former; and in most instances, of even so much as a common green, in the latter: let a man go where he will, he is beset on every side by the exclusiveness of private property: the public has kept nothing. This has arisen very much out of the false and degrading notions of civil society which have prevailed within the last century. Society has been regarded as a mere collection of individuals, looking each after his own interest; and the business of government has been limited to that of a mere police, whose sole use is to hinder these individuals from robbing or knocking each other down. This view of society, alike unphilosophical and unchristian, has largely counteracted the good which the world, in this advanced stage of its existence, has derived from its increased experience; and its pernicious effects have been abundantly shown in the actual state of the poor throughout England. For their physical distresses, their ignorance, and their vices, are the true fruits of the system of "letting alone;" in other words, of leaving men to practise for their own advancement, all arts, save actual violence; of allowing every natural, and every artificial superiority, to enjoy and push its advantages to the utmost, and of suffering the weaker to pay the full penalty of their inferiority.

Thus, even before I consider the particular application of Church property, I hold it to be an enormous benefit that it is so much secured for ever to public uses;—a something saved out of the scramble, which no covetousness can appropriate, and no folly waste. Again, it is not only a considerable mass so saved;—but it is so happily divided, that every portion of the kingdom, with certain wretched exceptions, shares in the benefit. The sight of a church tower, wherever it is met with, is an assurance that every thing has not been bought up for private convenience or enjoyment;—that there is some provision made for public purposes, and for the welfare of the poorest and most destitute human being who lives within the hearing of its bells. In the most unattractive districts of the country, no less than in the most inviting, this same beneficient provision extends itself:—or if it does not, it is owing wholly to the neglect of these later times, when all things have been left to find their own level; and the result has been, as might well have been expected from the inequalities of the bottom, an alternation of some deep pools here and there with huge wastes of unmoistened sand and gravel.

But what are the particular public purposes for which this property is set apart? Alms-houses are an admirable provision for the poor and aged;—hospitals for the sick;—schools for the young;—a public garden furnishes amusement to all;—a public library gives instruction to all. But this property is designed to provide a benefit higher and more universal than any of these,—to secure for every parish the greatest blessing of human society, that is, the constant residence of one individual, who has no other business than to do good of every kind to every person. Men in general have their own profession or trade to follow; and although they are useful to society, yet it is but an indirect benefit—not intended for society in the first place, but for themselves; so that no one feels obliged to them for their services, because there is nothing in them which partakes of the nature of a kindness. Those again who possess an independent fortune, are not only raised too high to be in perfect sympathy with the majority of their neighbours, but are exposed to moral temptations of a peculiar kind, which often render them an inadequate example to others. Whereas, it is impossible to conceive a man placed so favourably for attaining to the highest perfection of our nature, as a parochial minister. Apart from all personal and particular interests; accustomed by his education and habits to take the purest and highest views of human life, and bound by his daily business to cherish and sweeten these by the charities of the kindest social intercourse: in delicacy and liberality of feeling on a level with the highest: but in rank and fortune standing in a position high enough to insure respect, yet not so high as to forbid sympathy:—with none of the harshness of legal authority, yet with a moral influence such as no legal authority could give;—ready to advise, when advice is called for, but yet more useful by the indirect counsel continually afforded by his conduct, his knowledge, his temper, and his manners;—he stands amidst the fever and selfishness of the world, as one whom the tainted atmosphere cannot harm, although he is for ever walking about in it, to abate its malignant power over its victims.

Now I wish it to be observed, that all this good results simply from the circumstance, that here is a man of education, relieved from the necessity of following any trade or ordinary profession in order to maintain himself, and placed in the most improving of all situations,—a life of constant intercourse with men, of which the direct and acknowledged business is to do them good physically and morally. Thus much is independent of religion:—and had there been a resident sophist stationed in every village of the Roman empire, with such a general commission to improve in every way the condition of the people, the amount of crime and misery would have been enormously les-

sened. But to all this, how much is superadded in the Christian ministry! How great is the difference of the notions conveyed by the terms "lecturer" and "preacher;" by the names of "sophist" and "pastor!" The truth is, that men bear impatiently the teaching of men, unless it comes with more than man's authority: the beneficent relations in which a minister stands towards his people, derive much of their power from this very circumstance, that he is a minister of *religion*. And Christianity, whilst it fully invests him with this character, yet has provided in the strongest manner against superstition and priestcraft; for a minister can speak with no authority beyond his commission, and this commission lies open for all men, to judge whether he adheres to it or no. It gives him power unspeakable, so long as he faithfully discharges it: but deserts and condemns him the very moment that he would pervert it to selfish purposes, to make his own word a law, and himself an idol. But in this commission there is contained indeed the very food, and more than the food of man's life; the remedy for all troubles and sorrows, from the simplest physical suffering of the rudest nature, up to the mental conflicts which are the inevitable portion of the loftiest and most sensitive: the medicine for all moral evil, from the mere bodily appetites of the most grossly ignorant, to the most delicate forms of pride or selfishness in minds of the highest intelligence: the light to clear up every perplexity of practice, strengthening the judgment through the purified affections: the most exalted hope inseparably united with the deepest humility; because we believe in Christ crucified—because we trust in Christ risen.*

Now an appropriation of a certain portion of property to secure for ever to a whole people so invaluable a blessing as a resident Christian ministry dispersed over every part of the country, will naturally be objected to by those who hate the very names of God and of goodness. And persons who arrive from mere brutishness at the same practical conclusion to which the godless party are led by deliberate wickedness,—men who can neither look before nor after, but limit their notions of political good to the mere physical welfare of their own generation, because they can understand nothing higher,—such per-

* I shall not be suspected of meaning this high character of the benefits of a national Christian ministry to apply in its full perfection to the actual state of the Church amongst us The faults of human nature will always make the practice of an institution fall below its theory. But it is no less true that all the tendencies of the ministerial office, as such, are wholly beneficial; and if the actual good derived from it be not so great as it might be, this is owing to counteracting causes, some remediable—such, for instance, as faults produced by imperfect education and inefficient church discipline; others, arising out of the mere weakness of human nature, admitting only of palliation, not of complete removal.

sons may consistently think that hand work is more useful than head or heart work, and that no elements in society can be so well spared as piety, and charity, and moral wisdom. It is no wonder, then, but a just tribute to the excellence of the Christian ministry, that it should be hated by the sublimed and systematic wickedness of the godless party, and by the brute ignorance and coarseness of the dregs of the democracy. But that men who, though not religious, are yet admirers of much that is noble, and much that is excellent;—still more, that men who really fear God and love Christianity, should be found to doubt the wisdom of a national provision for the moral and intellectual improvement of the people, for giving them the knowledge of that truth which is life eternal,—this is on the face of it a phenomenon so strange, nay, so monstrous, that we cannot but eagerly desire, for the honour of human nature, to explain the causes of it.

It has arisen from that worst reproach of the Christian name,—the spirit of sectarianism. For Christians having become divided into a thousand sects, and refusing to join in each other's worship, a national establishment is regarded as an unjust preference of one sect over another;—and, as it is considered impossible to establish all, and unfair to establish any other rather than another, there remains no alternative but to establish none; and, to use a phrase much in fashion to look upon every man's religion as an affair between God and his own conscience only.

That the objection to a national provision for the ministers of religion arises, amongst thinking men, solely out of the difficulties created by sectarianism, is manifest from this;—that where sectarianism has not existed, or only in an insignificant degree, the wisdom of such a provision has been allowed with remarkable unanimity. For, not to speak of the ancient world, where it was a thing unheard of for a state to be without its national worship, its temples, its festivals, and its priests; the whole Christian world, from the time that governments have become Christian, has acted uniformly on the same principle, with the single exception of the United States of America, where the evil spirit of sectarianism has wrought his perfect work. And what is still more to our purpose, the French people, even while declaring that they will have no established religion, have yet retained the great benefit of an establishment, namely, a national provision for the religious instruction of the people, inasmuch as they keep up the churches, and pay the ministers who officiate in them. This they do, because the clear wisdom of the principle is not obscured to their minds by the perplexities which rise out of religious dissent;—the Catholics are so great a majority, and in most parts of France so nearly the whole

of the population, that Catholic and Christian are convertible terms, and the state's wish to instruct its people is not frustrated by the endless discussions of contending sects, each objecting to all forms of instruction but its own.

This evil of religious dissent is so enormous,—is so fraught with danger at this moment to our highest interests, national and spiritual, and has been to my mind so unfairly and unsatisfactorily treated by men of all parties, that I shall make no apology for entering fully upon the consideration of it. Unless it be duly appreciated, and in some measure remedied, it is perfectly needless to talk of Church Reform.

Whoever is acquainted with Christianity, must see that differences of opinion amongst Christians are absolutely unavoidable. First, because our religion being a thing of the deepest personal interest, we are keenly alive to all the great questions connected with it, which was not the case with heathenism. Secondly, these questions are exceedingly numerous, inasmuch as our religion affects our whole moral being, and must involve, therefore, a great variety of metaphysical, moral, and political points;—that is to say, those very points which, lying out of the reach of demonstrative science, are, through the constitution of man's nature, peculiarly apt to be regarded by different minds differently. And thirdly, although all Christians allow the Scriptures to be of decisive authority, whenever their judgment is pronounced on any given case, yet the peculiar form of these Scriptures, which in the New Testament is rather that of a commentary than of a text;—the critical difficulties attending their interpretation, and the still greater difficulty as to their application:—it being a constant question whether such and such rules, and still more whether such and such recorded facts or practices, were meant to be universally binding;—and it being a farther question, amidst the infinite variety of human affairs, whether any case, differing more or less in its circumstances, properly comes under the scope of any given Scripture rule;—all these things prevent the Scriptures from being in practice decisive on controverted points, because the contending parties, while alike acknowledging the judge's authority, persist in putting a different construction upon the words of his sentence.

Aware of this state of things, and aware also with characteristic wisdom, of the deadly evil of religious divisions, the Roman Church ascribed to the sovereign power in the Christian society, in every successive age, an infallible spirit of truth, whereby the real meaning of any disputed passage of Scripture might be certainly and authoritatively declared; and if the Scripture were silent, then the living voice of the Church might supply its place,—and being guided by that same spirit

which had inspired the written word, might pronounce upon any new point of controversy with a decision of no less authority.

With the same view of preventing divisions, the unity of the Church was maintained, in a sense perfectly intelligible and consistent. Christians, wherever they lived, belonged literally to one and the same society,—they were subject to the same laws and to the same government. National and political distinctions were wholly lost sight of; the vicar of Christ and his general council knew nothing of England or of France, of Germany or of Spain; they made laws for *Christendom*—a magnificent word, and well expressing those high and consistent notions of unity, on which the Church of Rome based its system. One government, one law, one faith, kept free from doubt and error by the support of an infallible authority—the theory was in perfect harmony with itself, and most imposing from its beauty, and apparent usefulness; but it began with assuming a falsehood, and its intended conclusion was an impossibility.

It is false that there exists in the Church any power or office endowed with the gift of infallible wisdom; and therefore it is impossible to prevent differences of opinion. But the claim to infallibility was not only false, but mischievous; because it encouraged the notion that these differences were to be condemned and prevented, and thus hindered men from learning the truer and better lesson, how to make them perfectly compatible with Christian union. Doubtless it were a far happier state of things if men did not differ from each other at all;—but this may be wished for only; it is a serious folly to expect it. For so, while grieving over an inevitable evil, we heap on it aggravations of our own making, which are far worse than the original mischief. Differences of opinion will exist, but it is our fault that they should have been considered equivalent to differences of principle, and made a reason for separation and hostility.

Our fathers rightly appreciated the value of church unity; but they strangely mistook the means of preserving it. Their system consisted in drawing up a statement of what they deemed important truths, and in appointing a form of worship and a ceremonial which they believed to be at once dignified and edifying; and then they proposed to oblige every man, by the dread of legal penalties or disqualifications, to subscribe to their opinions, and to conform to their rites and practices. But they forgot that while requiring this agreement, they had themselves disclaimed, what alone could justify them in enforcing it—the possession of infallibility. They had parted with the weapon which would have served them most effectually, and strange were the expedients resorted to for supplying its place. At one time it was the

Apostles' Creed; at another the decrees of the four first general councils; or, at another, the general consent of the primitive Church, which formed an authoritative standard of such truths as might not be questioned without heresy. But though the elephant might still rest upon the tortoise, and the tortoise on the stone, yet since the claim to infallibility was once abandoned, the stone itself rested on nothing. The four first councils were appealed to as sanctioning their interpretation of Scripture by men who yet confessed that the decisions of these councils were only of force, because they were agreeable to the Scripture. Turn which ever way they would, they sought in vain for an *authority* in religious controversies; infallibility being nowhere to be found, it was merely opinion against opinion; and however convinced either party might be of the truth of its own views, they had no right to judge their opponents.

With regard to the ceremonies and practices of the Church, a different ground was taken. It is curious to observe the contradictory positions in which the two parties were placed:—the Church of England enforcing a tyranny upon principles in themselves most liberal and most true;—the Dissenters accidentally advocating the cause of liberty, while their principles were those of the most narrow-minded fanaticism. One feels ashamed to think that the great truths so clearly and so eloquently established by Hooker, in the earlier books of his ecclesiastical polity, should have served in practice the petty tyranny of Laud and Whitgift, or the utterly selfish and worldly policy of Elizabeth. The Church of England maintained most truly, that rites and ceremonies, being things indifferent in themselves, might be altered according to the difference of times and countries, and that the regulation of such matters was left wholly to the national Church. But inasmuch as the government of the national Church was a mere despotism —the crown having virtually transferred to itself the authority formerly exercised by the popes—its appointments were made with an imperious stiffness, which was the more offensive from the confessed indifferent nature of the matters in question; and while one ritual was inflexibly imposed upon the whole community, in direct opposition to the feelings of many of its members, and too simple and unattractive to engage the sympathies of the multitude, this fond attempt to arrive at uniformity, inflicted a deadly blow, according to Lord Falkland's most true observation, on the real blessing of Christian union.

I am well aware that if it be a mere question of comparative faultiness, the opponents of the Established Church in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are at least as much to be condemned as its rulers. That coarse-minded ignorance, which delighted to isolate itself

from all the noble recollections of past times, and confounded all the institutions and practices of the Christian Church during several centuries, under the opprobrious names of superstition and idolatry; that captious superstition which quarreled with the form of a minister's cap, or the colour of his dress, deserved indeed little consideration, if the principles of government are to be made dependent on the merits of particular parties or individuals. But the cause of truth, and the welfare of mankind, have been for ever sacrificed to the paltry triumphs of personal argument:—if a party can show that its opponents have been more blameable than itself, it looks upon itself as standing clear in the judgment of posterity and of God. The provocation given may indeed lessen our estimate of the guilt of individuals; but it ought not to affect our sentiments of the wisdom or evil tendency of their conduct; and though the virulence and ignorance of the puritans may dispose us to excuse Whitgift and Laud, as individuals, yet their system is not the less to be condemned, as in itself arbitrary and schismatical, and tending to aggravate and perpetuate the evils which it professed to combat.

Thus within fifty years of the overthrow of the Roman religion in England, the spirit of Protestantism, followed up only in one half of its conclusions, had divided the nation into two hostile parties, each careless of union, and looking only to victory. The religious quarrel blending itself with the political struggle at which society in its progress had then arrived, became thus the more irreconcileable; each party boasted of its martyrs, and exulted in the judgments which had befallen its enemies; the royalist churchman consecrated the 29th of May as a day of national thanksgiving; the puritan, who had deemed popery and prelacy crushed for ever by the arms of God's saints, now bewailed the new St. Bartholomew of 1662, and the vindictive oppression of the Five Mile Act.

There succeeded an age of less zeal, but scarcely of more charity. Time had reconciled men to the monstrous sight of a large proportion of a Christian people living in a complete religious separation from their fellow-Christians; of a numerous portion of the children of the State, living as aliens from the national worship. And the means hitherto adopted for preventing such a division were so odious in themselves, and had so signally failed to effect their object, that none could wish them to be continued any longer. Hostilities were accordingly suspended and the Toleration Act was passed;—a strange measure, by which the nation sanctioned the non-observance of its own institutions, and relaxed by one half the bond of national communion. Yet at the very same period an attempt to effect, not a peace, but an union

with the Dissenters, totally failed: those true Christians who wished to make the national Church more comprehensive, were unable to carry their point: persecution first—toleration afterwards—any thing seemed preferable to Christian charity and Christian union.

Then followed one of those awful periods in the history of a nation, which may be emphatically called its times of trial. I mean those tranquil intervals between one great revolution and another, in which an opportunity is offered for profiting by the lessons of past experience, and to direct the course of the future for good. From our present dizzy state, it is startling to look back on the deep calm of the first seventy years of the eighteenth century. All the evils of society were yet manageable; while complete political freedom, and a vigorous state of mental activity, seemed to promise that the growth of good would more than keep pace with them, and that thus they might be kept down for ever. But tranquillity, as usual, bred carelessness; events were left to take their own way uncontrolled; the weeds grew fast, while none thought of sowing the good seed. The Church and the Dissenters lived in peace; but their separation became daily more confirmed. Meanwhile the uniformity, and the strict formality, which the Church had fondly adopted in order to extinguish Dissent, now manifestly encouraged it. As the population increased, and began to congregate into large masses in those parts of the country which before had been thinly inhabited, the Church required an enlarged machinery, at once flexible, and powerful. What she had was both stiff and feeble; her ministers could only officiate in a church, and were compelled to confine themselves to the prescribed forms of the liturgy; while the Dissenters, free and unrestricted, could exercise their ministry as circumstances required it, whether in a mine, by a canal side, or at the doors of a manufactory; they could join in hymns with their congregations, could pray, expound the Scriptures, exhort, awaken, or persuade, in such variety, and in such proportions, as the time, the place, the mood of their hearers, or their own might suggest or call for.

Thus, by the very nature of the case, the influence of the Dissenters spread amongst the poorer classes. It was a great good, that the poor and ignorant should receive any knowledge of Christianity;—but it was a mixed good, because the evil of sectarianism was at hand to taint it. The minister at the meeting-house rejoiced to thin the church;—the minister of the church rejoiced in his turn, if he could win back hearers from the meeting. As if their great common cause had not required all their efforts, much of their zeal was directed against each other; and if there was not hostility, there was an increase of rivalry and of jealousy. It might have been thought that the many

good and active men who were now daily rising up amongst the ministers of the Establishment, would have been struck by the evils of their position, and have laboured to remove them. But some had been so used to the existence of Dissent, that they were insensible to the magnitude of its evils;—others, with the old party spirit of the High Churchmen, imagined that all the blame of the separation rested with the Dissenters; they talked of the sin of schism, as if they were not equally guilty of it; they would have rejoiced in the conformity of the opposite party, that is to say, in their own victory; but they had no notion of any thing like a fair union. Others, again, fully occupied with their own individual duties, and feeling that they themselves were usefully employed, never directed their attention to the inadequacy of the system to which they belonged, considered as a whole; while a fourth set argued against reforming the Church now, from the fact of its having gone unreformed so long; and because the crisis was not yet arrived, they were blind to the sure symptoms of its progress, and believed that it would only be brought on by the means used to avert it.

But the population outgrew the efforts both of the Church and of the Dissenters; and multitudes of persons existed in the country who could not properly be said to belong to either. These were, of course, the most ignorant and degraded portion of the whole community,—a body whose influence is always for evil of some sort, but not always for evil of the same sort,—which is first the brute abettor and encourager of abuses, and afterwards their equally brute destroyer. For many years the populace hated the Dissenters for the strictness of their lives, and because they had departed from the institutions of their country; for ignorance before it is irritated by physical distress, and thoroughly imbued with the excitement of political agitation, is blindly averse to all change, and looks upon reform as a trouble and a disturbance. Thus the populace in Spain and in Naples have shown themselves decided enemies to the constitutional party; and thus the mob at Birmingham, so late as the year 1791, plundered and burnt houses to the cry of "Church and King," and threatened to roast Dr. Priestley alive, as a heretic. But there is a time, and it is one fraught with revolutions, when this tide of ignorance suddenly turns, and runs in the opposite direction with equal violence. Distress and continued agitation produce this change; but its peculiar danger arises from this, that its causes operate for a long time without any apparent effect, and we observe their seeming inefficiency till we think that there is nothing to fear from them; when suddenly the ground falls in under our feet, and we find that their work, though slow, had been done but too

surely. And this is now the case with the populace of England. From cheering for Church and King, they are now come to cry for no bishops, no tithes, and no rates : from persecuting the Dissenters, because they had separated from the Church, they are now eagerly joining with them for that very same reason ; while the Dissenters, on their part readily welcome these new auxiliaries, and reckon on their aid for effecting the complete destruction of their old enemy.

This being the state of things, it is evident, that the existence of Dissent has divided the efforts of Christians, so as to make them more adverse to each other than to the cause of ungodliness and wickedness ; it has prevented the nation from feeling the full benefits of its national Establishment, and now bids fair to deprive us of them altogether. Dissent, indeed, when it becomes general, makes the establishment cease to be national ; there being so large a portion of the nation whose religious wants it does not satisfy. Yet we have seen, on the other hand, that differences of religious opinion, and of religious rites and ceremonies, are absolutely unavoidable ; and that since there exists on earth no infallible authority to decide controversies between Christians it is vain for any one sect to condemn another, or in its dealings with others to assume that itself is certainly right, and its opponents as certainly in error.

Is it not, then, worth while to try a different system ? And since disunion is something so contrary to the spirit of Christianity, and difference of opinion a thing so inevitable to human nature, might it not be possible to escape the former without the folly of attempting to get rid of the latter ; to constitute a Church thoroughly national, thoroughly united, thoroughly Christian, which should allow great varieties of opinion, and of ceremonies, and forms of worship, according to the various knowledge, and habits, and tempers of its members, while it truly held one common faith, and trusted in one common Saviour, and worshipped one common God ?

The problem then is, to unite in one Church different opinions and different rites and ceremonies ; and first, let us consider the case of a difference of religious opinions.

Before such an union is considered impracticable, or injurious to the cause of Christianity, might we not remember what, and how many, those points are, on which all Christians are agreed ?

We all believe in one God, a spiritual and all-perfect Being, who made us, and all things ; who governs all things by His Providence : who loves goodness, and abhors wickedness.

We all believe that Jesus Christ, His Son, came into the world for our salvation ; that He died, and rose again from the dead, to prove

that His true servants shall not die eternally, but shall rise as He is risen, and enjoy an eternal life with Him and with His Father.

We all believe that the volume of the Old and New Testaments contains the revelation of God's will to man; that no other revelation than what is there recorded has been ever given to mankind before or since; that it is a standard of faith and a rule of practice; so that we all acknowledge its authority, although we may often understand its meaning differently.

We all have, with very few exceptions, the same notions of right and wrong; or, at any rate, the differences on these points do not exist between Christians of different sects, but between sincere Christians of all sects, and those who are little better than mere Christians in name. We all hold that natural faults are not therefore excusable, but are earnestly to be struggled against; that pride and sensuality are amongst the worst sins; that self-denial, humility, devotion, and charity, are amongst the highest virtues. We all believe that our first great duty is to love God; our second, to love our neighbour.

Now, considering that on these great points all Christians are agreed, while they differ on most of them from all who are not Christians, does it seem unreasonable that persons so united in the main principles of man's life, in the objects of their religious affections, and of their hopes for eternity, should be contented to live with one another as members of the same religious society?

But they differ also in many important points, and cannot therefore form one church without seeming to sanction what they respectively believe to be error. Now, setting aside the different opinions on church government, which I shall notice presently, is it true that there are many important points of pure doctrine on which the great majority of Christians in England at this moment are not agreed? The Presbyterians, the Methodists of all denominations, the Independents, the Baptists, the Moravians, can hardly be said to differ on any important point, except as connected with church government, either from one another or from the Establishment. The difference with the Baptists as to the lawfulness of Infant Baptism, may perhaps be thought an exception; but, if I mistake not, one of the highest authorities among the Baptists has expressly maintained the lawfulness of communion with Pædobaptists; and the question is not which practice is the more expedient, but whether Infant Baptism on the one hand, or the refusing it to all who cannot understand its meaning on the other, be either of them errors so fatal as to make it impossible to hold religious communion with those who maintain them.

There remain the Quakers, the Roman Catholics, and the Unita-

rians, whose differences appear to offer greater difficulty. And undoubtedly, so long as these sects preserve exactly their present character, it would seem impracticable to comprehend them in any national Christian church; the epithet "national" excluding the two former, and the epithet "Christian," rendering alike impossible the admission of the latter. But the harshest and most offensive part of the peculiarities of every sect has always arisen from the opposition of antagonists. Extravagance in one extreme provokes equal extravagance in the other. If, then, instead of devising forms so positive and controversial, as to excite mistrust of their accuracy in the most impartial minds, and vehement opposition from those whose opinions lean to a different side, we were to make our language general and comprehensive, and content ourselves with protesting against the abuses which may follow from an exclusive view of the question, even when it is in itself substantially true, it is probable that those who differ from us would soon begin to consider the subject in a different temper; and that if truth were the object of both parties, and not victory, truth would in fact be more nearly attained by both. In this respect, the spirit of the Seventeenth Article of the Church of England affords an excellent model, inasmuch as it is intended to be comprehensive and conciliatory, rather than controversial. And the effect to be hoped for from assuming such a tone, would be the bringing reasonable and moderate men to meet us, and to unite with us; there would of course be always some violent spirits, who would maintain their peculiar tenets without modification; but the end of all wise government, whether in temporal matters or in spiritual, is not to satisfy every body, which is impossible, but to make the dissatisfied a powerless minority, by drawing away from them that mass of curable discontent whose support can alone make them dangerous.

That there is this tractable disposition in the majority of mankind, experience sufficiently proves. And we should remember that at present the spirit of sectarianism binds many men even to the extravagances of their own party, because they think it a point of honour not to be suspected of lukewarmness. But even as things are, we know that many Quakers conform, in their dress and language, much more nearly to the rest of the world, than the stricter members of their sect approve of. Would not this temper be carried still further if those needless assertions of the lawfulness of war and of oaths were expunged from our Articles, and if we showed ourselves more sensible to that high conception of Christian perfection, which breathes through their whole system, and which, even when perverted into extravagance, ought not to be spoken of without respect?

Again, with the Roman Catholics;—as long as we indulge in that scurrilous language respecting them, which is almost habitual to one party amongst us, we shall assuredly do nothing but confirm them in all their errors, and increase their abhorrence of Protestantism. It is perfectly idle to attack their particular tenets and practices, till we can persuade them that they may lawfully judge for themselves. Nor shall we effect this by calling the Pope Antichrist;—and his claim to infallibility the blasphemous fruit of ambition and avarice. We dare not analyze too closely the motives of our best actions;—but if ever grand conceptions of establishing the dominion of good over evil may be allowed to have concealed from the heart the ignobler feelings which may have been mixed with them, this excuse may justly be pleaded for Gregory VII. and Innocent III. The infallibility of the Church was the fond effort of the human mind to believe in the reality of the support which its weakness so needed;—its unity was a splendid dream, beautiful but impracticable. We might sympathize with the Roman Catholics in the wish that we could find any infallible guide—that there existed on earth the wisdom and the goodness capable of exercising an universal dominion;—and then we might urge them to consider whether indeed our wishes are enough to warrant our belief—whether experience does not forbid the fulfilment of our hopes;—and whether the lesser, but certain good be not a surer stay to our infirmities, than an image of perfection which we cannot realize.

If ever the Roman Catholics of England could be convinced that universal empire is equally impracticable in religious matters as in temporal; and that no bond of society, using the term in the strict sense of a body of men living under the same government, and bound by the same laws, can be more extensive than that of the political society or nation to which every man belongs by birth, they would then feel that they were members naturally of the Church of England, and not of the Church of central Italy. And then they would acknowledge further, that as the Parliaments of our ancestors could not preclude their posterity from making such alterations as the altered circumstances of a future generation might demand; so neither could the councils of our ancestors debar their successors from a similar right; that the national Church in every generation is equally invested with sovereign power to order such rites and forms of worship as it may deem expedient; and that though necessarily unable to command conviction in matters of opinion, it may yet lawfully regulate matters of practice. And if our Church were made truly national in point of government, if the king's supremacy were made what it was intended to be in principle, the substitution of a domestic government instead of a foreign one, and if our

ecclesiastical constitution were rendered definite and intelligible, is it beyond hope that many who are now Roman Catholics, would ere long unite themselves religiously as well as politically with the rest of their countrymen?

Lastly, with regard to the Unitarians, it seems to me that in their case an alteration of our present terms of communion would be especially useful. The Unitarian body in England consists of elements the most dissimilar; including many who merely call themselves Unitarians, because the name of unbeliever is not yet thought creditable, and some also who are disgusted with their unchristian associates, but who cannot join a church which retains the Athanasian creed. Every means should be taken to separate these from their present unworthy society, that they who are really Christians might join their fellow-Christians, and they who are really unbelievers might be known by all the world to be so. I know that many good men draw a broad line of distinction between errors respecting the Trinity, and errors on any other point. They cannot unite, they say, with those who are not Trinitarians; and Lord Henley, while advocating an union with Dissenters in general, especially excepts those who, to use his own language, "deny the divinity of our Lord, or the mystery of the triune Jehovah." The last expression is worthy of notice, as affording a specimen of that irritating phraseology which has confirmed so many in error. Is it the way to reclaim any man from Unitarianism, to insist upon his believing in "the mystery of the triune Jehovah?" The real question is, not what theoretical articles a man will or will not subscribe to, but what essential parts of Christian worship he is unable to use. Now, the addressing Christ in the language of prayer and praise, is an essential part of Christian worship. Every Christian would feel his devotions incomplete, if this formed no part of them. This, therefore, cannot be sacrificed; but we are by no means bound to inquire, whether all who pray to Christ entertain exactly the same ideas of his nature. I believe that Arianism involves in it some very erroneous notions as to the object of religious worship; but if an Arian will join in our worship of Christ, and will call him Lord and God, there is neither wisdom nor charity in insisting that he shall explain what he means by these terms; nor in questioning the strength and sincerity of his faith in his Saviour, because he makes too great a distinction between the divinity of the Father, and that which he allows to be the attribute of the Son.

It seems to have been the boast hitherto of the several sects of Christians, to invent formulæ both of worship and of creeds, which should serve as a test of any latent error; that is, in other words, which should force a man to differ from them, however gladly he would have

remained in their communion. May God give us, for the time to come, a wiser and a better spirit; and may we think that the true problem to be solved in the composition of all articles and creeds and prayers for public use, is no other than this; how to frame them so as to provoke the least possible disagreement, without sacrificing, in our own practical worship, the expression of such feelings as are essential to our own edification.

If it be said that this is contrary to the uniform example of the Christian world, it is unhappily too true that it is so: and let history answer how the cause of Christianity has prospered under the system actually adopted. Or let those answer who, in attempting to acquaint themselves with ecclesiastical history, have groaned inwardly for very weariness at its dull and painful details. What ought to be more noble or more beautiful, than the gradual progress of the Spirit of light and love, dispelling the darkness of folly, and subduing into one divine harmony all the jarring elements of evil, which divided amongst them the chaos of this world's empire? Such should have been the history of the Christian church; and what has it been actually? No steady and unwavering advance of heavenly spirits; but one continually interrupted, checked, diverted from its course, nay, driven backwards, as of men possessed by some bewildering spell—wasting their strength upon imaginary obstacles—fancying that their road lay to the right or left, when it led straight forward—hindering each other's progress and their own by stopping to analyse and dispute about the nature of the sun's light till all were blinded by it—instead of thankfully using its aid to show them the true path onward. In other words, men overrated the evil of difference of opinion, and underrated that of difference of practice; and their efforts were thus diverted from a cause in which all good men would have striven together, to one where goodness and wickedness were mere accidental adjuncts, equally found on one side as on the other. Or, to take a much narrower view of the question, we should consider that the very notion of an extensive society implies a proportionate laxity in its points of union. There is a choice between an entire agreement with a very few, or general agreement with many, or agreement in some particular points with all: but entire agreement with many, or general agreement with all, are things impossible. Two individuals might possibly agree in three hundred articles of religion; but as they add to their own numbers, they must diminish that of their articles, unless they can prevent their associates from exercising their own understandings. Nor is this only applicable to a national church; it holds good of the smallest districts, where there are assembled men of different habits, different abilities, different degrees of knowledge, different

tempers, and it may almost be said, different ages. If agreement of *opinion* on a number of points be required as the condition of communion, there must be many different churches in every town; and these will be continually multiplying, for exclusiveness grows by indulgence; and men will form select societies among the select, till the church of Christ will become almost infinitely divisible. Infallibility or brute ignorance can alone prevent differences of opinion. Men, at once fallible and inquiring, have their choice either of following these differences up into endless schisms, or of allowing them to exist together unheeded, under the true bond of agreement of principle.

I may be pardoned, perhaps, for some repetition in dwelling again on points already noticed; as this perversion of the term unity, from a practicable and useful sense to one at once impracticable and unimportant, has been the great mischief both of the Christian church in general, and of the Church of England in particular, and has brought abou in the latter that monstrous state of things in which a total Reform can alone save it from total destruction. We now proceed then to consider the practicability of uniting in one national church men attached to various forms of church government.

In proposing any alterations in this part of our system, we have at least this advantage; that the present state of things is acceptable to no one. It is in fact a confessed anomaly, at once weak and unpopular; and has come to such a point of actual dissolution, that it has been made a question what the government of the Church of England is. Yet there exist prejudices which would be more shocked, perhaps, by any change than they are by the present system; and these prejudices should be consulted as far as is possible, without interfering with the substantial ends of all government.

It is the fashion to complain of the great inequality which prevails in the Established Church; but it is not very difficult to prove that there is not inequality enough;—that the Church is like an army destitute of non-commissioned officers, and therefore incapable of acting with sufficient effect, through this defect in its organization. In other words, as all classes of society require the services of the ministers of religion, the ministry should contain persons taken from all; and in a national church, all the great divisions of the nation should have a share in the government. The Scotch Church fails in not reaching up to the level of the aristocracy; the English Church, as Wesley saw, fails in not reaching down to the level of the poor:—the Roman Church, embracing in the wide range of its offices every rank of society, from the prince to the peasant, offers in this respect a perfect model. And if the scale of ascent be sufficiently gradual the Christian ministry thus

furnishes a beautiful chain to link the highest and the lowest together through the bond of their sacred office, without the absurdity of attempting to bring both to the same level.

But when we propose such a scale, we find that its highest and lowest points are vehemently objected to by opposite parties. On one side we have the old cry against prelacy, strengthened at this moment by a foolish political prejudice, and by the natural impatience of the lovers of evil at seeing Christianity advanced, as such, to situations of honour and influence. And on the other side, there is a dread of low-minded and uneducated teachers; combined, perhaps, with some Jewish and Pagan confusion of the Christian ministry with the caste and family priesthoods of antiquity. The cry against a wealthy and dignified episcopacy, is, where it is honest, the fruit of a whole series of mistakes and misconceptions. It is ridiculous to suppose, that the rulers of a society could ever have been, as a body, taken from the poorer members of it. The relation of the Apostles to the rest of the Church was wholly peculiar: men, so divinely gifted, had a claim to authority, which set aside all considerations of wealth or poverty; but the instant that these gifts ceased, wealth would be in itself a title to power; and where merit was equal, a rich man would have made a more efficient bishop than a poor one. St. Paul requires a bishop to be "given to hospitality;" he must therefore have wherewith to exercise it. There is a great deal said in the New Testament against covetousness and self-indulgence; but this is addressed to all Christians equally; and if a layman does not conceive himself to be violating these commands by possessing a considerable property, with what assurance can he press such an interpretation of them upon his neighbour, because he is a minister? Some who inveigh against the wealth of the Church, meaning by that term, the clergy, and yet express great satisfaction in the wealth of the nation, which in this country is the Church, betray an ignorance and an inconsistency truly surprising: but an argument from misapplied texts of Scripture would be called superstition and folly, if it were urged in defence of tithes; and truly it is no less fanatacism and folly, or folly and something worse, when it is used against the riches of the clergy, than when it is used in support of them.

Equally unreasonable are the arguments against an order of ministers chosen from the poorer classes of society. That they must be generally less educated than the ministers of a richer class, is clear; and so far they would be inferior to them: nor is it intended that an uneducated man should in any case be the principal minister in a parish, as that would undo one of the chief benefits, so far as moral and social improvement is concerned, of a national establishment. But there is an

enormous advantage in giving all ranks of society their share in the administration of the Church: they would think that they had an interest in a system which provided a place for them as well as for the rich; but no man cares much about a system in which he is wholly passive; in which he never acts himself, but is always the object of the care and regulations of others. The difference of the gifts possessed by the first Christians, applies entirely by analogy, to us now: "those members of the body which seem to be more feeble, are necessary;" and more is gained by the variety of qualifications, than is lost by their inequality.

But it is said that uneducated ministers would spread the most mischievous fanaticism. I ask, what is the case as things are now? Have we no fanatical teaching at present? Now, if an uneducated man of serious impressions feels that he can be useful to persons of his own sort, by pressing on their minds the truths which have improved and comforted his own he finds no place for himself in the Established Church. The clergyman of his parish would tell him to go to church and learn himself, instead of setting up to teach others. And no doubt he has enough to learn, but so have we all; and it does not follow that he should be unfit to teach some, because there are others who could teach him. But, meanwhile, the result is, that whether fit or not, he *does* teach: the Toleration Act has settled this point. He may teach where and what he chooses, so long as he does not belong to the Establishment. And of what use is it to say that the *Church* does not suffer from his ignorance, and is innocent of encouraging it? The *nation* suffers from it so far as it is ignorance, and the National Church is therefore concerned in remedying it. At present it exists unchecked and undirected, because the Church abandons it to itself: but if it were incorporated into its system, it would become immediately subject to control, and whilst all, and more than all, of its present usefulness was derived from it, its mischiefs would in a great degree be obviated.

But the most essential step towards effecting this and every other improvement in the Church, consists in giving to the laity a greater share in its ordinary government.

The Bishop stands alone in his diocese, the Minister in his parish; and so little are the laity associated with them officially in their operations that the very word Church has lost its proper meaning, and is constantly used to express only the clerical members of it. The worst consequence of this, no doubt, is the unchristian distinction thus created between the clergy and the laity, to the equal injury of both; but one considerable evil resulting from it is the annihilation of Church discipline. As long as the clergy have the whole administration of the Church in

their own hands, their power over other men must be neutralized, or else we incur all the dangers of a system of priestcraft; and for the same reason, if a bishop be the sole ruler of his diocese, he must be so shackled to prevent him from becoming a tyrant, as to be actually divested of the powers essential to government. And so from a superstition about what men fancy to be the divine right of Episcopacy, the Church has practically all but gone to pieces, from the want of any government at all.

This want of government or of social organization in the Church has been one main cause of the multiplication of Dissenters. Men's social wants have not been satisfied;—and a Christian Church which fails in this particular, neglects one of the most important ends of Christianity. Consider the case of one of the parishes in a large manufacturing town; there is a population of several thousand souls often comprised nominally within the same subdivision of the whole Christian society of the nation; but what is their organization and bond of union? Perhaps one parish church, utterly unable to contain a fourth part of their numbers; and one minister, who must be physically incapable of becoming personally acquainted with even so much as a smaller proportion of them. The other officers of the parochial society are the parish clerk, the churchwardens, the overseers of the poor,—how little like the deacons of old,—the beadle and the constable! What an organization for a religious society! And how natural was it that men should form distinct societies for themselves, when that to which they nominally belonged performed none of the functions of a society. And even in those cases, where, by the exertions of the incumbent, in providing one or more curates to assist him in his duty, by the endowment of chapels of ease, or the institutions of lectureships, the visitation of the sick in the parish is tolerably provided for;—still the want of a social organization remains the same. The parishioners, except in questions about rates, never act as a body, nor feel as a body. They have no part in keeping up any religious discipline; those amongst them who are qualified for instructing or exhorting their neighbours can do it only as individuals. The very church itself closed during the greater part of the day, perhaps of the week, is opened only for the performance of one uniform service, never to be added to, never to be varied. Even the singing, where alone some degree of liberty has been left to the congregation, is in some dioceses brought down to the same uniformity, and nothing may be sung but the old and new versions of the Psalms of David. Thus the people are, as members of the Church, wholly passive;—the love of self-government, one of the best instincts in our nature, and one most opposite to the spirit of lawlessness, finds no place

for its exercise; they neither govern themselves, nor is there any one else to govern them.

In order to an efficient and comprehensive Church system, the first thing necessary is to divide the actual dioceses. A government must be feeble where one bishop, as is the case in the diocese of Chester, has the nominal superintendence over a tract of country extending in length above a hundred miles, and over a population of nearly two millions of souls. Every large town should necessarily be the seat of a bishop, the bishopric thus created giving no seat in Parliament;—and the addition of such an element into the society of a commercial or manufacturing place, would be in itself a great advantage;—for, as in small cathedral towns, the society is at present much too exclusively clerical, so in towns like Manchester and Birmingham, the influence of the clergy is too little; they are not in a condition to colour sufficiently the mass of a population whose employment is to make money. The present dioceses might then become provinces, or if it should be thought desirable to diminish the number of bishops in the House of Lords, the number retained might correspond to the number of provinces which it might be found convenient to constitute, so that metropolitan bishops alone should have seats in Parliament. And for the new bishoprics to be created, the deaneries throughout England would go a long way towards endowing them;—while in many cases nothing more would be required, than to change the name and office of the incumbent of the principal parish in the town? so that instead of being the minister of one church he should become the bishop of the diocese, the income of his office remaining the same as at present.

The several dioceses throughout England being thus rendered efficient in point of extent and population, it would be next required to organize their government. Episcopalians require that this should be *episcopal;* the Dissenters of almost every denomination would insist that it should not be *prelatical.* But it may be the first without being the last. Episcopacy may be regulated in two ways, so as to hinder it from being tyrannical; either by withdrawing almost every matter from its jurisdiction, according to the system now pursued in England, or by uniting and tempering it with an admixture of more popular authorities. But of these two expedients the first is equally destructive of the power of a bishop for good as for evil; the last would leave him at liberty to do good, but would merely restrain him from using his authority amiss. For instance, a bishop should be incapable of acting without his council, and this council should consist partly of lay members, and partly of clerical, to be appointed partly by himself, and partly by the ministers and lay elders of the several parishes in his diocese. A

court would be thus formed, to which the maintenance of discipline might be safely entrusted, and ministers of scandalous life might be removed from their benefices without the tedious and ruinous process now imposed upon the bishop, if he is anxious to do his duty in such cases. Probably, too, it would be expedient to create something like a general assembly of the Church in each diocese, to meet at a certain time in the year, under the presidency of the bishop, and to enact such general regulations as might from time to time be needed. A meeting of this kind, even were its sittings ever so short, would be useful in the mere sensation that it would excite among the people; as it would present the Church to them in a form at once imposing and attractive, and would destroy that most mischievous notion which the present visitations rather tend to encourage—that the Church is synonymous with the clergy. Again, either this general assembly, or the bishop and his ordinary council, should have the power of increasing or reducing the number of church officers in any particular parish, and of settling the limits of their respective ministrations. Where one man's constant ministry is sufficient, the occasional assistance of more may yet be desirable; or or if not a public, yet a domestic ministry, in addition to the public one, may be useful; that is, even in small country parishes there are often found men of serious character, who would be able and willing to preach to their neighbours, and who do preach, as things are at present, but with this evil, that they preach by their own authority, and are unavoidably led to feel themselves in opposition to the Establishment. Now, it is an obvious principle of every society, that men should not take its offices upon themselves without authority; and many persons who are now self-constituted teachers, would gladly obtain a sanction to their ministry, and would consent to put it under the regulation of the government of the Church, if such a recognition were rendered a thing easily obtainable. But in large towns, all the Christian ministers of every denomination actually employed in them are certainly not more than adequate to the wants of the population. That these could not be all maintained out of the funds of the present establishment is manifest; it is possible that some may be; and it is also possible that some gratuitous assistance might be rendered by persons who, having another trade or profession, were not wholly dependent on the ministry for support. But as the *dissenting* ministers are actually maintained by voluntary contributions, so the *assistant* ministers of a more comprehensive system, whether their opinions were in exact agreement with the present articles or not, would be easily, and I believe, most cheerfully maintained by Easter offerings, levied upon all the members of the Church, and divided according to the qualifications and labours of the respective ministers.

And as these would all be equally ministers of the National Church, they would have their share in the election of the clerical members of the bishop's council, and would be effectually secured against any lurking spirit of sectarian hostility which might be supposed to survive the overthrow of the present sectarian system.

But it may be said that a difficulty would arise as to the manner in which these ministers should be appointed; their election by their congregations being as odious to one class of persons, as it is dear to another. It seems to me desirable that a national Church should comprehend in itself many various ways of appointment; and that whilst the patronage of the existing benefices should on no account be disturbed, whether it be vested in the crown, or in corporate bodies, or in private individuals; yet, that where there is no endowment, and the minister is paid by a general contribution, the principle of election may fitly be allowed. But the actual abuses of all patronage, whether individual or popular, might easily be obviated by certain general regulations. It is a great evil, that a worthless individual, whether nominated by a private patron, or chosen by a misguided majority, should immediately and without further question enter upon his ministry. All patronage should be strictly recommendatory, and no more; the patron or electors should send the object of their choice to the bishop and his council, or, if it were thought fit, to another distinct tribunal, appointed by them; and here his qualifications should undergo a most rigid scrutiny. If he were rejected, the patron should recommend another candidate; but never should his recommendation, or the election of the inhabitants, be deemed equivalent to an actual appointment. And even when confirmed by the Church authorities, it should still be, in the first instance, only provisional, for one year; that during that time he might be tried in actual service, and if any just ground of objection existed against him, which might well happen, without supposing any such misconduct as should warrant his removal from an office conferred for life, the appointment might be either wholly cancelled, according to the nature of the case, or the term of probation extended to a longer period.

In suggesting that the qualifications of every person recommended to a benefice should be rigorously scrutinized, I am far from meaning that he should be subjected to an examination. Examinations can only be fitly applied to young men, and their proper place is previous to ordination, not when a man, after having been ordained, is to be appointed to some particular cure. Yet, in a matter of such importance, every security is needed; and more is required than the present system of testimonials, not only from their proved insufficiency, but because the people should have a more direct check than they have at present on

the nomination of their ministers. It should be the duty of the parish authorities, both lay and clerical, to report fully to the bishop's council, all that they can collect as to the character and general fitness of the person recommended by the patron. For instance, a senior fellow of a college, however irreproachable in his character, may, from his inactive and retired habits, be an unfit person to be appointed minister of a populous parish in a large town. It would be the duty of the parish authorities to represent this to the bishop's council; and in some cases the objection might be so strong, owing to local circumstances, as to render it proper to reject the person proposed altogether. But in every case it would be desirable that the appointment should, in the first instance, be only temporary, that it might be seen how the individual could accommodate himself to a life so different from his past one, whether his previous habits were or were not alterable. And we may be sure that the working of every system will be so much more indulgent than the theory, that we never need fear an excess of strictness; do what we will, considerations of good-nature and kindness to an individual will always prevail in the long-run over the sense of public duty.

The Church government then would be made more efficient, and at the same time, more popular than it is at present; 1, By reducing the size of the dioceses: 2, By giving the bishop a council consisting of lay members and of clerical, and partly elected by the officers of the respective parishes; which officers should themselves also be lay and clerical, and for the most part elected directly by the inhabitants: 3, By the institution of diocesan general assemblies: 4, By admitting into the Establishment, persons of a class much too poor to support the expense of an university education; but who may be exceedingly useful as ministers, and who do preach at present, but under circumstances which make them necessarily hostile to the National Church, and leave them utterly at liberty to follow their own caprices: 5, By allowing in many cases the election of ministers, and by giving to the inhabitants of the parish in every case, a greater check over their appointment than they at present enjoy: and 6, By constituting church officers in every parish, lay as well as clerical, who should share with the principal minister in its superintendence; and thus effect generally that good, which in London and elsewhere is now being attempted by individual zeal, in the establishment of district visiting societies. Whilst by rendering the Articles far more comprehensive than at present, according to what was said in the earlier part of this sketch, those who are now Dissenting ministers might at once become ministers of the Establishment, and as such would of course have their share in its government.

It will be observed, that the whole of this scheme supposes an episcopal government, and requires that all ministers should receive episcopal ordination. The Establishment is entitled surely to this concession from the Dissenters, especially when Episcopacy will have been divested of all those points against which their objections have been particularly levelled. Besides, there are many members of the Establishment who believe Episcopacy not expedient only, but absolutely essential to a Christian Church: and their scruples are entitled to quite as much respect as those of the Dissenters. And when experience has shown that Episcopalians will be satisfied if the mere name of bishop is preserved—for nothing can be more different in all essential points, than our Episcopacy and that of the primitive Church—and as this name is recommended not only by its ancient and almost universal use throughout Christendom, but by its familiarity to ourselves, and its long existence in our own constitution, there seems every reason why it should be retained,—and why those who may have objected to a prelate lording it over Christ's Church with absolute authority, may readily acknowledge the limited authority of a bishop, the president of his council of elders, supreme in rank, but controlled effectually in power.

This, perhaps, may be the fittest place to notice the clamour in which the Dissenters have blindly joined the unbelievers, against the bishops holding seats in the House of Lords. Never was there a question on which fanaticism and narrow-mindedness have so completely played into the hands of wickedness. The very notion of the House of Lords, is that of an assembly embracing the highest portions of the most eminent professions or classes of society. Accordingly, it contains, speaking generally, the most considerable of the landed proprietors of the kingdom, the most distinguished individuals in the army and navy; and in like manner a certain number of the heads of the clerical profession, and of the law. It is not that the Lord Chancellor and the Bishops are the representatives of their respective professions, in the sense of being placed in Parliament to look after their particular interests; nor is it at all for the sake of the clergy or the lawyers that they sit in the House of Peers, but for the sake of the nation; that the highest national council may have the benefit of their peculiar knowledge, and peculiar views of life. Now it is manifest, that all of what are called the liberal professions, exercise a certain influence over the minds of those who follow them both for good and for evil;—for evil, so far as they lead to exclusiveness—for good, inasmuch as they foster particular faculties of the mind, and give an especial power of appreciating and enforcing one class of important truths. As then, in an assembly consisting of men of one profession only, the evil influence

becomes predominant, and pedantry and narrow-mindedness are sure to be its characteristics; so when men of different professions are mixed, the evil of a professional spirit is neutralized, while its advantages remain in full force; and in proportion to the greater number of professions thus brought together in one assembly, will be the universality of its tone, and at the same time the soundness of its particular resolutions.

Lord Henley, therefore, labours under a double error when he supposes that the revival of any sort of ecclesiastical synod or convocation could be a substitute for the sitting of the bishops in Parliament, and when he talks of allowing the bishops to vote only on such questions as concern the *Church*. A synod or convocation might look as effectually after the interests of the clergy; but how would it compensate for the removal of one important element from the constitution of our highest national assembly? And again, when he speaks of questions which concern the Church, he means questions about the duties and payment of the clergy—an important part certainly of Church questions—but by no means the most important, still less the only ones. According to this narrow view of the meaning of the word Church, the bishops may vote upon a curate's salary bill, or a church building act; but the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and truth, are questions which affect the Church no more than the Royal Society. In other words, it concerns not the Church whether its members are involved in the guilt and misery of an unnecessary war,—whether their laws are regardless of human life, and multiply temptations to crime;—whether, in short, their institutions and form of society are favourable to their moral advancement, or tend, on the contrary, to debase and to harden them.

But, says Lord Henley, the Divine Founder of the Church has declared that his kingdom was not of this world, and he "refused to give sentence in a criminal cause of adultery, and in a civil one of dividing an inheritance," p. 49. It might make Lord Henley and other good men a little suspicious of the applicability of our Lord's words to the present question, if they would remember how favourite a text they are with men who scarcely know any single declaration of our Lord's besides this, and who clearly and almost avowedly fear nothing so much as that the world should really become his kingdom. But first of all, if Christ's kingdom be not of this world, in the only sense which applies to the present question, if his Church may have nothing to do with making and repealing laws, approving of peace and war, imposing taxes, and other such matters, it follows distinctly, not that every clergyman, but that every Christian, should instantly be excluded

from the Throne, from Parliament, and from every public office whatever,, whether civil or military. We should require from members of Parliament no declarations against transubstantiation,—but simply a protestation that they did not belong to the kingdom of Christ, but were, and would remain so, faithful subjects of the kingdom of the world, and bound to do the god of this world true and undivided service. It is perfectly inconceivable how a man like Lord Henley can go on, page after page, using the word "Church" to signify the clergy, when he must know it is never used so in the New Testament; and that every passage which he quotes against mixing in secular affairs, applies exactly as much to the Lord Chancellor and the Commander-in-Chief, if they are Christians, as to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Lord Henley objects to "the example of such Jewish precedents as Eli and Ezra," p. 49. By what strange perversity does it happen, that the party to which Lord Henley seems to belong, should refuse to acknowledge the authority of Old Testament precedents, in the very case where they are really applicable, and yet should be for ever appealing to them where they are not applicable at all? Eli and Ezra are in this matter far more to the purpose than Paul, or Peter, or John; because, in their days, as in ours, the kingdom of God was a kingdom of the world also; whereas, in the days of the apostles it was not so. It is absolutely ridiculous in a country where Christianity is said to be the law of the land,—where all our institutions acknowledge it, and our kings are actually anointed before the altar,—to quote as applicable the state of the Christians of the first century, whose religion necessarily drew them away from all public duties, because heathenism and heathen principles were so mixed up with all the institutions of Rome, that every public office involved some compliance with them.

It is again a most groundless superstition, and one which at once occasioned and has been increased by the mischievous confusion of the Christian ministry with a *priesthood*, that any thing can be lawful for a Christian layman which is unlawful for a Christian minister. As the ministers are in a manner picked out from the whole Christian body, it may be within possibility to exact from them a higher standard of practice than can be enforced generally; but this is no more than saying, "what *all ought be*, we will take care that *some* at least *shall be*." If any one looks at the qualifications required by St. Paul in the ministers of the Church, 1 Tim. iii. 1–10. Titus i. 6–9, he will find amongst them no esoteric purity of life or fulness of knowledge; but the virtues of a good man, a good public officer, and a good Christian; the virtues which become, and are to be expected of, every one invested with authority in the Church of God, whether his peculiar minis-

try be on the seat of justice, or at the altar, or in the general government of the whole society.

But because these virtues are now become rare, because there may be found in the other ministries of the Church, men who do not acknowledge their obligation, therefore it is the more important that they who are called ministers in a peculiar sense, the ministers at the altar, should be put forward in situations where they can most loudly and most efficiently enforce them. And this is the great reason why the clergy ought to sit in both houses of Parliament, and why the enemies of Christianity, who well understand the interests of *their* Master, would gladly exclude them from both. It is because they are not priests, but Christians; because they hold and know no esoteric doctrine; because they are required to practise no virtue beyond the rest of their brethren, but yet because their profession obliges them to know what Christianity is, and public opinion, to take the lowest ground, hinders them from utterly casting it off in their practice, that therefore they are wanted in the national assembly of a professedly Christian nation. What we ought to calculate on in every member of the legislature—namely, that he should speak and act on Christian principles we are obliged now to look for from those who are bound to be Christians by a double profession, by their ordination as well as their baptism. In proportion to the proved insufficiency of one of these securities singly, is the need of applying to the combined strength of both.

But what if the salt has lost its savour; if in point of fact the bishops have not thus diffused the influence of Christianity through the House of Lords: whose has been the fault, and what is its remedy? Was not the fault theirs, who for so many years, I may almost say so many generations, made the appointment of a bishop a mere matter of patronage; or, at the best, the reward of ability and knowledge displayed on some mere abstract question of theology? Was not, and is not, the fault theirs, who, some in fraud and others in simplicity, adopting Lord Henley's confusion about the word Church, would confine the bishops to speaking on merely professional subjects, and would accuse them of meddling with secular matters, if they were to endeavour to christianize the laws or the measures of the government? Is not the fault, above all, theirs, who, retaining the system of translation for the sake of their own patronage, place the bishops in a situation of certain suspicion, and of unfair temptation? And is it not the most obvious remedy to do away at once and entirely with the system of translations, and thus to make the bishops the most independent of

any men in the House of Lords. For a lay lord, if he is an able and active man, may hope to rise to power by displacing an existing ministry, or by supporting them; a bishop, if translations were at an end, would have nothing to hope for from courtliness or from faction: he could gain nothing by basely voting for the government,—nothing by ambitiously and unfairly molesting them.

This digression, if such it can be called, has somewhat interrupted the main divisions of my argument; but it is naturally connected with the question of Church Government, and no part of the whole subject has been so mistakenly and so mischievously handled. I now return to the third division of my inquiry: whether it be not possible to unite in one Church great varieties of ritual,—in other words, whether uniformity of worship has been wisely made the object of our ecclesiastical legislation.

The friends of the Established Church justly extol the substantial excellence and beauty of the liturgy. It can indeed hardly be praised too highly as the solemn service of the Church embodying one of the best representations of the feelings and language of a true Christian, in his confessions, his thanksgiving, and his prayers. But as, while we reverence the Bible above all other books, we yet should never think of studying it to the exclusion of all others, so, and much more, may we say of the liturgy, that even allowing it to be the best conceivable religious service in itself, still it ought not to be the only one. The liturgy of the Church of England, with some few alterations, which I need not here specify, should be used once on every Sunday and every great Christian holiday throughout the year, in every parish church in England. But I doubt whether there are not many, even amongst its most sincere admirers, who in a second service on the same day, would be glad of some variety,—still more who would wish to vary the service according to the time and circumstances, when the church was opened on week days. Indeed I hardly know a more painful sight than the uninterrupted loneliness in which our churches are so often left from one Sunday to another. The very communion table and pulpit are dismantled of their coverings and cushions; the windows are closed; the doors fast locked, as if a Protestant church, except on a Sunday, were like the Pelasgicum at Athens, "best when unfrequented."* Now this has arisen partly, no doubt, from other causes; but the necessity of reading the Liturgy, and nothing but the Liturgy, both at morning and evening prayer, is an invincible obstacle to the opening of the Churches generally with any effect, except on a Sunday. It is doubt-

* Τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον. Thucyd. II. 17.

ful whether our arrangement of our time, and the universal pressure of business, would allow of the attendance of a large congregation at church on week days, under any circumstances; but it is certain, that in order to overcome these disadvantages, something more attractive is needed than the mere uniform reading of the same prayers, and going through the same forms day after day, both in the morning and the evening. Nor should I think it an evil, but a great good, that different services should be performed at different times of the day and week within the walls of the same church. Not only do the various tastes and degrees of knowledge amongst men require varieties in the form of their religious services, but the very same men are not always in the mood for the same things: there are times when we should feel most in unison with the deep solemnity of the Liturgy; there are times also, when we should better enjoy a freer and more social service; and for the sake of the greater familiarity, should pardon some insipidity and some extravagance. And he who condemns this feeling, does but lose his labour, and can but ill appreciate one great attribute of God's works,—their endless variety. Our sight, our hearing and our taste, are furnished with subjects of gratification, not of one kind only, but of millions; the morning song of the lark is not the same with the evening song of the nightingale: the scenery which we most enjoy in the full brightness of a summer day, is not that which best harmonizes with the solemnity of an autumn evening.

Now, considering that some persons would like nothing but the Liturgy, that others, on the contrary, can endure no prayers but such as are extemporaneous,—that many more have a preference for one practice or the other, but not so as to wish to be confined to the exclusive use of it, there seems to be no reason why the National Church should not enjoy a sufficient variety in its ritual, to satisfy the opinions and feelings of all. In a parish where there was but one minister, he might read the Liturgy on Sunday mornings, while on Sunday evenings, and on week days, he might vary the service according to his discretion and the circumstances of the case. But where there were several ministers, as there would be wherever there are now ministers of different denominations, the church might be kept open nearly the whole of the Sunday, and we may hope, during some part at least of every week day;—the different services being fixed at different hours, and performed by different ministers. And he judges untruly of human nature, who does not see that the peculiarities which men now cling to and even exaggerate, as the badge and mark of their own sect, would then soon sink into their proper insignificance when nothing

was to be gained by dwelling on them. Good men, feeling that they might express their opinions freely, and that their silence could not be misconstrued into fear or insincerity, would gladly listen to their better nature, which would teach them how much they had in common with one another, and how infinitely their points of agreement surpassed in importance their points of difference. And instead of an unseemly scene of one minister preaching against another, we should probably have an earnest union in great matters, and a manly and delicate forbearance as to points of controversy, such as would indeed become the disciples of Him, who is in equal perfection the God of truth and the God of love.

It may appear to some a point of small importance, but I believe that it would go a long way towards producing a kindly and united feeling amongst all the inhabitants of the parish, that the parish church should, if possible, be the only place of public worship ; and that the different services required, should rather be performed at different times in the same spot than at the same time in different places. In this respect, the spirit of the Mosaic law may be most usefully followed, which forbade the multiplication of temples and altars, but fixed on one spot to become endeared and hallowed to the whole people as the scene of their common worship. Besides the parish church has a sacredness which no other place of worship can boast of, in its antiquity, and in its standing amidst the graves of so many generations of our fathers. It is painful to think that any portion of the people should have ever broken their connexion with it ; it would be equally delightful to see them again assembled within its walls, without any base compromise of opinion on either side, but because we had learned a better wisdom than to deprive it of its just claim to the affections of all our countrymen, or to exclude any portion of our countrymen from the happiness of loving it as it deserves. Nor is it a light thing in the judgments of those who understand the ennobling effects of a quick perception of what is beautiful and venerable, that some of the most perfect specimens of architecture in existence should no longer be connected, in any man's mind, with the bitterness of sectarian hostility ; that none should be forced to associate, with their most solemn and dearest recollections, such utter coarseness and deformity as characterize the great proportion of the Dissenting chapels throughout England.

The appointment of various services in the same church, would not only be desirable in itself, but would also obviate the necessity of altering our own Liturgy, in order to enable the Dissenters to join in it ; for even if we could overcome their objections to any Liturgy whatever,

as such, still the differences of mere taste between different classes of people are so great, as to render it impossible to contrive any one service such as should be satisfactory to one party without a needful sacrifice of what is a great source of pleasure to the other. For instance, some of the Dissenters object to an organ, and to all but the simplest kinds of church music: yet it would be very unreasonable to pull down our organs, and to banish our anthems, and all the magnificence of our cathedral service, without considering that numerous class who feel as much delighted and edified by these things as others are offended at them. On the other hand, it is quite as unreasonable, and much more unchristian, to make a difference of taste a reason for continuing divisions in the Church of God. There is no reason why all should not be gratified without quarreling with each other; why the organ should not sound at the morning service, and be silent in the evening: why the same roof which had rung at one part of the day with the rich music of a regular choir, should not at another resound with the simpler but not less impressive singing of a mixed congregation.

Such, as it seems to me, is the reform really needed; to make the Church truly and effectually the "Church of England." Many points, about which there is the loudest clamour, I have passed over without notice;—partly, because for these there have been remedies proposed by other writers,—and partly, because I hold them to be utterly subordinate grievances when compared to the monstrous evil of sectarianism. The evil of pluralities is like that of sinecures and unmerited pensions in the state;—it should be removed, because it is unseemly and discreditable; but it is only folly or bad faith which would rank it amongst the most serious practical mischiefs of our ecclesiastical system. The inequality of ranks and emoluments in the Church, like that existing also in the whole frame of our Society, is probably excessive; but is a far less evil than the platform of equality to which some would reduce it. Even non-residence itself,—by which I mean the non-residence of any minister of the Establishment, whether incumbent or curate, happens accidentally to be only of inferior importance, because it generally exists in the country parishes, where the amount of population is small. Destroy it altogether, and the efficiency of the Church would be increased in a scarcely perceptible degree; for its great inefficiency as a national establishment arises from other causes,—from the enormous population of the towns, where the minister of the parish *is* generally resident, but utterly incapable of doing the work which he is nominally set to perform,—and from that other large masses of population, to whom the ministers of

the Establishment are nothing, whether resident or not, because they have separated themselves from the national communion. With regard to the cry about the bishops, translation is certainly indefensible, and its utter extinction highly needful: some means also should be taken to increase the revenue of the poorer bishoprics; and for this object something probably might well be spared from the revenue of those that are richest. But the sitting of the bishops in Parliament is a great national good; and a multiplication of their number, with a remodelling of their power, so as to give the Church a real episcopal government, is the reform of their order most needed and most effectual.

Nor have I said a word on the great question of Tithes, because I have reason to believe the question is in other and far abler hands. All acknowledge the odiousness of the present manner of payment;—but the problem hitherto has been, how to provide for it an adequate substitute.

But, suppose Tithes to be commuted,—the revenues of the clergy equalized,—residence universally enforced,—and pluralities done away with, the efficiency of the Establishment, as a great social engine of intellectual, moral, and religious good, will still be incomplete,—and for this very reason its stabiltty will be precarious. There will still remain that vast mass of the dissenting and of the godless population, who not sharing in its benefits, will labour to effect its destruction. These two parties are leagued together; and unless their league can be dissolved, the long continuance of a national Church in this country is a thing impossible. The cry which is destroying the Protestant Establishment in Ireland is already beginning to be echoed here: the Dissenters repeat the complaint of the Catholics,—"Why should we be obliged to contribute towards the maintenance of a Church which is not ours?" All the inherent evils of our detestable sectarian system will presently be brought to light, and will derange the very frame of society. Church rates have been already resisted;—that is to say, the noblest and most useful of all our public buildings will be suffered to go to ruin, or to be maintained by private munificence. Marriage, the most important of all social ordinances, will be made a private ceremony;—for such must be the character of a rite performed without the intervention of any public officer; whether that officer be a magistrate or a clergyman, may be a question of comparative indifference; for in either case society sanctions, and in a manner presides at the celebration of its holiest contract; but a Dissenting minister is a mere private individual, or rather an alien from the national society, to whose

acts society lends no authority. The registration of births, marriages, and deaths, a thing essentially of national concern, and to be placed under the control of public officers, is already claimed by the Dissenters as a right to be enjoyed by their own communities separately. Our universities, the great seats of public education, are in danger of becoming odious, because they are practically closed against so large a portion of the community;—while the evils of Dissenting colleges, pledged by their very name to narrow-mindedness, will continue to multiply. The end of all this will be, what the godless party are earnestly labouring to effect, the dissolution of the Establishment altogether;—that is, in other words, the public renouncing of our allegiance to God; for, without an Establishment, although it may happen that the majority of Englishmen may still be Christians, yet England will not be a Christian nation;—its government will be no Christian government;—we shall be wholly a kingdom of the world, and ruled according to none but worldly principles. In such a state the establishment of paganism would be an absolute blessing; anything would be better than a national society, formed for no higher than physical ends;—to enable men to eat, drink, and live luxuriously;—acknowledging no power greater than its own, and by consequence, no law higher than its own municipal enactments. Let a few generations pass over in such a state, and the missionary who should preach the worship of Ceres, or set up an oracle of Apollo, or teach the people to kindle the eternal fire of Vesta on the common altar hearth of their country, would be to that degraded society as life from the dead.*

But we are told to look at America; the United States have no national religion; but yet we are assured that they are as religious a peo-

* I cannot resist the pleasure of copying here the beautiful lines in which Mr. Wordsworth sympathizes so entirely with the feeling expressed in the text:—

"The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers;
Little we see in nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!
This sea, that bears her bosom to the moon;
The winds, that will be howling at all hours,
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers;
For this, for everything, we are out of tune;
It moves us not. Great God! I'd rather be
A pagan suckled in a creed out-worn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

ple as ourselves. When a man of science hears a fact asserted in direct contradiction to the known laws of nature, he cannot but suspect some misrepresentation or confusion in the statement. To assert that the irregular efforts of individual zeal and courage will oppose an invading enemy as effectually as a good regular army, would be little better than insanity; and yet it may be true, that in the last war the Spanish guerillas did more service to their country than the Spanish regular armies. We know, however, that the guerillas did not, and could not deliver Spain; it was an efficient regular army which achieved that work. So, if it could be shown that under any circumstances Christianity was flourishing as much without an Establishment as with one, it would merely prove that the particular Establishment in question was in a state of deplorable corruption, as it had so completely forfeited its inherent advantages. But in the alleged instance of the United States, we forget that "America" is, in the first place, a very vague word, and that in those parts of the Union in which religion is in the healthiest state, there is what is almost equivalent to an Establishment; that is, every man is obliged to contribute to a fund for religious instruction, but he has his choice as to the particular sect to which his quota is to be paid. Again, the Episcopal Church in New York is an endowed church; it still possesses the lands assigned to it by the British government, previously to the revolution. It may well be then that in New York, and in some of the New England states, the people may be more religious than in the great towns of England; but this concludes in favour of an Establishment, not against one; because there is an Establishment, or what amounts to nearly the same thing, in these parts of the United States, whereas there is virtually none in our great towns; so utterly inadequate is the supply of ministers to the demands of the ever-growing population. But if it be asserted, that in the southern and western states, society is in as healthy a state morally and religiously as in those parts of England where the Church is enabled to be efficient, then I should deny the fact altogether. With all the advantages enjoyed by America, as to the physical condition of her people, with her prodigious extent of available land, and her as yet comparatively scanty population, rendering the temptation to offences against property far less than it can be in an old and fully peopled country; still the world has as yet produced no instance of society advancing under a less promising aspect, intellectual, moral, and religious, than in the new states and territories of the American union.

But if we with our overflowing population and narrow limits were wilfully to plunge ourselves into the moral and religious state of southern and western America, the evils of their condition would be multi-

plied a thousand-fold here. Crowded together as we are, we cannot afford to be disorderly; it is well if, with all the aid of the most powerful and the purest institutions, we can organise and keep from taint the unwieldy masses of our population. And as the best of all institutions, I am anxious to secure a truly national Church, which, uniting within itself all Christians who deserve the name, except perhaps the mere handful of the Quakers and Roman Catholics, would leave without its pale nothing but voluntary or involuntary godlessness. We should hear no complaints then of the burden of supporting a Church to which men do not belong. Such language in a Dissenter's mouth is forcible; but who would heed it from a man who belonged to no church, who paid no minister of his own,—but hating God altogether, was consistently averse to contributing towards his service? Truly we may wait a long time before we shall find the thieves of a country willing to pay for the building of gaols, or the maintenance of an efficient police.

But, it may be said, admitting the soundness of the principles put forward in these pages, that the National Church should be rendered thoroughly comprehensive in doctrine, in government, and in ritual, by what power are they to be carried into effect? To whose hands in particular, should be committed the delicate task of remodelling the Articles, a measure obviously essential to the proposed comprehension, yet presenting the greatest practical difficulty? It seems to me that this is a question more properly to be answered by the Government, than by an individual; only, I may be allowed to express an earnest hope, that if ever an union with Dissenters be attempted, and it should thus become necessary to alter our present terms of communion, the determining on the alterations to be made should never be committed to a convocation or to any commission consisting of clergymen alone. It is the more needful to express this opinion strongly, because Lord Henley, while himself looking forward to an extension of the pale of the Church, declares that this is "exclusively a theological and ecclesiastical duty, and that no layman can take, or should desire to take, any part in the execution of it." So completely does his confused notion of what is meant by the Church pervade and vitiate every part of his work. Well has Mr. Hull * observed, with reference to this notion, that, "it breathes too little sense of Protestant responsibility." "We cannot be justified," he adds, "in neglecting the public service of our Creator, our Redeemer, and our Sanctifier; and must, therefore, at our own peril, look well to the method in which that public service is conducted and maintained." Laymen have no right to shift from their own

* "Thoughts on Church Reform." London: Fellowes, 1832.

shoulders an important part of Christian responsibility; and as no educated layman individually is justified in taking his own faith upon trust from a clergyman, so neither are the laity, as a body, warranted in taking the national faith in the same way. If ever it should be thought right to appoint commissioners to revise the Articles, it is of paramount importance, in order to save the plan from utter failure, that a sufficient number of laymen, distinguished for their piety and enlarged views, should be added to the ecclesiastical members of the commission. Professional learning, if not sufficiently tempered with the straight-forward views of a plain and sensible piety, would be absolutely mischievous; as it would lead men to retain the language of former controversies, where it is most important, both for the sake of truth and charity, that the statement should be general and should adopt no technical terms whatever in declaring doctrines, beyond such as may be used in the Scriptures themselves.

As for the proposed constitution of the government and ritual * of the Church, this would be naturally and in the first place the subject of legislative enactment; nor would it be more difficult to draw up the necessary details in this case, than it was found to be in the case of the Reform Bill. Care and attention would of course be requisite; and information on many points must be sought from persons locally or professionally qualified to furnish it; but there is nothing in the subject mat er itself which can render the previous report of any other authority necessary, before the question is submitted by the king's Governmei t to the consideration and decision of Parliament.

In venturing even to suggest so great a change in the constitution of our Church, I may probably expose myself to a variety of imputations. Above all, whoever pleads in favour of a wide extension of the terms of communion, is immediately apt to be accused of latitudinarianism, or as it is now called, of liberalism. Such a charge in the mouths of men at once low principled and ignorant, is of no importance whatever; neither should I regard it if it proceeded from the violent fanatical party, to whom truth must ever remain unknown, as it is unsought after. But in the Church of England even bigotry often wears a softer and a nobler aspect; and there are men at once pious, high minded, intelligent, and full of all kindly feelings, whose intense love for the forms of the Church, fostered as it has been by all the best associations of their

* By "ritual" I do not mean the alterations to be made in the Liturgy, and which would be the proper business of the commission appointed to revise the Articles; but only the repealing those laws which permit nothing but the Liturgy to be read in the Church, and enjoin that it shall be read itself both at Morning and Evening Prayer.

pure and holy lives, has absolutely engrossed their whole nature; they have neither eyes to see of themselves any defect in the Liturgy or Articles, nor ears to hear of such when alleged by others. It can be no ordinary church to have inspired such a devoted adoration in such men;—nor are they ordinary men over whom the sense of high moral beauty has obtained so complete a mastery. They will not, I fear, be willing to believe how deeply painful it is to my mind, to know that I am regarded by them as an adversary; still more to feel that I am associated in their judgments with principles and with a party which I abhor as deeply as they do. But while I know the devotedness of their admiration for the Church of England, as it is now constituted, I cannot but wish that they would regard those thousands and ten thousands of their countrymen, who are excluded from its benefit; that they would consider the wrong done to our common country by these unnatural divisions amongst her children. *The Church of Christ* is indeed far beyond all human ties; but of all human ties, that to our country is the highest and most sacred: and *England*, to a true Englishman, ought to be dearer than the peculiar forms of *the Church of England*.

For the sake, then, of our country, and to save her from the greatest possible evils,—from evils far worse than any loss of territory, or decline of trade,—from the sure moral and intellectual degradation which will accompany the unchristianizing of the nation, that is, the destroying of its national religious establishment, is it too much to ask of good men, that they should consent to unite themselves with other good men, without requiring them to subscribe to their own opinions, or to conform to their own ceremonies? They are not asked to surrender or compromise the smallest portion of their own faith, but simply to forbear imposing it upon their neighbours. They are not called upon to give up their own forms of worship, but to allow the addition of others; not for themselves to join in it, if they do not like to do so, but simply to be celebrated in the same church, and by ministers, whom they shall acknowledge to be their brethren, and members no less than themselves of the National Establishment. The alterations which should be made in their own Liturgy should be such as, to use Bishop Burnet's words, "are in themselves desirable, though there were not a Dissenter in the nation;" alterations not to change its character, but to perfect it.

"But it is latitudinarian not to lay a greater stress on the necessity of believing the truth, and to allow by public authority, and sanction by our own cooperation, the teaching of error." I will not yield to any man in the strength of my conviction of truth and error; nor in the

wish that the propagation of error could be prevented. But how is it possible to effect this? How many of the sermons and other writings of our best divines contain more or less of error, of foolish arguments, of false premises, of countervailing truths unknown or neglected, so that even the truth on the other side, being stated alone, becomes virtually no better than falsehood! How many passages of Scripture are misinterpreted in every translation and in every commentary! But are we to refuse to cooperate with our neighbour because of these errors: or shall our own love of truth be impeached because of our union with him? Every one knows, that it is a question of degree and detail; but with a discipline watching over a man's practice, and with a sincere acknowledgement of the authority of the New Testament, although much and serious error may yet be maintained and propagated, yet it is better even to suffer this, than by insisting on too great an agreement, necessarily to reduce our numbers, and bring upon our country the fearful risk of losing the establishment of Christianity altogether.

Men are alarmed by the examples of Germany and Geneva. But what do they prove? The latter proves admirably the mischiefs of an over-strict creed; and ultra-Calvinism was likely to lead to ultra-Socinianism, with the change of times in other respects. But at this moment the mischief in Geneva consists in the enforcement of the exclusive principle, not in its abandonment: the Church is now exclusively Arian or Socinian, as it was once exclusively Calvinistic; and Trinitarian ministers are not allowed to teach to their congregations the great and peculiar doctrines of Christianity. And with regard to the Germans; had the Protestant Churches there retained ever so exclusive a body of articles, yet the strong tendency of the national character would probably have led to the same result: with no other difference than the addition of the evil of hypocrisy to that of ultra-rationalism. For let any man observe the German literature in other branches besides theology; and he will see the same spirit of restless inquiry everywhere pervading it. Nor is it confined in theology to the German Protestants; the Catholics are not exempt from it; only there, from the nature of their Church, it is displayed less sincerely, and therefore, I think much more painfully. As an instance of this covert rationalism, I should name a book which has been translated into English, and has had some circulation in this country, "Hug's Introduction to the Study of the New Testament."

For us, on the other hand, critical and metaphysical questions have but small attractions; we have little to fear from the evil of indulging

in them to excess. Unbelief, with us, is mostly the result of moral and political causes; to check which, nothing would be so efficient as a well-organized and comprehensive National Church, acting unitedly and popularly, and with adequate means, upon the whole mass of our population. The widest conceivable difference of opinion between the ministers of such a Church would be a trifling evil compared with the good of their systematic union of action.

Lastly, if it be said that the changes proposed are too great,—that the scheme is visionary and impracticable; I answer, that the changes proposed are great, because the danger threatening us is enormous; and that although the scheme very probably will be impracticable, because men will persist in believing it to be so without trial, yet that it remains to be shown that it is impracticable in itself. But if the Reform of the Church be impracticable, its destruction unhappily is not so, and *that* its enemies know full well. It may be that a patchwork reform will be deemed safer, as assuredly it is easier; it may be, too, that after such a reform has been effected, and has left the great evils of the Church just where it found them, so that its final destruction shall be no less sure, the blame of its destruction will be laid by some on the principle of reform, and we shall be told that had no pretended improvements been attempted in it, it would have stood for ever. So it is, that no man is ever allowed to have died from the violence of his disease; but from the presumption of his physician, whose remedies, tried at the eleventh hour, he was too weak to bear. If I have seemed to speak confidently, it is not that I forget the usual course of human affairs; abuses and inefficient institutions obstinately retained, and then at last, blindly and furiously destroyed. Yet, when interests of such surpassing value are at stake, it may be allowable to hope even against hope; to suppress no plan which we conscientiously believe essential to our country's welfare, even though no other result should follow than that we should be ridiculed as theoretical, or condemned as presumptuous.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the first publication of this pamphlet I have heard and read a great many objections against its principles and details. But a very recent work on Church Reform, by the Rev. C. Dickinson, Domestic Chaplain to the Archbishop of Dublin, has particularly determined me to add some explanation and defence of what I have written; for Mr. Dickinson's objections are levelled against that part of my pamphlet which rests on principles most commonly misunderstood; and the tone

of his remarks is at the same time so friendly, that it is impossible for any acrimonious feelings to mingle with my re-statement of my argument.

The substance of what I endeavoured to show was this,—that a Church Establishment is one of the greatest national blessings; that its benefits have been lessened, and are now in danger of being forfeited altogether, by its being based on too narrow a foundation, and being not so much the Church of England, as of a certain part only of the people of England; and that in order at once to secure it from destruction, and to increase its efficiency as an instrument of national good, it should be made more comprehensive in its doctrines, its constitution, and its ritual.

The first proposition, namely, that a Church Establishment is a great national blessing, is disputed sufficiently in many quarters, but not in those from which most of the objections to my pamphlet have proceeded. Nor have I met with any attempt to disprove the most important part of my second proposition,—that is, the actual jeopardy in which the Establishment as at present constituted is placed, from the strength of the several parties who are working together to effect its overthrow. And yet this is the main ground on which I urge the necessity of so extensive a reform: for although it might be an improvement upon our present system under any circumstances, yet if the Church, as it now is, were in no danger, I am quite ready to allow that it would be unwise to risk, supposing the proposed change to be a risk, the great benefits which the country even now derives from it, merely in the hope of making them greater.

But against my third proposition, that the Establishment should be made more comprehensive, a surprising outcry has been raised. Some as I expected, have ridiculed it as impracticable, while others have protested against it as latitudinarian* and contrary to the truth of Christ's Gospel; and the whole argument connected with it has been assailed on various grounds, and with various degrees of understanding, of good feeling, and of knowledge.

"The proposed comprehension is impracticable." It may possibly be so, and it is not only possible, but very likely, that I may have spo-

* "A considerable cause of our divisions hath been the broaching scandalous names, and employing them to blast the reputation of worthy men; bespattering and aspersing them with insinuations, &c.;—engines devised by spiteful, and applied by simple people;—latitudinarians, rationalists, and I know not what other names, intended for reproach, although importing better signification than those dull detractors can, it seems, discern."—*From an unpublished and unfinished Treatise,* "*relating to the Dissenters,*" *by Isaac Barrow.*

ken too sanguinely of its *immediate* practicability in its full extent. I have supposed it impossible to include at present the Roman Catholics, the Quakers, and the Unitarians: it may be, that other bodies of Dissenters whom we might be willing to admit, would themselves object to the union, and would prefer their present independence, especially if they can succeed in obtaining relief from what they consider the burdens of their actual condition. Undoubtedly if they do obtain this relief, they will have so much less inducement to become members of the Establishment; yet if the Establishment make no efforts to unite them to itself, how can this relief be refused them? But if the Establishment were to set its doors widely open, do we doubt that within fifty years the great mass of the dissenting population would gladly enter them? Supposing that habit made the majority of the existing generation of dissenting ministers prefer their own chapels and their own separate society; yet how many of the rising generations, who will now be Dissenters, would eagerly enlist as ministers of the Establishment, if an opening were made for their services by our employing ministers of different stations in society, and exacting from them a less rigid conformity?

I would have no renewal of the Savoy or Hampton Court Conferences; some of the leading Dissenters might be privately consulted, but the alterations to be made in the Liturgy and Articles should be marked out by a Commission*, appointed by the king in the first instance, and then submitted to Parliament; and the alterations in the administration of the Church should be decided by an act of the legislature, drawn up under the direction of the Government. That the improvement thus effected would at once reconcile many of the Dissenters, and convert many merely nominal Churchmen into hearty friends

* And above all, I must repeat what I have said before, that this Commission should not consist solely, nor even principally, of Clergymen. The failure of the Commission in 1689 is a warning on this point, as well as against the notion of submitting any plan of Church Reform to the judgment of a Convocation. Previously to this unsuccessful attempt, it had been moved in the House of Lords, "that a number of persons, both of the clergy and laity, should be empowered to prepare such a reformation of things relating to the Church as might be offered to King and Parliament, in order to the healing our divisions," (I am quoting Burnet's words,) "and the correcting what might be amiss or defective in our constitution." Burnet, giving the clergy credit for a sincere desire to promote such a design, wished to leave the matter wholly in their hands, and therefore warmly opposed the motion, which was accordingly rejected. "But I was convinced soon after," he says, "that I had taken wrong measures, and that the method proposed was the only one like to prove effectual."—*History of His Own Times*, Vol. III. p. 11. 8vo. edit. London, 1818. Unless we profit, as Burnet did, by his experience, we are likely to meet with a repetition of the same disappointment now.

of the Establishment, appears to me little less than certain. That within fifty years they would nearly extinguish all dissent throughout the kingdom, or reduce it so greatly as to destroy its importance as a national evil, I hold to be in the highest degree probable.

"The proposed comprehension is unchristian." Surely not, as far as the mass of the Protestant Dissenters are concerned, or how could three attempts have been made, in the course of the seventeenth century, to effect it? It matters not whether the ruling party was sincere in its professions; the mere fact of the Hampton Court and Savoy Conferences, to say nothing of the abortive Commission of 1689, is an admission on the part of the Church that a comprehension with those who are called the orthodox Dissenters, cannot be in itself unlawful. I would go farther, and include all who will agree in τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα,—in those points, a denial of which absolutely excludes a man from the Church of Christ. And I hold with Bacon, that the bonds of Christian communion are laid down to be, "One faith*, one baptism," not "one ceremonial, one opinion." And further, I think that what Bacon found wanting in his time is wanting still; namely, "a declaration of the nature and magnitude of those points which utterly divide men from the Church, and expel them from the communion of the faithful." "And if any man think that this has been done long since," either in the decrees of the four first councils, or in any creeds or articles of any existing Church, "let him observe again and again," as Bacon most justly adds, "how much truth and how much moderation have been shewn in the doing of it." For instance, a false criterion of "fundamental errors" has been set up, in measuring the importance of the error to us by the excellence of the object to which it relates. This has caused men to lay so much stress on all opinions that relate to God. And, indeed, opinions of his moral attributes are of the last importance, because such as we suppose him to be morally, such we strive to become ourselves; but opinions as to his nature metaphysically may be wholly unimportant, because they are often of such a kind

* "Vincula enim communionis Christianæ ponuntur, *Una fides, unum baptisma*, &c., non unus ritus, una opinio."—"His itaque perpensis, magni videatur res et momenti et usûs esse, et definiatur, qualia sint illa et quantæ latitudinis, quæ ab ecclesiæ corpore homines penitus divellant, et a communione fidelium eliminent. Quod si quis putet, hoc jam pridem factum esse, vidcat ille etiam atque etiam, quam sincerè et moderatè. Illud interim verisimile est, eum qui pacis mentionem fecerit, reportaturum responsum illud Jehu ad nuntium, '*Numquid pax est, Jehu? Quid tibi et paci? Transi et sequere me.*' Cum non pax sed partes plerisque cordi sint."—*Bacon, De Augmentis Scientiarum*, IX. I. § 2.

as to be wholly inoperative upon our spiritual state: they neither advance us in goodness, nor obstruct our progress in it.

On the other hand, that is *to us* a fundamental error which directly interferes with our own edification. That is to say, we cannot worship with a man who insists upon our omitting some religious exercise which we feel to be important to our own improvement. I laid the stress therefore on the *worship* of Christ, not on the admission of his proper divinity. If a man will not let me pray to and praise my Saviour, he destroys the exercise of my faith altogether;—but I am no way injured by his praying to him as a glorified man, while I pray to him as God. The conclusion to be drawn from the known fallibility of human judgments, is, not that we should be sceptical ourselves or compromise our own practice, but that we should bear with our neighbour's thinking as he judges right, so long as he will bear with our acting as we judge right. Conformity to our Liturgy therefore is a much better test to require than subscription to our Articles. In other words, if the public prayers of a Church be enough to satisfy a Christian's devotion, and to be an effectual means of grace to him, and if the sacraments be duly administered, we have every thing that is essential to our own improvement; and what has been imagined to afford a greater security to our faith, has, in fact, rather tended to weaken and perplex it.

Of course I am aware that Articles are regarded as a security against erroneous preaching. Now, certainly it would belong to the common discipline of the Church that a minister should not preach against the Liturgy,—he should not contradict the prayers in which he had just before joined. And gross ignorance, and violence, or any indecency of language or manner, might and ought to be noticed by the Church authorities, whose superintendence, if the Church were reformed, would be much more complete and efficient, we might hope, than it is at present. But as to differences of opinion, they exist actually, in spite of the Articles, and all the inconveniences which would arise on that score may be thoroughly appreciated already. We have at this moment the extremes of Calvinism and Arminianism united within the pale of the Establishment;—it is difficult to conceive how any greater differences of opinion could exist, so long as the Liturgy was a Christian Liturgy, and no man was allowed to preach against it.

With respect to Church government, the principal points which I urged were, first, the admission of the laity to a larger share in it;—secondly, that its constitution should be rendered more popular; and, thirdly, that the power of the bishops should be rendered more efficient by the institution of such checks as might allow of its exercise without danger.

I am not aware that on these points Mr. Dickinson's views would differ from mine. He speaks of "the bishop of the diocese, *aided by his proper council*," as if he had no idea that such a limitation of a bishop's power were either unlawful or inexpedient. He is probably not ignorant that in the primitive Church* "the bishop did nothing of importance without the advice of his presbyters and deacons," and that "frequently he took the opinion of the whole people." He remembers, that one of the circumstances in the administration of bishops in England, with which Bacon never could be satisfied, was, "the sole exercise of their authority;" that "the bishop giveth orders alone, excommunicateth alone, judgeth alone;"—"a thing," he adds, "almost without example in good government."† Nor is Mr. Dickinson, so far as appears, one of those extraordinary persons who gravely maintain that primitive Episcopacy, and Episcopacy as it now exists in England, are essentially the same. I was well aware that many persons did maintain this, and I spoke purposely in my pamphlet of the great difference between the two institutions, in order to draw their attention to the grounds on which their belief rested. But as it seems that they are not apt to think out the question for themselves, they are requested to consider the following points.

An office may be said to be essentially the same so long as it is calculated to fulfil equally well the object for which it was originally instituted. Thus, if the object be to perpetuate the dignity and authority of one particular family or race, the office may be called the same, so long as it is hereditary in this family or race, even though its powers in the course of years may undergo considerable alteration. Thus in an hereditary priesthood, as long as the blood was preserved pure, the office would retain its most essential character of identity, although at one period the priest's power were independent of the civil magistrate, and at another completely subservient to him.

Again, if the object were to secure the continued efficiency of some highly valuable gift, which the possessor for the time being could com-

* "En chaque église l'Evêque ne faisoit rien d'important, sans le conseil des prêtres, des diacres, et des principaux de son clergé. Souvent même il consultoit tout le peuple quand il avoit intérêt à l'affaire, comme aux ordinations."—*Fleury, Discours sur l'Histoire des Six Premiers Siècles de l'Eglise*, prefixed to the eighth volume of his *Ecclesiastical History*. This and the other discourses of the same writer, scattered through the volumes of his history, can hardly be recommended too strongly. I know of nothing that at all approaches to them in excellence on the subjects to which they relate. Sir J. Mackintosh has done justice to their merit, in a note in the first volume of his *History of England*, p 146.

† "Of the Pacification of the Church."—*Bacon's Works*, Vol. IV. p. 436. Folio edit. 1730.

municate to any one whom he might fix upon, then the office would be substantially the same so long as the possession of this gift remained annexed to it, although in other matters its powers might be increased or diminished.

But if the object be simply to provide for the general ends of good government, then the office loses its essential identity so soon as it is altered in those points which affect its operation upon the commonwealth. For, instance, the powers of the office may remain the same, but its operation for good or for evil may be wholly different according to the different hands in whom the appointment is vested. No man would call the House of Commons essentially the same, if its members were to be nominated by the crown instead of elected by the people. And, on the other hand, the mode of appointment may remain unchanged, but the character of the office may be essentially changed, by extending its powers or abridging them. The tribunes were still chosen by the tribes as formerly, but the people felt that it was no longer the same office when Sylla deprived it of the right of originating any measure, and made it a disqualification for attaining to all the higher honours in the commonwealth.

Now Episcopacy was clearly not instituted for the sake of maintaining the ascendancy of any one family or race; and therefore it has never been hereditary. It is the second case which has given rise to the prevailing confusion on the subject. For the Apostles were possessed of certain most valuable gifts, and could communicate them to others; and had these gifts been capable of perpetual transmission, the office with which they were transmitted would have remained essentially the same, however much its ordinary powers might have been changed from what they were originally. Now if any gift be thus transmitted in the case of Episcopacy, what is it, and where is the proof of its existence? When men say that the power of ordaining ministers is thus transmitted, there is a confusion in the use of the word power. Bishops confer a legal qualification for the ministry, not a real one, whether natural or supernatural. They can give neither piety, nor wisdom, nor learning, nor eloquence;—nothing, in short, but what the laws or constitutions of the Church empower them to give,—that is to say, a commission to preach and to administer the sacraments in the Church of God, according to the measure of the gifts which the person ordained has received, or may receive hereafter, not from them, or through their medium, but from God, and the blessing of the Holy Spirit on his own prayers and exertions.

Episcopacy then was instituted for the general ends of good government; and like ordinary civil offices, its identity depends on its con-

tinuing to exercise an equal influence on the welfare of the body connected with it. If then its mode of appointment be wholly changed, and its relation to the Church greatly circumscribed; still more, if the whole society to which it belongs has assumed a different aspect, it is hard to conceive how it can be said to continue essentially the same. Now the primitive bishops were appointed by the members of their own order, with the approbation of the people of the diocese:—bishops in England are appointed solely by the crown. The primitive bishops could legislate for the Church, laity as well as clergy:—the bishops in England can legislate for no one without the consent of the crown,—and if they are allowed to meet in synod, they can legislate only for the clergy,—over the laity their canons have no authority whatever.* The primitive bishops fixed the doctrine of their churches, and ordered their ceremonies:—no single bishop, nor all the bishops in England united, can order a single prayer to be added to, or taken from the Church service, nor can they do so much as alter a single expression in its language. No bishop can ordain any man unless he will take certain oaths imposed by act of Parliament, and subscribe to the articles of religion as required by act of parliament. No bishop can refuse to institute any man regularly ordained to any cure of souls in his diocese, to which he may be appointed by the patrons; nor can he, except as patron, and not as bishop, confer the cure of souls on any one. Finally, in the primitive times the bishops were judges in civil matters amongst their people, and thus possessed a temporal influence and authority as well as a spiritual:—whereas in England they are accounted solely the governors of the clergy, and the bulk of the people are hardly aware of their possessing any authority at all.

It will not be supposed that I am dwelling on these differences for the purpose of depreciating our present Episcopacy. Whatever be the faults of our system, it is no reproach to it that it differs from that of the primitive Church. With every thing changed around us, it would be most extraordinary if the same forms of government could continue to suit our altered condition: and to imagine that any one form was intended by the Apostles to be binding upon all Christians, in all times and in all countries, seems to me to betray equal ignorance of the spirit of Christianity, and of the nature and ends of Government.

But the change which has taken place in the relations of the Church with the civil power since the first beginning of Christianity, has been a fruitful subject of dispute. The pretensions of the popes, and of the Roman Catholic clergy in general,—the fanaticism of the Puritans,—and in later times, some practical inconveniences in our actual system

* Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. I. p. 83. Edit. Coleridge, 1825.

in England, have all helped to embarrass the question. I have charged others with using the word "Church" in a vague or improper sense; and Mr. Dickinson brings the same charge against me. He complains that I have identified the Church in this country with the nation. I plead guilty to the charge, for I do believe them to be properly identical.

The Church, using the word now as synonymous with "Christian society," was instituted for the promotion of man's highest possible perfection and happiness. It did not neglect even his physical wants and sufferings,—but its main object was to improve him morally and spiritually;—to bring him to such a state of goodness and wisdom that his highest happiness would be no longer an unattainable dream.

Now this is precisely the object of civil society also: that is, of the State. Our physical wants may have led * to its actual origin, but its proper object is of a higher nature;—it is the intellectual and moral improvement of mankind, in order to their reaching their greatest perfection, and enjoying their highest happiness. This is the object of civil society, or "the State" in the abstract; and the object of any particular civil society or state is still the same, but limited to certain local boundaries which mark the particular subdivisions of the society of mankind.

Civil society aims at the highest happiness of man according to the measure of its knowledge. Religious society aims at it truly and really, because it has obtained a complete knowledge of it. Impart then to civil society the knowledge of religious society, and the objects of both will be not only in intention but in fact the same. In other words, religious society is only civil society fully enlightened: the State in its highest perfection becomes the Church.

When then the individuals of any nation have been converted to Christianity, they see that they had in many instances entertained false and imperfect notions of their highest perfection and happiness. Their mistakes are now corrected; what they thought was the summit of the mountain, they now find to be a point of inferior height: but their object is still the same as it was before,—to reach the top of the mountain. Institutions may be modified, laws amended, wars may become less frequent and less bloody, the practice of the nation may be substantially changed, but still it is pursuing the same object as before; only with the advantage of discerning it more clearly, and following it more steadily.

But the case has been perplexed, by its being supposed that civil and

* Πόλις—γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.—*Aristotle, Politics*, 1, 2.

religious society have necessarily two distinct governments; that the magistrate is at the head of the one, and the priest of the other; and that these two offices have a different tenure; the one deriving its authority from human law, from custom, from mutual agreement, or from superior force, while the other was derived from the express command of God, and handed down in an unbroken succession from those whom God first invested with it.

Of two powers with such pretensions neither could be expected to yield to the other. And the alleged distinctness of their titles hindered them from coalescing; the State not choosing to take its rulers from those who boasted to possess already a higher title to authority than the State could give them, while the Church regarded it as a profanation to place rulers made by man on a level with those appointed by God. Offices so distinct naturally kept up the belief that the societies to which they respectively belonged were essentially distinct also.

But the error consisted in ascribing to Christianity an office which it does not recognize on earth,—that of the priesthood. Grant that there is a priesthood, that is, an order of men deriving their authority from God only, through the medium of one another, and you introduce at once into the relations of civil and religious society an element of perpetual disunion. It will forever be a question whether the State is to rule the Church, or the Church the State, or if they are supposed to meet as allies with one another, yet one or the other party will be forever complaining that the terms of the alliance are not strictly kept to.

The New Testament, amongst a thousand other proofs of that divine wisdom in which Christianity originated, offers this most remarkable one,—that alone, of all the religions of civilized man, it disclaims any earthly priesthood. The Christian society had its ministers of various ranks and various offices; but nothing was definitely and universally commanded with regard to their number, jurisdiction, or mode of appointment. As far as related to its external constitution, it was left from age to age in full possession of the right of regulating its own government.

Now, whilst the civil society was distinct from the religious one, it is manifest that the civil offices belonging to the latter must have held a very subordinate place, because those of the highest dignity and importance were exclusively in the hands of the former. The highest earthly ministers of God's moral government, that is to say, those persons who were invested with the supreme executive and legislative power, could not be ministers of His spiritual government also, because they were not yet acquainted with it. Yet as their jurisdiction, and the benefits of their functions, extended to the members of the religious society, the exercise of similar functions by these last was at

once unnecessary and impossible. The great work of civil society was already done for them by others; not perfectly indeed, because it proceeded from men who had not the benefit of their wisdom, but yet so as to preclude them from attempting to do it for themselves.

But no sooner had civil society become enlightened, and learned aright what was the destiny of man, what his greatest perfection, and what his highest happiness, than it became at once a religious society, but armed with powers, and grown to a fullness of stature, which religious societies till now had never known. The civil offices which it now had to discharge were no longer subordinate and municipal, but sovereign and national; nor did they lose their inherent supremacy, because they were administered on higher principles. The king had been the head of the State, he was equally the head of the perfected State, that is, of the Church; with him rested the duty of disposing and superintending all the details of the society's government, so as to make them most effective towards the attainment of its great object, the highest perfection and happiness of the community. And the "King," in this statement, is merely another name for the supreme power in society; so that what is true of the individual sovereign in a pure monarchy, is true equally of the bodies of men, be they more or less numerous, by whom the sovereignty is exercised in an aristocracy or a democracy.

When this sovereign power then directs and controls its inferior ministers, the clergy, and legislates for the great objects of the society, by providing for the highest instruction of its members, and taking care that it be at once pure and effective; it is not that the State is governing the Church, but that the Church, through the medium of its supreme government, is ruling itself. The confusion has arisen from the notion that the highest ministers of the Church must always be bishops or presbyters, because they were so in the days of its existence as a subordinate and municipal society. Even had the Christian ministers of religion been a priesthood, yet the example of the Israelites might teach us that Moses is greater than Aaron,—that he who rules God's people, to direct them in the ways of judgment, mercy, and truth, is greater than he who ministers at the altar. Much more are Christian rulers greater than the Christian clergy, inasmuch as the functions of the latter, not being definitely fixed by any divine law, are far more subject to the control of the supreme government of the Church than were the offices of the Jewish priesthood.

What I have here stated are the true principles of the Church of England, upon which she asserted, in opposition to the Roman Catholics and to the Presbyterians,—that the King is the supreme head of the

Church on earth. "It was certainly designed at one time," says Mr. Dickinson, "that the Church and the nation should be co-extensive." I should rather say that the founders of the Protestant Church of England considered them as identical:—the Christian nation of England was the Church of England; the head of that nation was for that very reason the head of the Church;—the public officers of the nation, whether civil or ecclesiastical, were officers therefore of the Church;—and every Englishman was supposed to be properly a member of it,—baptized into it almost as soon as he was born,—taught its lessons in its early childhood,—required to partake of its most solemn pledge of communion,*—married under its sanction and blessing,—and laid in the grave within its peculiar precincts, amidst its prayers and most affectionate consolations. And is it indifference or latitudinarianism to wish most devoutly that this noble, this divine theory, may be fully and for ever realized?†

* "And note that every parishioner shall communicate at the least three times in the year."—*Rubrick at the end of the Communion Service.*—See also the Prayer for the Church militant, and the second Collect for Good Friday, as beautiful instances of the extensive sense in which our reformers used the word "Church." In the former, the King's Council, the Judges, &c., are prayed for as officers in the Church, before even the Bishops and Curates.—See also Romans xii. 6—8.

† It is objected to this doctrine, that it implies the exclusion of those who are not members of the Church from the civil rights of citizens. I think it does imply such an exclusion in the case of those who are not members of the Church of Christ: nor should I consider a Christian nation justified in forming a legislative union with a nation of Jews, or Mahometans, or Heathens. If the citizens of the same nation are in nearly equal proportion Christians and Heathens, the State in that country is not yet sufficiently enlightened to become a Church; and it is here that our Lord's words apply, that "his kingdom is not of this world:"—Christians have no right, as such, to press the establishment of their religion to the prejudice of the civil rights of others. Yet if the two religions happened to be for the most part locally divided, it would be a reason why such a nation should separate itself into two, and the Christian and Heathen portions of it form a state distinct from the other. But when the decided majority of a country become Christians, so that the State may justly become a Church, then the Heathen part of the population ought to be excluded from the legislature, and encouraged, if it be possible, to emigrate to other countries, if they complain of not participating in the full rights of citizenship. At present, in England, I should earnestly deprecate the admission of the Jews to a share in the national legislature. It is a principle little warranted by authority or by reason, that the sole qualification for enjoying the rights of citizenship should consist in being locally an inhabitant of any country. But all professing Christians, of whatsoever sect, as being members of the Church of Christ, must be supposed to have much more in common with each other, as far as the great ends of society are concerned, than they have points of difference. Their peculiar tenets, therefore, need form no ground for their exclusion.

It is owing to the existence of religious dissent that not only is it not realized in practice, but its very truth and excellence are disputed. And that dissent has arisen out of faults and errors on both sides, on the part of the Dissenters no less than on that of the Church, is a fact which no impartial man can doubt. It may be too late now to remedy the mischief entirely; but surely, if it be remedied even in part, it will be no light benefit,—and it is absurd to suppose that it can be remedied at all without an alteration, or rather an enlargement of our present ecclesiastical constitution and ritual. Therefore I earnestly desire such an enlargement, and I look to the supreme government of the Church,—the government of this still Christian nation,—as the only power by which it can or ought to be effected. Let it be supposed chimerical to expect any extensive comprehension of the Dissenters; even then the relaxing uniformity of the Liturgy, the reduction of the size of the dioceses, and the increase of their number, the appointment of additional orders of ministers, which might include members of the poorer classes, and, above all, the conferring on the lay members of the Church a greater share in its ordinary administration, would be productive of the greatest benefit, inasmuch as it would interest many in the welfare of the Church, who now, without being Dissenters, feel that they have little to do with it, and habitually look upon it as the concern of the clergy, and not their own. Such a reform, too, might make the Church effective, where its exertions are most needed, and where they are at present necessarily most inefficient; I mean, amongst the masses of our manufacturing population. Indeed, when we consider the utter inadequacy of the Establishment, as it now stands, to meet the wants of the great manufacturing towns and districts, it may be said that in those portions of the kingdom our business is not so much to reform the Church, as to create one.

Undoubtedly if that large part of our population, who are at present neither Churchmen nor Dissenters, could be really attached to the Established Church, the danger arising from the existence of avowed dissent would be greatly lessened. We might then hope to save the Establishment; which must always be a great blessing, however much its usefulness and excellence may be impaired by exclusiveness. But as things now are, in any attempts to attach the people to the Church, we find that the Dissenters actually oppose us; and this, it is to be feared, will always be the case, unless a more comprehensive system be adopted. If this fear be ill-founded; if the Church, without any alteration of its Articles, or Liturgy, or government, can succeed in working its way amidst the manufacturing population; can improve them physically and morally, and make them sensible of the benefits

which they receive from it; there is not a man alive to whom this proof of its inherent vitality will be more grateful than to me. Were it even more exclusive than it is, its preservation would still be earnestly to be desired, as one of the greatest national blessings. Most heartily do I wish to see it reformed, at once for the sake of its safety and of its greater perfection; but, reformed or not, may God, in His mercy, save us from the calamity of seeing it destroyed.

THE OXFORD MALIGNANTS,

AND

DR. HAMPDEN.

[This article is taken from the Edinburgh Review for April, 1836.]

Dr. Hampden, the present Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford, after having obtained as a young man the highest academical distinctions, was appointed, in the year 1832, to preach what are called the "Bampton Lectures." These consist of a course of eight sermons, preached before the University every year on some point of Christian theology; and when the preacher is a man of any ability or reputation, the sermons, from their elaborate character, and from being delivered during a period of several weeks, always attract considerable attention. In the following year, Dr. Hampden was appointed by Lord Grenville, Principal of St. Mary's Hall; and, in 1834, he was elected Professor of Moral Philosophy, the electors being the Vice-chancellor and Proctors for the time, the Dean of Christ Church, and the Presidents of Magdalen and St. John's Colleges; and one of the qualifications required in the Professor by the statutes being, that he should be *sinceritate fidei commendatus*. The Dean of Christ Church, Dr. Gaisford, and the Presidents of Magdalen and St. John's, Drs. Routh and Dynter, held their present situations in the year 1834, and elected Dr. Hampden to the professorship. The "Purity of his Faith" received also, on the same occasion, the sanction of Dr. Rowley's approbation, the Master of University College, who was, in 1834, as he still is, the Vice-chancellor of the University.

A career so marked at every period by academical honours, pointed out Dr. Hampden as one of the most distinguished members of his University; and when the King's Government selected him to fill the important office of Regius Professor of Divinity, upon no other recommendation than that of his high public and academical character, it might have been supposed that their choice would have been received by the University, not with satisfaction merely, but with gratitude. The Government had, in a manner, believed the University's testimonial;

and had attached so much weight to it as to be thereby influenced in the disposal of a piece of preferment not more lucrative than honorable.

But instead of peace there came a whirlwind. A numerous party in the University first took upon themselves, with characteristic modesty, to petition his Majesty to rescind his own appointment; and when this application was treated with due contempt, the baffled petitioners, or rather conspirators, commenced one of the most extraordinary courses of agitation ever yet witnessed even in the annals of party malignity.

As a first step, they met in the common room of Corpus Christi College, and named a committee to conduct their business. The committee drew up a declaration, which was submitted to the whole body of the conspirators, and then published, with a long list of names subscribed to it. The declaration contained a protest against Dr. Hampden's appointment: it charged him with having "contradicted the doctrinal truths which he was pledged to maintain;" and with having "asserted principles which necessarily tend to subvert, not only the authority of the Church, but the whole fabric and reality of Christian truth." By way of scholium on this declaration, the committee annexed to it an extract from their own report, in which they explained the mischievous principles ascribed to Dr. Hampden as no other than what they call the "Philosophy of Rationalism." "It is the theory of rationalism," they say, "[as set forth systematically in the Bampton Lectures of 1832, and still more recently asserted in lectures addressed to students,] which is to be considered the root of all the errors of Dr. Hampden's system."

We feel, that in this last quotation, we are drawing somewhat largely upon the confidence of our readers. We can indeed, to speak plainly, forgive them if they mistrust us. It is monstrous, it is almost incredible, that a charge of "mischievous principle" should be founded upon Dr. Hampden's Bampton Lectures of 1832; and not only this, but that these mischievous principles should be described as "SET FORTH SYSTEMATICALLY!" Mischievous principles, SET FORTH SYSTEMATICALLY, in a course of eight sermons preached successively in the University pulpit, before the Vice-chancellor and all the Dignitaries and Tutors of the University,—and no proceedings instituted, no censure passed, no accusation made,—but, on the contrary, the preacher subsequently receiving from the University the highest degree in Divinity—that degree which is virtually a professorship of theology—the University's commission to give lectures to its students in every branch of that faculty—receiving again the office of Head of a Hall—and lastly, the Professorship of Moral Philosophy? Such was the University of Oxford's censure upon eight sermons full of "SYSTEMATIC MISCHIEF," preached in

her own church,—and in the presence of her highest authorities? And this statement comes not from an enemy, not from a rival; it is no dissenting slander; no *Edinburgh Review* calumny; but it is given out to the world from the very heart of Oxford herself; and subscribed with the names of five of her most devoted sons, who have known her long and well, who cannot misrepresent her in ignorance, who would not slander her in malice!

But the marvel is greater still. This charge against Dr. Hampden's Bampton Lectures, made by five individuals, has been adopted and sanctioned by seventy-six others—all of them masters of arts at the least—all describing themselves as persons "engaged or interested in the religious instruction of the University." All the five accusers, and an immense majority of the seventy-six sanctioners of the accusation, were exactly as much engaged and interested in the religious instruction of the University, in 1832, as they are now, in 1836. A reference to the Oxford calender of 1832 will prove this at once to those to whom it is not notorious. Was there ever an accusation involving its unhappy promoters in such a dilemma of infamy? Compromisers of mischievous principles in 1832, 1833, 1834, and 1835,—or slanderers of a good and most Christian man in 1836—disqualified for the office of religious instructors, upon their own showing, by four years of either dullness or indifference, during which they could not understand, or did not notice, what was "mischievous"—or else by one month of audacious and unprincipled calumny! We leave it to the nation to decide for which of these merits it will continue to respect and confide in the greater part of the eighty-one graduates, fellows, and tutors who have signed the declaration against Dr. Hampden.

Still, here is a phenomenon which requires explanation. What new circumstances have either enlightened the ignorance of these persons, or awakened their slanders? Whence this hurricane after so profound but, it seems, so treacherous a calm? Dr. Hampden, in 1834, published a pamphlet, entitled "Observations on Religious Dissent, with particular reference to the use of Religious tests in the University;" and, in 1835, he was a strenuous advocate for the measure, which had received, it is said, the sanction of the Duke of Wellington, the Chancellor of the University; namely, the substituting of a Declaration of Agreement with the doctrines of the Church, so far as the declarant's knowledge went, in the place of the unqualified subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles, now required of every young man who enters at Oxford. It was natural that these acts should throw a new light on all that Dr. Hampden had formerly written; nor can we be surprised

that the eighty-one graduates, &c., should have partaken in this sudden illumination.

We return, however, to our narrative. The Corpus new Political Union petitioned the Board of Heads of Colleges and Halls, to propose to Convocation, two measures;—one, an address from the University to the Bishops, requesting them not to require from candidates for orders the usual certificate of having attended the lectures of the Regius Professor of Divinity, but to be satisfied with attendance on the lectures of the Margaret Professor of Divinity, Dr. Fawcett;—the other, a statute to be passed by the University itself, depriving the actual Regius Professor of his voice in the nomination of the select preachers, and also in the cognizance of any alleged heretical preaching. But the Heads of Houses refused to bring forward either of these measures before the Convocation.

Undismayed by this check, the unionists, by dint of sheer importunity and agitation, prevailed upon the Board to depart from their former resolution, and to propose the second of the two measures to Convocation,—the address of the Bishops being tacitly relinquished. Accordingly, notice was officially given, that on the 22d day of March a Convocation would be held for the consideration of the proposed statute. This precious bill of attainder states, in its preamble, that the University has no confidence in its Regius Professor of Divinity, in consequence of the manner in which he has treated theological subjects, in his published writings; and then, an enactment follows, divesting the said Professor of the powers which we have mentioned a little above, and which are attached to his office.

It were waste of time to comment on this proceeding; it were idle to dwell on the utter confusion which it exhibits of the simplest principles of good government—on the attempt to substitute the vote of a factious majority for the sober judgment of a court of justice—to put a vague charge of "having forfeited the confidence of the University" in the place of the definite, intelligible, and tangible accusation of "having preached doctrine contrary to the Articles of the Church." For the Church of England, like every other society, is not without a legal check upon the conduct of his ministers. If a clergyman's preaching be at variance with the tenets of the Church, the Bishop of his diocese may take cognizance of it; or if the alleged offence be committed in Oxford, the University statutes have provided that the Vice-chancellor, with the assistance of six doctors of divinity, shall inquire into the truth of the charge, and pass sentence accordingly. If Dr. Hampden had really published anything in opposition to the Articles of the Church of England, there was a ready way of substantiating

the charge, and obtaining a censure upon him, from a competent authority. But the course of truth and honesty was not suited to the eighty-one conspirators. They thought that they had a secure majority in Convocation, which would vote for anything that they proposed to it. A *vote*, they knew, might give them what they could never dare to hope from a *verdict*. If Justice were to decide upon the case, they were sure to be disgracefully defeated; if Faction could be made the judge, they had a reasonable prospect of success.

Meantime, a charge that dared not abide the decision of a legal tribunal, was to be supported by evidence worthy of itself. A pamphlet was published, entitled "Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological statements," consisting of a number of quotations from his work, classed in such an order, and separated in such a manner from the context, as might best serve the compiler's purposes. This was followed by another and more elaborate production, in which a number of propositions on different points of theology are professedly selected from Dr. Hampden's works, and contrasted with the Articles of the Church of England—a selection made precisely in the same spirit, and conducted with the same honesty, as the famous selection of articles from Wycliff's works, which had the honour of being condemned by the Council of Constance.

We have before us a copy of the "Elucidations," in which the *omissions* in the pretended quotations there given from Dr. Hampden's works have been carefully noted down; and these omissions happen so unluckily to fall upon passages which would have altered the whole tone and character of the quotation, that there is no possibility of acquitting the compiler of deliberate dishonesty. For instance, that person, in order to "elucidate," which, in his language, means "misrepresent," Dr. Hampden's Doctrine on the Trinity, begins a quotation with this sentence: "No one can be more convinced than I am, that there is a real mystery of God revealed in the Christian dispensation; and that no scheme of Unitarianism can solve the whole of the phenomena which Scripture records. But I am also as fully sensible, that there is a mystery attached to the subject, which is not a mystery of God;" and then follows the explanation of this last clause, for which the passage has been selected. The appearance, therefore, to the reader of the "Elucidations" is necessarily this, that Dr. Hampden, after one prefatory sentence expressing, for decency's sake, his belief that there was a *mystery* connected with the divine nature, goes on with great satisfaction to dispute, or undervalue the peculiar view of this mystery entertained by the Church of England. Accordingly, the pretended elucidator observes, in his introduction to this chapter of his work, that

"Dr. Hampden holds that there is *some* mystery in the divine nature; but what that mystery is, or that it is the very mystery which the Ca holic doctrine of the Trinity expresses, is, he considers, not revealed?" A grave charge undoubtedly against a member and minister of the Church of England, which professes its belief in the especial doctrine of the Trinity! But what shall we say to this elucidator, when we find that this serious charge rests only on his own direct falsification of what Dr. Hampden has written? For the quotation which we have copied is preceded by about a page and a half, in which Dr. Hampden has been at great pains to distinguish between the doctrine of the Trinity itself, and the technical language in which it has been expressed in the writings of theologians; and to urge that it is only this language which has thrown a difficulty in the way of receiving the doctrine;—"causing," he says, "the wisdom of God to be received as the foolishness of man." And then the paragraph with which the elucidator's quotation begins, begins in reality with the following sentence, which alone is sufficient to refute the whole charge founded upon its deliberate suppression. "The truth itself, of the Trinitarian doctrine, emerges from these mists of human speculation, like the bold naked land on which an atmosphere of fog has for a while rested, and then been dispersed." It is apparent enough that the atmosphere of fog, of which Dr. Hampden speaks, has rested without being dispersed, upon the understanding or conscience of the "elucidator."

This same falsehood, for it deserves no lighter name, runs through all the second pamphlet, the preface to which is actually signed with the name of Dr. Pusey. The technical language in which scriptural truths have been expressed is carefully confounded with the truths themselves. Dr. Hampden as carefully distinguishes them; repeating over and over again his firm belief that the scriptural truths are such in substance as the Church of England represents them,—but agreeing with many other good and sound divines, in regarding the language in which they are conveyed in theological writings, as perplexing; and as not setting forth the truth in the same practical manner as it is to be found in the Scripture. Now, if a minister of the Church of England did not believe that her articles expressed substantially the truth, as it is in the Scripture, he would undoubtedly be guilty of great inconsistency in subscribing them; but to account *historically* for the origin of the technical language of those articles,—and to separate it from the divine truth intended to be expressed by it, is neither inconsistent with the faith of an orthodox Christian, nor with the subscriptions signed by a clergyman of the Church of England.

With a natural and pardonable earnestness, yet paying, we think, far too great deference to charges so worthless in themselves, and known to proceed from authors whose censure was to be coveted by every good Christian minister, Dr. Hampden's friends were at the pains of publishing "statements of Christian doctrine," extracted also from his works; and containing a series of passages on every important point in theology, so full, so clear, so entirely in unison with the doctrines of the Church, and expressed with such intense earnestness of sincerity, that it might seem beyond the power of the very spirit of calumny itself to affix a charge of heresy on their author. It is very important also to observe, that these passages are extracted in great proportion from a published volume of Dr. Hampden's parochial sermons; a work which his calumniators took good care not to notice. Now, it is manifest, that the real nature of a man's religious views and feelings is to be collected most perfectly from his general pastoral preaching to his own congregation; and not from a set of sermons preached on a particular subject, and when that subject is in itself of an abstract and unimpassioned character. The subject of Dr. Hampden's Bampton Lectures was the influence of the Scholastic Philosophy on Christianity; his business therefore was less to enforce the original truths of the Gospel, than to condemn the corruptions of them; his statements were of necessity negative rather than positive; confuting error rather than inculcating truth. To quote, therefore, exclusively from such a work, even had the quotations been fairly made, was to give an utterly inadequate and unjust view of Dr. Hampden's character as an instructor in positive Christianity.

In the midst of all this ferment, the day arrived on which Dr. Hampden was to deliver his inaugural Lecture. As might have been expected, an immense crowd of hearers attended it. It was a trying moment; for as the Professor looked round upon his audience, he saw the well-known faces of his persecutors, who had already shown abundantly that they were of those who make a man an offender for a word, and who were come to his lecture not to be convinced, not to be softened, not to listen and to judge with fairness and truth; but to lay hold upon every expression, to misunderstand or misrepresent his matter, and to pervert his tone and manner;—ready to call conciliation cowardice, and firmness pride. Yet from this fiery ordeal Dr. Hampden came forth nobly triumphant. It was touching to observe the subdued emotions of his countenance, and the unequalled and unexcited dignity of his voice:—it was beautiful to mark how he had triumphed over opposite temptations,—how meekly and patiently he laboured to remove misunderstanding,—how honestly he abstained from one word

of unworthy compromise,—yet how heroically he forebore from every expression of resentment or contempt towards the faction of his unworthy calumniators. We cannot resist the pleasure of copying the concluding passage of this most Christian address :—

"I appeal from an excited spirit to a spirit of soberness and candor; I demand not to be tried by the conclusions of an adverse school, but by the calm and gentle reason of men disposed to give me credit for no less love of the truth and the faith than themselves, and who will openly contend with me by argument, not by censure and intimidation, and the array of hostile numbers: 'Non tam bene cum rebus humanus agitur,' says an ancient philosopher, 'ut meliora pluribus placeant; argumentum pessimi, turba est.' And a far greater than the philosopher has said :—'Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you.'—'Blessed are ye when men shall revile you and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake.'—'If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me.' These words are my comfort; I trust he who spoke them will enable me to proceed on my way without repining at the suffering through which he has required that I should pass; and without relaxation of spirit in his work under the painfulness of the counteraction against which it must be done. I am at all times ready to meet fair and free discussion, but to misrepresentation, and clamour, and violence, with God's help I will never yield. I pray God to forgive those who may have employed such weapons against me, and to turn their hearts, and to grant them more of that mind which was in Christ Jesus.

"It is a great grief to me, I acknowledge, to know that there are any whose honest though mistaken zeal I may have offended. Such are, I trust, open to conviction and kinder feelings; I should, however, unless experience had furnished ample instances of it, wonder that Christian zeal should in any individual have carried him to proceedings destructive of Christian purity and peace. A sense of Christian duty and the kind feelings of the heart will never, I believe, be found apart from each other, and least of all, in doing 'the work of the Lord.'

"After all, however, I appear not here as a functionary of the University or of the Church alone, but as the servant of a Master in Heaven by whose judgment I must stand or fall. For let me say it with that humility which becomes me in applying to myself such sacred words: 'With me it is a very small thing that I should be judged of you or of man's judgment; yea, I judge not mine own self. For I know nothing by myself; yet am I not hereby justified: but he that

judgeth me is the Lord. Therefore judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts; and then shall every man have praise of God.' "

This might have been thought irresistible; but faction and fanaticism combined are proof against any impression of truth or goodness. The conspirators actually adjourned their meetings from Corpus common room to Mr. Baxter's Printing office; there, with the press before them, they issued with unabated zeal their placards, and circulars, and elucidations, and statements,—all designed to fanaticise their partizans amongst the country clergy, whom they had summoned up to Oxford to secure their expected triumph in the Convocation on the 22d of March.

There is no reason to doubt that their arts would have been successful; but the exemplary firmness of the Proctors saved the University, for a time at least, from the deep disgrace in which the party would have involved it. By the Constitution of Oxford, if two Proctors are agreed, they can interpose a *veto* upon any measure brought forward by the Heads of Houses; and thus prevent it from being submitted at all to the votes of the Convocation. On the 19th of March the Proctors gave official notice of their intention to negative the statute. The factious and fanatical party, deceived by the unscrupulous falsehoods of the Tory newspapers, still expected that there would be a division, and crowded up to Oxford. When the 22d of March arrived, they found out their error;—the Convocation was held, and the Proctors, as they had declared they would do, put their negative on the statute in the usual form. The conspirators and their country disciples consoled themselves by fresh placards, and by a meeting in Brazenose Hall, where they had the pleasure of listening to speeches from Lord Kenyon, Lord Encombe, Mr. A. Trevor, and Dr. Pusey.

Thus the persecution rests for the present. But it will be renewed, in all probability, early in the next term, when new Proctors will have come into office. Meanwhile, we may be thought to have given undue importance to these Oxford squabbles; and to have unwisely gratified the vanity of a few obscure fanatics by noticing them in this Journal. The *individuals*, indeed, are sufficiently insignificant;—nor shall we, by naming them, confer on them that notoriety for which nature has not designed them. But the *party*, unworthy as it is, is yet strong enough to be mischievous. Always defeated in the end, it has yet always impeded the progress of good, and in some degree marred its triumph; so it did at the Revolution of 1688,—so it did at the Reformation.

The common language, which describes history to be philosophy teaching by examples, is an ambiguous expression of a great but ill-understood truth. No man would go to history for lessons of private morality: we have other far better and readier means of learning these. But what history does furnish, when read aright, is a mirror to reflect the true character of existing parties, and so, to determine our judgment, in taking part with one or another. It gives us this true mirror when we have learned, in the parties and revolutions of past times, to separate what is accidental and particular from what is essential and universal—to fix first the true standard of all political enterprise, and then to judge of parties, whatever may be their subordinate resemblances or differences, by their attachment or opposition to this one great end. Thus we find, that the zealous worshipper of the saints and apostles, in the sixteenth century, was the real moral successor of their persecutors in the first; and thus the fanatic who now spreads the no-popery war-cry, is the genuine representative of those very Papists of the sixteenth century, whose names he is overwhelming with obloquy.

This is consoling, because it shows that the world has on the whole advanced;—that the heresy of one period becomes the orthodox faith of another;—and that that which great and good men taught at the price of their blood, obtains in the end so sure a triumph, that even the low and the wicked are obliged to do it homage, and make use of its name to exclude that further development of truth which is indeed its own genuine child. Thus, even the Tories of our day profess to admire the Revolution of 1688; but whilst exalting the individual of the race, as it were, who has done his appointed work, and has nearly lived out his generation, they would fain see his lineage become extinct for ever, and no heir born in due season to continue and improve what he had begun. For it is false to say that the reform, or the truth, of a later age undoes or despises the reforms and the truths which have preceded them. They do not destroy, but complete;—holding in honor, loving, and using the reforms and the truths achieved and discovered by their fathers,—but deeming it the worthiest tribute to their fathers' memory to imitate their example, by farther reforming and developing some farther truth, as they did.

But on the character of no party does history throw so full and clear a light as on the High Church party of the Church of England—the party of the Oxford conspirators. Unlike the political Tories, who are only analogously like the Tories of the Revolution, by being as much in the rear of the existing generation as the old Tories were in the rear of theirs, these Church Tories have stirred neither actually nor

relatively; they are the very Nonjurors and High Church clergy of King William's, and Anne's, and George the First's reign, reproduced, with scarcely a shade of difference. Now, as then, this party is made up of two elements; of the Hophni and Phinehas school, on the one hand—the mere low worldly clergy, careless and grossly ignorant,—ministers not of the Gospel but of the aristocracy, who belong to Christianity only from the accident of its being established by law; and of the formalist Judaizing fanatics, on the other hand, who have ever been the peculiar disgrace of the Church of England; for these High Church fanatics have imbibed, even of fanaticism itself, nothing but the folly and the virulence. Other fanatics have persecuted, like the Romanists, in order to uphold a magnificent system, which, striking its roots deep, and stretching its branches wide, exercises a vast influence over the moral condition of man, and may almost excuse some extravagance of zeal in its behalf. Others again have been fanatics for freedom, and for what they deemed the due authority of God's own word. They were violent against human ceremonies—they despised learning—they cast away the delicacies, and almost the humanities of society, for the sake of asserting two great principles, noble even in their exaggeration,—entire freedom towards man, and entire devotion towards God. But the fanaticism of the English High Churchman has been the fanaticism of mere foolery. A dress, a ritual, a name, a ceremony;—a technical phraseology;—the superstition of a priesthood, without its power;—the form of Episcopal government, without the substance; a system imperfect and paralyzed, not independent, not sovereign,—afraid to cast off the subjection against which it is perpetually murmuring. Such are the objects of High Church fanaticism; objects so pitiful, that, if gained ever so completely, they would make no man the wiser or the better; they would lead to no good, intellectual, moral, or spiritual; to no effect, social or religious, except to the changing of sense into silliness, and holiness of heart and life into formality and hypocrisy.

Once, however, and once only, in the history of Christianity, do we find a heresy—for never was that term more justly applied—so degraded and low-principled as this. We must pass over the times of Romanists—we must go back to the very beginning of the Christian Church, and there, in the Jews and Judaizers of the New Testament, we find the only exact resemblance to the High Churchman of Oxford. In the zealots of circumcision and the ceremonies of the law,—in the slanderers and persecutors of St. Paul—the doters upon old wives' fables and endless genealogies—the men of "soft words and fair speeches,"—of a "voluntary humility," all the time that they were

calumniating and opposing the Gospel and its great apostle;—in the malignant fanatics who, to the number of more than forty, formed a conspiracy to assassinate Paul, because he had denied the necessity of ceremonies to salvation—"the men of mint, and anise, and cummin," who cared not for judgment, mercy, and truth—the enemies and revilers of the holiest names which earth reverences, and who are condemned, in the most emphatic language, by that authority which all Christians acknowledge as divine;—in these, and in these alone, can the party which has headed the late Oxford conspiracy find their perfect prototype.

But we may not press this farther *now*. Most true and complete as is the parallel, and most instructive as it is, towards setting a mark upon these revived Judaizers, to warn all Christians against their spirit and their practice, yet it would lead us into matter, and thoughts, and feelings too deep to find a place here. We turn to a comparison less solemn—to a period and a country less remote—to the events of scarcely more than a century ago—to the spirit and the proceedings of the High Church party under the Liberal Government that followed the Revolution. The tricks that have been now attempted to be played in the Convocation of the University were then played in the Convocation of the Clergy. There, we find the bigot Dr. Jane, who defeated the attempt of King William's government to effect a union between the Church and the Dissenters, by the parrot-like repetition of *Nolumus leges Angliæ mutari*. There we find Burnet's *Exposition of the Articles* condemned by the lower House of Convocation, on grounds similar to those now urged by the Oxford conspirators against the writings of Dr. Hampden; namely, "that it allowed a diversity of opinions, which the Articles were framed to avoid; that it contained many passages contrary to the true meaning of the Articles, and to other received doctrines of our Church; and that some things in it were of dangerous consequence to the Church, and derogated from the honour of the Reformation." Such was the sentence passed by the High Churchmen of the last century, upon a book which is now universally received as a correct statement of the doctrines of the Church, and which is commonly recommended by the Bishop as a companion to theological studies of candidates for orders! Again, the rancorous slanders of the High Churchmen against names amongst the most revered in the annals of the Church, may sufficiently console Dr. Hampden for the same slanders now vented against himself. The Irish nonjuror Lesley, in an anonymous pamphlet, professing to be written by "A true son of the Church," and published in 1695, writes thus of Archbishop Tillotson:—"His politics are Leviathan, and his religion is

latitudinarian, which is none; that is, nothing that is positive, but against everything that is positive in other religions. * * * He is owned by the atheistical wits of all England as their true primate and apostle. They glory and rejoice in him, and make their public boasts of him. He leads them not only the length of Socinianism (they are but slender beaux who have got no further than that,) but to call in question all revelation, to turn Genesis, &c., into a mere romance—to ridicule the whole, as Blount, Gildon, and others of the doctor's disciples have done in print." Lesley goes on to call Tillotson's principles "diabolical," and says that he had by them "deeply poisoned" the nation.* And another nonjuror, Hickes, a man, like one or two of the Oxford conspirators, much vaunted by his party for the pretended holiness of his life, because he used a sentimental style of excessive religious feeling in his prayers and other compositions, found his religion perfectly compatible with falsehood and malignity; for he was privy to the writing of this wicked libel, and recommended it, hoping that it might see the light before the publication of his own discourses upon Dr. Burnet and Dr. Tillotson.† These men, whose intellectual powers were so low, that Dr. Johnson himself, in spite of all his prejudices in their favour, declared, "that with one exception, he never knew a nonjuror who could reason," appear to have exactly reversed the precepts of St. Paul, which bids us "in malice to be children, but in understanding to be men."

But the Government held on its way in spite of the clamours, the constant libels, and the occasional treasons of the High Church clergy. It continued to advance real Christians, like Burnet and Tillotson, to such important stations in the Church as fell vacant. The higher clergy were thus gradually purified; and of the lower, the Hophni and Phinehas party, seeing which way promotion came, composed their outward bearing accordingly, while the more fanatical party died out in their own folly. Then came a period in which the spirit of the Heads of the Clergy was indeed an honour to the Church of England —the period marked by the names of Wake, of Butler, of the apostolical Bishop Wilson, and of Secker—men firm and earnest in the faith of the Church of England; but in whom faith ministered to holiness and to charity, because it was the faith of Christians, and not of Judaizers.

Yet the experience of the last century affords, in one respect, a warning by which we hope that the Liberal Government of the present day will not fail to profit. The poisonous plant of Judaism was

* Birch, Life of Tillotson, p. 297, 2d ed. 1753.
† Birch, *ubi supra.*

cut down or withered away; but the root was left in the ground; and thus, when its season returned, it sprung up again, and is now again growing rankly. In other words, Oxford was allowed to retain its exclusive character—opinions and prejudices of one sort only found admission to it—it stood aloof from the great mass of the intelligence of the nation, neither influencing it, nor influenced by it. The consequences were doubly injurious: Oxford, on the one hand, lived wholly in the past, and that past continually viewed amiss; whilst the active part of the nation, finding one of its great seats of education thus incompetent to discharge its duties, could but supply its place imperfectly by other means. Men's views became too exclusively practical and utilitarian —they lived too entirely in the present; and thus learning decayed, and a narrow-mindedness of another sort began to prevail, equally injurious to that lofty wisdom, which, by ever looking at the present through the past, learns thus, and thus only, to provide aright for it and for the future. We are satisfied that there is a spirit, in an ancient and magnificent University like Oxford, far too valuable to be quietly suffered to taint and spoil itself by refusing the wholesome combinations of elements of a different species. If Oxford be left alone, and a substitute for it be sought in a new University, both will suffer, for both will remain more or less sectarian;—the High Church fanaticism will become more and more inveterate, while it will be met by extremes of another sort, not more respectable or profitable.

One word more in conclusion. We have used the language of severe condemnation in speaking of the late proceedings at Oxford, and of the party which originated them. We should be most unwilling to speak harshly of any mere differences of opinion, utterly false and mischievous as we hold the views of the High Church party to be; yet, if it were merely an *intellectual error*, it should be confuted, indeed, firmly and plainly, but still, with all tenderness to the persons of those who held it. But the attack on Dr. Hampden bears upon it the character, not of error, but of *moral wickedness*. When men break through the charities and decencies of life, to run down a good and pious individual—when they raise a cry against him which they know will arouse the worst passions, and be re-echoed by their baser followers with a violence to shame even themselves—when they appeal not to any legal and competent tribunal, but to the votes of an assembly where party spirit is notoriously virulent—when they garble the writings of their intended victim, wholly neglecting such as would palpably refute their charge, and so detaching the passages which they quote from the context, and keeping out of sight the writer's general object, as to produce an impression unfair and false—above all, when refusing

to give credit to a good man's solemn declarations, they labour as far as in them lies to ruin his character,—to say nothing of the acute pain occasioned to a noble mind by being insulted with such suspicions,—in such a proceeding we see nothing of Christian zeal, but much of the mingled fraud, and baseness, and cruelty, of fanatical persecution. And, for such persecution, the plea of conscience is not admissible; it can only be a conscience so blinded by wilful neglect of the highest truth, or so corrupted by the habitual indulgence of evil passions, that it rather aggravates than excuses the guilt of those whom it misleads.

THE BIBLE.

I. GENESIS.

[This Essay was originally published in six successive articles, in the "Englishman's Register." They are now combined in one continuous disquisition.]

"Understandest thou what thou readest?"—Acts viii. 30.

The answer given to this question in the story from which it is taken must still be the answer of thousands and ten thousands of those who have the Bible in their hands, and read it with their eyes and their affections.—"How can I, unless some man would guide me?" How indeed can they understand a book written so many ages ago, in countries unlike to our own in every point of climate, productions, and manners, so little illustrated, in its earliest parts by any other books of the same period, and, in many places, obscure in itself, and rendered much more so to an English reader by an imperfect translation, and by the faulty division into chapters now so universally adopted?

It is true that a great many commentaries and helps to the Bible have been published; but still the number of Bibles published is much greater, and therefore there may be many persons who may like short remarks and explanations on different parts of the Bible as we can find room for in the Register.

No one needs to be told that the general and peculiar character of the Bible is *religious:* that is, it speaks of what God has done for man, and what man ought to do towards God. It is a religious book, just as a common history of England may be called a political book; but as in a common history there are parts which are not political, such as those which give anecdotes of particular individuals, or which speak of the state of religion or of the arts and sciences, so there are parts in the Bible which are not religious, but merely historical; that is, which contain stories of men and manners, such as might be found in any other book, without any particular reference to our relations with God.

Thus the book of Genesis is, in its general object and character, quite unlike any other history. It does not give an account of the most powerful kingdoms of the world, nor of the first settlement of differ-

ent tribes of the human race in their several countries, nor of their progress in laws, arts, and civilization. Leaving all these things aside, as far as its main object is concerned, it looks through the earth only for the most manifest signs of God's presence, and regards only those persons with whom He has most vouchsafed to communicate.

It thus begins with the creation of the world—not its origin or coming into existence, which are mere matters of natural philosophy, but its creation—"In the beginning *God created* the heaven and the earth." It follows, therefore, that if it is He who has made us, and not we ourselves, that we are his people, wholly dependent upon Him, and in an unnatural state if ever we forget Him.

It records the destruction of the inhabited world by water, for the wickedness of the inhabitants. The great destructions of the earth's surface both by water and fire; the utter extinction of some species of animals; the revolutions in climate that have befallen our globe, and the immediate or natural causes which have produced them—these are all matters of geology, considered in themselves, and as such the Bible says nothing about them.* But without telling us at all by what natural causes the deluge was effected, the Book of Genesis sees in it only the first and real cause, God. "I, even I, do bring a flood of waters upon the earth to destroy all flesh."

After the Flood, what may be called our present world began its existence. Whatever changes in the earth's surface have taken place since that time have been confined only to particular districts, or have been too gradual to produce a striking effect at any one period. No general destruction has since happened; but the order of nature has gone on, for the most part regularly. The human race, as a body, have since received no special manifestation of God's will, or of his judgment, and therefore the Bible, as the history of God's revelations to mankind, confines its attention, after the Flood, only to particular nations or to individuals, with whom, alone, God did in a special manner communicate. In other words, after a brief notice of the dispersion of the descendants of Noah into the different countries of the earth, the Book of Genesis takes up the story of Abraham, and all the remaining part of it is occupied with the account of his life, and of the lives of his posterity for the three generations next following him.

Abraham is called the Father of the Faithful—in other words, he stands at the head of those who, in all ages and all countries, have had a revealed knowledge of God, as distinguished from that knowledge of Him which we gain by natural reason. This revealed knowledge was

* Sermon I. vol. vi.

first given to his natural descendants, the nation of Israel; it is now given to those who are called the heirs of his faith, that is to persons, of whatever nation they may be, who believe in the God of Abraham, and consider themselves to be sharers in the promises which Abraham first received, although he was not destined to witness their fulfilment.

Of these promises, the chief was this, "that in Abraham's seed should all the nations of the earth be blessed." It is a promise simple, short, and clear, of which we cannot mistake the meaning, nor dispute the fulfilment. Except a few fanatics in wickedness, all then, whether believers in Christ or no, will acknowledge that Christianity has done more to civilize the world than any other system, religious, political or philosophical; and that it is literally and undeniably true that from an Israelite, a descendant of Abraham, all nations have derived the most signal blessings.

I believe, certainly, that we owe to Christianity something even better than civilization: but at any rate, even in its lower sense, the promise made to Abraham is fulfilled and fulfilling daily before our eyes; and thus, one of God's earliest revelations recorded in the Bible is to us at this day not a matter of faith, but of positive and certain knowledge.

It was thus declared, that at some future time some person of Abraham's descendants should be a blessing to the whole earth. It was also said that his descendants should become a great nation. This was fulfilled once, for they were at one time a very great nation;—and what has been often remarked, they are at this day *a nation*, though not a great one: which is more than can be said of any other people on the face of the earth who were a nation as early as the Jews, and have suffered so many strange revolutions of fortune.

The Jewish nation, Abraham's natural descendants, were set apart, above all other nations, to receive and keep the revealed knowledge of God until the time when that one Person should rise up from among them through whom all nations were to be blessed equally. But it should be observed, that, while set apart to be the keepers of revealed religion, there was no special interference with their minds and characters to make them fully understand and improve it. Certain truths were told them and no more. Truths which *might* indeed have led them to a great many other truths, but which would not do so of necessity. And though from a right knowledge of God we *may* make out perfectly all our duties to one another, yet it by no means follows that we cannot help making them out. Therefore, Abraham and Abraham's descendants, not having a perfect revelation of their duties to

their fellow creatures distinctly given to them, and not finding it so easy as we might fancy to *make them out for themselves* from what was revealed to them about God, were in fact no further advanced in many respects than other nations of the same period, and had no higher notions of moral duty in many points than the heathens around them. Nor is this to be wondered at, if we take the Bible as we find it, and do not spoil it by foolish suppositions of our own; if we observe *what is there said to have been revealed to the early patriarchs*, and do not *fancy that a great deal more must have been revealed to them, because it is now revealed to us.*

The key to all the difficulties in the Old Testament was to be found in one simple truth—namely, that the revelation made to the early patriarchs consisted of some particular points, only; that although much more *might* have been made out from these in the course of time, yet that it does not follow that it *must* have been, or *was* made out; and that in a great many points therefore the Patriarchs may have been no better informed than the Heathens around them. I call this the key to the difficulties of the Old Testament, because, as all our goodness must be judged according to our knowledge, we can well understand how men may be spoken of as good, who lived up to the best light of their conscience, even though that conscience might have still had much to learn. But if, on the other hand, the Patriarchs had the knowledge of Christians, then, unquestionably, nothing less than the standard of Christian excellence can be referred to in judging of their principles and practice.

It has been made an objection to Mr. Milman's History of the Jews, that he lowers our notions of Abraham by calling him a "Sheik," or "Emir." And indeed so far as these terms are associated in our minds with "Belief in a false Religion," so far they are unworthily and improperly applied to the "Father of the Faithful." But so far as they lead us to think of a state of society very little advanced in its knowledge of the duties of man to man, and even in some respects of the duties of man to God,—a state of society in which slavery, polygamy, and private revenge were held to be perfectly lawful, and which was accustomed to make a very wide distinction between false speaking and false swearing, so far they give us not only the truest, but also the most favourable impression of the lives of the Patriarchs. It is by considering Abraham as an Eastern Emir, and as a man living in a state of society even less enlightened than that of the East at this moment, that we can best appreciate the excellence of his faith, and the power of the revelation of God. That unhesitating submission to God's command which led him to leave his country and pass all his days as

the chief of a shepherd tribe; that noble sacrifice of all his dearest hopes at the call of his Maker, which made him consent to offer up his son; that mingled reverence to God and love to man which appear in his earnest intercession for Sodom; all these points, in which the most enlightened Christian cannot surpass him, become still more admirable when viewed as showing what the knowledge and love of God can effect upon the chief of a wandering tribe, surrounded by examples of the completest ignorance of all duty, both religious and moral.*

Thus also in that most famous action of his life, when he was going to offer up his son as a sacrifice, the *principle* of this great trial was the same which has been applied to God's servants in every age, whether they were willing to part with what they loved best on earth when God's service called for it. But the *particular form* in which this principle was conveyed to Abraham was one suited to the imperfect religious knowledge of that early period. To sacrifice his son as a burnt offering to God would be to a Christian, not an heroic act of self-denying duty, but one of blasphemous fanaticism, which no evidence of its being a divine command could justify; because it is so contrary to the Gospel of Christ, that if an angel from Heaven were to bid us do it, we should be bound to reject it with abhorrence. Even after the Law of Moses had been given, which spoke of parents sacrificing their children as an abomination which God hated, we cannot conceive that such a mode of trial could have been chosen, since it is not so much a trial of our faith as an utterly maddening confusion of our notions of right and wrong, if we are forced to believe that God commands us to do what he has himself forbidden. But before the Law, before God had declared his abhorrence of human sacrifices, and in an age and country where they were resorted to as awful proofs of a wish to purchase the favour of Heaven by any sacrifice however costly, the command to sacrifice his son would be to Abraham distressing but not shocking; it would be the call of God to the performance of a most trying duty, not the dreadful delusion of a fanatic that revelation can be contrary to our uncorrupted conscience.

But if any one should think that the lives of the Patriarchs are rendered less instructive by being thus considered, or that it is lowering the early scripture history if we speak of the actors in it as of men possessing far less than a Christian's knowledge of right and wrong; nothing, as it seems to me, can be more unreasonable than such a fear. What can be more instructive than to trace the one great principle of faith in God existing in combination with the most different degrees of

* See "Essay on the Interpretation of Scripture," vol. ii. p. 446.

moral knowledge; yet always so ennobling the character in which it dwells as to raise it above the standard of its own times; and thus to witness in each successive generation that it is the true salt of human nature, the main element of its highest perfection? And as for lowering the Scriptures, it may indeed prevent us from superstitiously bestowing upon imperfect goodness that reverence which can be safely paid to One alone; but we can have learnt but little of the spirit of the Gospel, if because we know our duty more fully than the Patriarchs we think ourselves better than they; not considering that as our clear light is our heaviest condemnation, so it is their greatest glory, that so long before the sun had risen, they yet amid the twilight, could so steadily keep the right way.

Having set out at some length what I conceive to be a principle most important to the right understanding of the whole of the Old Testament, that the revelations made to the Patriarchs were only partial, or limited to some particular points, and that their conduct must be judged of not according to our knowledge but to theirs, I now shall consider some of the particular events recorded in Genesis, beginning with the earlier part of it.

Considering the main object of the Scripture History to be that of tracing the religious progress of mankind, or their successive relations towards God, the story of the first state of man, and of his fall, contains all that we could most expect to find in it. For leaving out a great many things which certainly we should be very glad to know, but which yet belong only to the subject of ordinary history, the story in Genesis, following man only in his relations to God, describes him as being first innocent, and then overcome by temptation—as being at first at peace with God, and afterwards afraid of Him and averse to Him—as being at first completely happy, and afterwards made subject to all those evils which we know to embitter the life of man at this day. It is very true that there are some things in the first chapters of Genesis which we cannot understand, and part of it possibly may be a sort of allegory or parable, of which we have not the key; yet, after all, there is much which is not only intelligible, but which speaks a language no less remarkable than valuable. It is most striking, and most original, that the first fault of man should be described as consisting partly, at any rate, in a desire after knowledge, and that this knowledge when gained made him feel more unfitted than before for communion with God, and more anxious to escape out of his presence. This is remarkable; for the whole tone and language of the Scripture is sensible and manly, and ignorance and superstition are continually combated and condemned. But unquestionably the Scripture, while encouraging to the utmost all

knowledge that may help us to do our duty better, does seem habitually to discourage the cultivation of the mere intellect, as a thing unfitted to our present condition in this world. The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and for the mere indulgence of our intellectual appetite, seems to be regarded pretty nearly in the same light with an excessive desire of food for its own sake, for the gratification of our bodily appetite. There is indeed this great difference between the two, that whereas our bodily desires are too low for us, so the desires of our mind are too high: the one a good man has outgrown, but for the other he is not yet grown enough; and he is told to wait with patience for that more perfect state of being when knowledge may not only be safely followed, but may be obtained in its full perfection. That this is a true representation of what is best for us in our present state is to my mind certain; if for this reason only, that no one can doubt whether the happiness of a family, of a neighbourhood, or of a nation, is best promoted by moral excellence or by intellectual; or, whether, in plain terms, he would rather have his son distinguished as a very learned man, or as a very good man.*

All this may be misrepresented, and so rendered false and absurd, exactly in the same way as all sorts of superstitions have arisen from over straining the rules of common sense and of Scripture about our bodily appetites; instead of keeping them within proper bounds, men have tried to get rid of them altogether, and thus have made themselves very different beings from what God intended them to be. So, if a man were to destroy his intellectual appetite instead of regulating it; if he were to think ignorance was good, because knowledge may be pursued too keenly; if he were to trample upon his understanding, because some put it as it were in the place of God, then he too would act against God's purposes, and instead of becoming good and wise, his ignorance would certainly lead him into wickedness. Whereas what the Scripture teaches is, to have all our faculties and appetites in a healthy and vigorous state, but to take care that each keeps in its own proper order; for if our bodily appetites take the lead over those of our minds, we become no better than beasts; and if our intellectual appetites outgrow our affections, and make us forget that we are but put into the world to serve God, and do good to man, we are changing fast into the likeness of devils.

In the first chapters of Genesis there are some things which we cannot clearly understand; and that parts of them may possibly be a sort allegory or parable, of which we have lost the key. Yet still I

* See Serm. Vol. vi. The Fall.

have always thought that what is called the Story of the Fall illustrates the actual state of the world in some remarkable points more than is commonly noticed.

The story literally taken represents the offence of the first man and woman to have consisted in eating of a certain fruit, which is called the Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil; and it goes on to state that one consequence of this offence was the sense of *personal shame*, that sense of decency which has induced almost all nations, except some of the most ignorant savages, to wear at least certain portions of clothing. The account further states that a part of the punishment for this offence consisted in subjecting women to pain and danger in the birth of their children, and in imposing upon men the necessity of perpetual labour.

It is also mentioned—and this is a part of the history which is much more dwelt upon—that in consequence of having broken God's commandments, man became afraid of God, and wished to escape from His presence; and that he was driven out of the Garden of Eden, that he might not eat of the Tree of Life and live for ever; for now he was not only to labour while he did live, instead of enjoy, but his life was after a few years to be at an end, and he was to return to the dust out of which he had been made.

Now that there are things in this account very hard to be understood is plain to everybody. But looking at the whole carefully, it seems to show that man's first offence was a mixture of the desires of the body with those of the mind or intellect; that it was longing after sensual pleasures and intellectual power. And our present condition in the world seems very much to throw light upon the particular nature of the punishment inflicted.

Mr. Malthus has said that men, if left to themselves, have a tendency to multiply faster than food can be raised to maintain them. Therefore, the population must be checked either by good means or bad; either by men's own prudence and sense of duty before the evil begins, or by distress and various kinds of misery in the end. But it has been objected that this is accusing God of mismanaging the course of nature, and of putting an evil in it which must render happiness here impossible. The account in the beginning of Genesis seems here to step in, and to show that this state of things was in fact intended as a punishment; that it was ordered on purpose that there should be no happiness here unpurchased by self denial. The tendency to multiply faster than food can be produced, or in other words, to multiply *excessively*, seems to be itself a part of the corruption of our nature; it is the dominion of the animal appetite. It is an evil, doubtless, but one

not of God's original design, but of man's bringing in afterwards. He chose to give his animal passions an *unnatural* strength and power, and he takes the consequence. Hence the sufferings of child-birth in women and the necessity of labour in man, were at once the punishment and at the same time the check upon this evil. If a man multiplied his children, he must multiply his labours; while, at the same time, he was not cursed to labour without fruit; but the support which he could not get without working, he yet might obtain if he did work for it—if not in one country, yet in another—that so, good might still be brought out of evil; and the very necessity of labour always existing, and growing out of the very midst of prosperity and increasing numbers, might be too powerful even for man's indolence and natural feelings, and might force him from the land of his fathers to go and subdue and replenish other, even the most distant, parts of the world.

So far then as man's first offence consisted in longing after *forbidden animal pleasures*, and so making his animal desires unnaturally strong, so far we see its punishment in that constant tendency to an excess of population which obliges him to constant labour and self-restraint. And so far as his offence consisted in longing after *forbidden intellectual pleasure*, and so making his intellectual desires, his curiosity, and thirst of knowledge in itself, unnaturally strong, so far we see its punishment in that sentence of death and bodily infirmity which of necessity humbles the pride and cuts short the inquiries of the wisest. On the very verge of strong intellectual excitement is madness, incurred too commonly by an absence of wholesome control over our passions, intellectual as well as bodily—the natural termination of restless and selfish desires, whatever be their particular kind. And this is a disease which increases with the increase of civilization; the greater the excitement produced by a strong competition in everything, and by an almost feverish activity both of body and mind, the more is our reason endangered.

Thus far then the two-fold character of the original offence, as recorded in the earliest chapters of Genesis, corresponds with what we see now daily before us;—and what is described as having been adjudged as its punishment is, in fact, in daily operation, and rendering it impossible that this world should ever be a place of perfect bodily or perfect intellectual enjoyment. We all see that we are born under a necessity to labour. We see too that all our plans and all our undertakings are cut short by bodily decay and death.

But there is something more in this word "death," according to the Scripture account of it, than the mere end of our life here: it is spoken

of in darker terms than as a mere falling asleep for ever. And this farther sense of the term, this worst evil of our natural condition since the fall, I am now proposing to consider.

As man's first fault seems to have consisted in an excessive indulgence of his bodily desires, and in an excessive indulgence of his intellectual desires, so the punishment was exactly fitted to the offence; inasmuch as this world can never be a place of perfect bodily or perfect intellectual enjoyment. But there are other desires in man besides those of his body and his intellect; there are the desires of his spirit, his wish to know God, and his desire to be happy with Him, and in Him. It is very true that in too many of us, as we now are, there seems to be no such wish or desire at all; we are too often what the Scripture would call, dead to God; yet if we argue upon it coolly, such wishes and desires are just and reasonable, and in the best men they do exist as a matter of fact. I call them, therefore, natural, as being required by our nature in theory, and actually existing in the best specimens of it; although in the common and imperfect specimens they are wanting. These desires then after God were, by the first sin of man, thrown down from being the strongest principles in us, to be the very feeblest: the desires of the body and the mind quite overgrew them. This is what may be called the natural effect of the Fall, and it brought with it its own punishment; for having ceased to care about God, or to love him, we shut ourselves out, in a manner, from the highest happiness of a created being, and that which at once ensured immortality—we undid the relation between us and our Maker and Preserver, withdrawing ourselves from the care of His providence, and subjecting ourselves to whatever fate may attend those for whom His protecting care watches no longer.

What seems intended then by the word "death," in the Old Testament, is principally "a state of final separation from God." He is no longer our God, and we are no longer the objects of His care. If there were no God, and if all things in the universe were to become at once a blank when this mortal life were over, death would then indeed be no more than an eternal sleep, and we might easily train ourselves to regard it with no terror; but as God lives for ever, and His power fills the whole universe, death is dreadful on two accounts, first, for what it deprives us of—an eternity of happiness with God—and next, for what it may subject us to in an eternity passed without Him.

The very ungodliness then which prevails so commonly in the world, is the actual seal and assurance of this most awful sentence of death. Men are too often separated from God actually—they believe not in Him, care not for Him, are, in short, living without Him in the world.

They are, in the Scripture language, dead and condemned already, having shut their eyes, and closed their hearts against the fountain of light and life. They have denied Him, and are denied by Him. They look upon the universe as on a system without a governor; and to them it will be so for ever. They will probably never know any more of God than they do now: to them the universe will contain nothing wiser or better than themselves. And this now for a few years, and with God's creatures given them to enjoy, they find to be sufficiently tolerable; but when all these creatures are taken away from them, when left to themselves, and to the society of such as themselves only, nothing can be conceived so miserable as such a state—a state of death to every thing good and happy, and of the full experience of unmixed evil in themselves and others for ever.

THE BIBLE.

II. THE SIN NOT TO BE FORGIVEN.

"Whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come."—Matt. xii. 32.—Every one who reads his Bible for the first time, when he comes to this passage, asks anxiously, what does it mean? —what is this sin which shall never be forgiven, either in this world, or in the world to come? Some who have tried to explain it have said that it is a sin which cannot be committed now; while others have made themselves very unhappy from the fear that they themselves have committed it. But both are mistaken; for it is a sin which is committed unhappily every day: but it is most certain that they who are afraid of having committed it are the persons, above all others, who must be innocent of it.

Christian reader! it can scarcely happen in these days but that you must have heard or read some things in the course of your life unfriendly to the Master whom you profess to serve. But it is of great consequence that you should be able to distinguish which of these things seem like blasphemies against the Son of Man and which appear to be blasphemies against the Holy Ghost.

By the Holy Ghost, or Holy Spirit of God, is meant God speaking to men in such a language that no honest mind can mistake who it is that is speaking. Thus miracles wrought to confirm the doctrine of Christ are said to have been wrought by the Holy Spirit, because by them was shown a more than human power exerted in the cause of good; and much more may the Holy Ghost be said to be the author of all good desires, good thoughts, and good principles, inasmuch as these all bear most manifestly upon them the seal of God speaking in them. So the Holy Ghost inspired the apostles to deliver those great truths which are contained in their epistles, and which also commend themselves to the thinking mind as the fruit of a wisdom and goodness not less than divine. It is manifest, therefore, that although miracles have long since ceased, yet that other works of the Holy Spirit still are being

daily wrought, and that in these he may be still as much as ever blasphemed.

It is then a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit when any man speaks against Christianity because he cannot bear the purity of its spirit and the wisdom of its doctrines. It is a blasphemy against the Son of Man only when any one from ignorance, or prejudice, or carelessness, does not know what Christianity is, and speaks against it under a false impression of its being unfavourable to human virtue and happiness. For instance: in Roman Catholic countries, where the Scriptures themselves are not commonly read, a great number of persons speak against the Son of Man; and even in Protestant countries it may very often happen that men, not having been religiously brought up, and taking their impressions of Christianity upon trust, may confound it with the abuses of the Establishment, or with the errors, or bigotry, or servility, of some of its ministers, and thus dislike it, not for its good, but for its supposed evil. Such unbelief, although showing great unfairness, or at any rate, most blameable carelessness, is yet a very different thing from blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, because it does not of necessity show any dislike of goodness or love of evil.

But when a man knows what Christianity is, and hates it for that very reason—when he speaks against it, not from a mistaken impression that it favours evils which it in fact condemns, but because its spirit is pure and meek and self-denying, and he is lustful, and revengeful, and selfish, then he speaks not against the Son of Man only, but against the Holy Ghost: he has chosen to love evil and hate good, and if good triumph he must be for ever miserable. This is not an imaginary case only—there have been, and are, too many instances of it; but in imputing guilt so dreadful and so hopeless, none but he who sees the heart can dare to fix on any particular individual.

Still there is a use in looking at a picture so terrible. In the first place, men who, while they attack Christianity, show that they really do hate it for its own sake; men who say that revenge is a virtue and sensual indulgence no sin,—such men are not to be feared as dangerous enemies, but rather regarded as awful witnesses to the truth of the gospel. Far from their unbelief making against Christianity, it confirms it: for the Christian Scriptures say, not only that such men as these may be unbelievers, but that they must be so, that they are of necessity blinded to the truth, and that this blindness is a part of their punishment, because "they had pleasure in unrighteousness." Take up a tract or a paper written by men of this kind, and if you find in one page that all your bad passions are roused and encouraged, that the book is putting you into a state of mind which is neither good nor

happy, hope, rather than fear, that the next page may contain some open blasphemy against your Saviour and his gospel. It is all right and fitting that they who love evil should hate good; the only way in which such wretches can honour Christianity is by abusing it.

But for ourselves, Christian reader, we may draw this lesson, that any allowed carelessness of practice and much more any one unchristian principle cherished within us is sure to weaken and will in the end destroy our faith. A man may ruin his power of believing the gospel as surely as he may his power of relishing plain and wholesome food; indulged bad passions and neglect of God will as surely destroy the one as a course of drunkenness or gluttony will destroy the other. And the wickedness and unbelief help each other forward; the more wicked a man is, the less can he believe; and the weaker his faith, the more fearlessly does he plunge into wickedness. Let us only love God and try to please him, and all the infidel books in the world cannot really hurt us; they may disturb our understandings and greatly affect our comfort but they will never overthrow our faith; for let all the doubts and difficulties that the most diseased scepticism has ever imagined be brought together, and what do they amount to? They may infinitely darken our prospects of happiness, but with the words of Christ and his apostles in our hands, so full of wisdom and goodness, so entirely claiming our admiration and love, we should still desire to live and die Christians, even if our hopes of eternal life were far more clouded and uncertain than, thanks be to God, they are in reality.

CHRISTIAN DUTY

OF CONCEDING THE

ROMAN CATHOLIC CLAIMS.

PREFACE.

In the following pages my main object has been to correct the prevalent impression, that it may be wrong in a religious point of view to grant the Catholic claims, but it cannot be more than inexpedient to reject them. I have therefore argued the Question on the grounds of right: although in the ordinary discussion of it, the topic of right is one which it is on many accounts better to waive; and where the opponents of the Catholics do not make conscience their plea for resisting the claims, it is enough to press them on grounds of political expediency. My particular object will account for my omission of many powerful arguments which are usually brought forward in favour of concession; and especially for my not noticing more at length the trite objection, that the measure now before Parliament is an inroad upon the constitution; whereas it is in fact the fulfilment of it, if by the constitution be meant a system for the government of the commonwealth on the principles of liberty and justice.

For my writing on the Catholic Question, I need offer no other justification than the universal interest it excites, and the great misapprehension and irritation which exist concerning it. I write, because I wish to remove the one and allay the other among that class of men, who require arguments different from those commonly used in the political and Parliamentary discussions on the subject.

Rugby, 1829.

The political merits of the Catholic Question have been too often and too ably discussed, and the political authorities in favour of what is called Emancipation are too overwhelming, to render it necessary at this late period to state the grounds of national expediency on which that great measure may be defended. But the most respectable oppo-

nents of the Catholics, including, I believe, a large proportion of the Clergy of the Church of England, consider the Question in a higher light; they think that it involves more than political interests; that to admit Catholics to become Members of the Legislature would be most injurious to the cause of the Protestant Religion; and that therefore no views of worldly policy should induce a good man to compromise the service of God, and in effect to sacrifice his highest duty for the sake of obtaining a temporal advantage.

This is at once to put the Question on its true grounds: for as parties and public bodies are made up of individuals morally and religiously responsable; and as no individual Christian, who values his salvation, can knowingly prefer any temporal benefits however great to the strict line of his Christian duty; it is manifest that Parliament ought to reject the Catholic claims, even with the certainty of thereby provoking a civil war, if it be indeed a sin against God to grant them. I am therefore not only willing to consider the Question as one of duty rather than of expediency, but it is my earnest wish to do so. These are the principles on which it becomes a Christian to argue; and woe to him who for party, or even for national considerations, allows himself to lower the high standard of Christian perfection; to value civil privileges and political freedom beyond a single and unwavering devotion to the will of God.

It will be my endeavour then in the following pages to prove,

First, that it is the direct duty of every Englishman to support the claims of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, even at the hazard of injuring the Protestant Establishment; because those claims cannot be rejected without great injustice; and it is a want of faith in God and an unholy zeal to think that he can be served by injustice, or to guard against contingent evil by committing certain sin.

Secondly, that as the path of duty is the path of wisdom, so the granting of the Catholic claims, to which we are bound as a plain point of duty, will in all human probability greatly benefit the cause of Christianity; that it will tend to purify the Catholic Religion in Ireland from its greatest superstitions, and gradually to assimilate it more and more to Protestantism.

The principle of the first assertion, when addressing myself to conscientious Christians, I need not waste time in proving. No good man in our days would defend the practice of pious frauds, or of supporting the interests of his Church by persecution. If then the exclusion of the Catholics of Ireland from their civil rights be an act of injustice, or in other words if it be a sin when knowingly committed, it is not a lawful means of advancing or defending the Protestant Religion.

Now in order to shew that this exclusion is unjust, it will be necessary to ascend to higher principles than those to which its advocates generally appeal; and to shew that these higher principles can alone in fact determine the merits of the Question. And it is here that good men are blinded, as we shall see hereafter, by an original error in their political opinions; which being in its very essence destructive of our notions of justice, distorts the view of every political question, and makes those who entertain it mistake habitually wrong for right and right for wrong.

Nothing has ever been more pernicious to the growth of human virtue and happiness than the habit of looking backwards rather than forwards for our model of excellence. The individual who should compare his life with what he himself was in his earlier years, instead of contrasting it with that high Christian standard which he never yet has reached, but which it should be his daily prayer and labour to reach hereafter, would assuredly go back rather than improve in goodness and wisdom. And so on a larger scale is the improvement of civil society obstructed, by referring to its actual origin and past fortunes, rather than contemplating that hitherto unattained excellence, to which, if it rightly used its increasing experience, it should be approaching in every generation successively nearer. We might as well build our ships after the model of our forefathers' coracles, as endeavour to find the principles of wisdom and justice developed in our forefathers' government. Necessity or chance led to the first rude attempts at navigation: force and cunning were the predominant elements in the constitution of the earliest civil societies. The supremacy of strength and intellect over weakness and ignorance is no doubt sufficiently natural: so is selfishness natural; and nothing could be more in accordance with our unimproved nature, than that the strong and the wise should possess a pre-eminence and abuse it. Governments then being established, some on the base of mere physical force, some on priestcraft, and others on a mixture of both these elements, the language of the laws which were framed by the governing powers was naturally adapted to the principles and interests of the framers. And as these principles were very different from those of justice and true wisdom, so the written or municipal law was also very different from that unwritten and universal law, whose "seat is in the bosom of God, whose voice is the harmony of the world."

But the dictates of this divine law were never wholly unknown to men; and their excellence is such, that those who hated them most were often ashamed openly to dispute them. Those who suffered under the yoke of a tyranny grounded upon force or superstition, appealed

to justice as the most powerful advocate of the weak against the strong: they gave currency to her language, and asserted her principles; and even when success had corrupted them, and made them inclined themselves to forget her, yet the good which they had done continued to exist in spite of them: the truths by which they had profited remained to instruct others also; the wisdom of which they had opened the spring for their own necessities, flowed forth with a perpetual stream to refresh far distant lands. Meanwhile the language of municipal law underwent a very partial improvement. It ceased to press upon that part of the community who had succeeded in releasing themselves from bondage; and sometimes those who had obtained a participation in political power introduced into its enactments some of those just principles to which they had been indebted for their own deliverance. But the selfish fear, that from henceforth they had more to lose than to gain from the general ascendancy of truth and justice, disposed them to limit the application of those principles to their own particular case; and to shrink from substituting them broadly and universally for the language of the older constitution of things.

The repetition of this process in successive generations brings us to a state of things, in which most classes of the community have secured to themselves all the rights which equal justice could require; in which all have gained the simplest and most necessary of these rights; in which the great principles of the eternal law are most widely known, and upheld by the unanimous voice of the wise and good; but in which the municipal or written law of the land has not yet learnt to avow those principles, but still retains amidst great partial improvements much of the narrow and iniquitous spirit of its earliest origin. It was at first a mere system of exclusion: and so far from being the standard in great questions of national right, every victory gained by public right has necessarily led to the improvement of the law, and could have only been rendered legal by the law's alteration. Nay, as those very alterations from various causes have generally expressed the particular application of principles, rather than the principles themselves, and as their particular application may greatly vary with times and circumstances, so it may sometimes happen, that laws promulgated in one age to further the cause of liberty and justice, may in another have the very opposite tendency, and must be repealed in the letter if we wish to fulfil their spirit.

What I meant then by the original error of the political creed of many good men, is the principle that in all questions of political alteration the presumption is against change. Now on the contrary the presumption is always in favour of change, because the origin of our ex-

isting societies was an unjust and ignorant system; because where that system has not been altered, it must require to be so; and even where it has, as the alteration was often of a temporary and particular nature, a fresh improvement will be generally desirable, if we wish to secure the substantial principle of justice and wisdom.

A similar fallacy is involved in another argument, commonly used by the enemies of improvement, that the constitution must not be tampered with. Now this is a plea of considerable weight wherever the existing order of things is the result of one comprehensive plan; wherever the claims of the different elements of the social body have been impartially weighed, and each has received that exact proportion of power and consequence which a sound view of the general good would assign to it. Under such circumstances partial alterations may mar the symmetry of the whole; and a general change is not likely to be needed. But where the existing constitution is the mere result of various partial and independent reforms, each of which redressed one particular grievance, while incongruities in the rest of the body politic were suffered to continue unheeded; it is worse than idle to speak of it as one uniform system, digested by comprehensive wisdom; and to deprecate the repetition of those particular reforms to which all its excellence is owing, and which may by easy gradations bring it at last to a practical perfection, without the necessity of a complete revolution.

These remarks apply to the history of almost all nations; except those which have received an entire constitution at one particular time, founded on comprehensive views of the rights and interests of all orders of men in the country, and providing justly and wisely for the good of each and of all. Where such a constitution has been digested, proposals for any partial subsequent reforms are justly to be regarded with strong suspicion; because where the parts of a system have been expressly framed with a view to each other and to the whole, an alteration in any one of them introduced with a particular object is likely to harmonize ill with the rest, and to produce a general inconvenience greater than the local one which it was designed to remedy.

But it has rarely or never happened that the terms of this hypothesis have been fully complied with. In the constitutions given by the lawgivers of antiquity, or in that actually enjoyed by the United States of America, although these were framed much more on certain general principles than the constitutions of modern Europe, yet there was an order of men which they did not embrace, which formed no part in the civil edifice, and with regard to which the system of the legislator was imperfect, and required future revision. While all classes of *citi-*

zens were provided for, there was a class of *men* which remained unregarded, and whom justice seemed to have abandoned—the class of predial or domestic slaves. Among the ancient lawgivers, indeed, the time perhaps was never contemplated, when justice should have her perfect work, and all who possessed the same human nature should be regarded as fit elements of civil society. But now that Christianity has so greatly enlarged and purified our notions of moral good, all systems, where slavery exists, are regarded as confessedly imperfect, and the propriety of improvement, confessed by all as a question of principle, is only contested on particular and temporary grounds. I have shewn, that even the cases which I acknowledge as exceptions are not to be considered as altogether such, in order more fully to confirm the general statement, that considering the origin and subsequent history of civil societies, there is a presumption à priori in favour of any alteration, whose avowed tendency is to extend or enlarge the enjoyment of civil rights.

And now, I would ask of those who shrink from what they call liberal opinions, as if they were connected with a disregard for Christianity, in what do the opinions which have been here expressed differ from the spirit of the Gospel? Is it unchristian to labour to effect the destruction of injustice; to promote the growth of equal rights; to advance the physical and moral condition of mankind by applying to the constitution of society those notions of perfect goodness and wisdom, which the Gospel, and the Gospel alone, has taught us? Or will it be said, that all worldly objects are too insignificant to engage the attention of an heir of immortality? Yet it is only by the pursuit of some worldly object that we can perform our worldly duty, and so train ourselves up for immortality; it is by improving the various faculties that are given to us that we can fit ourselves for our everlasting habitations. Or can the relief of the ordinary physical wants of individuals be so high and essential a virtue, and yet the remedying those political evils, which affect both the physical and moral condition of millions, be no fit object of our exertions? And since in the present state of society we can scarcely avoid being called upon to act, or to express an opinion directly or indirectly upon public matters which may influence the conduct of others, is it well to remain in such ignorance of the principles and facts of political science, that our practice is but a leap in the dark, and our advice and influence can do nothing but mislead?

But it may be said existing laws and existing governments are invested with the authority of God, and cannot be resisted without sin. It does not indeed require the light of Christianity to teach us, that no individual can be justified in offering active physical resistance to the

government, of in disobeying the laws for any private advantage of his own. Metellus Numidicus understood the duty of passive obedience, when he yielded peaceably to an unjust sentence of banishment, and would not suffer his party to procure its repeal by violence. And certainly our Lord's strong expressions, when enjoining his disciples to resist not evil, must apply even more strongly, when the resistance, besides implying a want of meekness in ourselves, would also disturb the general peace of society. So also under a system of oppressive taxation, if the existing laws however unjustly authorise the exaction, then we are bound to be subject not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake; we should not presume to think that the injustice of the tax warrants us in evading it. But as the first Christians, while they never defended themselves by physical force, yet persevered in the most determined efforts to overthrow the established idolatry and corrupt practices of the Roman empire, and laboured earnestly to introduce a purer system in their room; so should we labour, every man according to his knowledge and influence, that established injustice and corruption should be overthrown, and that such laws as are oppressive or partial should be laws no longer. And is this only to be effected by violence? or does not experience shew that steady perseverance in a just cause mostly renders violence unnecessary; and that truth when sealed by the labours, the sufferings, nay, if it be needful, even the blood of its advocates, at last shames the few who have continued longest to oppose it from any further struggle against it? Or when its converts are become so numerous, that it is no more a small body of individuals striving to reform a corrupt state of society, but the society itself is divided, each division containing within itself the elements of a distinct social existence, numbers, and wealth, and rank, and intelligence; by what other laws can their mutual relations be judged, than by those which apply not to individuals the subjects of one society, but to the several societies of the human race themselves, who acknowledge no common law but that founded on the eternal principles of justice? Then if a contest ensue, its lawfulness must be decided on the same grounds which determine our judgment of national wars: one party must incur deep guilt in drawing the sword; but to which the guilt is to be attached depends solely on the merits of the question at issue, and in no degree on the former relation which subsisted between them while they were parts of the same society.

I may be allowed perhaps to notice one other impression, which tends strongly to indispose many minds à priori to what are called liberal principles: and this is the notion that the advocates for improvement rest their cause solely on theory, that the existing state of

things may indeed be often liable to objection on abstract principles, but that practically it works and has worked well. No answer has been more frequent than this in the mouths of the enemies of Reform; none perhaps has so often satisfied the rising scruples of honest but ignorant minds, and persuaded them that they may shut their eyes upon the evils which they see around them, for that the whole system with its evil and its good has had the sanction of experience; and that the plans proposed for its amendment are but the dreams of ingenious theorists, the mere imagination of intellectual enthusiasts. Now this belief, so injurious to our own moral improvement, as it accustoms us to a contented acquiescence in moral evil, is either altogether founded on falsehood, or is wholly inapplicable to the conclusions which they who inculcate it wish to make its practical consequence. It is false that experience sanctions existing institutions, and that theory alone objects to them. What is called theory, is in fact a wider experience than that which pretends exclusively to the name. The practical man sets his own individual experience, limited in place, and most span-like in duration, against that accumulated experience of many countries and all ages, whose conclusions he calls a theory. He presumes to judge of the whole by that small part of it which he has himself witnessed: he has seen the first stages only of intoxication, and knowing nothing but from his own observation, he calls it mere theory, when he is told that the short-lived merriment and animation which had so charmed him, would surely be followed by stupefaction and nausea. The effect of institutions can only be judged of after an experience far longer than the longest life of an individual; nor will one single specimen inform us how far local or temporary causes may have aggravated or softened their inherent properties. They must be watched from their origin to their extinction; their natural consequences must be distinguished from their accidental results; the experiment must be tried on various subjects in order to be satisfied that its operation is uniform; before we can be fairly said to judge of them from experience. But this true experience, furnishing indeed a safe and universal rule, is no other than what is often called theory; unattainable to the vulgar, because it alike exceeds their perseverance, their grasp of mind, and their capacities of discrimination; and hated by the ignorant and low principled, because it is at once above their reach, and because its lessons offer no apology for institutions founded on injustice, and supported by selfishness and folly.

So far then it is false, that men who are well acquainted with persons and things now existing, men who have mixed extensively in society in their own country, but whose knowledge of other times and

other countries is exceedingly imperfect, have any right to put their experience on a level with that far more universal experience which thinking and inquiring minds have gained from a comprehensive study both of the present and the past. But if many of the advocates for reform in various parts of our institutions have been theorists in the true meaning of the term, if they have ventured to form conclusions on an imperfect induction, or from some defect in themselves have proposed systems almost as faulty as those which they wished to alter, they individually may be undeserving of confidence; yet this failure affords not the shadow of an excuse for the vaunts of their adversaries. "Even a one-eyed man is a king amongst the blind;" and the glimmering of twilight is better than the thick darkness on which it has begun to dawn. Let the light indeed shine more and more unto the perfect day; but let us not so complain of the indistinctness of the dawn as to prefer the unbroken obscurity of midnight. Let those who complain of the ill-grounded theories of reformers reprove their fault in the best manner, by working their way themselves to a fuller knowledge; but let them not rest contented in the very depths of ignorance, because those who have essayed to soar into a purer region, have been unable in their first trial to escape altogether beyond the range of the mists of the valley.

But is there then so much to learn, and have our forefathers indeed lived in so intense a darkness? Let any Christian look first upon the volume of the New Testament, and then turn his eyes to the existing state of society, to the wars of ambition, to the conquests, the persecutions, the corruptions, the sufferings, the low principles, and lower practice, which have prevailed during the last eighteen hundred years, amidst men who have professed the Christian faith, and called themselves the redeemed and sanctified people of God! Alas! for the words of Christ's Prayer, so often repeated in mockery, when we daily beg of God that his kingdom may come, whilst our institutions, our principles, and our practice uphold the kingdom of another master! Alas! For the unfulfilled promises of the older prophecies, whose accomplishment has been so long hindered, while we either regard them as a splendid vision of eastern fancy, or murmur and are offended, because the blessings designed for a world that should be the image of Heaven have found no place amidst our evil passions and abounding iniquity! Dissatisfaction with ourselves is wisdom, but it is the most fatal folly to gaze with regret upon the past, rather than to turn with an eager and inquiring hope to the future. We are not worse than our fathers; it is shame enough that we are not more advanced than we are beyond their exceeding badness; but our desire should be to be ten

thousand times better; not looking back to the things behind, but pressing forward to those that are before, until we grow up into the perfect man; into the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.

I write as a Christian to Christians, and I have thought it neither irrelevant to my particular subject, nor generally unimportant, to endeavour to point out the unchristian tendency of those prejudices in favour of past times and established institutions which with too many close the ears and the understanding against the claims of truth and justice. Whereas he who knows the origin of society and its actual vicissitudes on the one hand, and has learnt from Christ's Gospel to understand what it ought to be on the other, will at once see that the antiquity of an institution does not afford a presumption in favour of its excellence; and that instead of idle language about holding fast to the laws of our ancestors, our constant object should be to carry on those successive improvements to which all that is good in them is owing; not to doat upon the productions of our childhood, but to labour to bring them to the perfection of the ripest wisdom of manhood. And we shall find that in the consideration of our immediate subject these general principles are peculiarly applicable.

The origin of the present form of civil society in Ireland was conquest; and what was more unfavourable to the establishment of just institutions, it was a conquest obtained over a barbarous people by another scarcely less barbarous, and of a race and language at once distinct and dissimilar. Now in that order of God's providence by which even our wickedness is sometimes made to promote his purposes of good, it cannot be denied that the ultimate consequences of conquest have been in many instances highly beneficial to the conquered themselves; a better national character has been produced by the intermixture of different races, and laws, commerce, and general civilization have been communicated by the conquerors to their subjects. To talk in this case of a continued right in the conquered people to regain by force that which they had lost by force is palpably foolish, for in a few generations there are neither conquerors nor conquered remaining, but one united people sprung from the intermixture of both, and professing in its improved moral and physical condition reasons for remembering only with thankfulness the cause which first brought its two elements into contact. But where the wounds inflicted by the first conquest have never been suffered to heal; where the conquerors have continued to form a distinct people, and the conquered have been regarded as an inferior race; where conquest, in short, has never been softened into union, but retains all the harshness of its original features, aggravated by successive centuries of irritation; such a state of things

is a perpetual crime, and the original guilt of the conquerors must for ever extend to their posterity, so long as by neglecting to remedy or palliate its evil consequences they make themselves a party to it. It is too late then to talk of the inconveniences of extending the rights of citizens to those whose peculiar opinions disqualify them for an union with their conquerors. We brought them forcibly into our national society, and we must not shrink from the just consequences of our own act. And the plea of conscience when urged as an excuse for not offering atonement for our crime, while we continue to profit by its fruits, is no better than self-deceit and hypocrisy. If Protestants urge that they cannot allow Catholics to have any voice in the government, why did they bring a Catholic people into political connexion with themselves? If they so dread the infection of Catholic opinions, why do they oblige Catholics to live and breathe in the same society with themselves? But this they have chosen to do; and if their health be endangered, they have only themselves to thank for it.

In saying this, it will not be supposed that I am gravely arguing in favour of a total separation between this country and Ireland. When I urge that those who refuse to do Ireland justice, and make conscience their plea for the refusal, are bound not to be conscientious only where it suits their own interests, but to make restitution in full if they scruple at coming to a fair compromise; I mean to show the futility of their plea, and to insist that it is only a deceived or self-deceiving conscience which advances it. In fact, it is a plea which would dissolve the whole fabric of society throughout Europe; and would make it impossible for men of different religions to live together as fellow-citizens, if they mutually insisted upon their own exclusive supremacy. The connexion between this country and Ireland is not now to be torn asunder; the injustice which we have done cannot now in that manner be rendered undone; but it is our bounden duty to remedy its actual evil effects. What ought to have been done long since, should at least no longer be delayed; we should hasten to remove all those marks of our original violence, which leave us still guilty till they are wiped away: we should make it as impossible even to dream of a separation with Ireland, as to break up England itself into the original elements of its heptarchy.

But it has been urged by Lord Bexley, that the Catholics of Ireland are not the Irish nation; that we are united with the Protestants of Ireland, and that they, politically speaking, constitute Ireland. Thus it is that the language of municipial law, so often the mere organ of power, is quoted to give an imposing sanction to injustice. What are the Protestants of Ireland, but military colonies planted by the con-

quering nation in a conquered province, who can only have a distinct existence so long as the evils of conquest are unatoned for, and the tenure is one of might and not of right. Such in the reign of Augustus were the colonies of Narbo, Vienna, and Lugdunum in Gaul; of Corduba and Hispalis in Spain; and whilst these alone possessed the privileges of citizenship, whilst these alone were regarded by the Romans as enjoying legal existence, so long was the connexion with Gaul and Spain forced and insecure, so long were the massacres and spoliations of the first Cæsar an enduring crime of the Roman government. But the Italian war had taught the Romans a memorable lesson; and the statesmen and lawyers of Rome were not incapable of profiting by the experience of the past. Within sixty years after the death of Augustus, the rights of Roman citizens were bestowed on all the free inhabitants of Gaul, and from that period Gaul was truly united to the empire, her old language and her old customs were gradually forgotten, and the bonds which bound her to Italy could only be torn asunder by the general convulsion of the civilized world. To consider then the Protestants of Ireland as the Irish nation, is merely to perpetuate the injustice of our original conquest; to say that although inferior in numbers, they possess a great superiority in property, is to keep alive the memory of those sweeping confiscations which transferred the soil of Ireland to the conquerors, and of those more atrocious laws which, down to the year 1778, forbade the Irish Catholic to become a purchaser of land in his own country. Who can wonder, that if we on our part still display the trophies of victory, the majority of the Irish people should cherish a bitter recollection of their defeat? that if we, till within the last fifty years, so far abused the rights of conquest as to hinder the conquered from regaining by peaceful industry the property which they had lost, they should have remembered how they had lost it, and by what means alone they could expect to recover a share of it? The stream of events cannot flow backward, nor is there any fear that the injustice of our conquest will be removed by an opposite injustice: unless we obstinately refuse ourselves to obliterate its traces, and persist in treating Ireland as a conquered province, where our Protestant colonies alone are to enjoy the rights of citizens.

It may be urged as a last plea for still calling upon Parliament to persevere in the iniquities of our ancestors, that exclusion from the full rights of citizenship is not directed against the Irish Catholics as Irishmen, but as Catholics; and that the Catholics of England are in some respects subjected to still greater disqualifications. This also is one of those arguments which men are liable to advance, while they

want the knowledge or the ability to connect the present state of things with the causes that produced it. That the majority of the Irish people are Catholics at this hour is almost demonstrably owing to the English conquest combined with the neglect of those measures which repair the evil of conquest. Had Ireland been left to herself, she would have experienced in all human probability the same course of events with the other countries of the North of Europe. Her kings would have become impatient of the papal pretensions; her aristocracy would have been jealous of the wealth and consequence of the Church; her commons would have been alienated by the unworthy lives of the clergy; and with these predisposing causes to aid them, the doctrines of the reformers would have taken root as effectually as they did in Scotland and in England. Or had conquest been followed by an effectual union; had we known how to improve, and conciliate, and civilize, as well as we understood the arts of slaughter and confiscation, Ireland would have had one heart with England, and Connaught and Munster would have opposed no greater obstacles to Protestantism than Cornwall and Cumberland; it would have been merely the slowness of ignorance, and not the deep aversion of national hatred. But now Ireland is Catholic because Protestantism was associated in her eyes with subjugation and oppression; she clung the more fondly to her superstitions because they were renounced and persecuted by her enemy. And who can doubt but that the dread and hatred of Popery which prevailed in England during the seventeenth century were at least greatly aggravated by causes arising out of her political relations with Ireland. If there was one thing more than another which made Popery detestable, it was the Irish rebellion and massacre of 1642: or at a later period, the support which Ireland gave to James the Second, and the Acts of James's Irish Parliament in 16[illegible]9. Now although religious animosity had a great share in the violences of both these periods; yet it was so mixed up with feelings of national and political hatred, that they ought not to be regarded as the mere effects of Catholic bigotry, but as the atrocious vengeance of a barbarous people upon those who had conquered and held them in subjection. In all these cases, to remember only the wickedness of the retaliation, and to pass over the injustice which provoked it, is at once morally and politically blameable. Let us abhor as much as we will the individual actors in scenes of cruelty, but let us not think that their guilt can cancel ours; or that because evil has been overthrown by worse evil, that therefore we are justified in restoring and upholding it.

Once again, it is urged by some that the disabilities imposed on the

Catholics are no other than all governments may enact in their discretion upon particular classes of their subjects: and parallels are sought for in the law which disables clergymen from sitting in the House of Commons; and in those which make the possession of a certain amount of income an indispensable qualification for a member of the legislature, or even for an elector in the county election. With respect to the privilegium against Horne Tooke, for such in fact it was, which assumed the thin cloak of a general principle to cover its real motives of personal aversion and fear, it is difficult to conceive how one act of injustice can be a defence for another; and the depriving the clergy of their rights as citizens, when their old rights as a distinct order in the State had been taken from them, was a measure worthy of the suspicions and violence of the time at which it was affected. But to require in a legislator the possession of such wealth as ought fairly to place him above any corrupt temptation, is allowed by the highest authorities in political science to be a provision for the common benefit; and it is a principle equally just and beneficial, however particular circumstances may sometimes require it to be modified, that he who has no interest in the maintenance of society, should have no voice in the choice of those who are to defend and govern it. But even admitting that it were otherwise, yet there is one great distinction between these laws of disqualification, and those which affect the Catholics of Ireland. The clergy form one particular profession; the poor form one particular class in society; but they are intermingled locally as well as politically with other professions and other classes; so that it is impossible that either should constitute a distinct society by themselves. They are essentially parts of a whole; and as such, submission is their duty; and Government may lawfully, on its own conscientious belief of its being for the general good, impose on them restrictions which they may consider injurious. And this same principle applies also to the Catholics of England, whose claims certainly could not be urged with justice if they were likely to be dangerous to the Church establishment of England, that is, to the interests of the great majority of that society of which the Catholics are necessarily and naturally a part. It applies also, it may be observed, to very small portions of a national society, even though they may be locally distinct; as, for instance, it were idle for the inhabitants of one single county, united as they are by laws, language, customs, and habits of living, to the rest of the nation, to consider themselves as capable of forming a distinct national society. Thus when Johnson,* in order to

* In his Pamphlet, entitled "Taxation no Tyranny," vol. viii. of his Works, 8vo. edit. 1806.

ridicule the pretensions of the American Congress, imagines a congress of Cornishmen assembled at Truro to hold a similar language, and then adds, that he knows no argument used by the Americans which may not with greater justice be urged by the Cornishmen, he forgets the infinitely different ratio which America and Cornwall bear towards Great Britain: and that distance, resources, and population fitted the former as decidedly for a separate social existence, as its close local connection, and its comparative insignificance in power and numbers, marked the latter as a natural part of the civil society of Britain. Now the Catholics of Ireland are not a single profession, like the clergy; nor a single class of society, like the poor; on the contrary, they comprehend all the different elements of a nation; nobility, wealth, intelligence, numbers, and variety of professions and occupations. Nor again, are they so locally mixed up with the mass of British society, as to form only a necessary part of it, incapable of a separate existence. On the contrary, Nature herself has marked out their boundaries with a decided hand; and Ireland is, geographically speaking, a world by itself. Further, they are not so insignificant a portion of the society of the empire, as to be bound under all circumstances to submit to the will of the majority, because their separation could not be contemplated without ridicule. Many states in Europe far inferior to Ireland in population and resources, and far less favourably situated, have enjoyed, and still enjoy, a happy and glorious independence. If by a persevering refusal to treat the Irish as citizens, we urge them hereafter to consider themselves as foreigners, they may be called rebels in England during the continuance of the struggle, but as soon as it is over the name of rebellion will be exchanged for that of war, and even municipal law will allow of our then giving it a title which universal law and the voice of all other nations had conferred on it from the very beginning.

Nay, even were we to extend the principle of non-resistence to societies as well as to individuals; if we hold that war is under all circumstances unlawful, and that the nation which repels injury by force is ever to be condemned, still this cannot lessen the guilt of those who offer injury, or those who make the injustice of the government their own by their loud petitions to persevere in it. Naboth certainly would have been guilty of rebellion, had he attempted as an individual to maintain his vineyard against Ahab by force; but would this have altered the wickedness of the king's act in seizing it, or of those counsellors who had instigated him to the crime? If it be sinful even to resist evil, how much more sinful is it to do evil? But some are not ashamed to argue, that although the present state of things in Ireland

is the result of injustice, yet that it is not injustice now to maintain it; that our fathers are answerable for the sin, and that we may fairly reap the profit of it. I know not a more striking proof of the lamentable ignorance in which many good men live as to all political duties, than that any one calling himself a Christian should use such an argument as this. Apply it to private life, and he who would advance it is not an erroneous reasoner, but deficient in common honesty; "non verbis et disputatione philosophorum sed vinculis et carcere fatigandus." The Catholic Louis, King of France, had other notions of Christian duty than these. He, not contented with the scrupulous justice of his own Christian life, "appointed commissaries to inquire what possessions had been unjustly annexed to the Royal domain during the two last reigns. These were restored to the proprietors, or, where length of time had made it difficult to ascertain the claimant, their value was distributed among the poor."* This was the real tenderness of an enlightened conscience; this was a true horror of the contamination of that worst idolatry, unrighteous gain. But to make no attempts to compensate for our fathers' injustice, or to think that sin can ever die to those who retain the benefit of it without repairing the evil which it occasioned, is indeed to "allow the deeds of our fathers," and to expose ourselves to the heavy judgment denounced against those who repent not of their fathers' crimes.

As a last resource we are opposed by the argument, "that men have no right to govern themselves, but only to be kindly and justly treated by their governors. That therefore the Irish Catholics may indeed claim exemption from persecution and tyranny, but that they have no right to a voice in the Legislature, or to exercise the highest functions of free citizens, the administration of the whole state." Now if men, that is, if societies of men, for we are not speaking of individuals, have not a right to govern themselves, who has the right to govern them? Government is either a matter of agreement, as when the proprietors in a joint stock company depute some of their body to manage the concerns of the whole; or, it arises out of a natural superiority, either temporary, as that of men over boys and children, or perpetual, as that of men over beasts. Now it is very true that beasts have no right to govern themselves, but only to be kindly and justly governed; for men have a natural superiority over them, which is perpetual and unalterable; and God has accordingly declared his will, that to men they should be subject. It is true also, that boys and children have no right to govern themselves while they remain boys and children, for there

* Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 42. 8vo. edit.

also is a natural superiority in their parents and elders over them; and God has accordingly in this case also sanctioned this authority by his express law. But as soon as boys arrive at manhood, the superiority of nature on the part of the parent expires: then therefore the child has a right to govern himself, and this the law of Christian countries, justly, as I conceive, interpreting the divine law, has agreed to acknowledge. A child then has no right to govern himself while he is a child, but he has a right so to be governed as shall qualify him for governing himself hereafter; and what should we say of the guilt of that parent who should wilfully neglect his son's education in order to protract the period of his own authority? Now according to the general belief of ancient times, such a natural superiority existed in some classes of men over the rest, and was derived from a supposed divine extraction: for the descendants of those deified men who were amongst the earliest objects of idolatry, were accounted themselves to be a race of demigods or heroes, and to be entitled to the exclusive possession of the offices of king and priest; of king, because as men were the natural lords of the brute creation, so demigods were the natural rulers of men: of priest, because the gods would receive no stranger's services with the same satisfaction as those offered by their own descendants. These were the διοτρεφέες βασιλῆες of the heroic age of Greece, and a similar belief gave a sacred authority to the Bramins of India, the Lucumones of Etruria, the Patricians of Rome, and the hero race who according to the national traditions were the earliest sovereigns of Egypt and of Aztlan. It was the government of such kings that the old philosophers accounted the most natural and perfect of all governments; because it was the government of a superior being, so far exalted above the nature of his subjects, that his single worth and fitness to govern surpassed the sum total of the virtues of the whole people besides. On similar principles the existence of slavery was defended; some divisions of the human race were naturally fitted to command, and others to obey; and the former, amongst whom the upholders of this doctrine took care to class themselves, were only acting agreeably to the order of nature when they made the latter their slaves. Still, however, it was a question whether this inferiority was accidental or perpetual; for if it were the former, then emancipation was the right of the slaves as soon as they became fit for it, and the duty of the masters was to prepare them in the mean time for exercising hereafter the power of self-government. But in all these cases the principle was just and intelligible, that a superiority of nature conferred a title to authority over beings of an inferior order; and they who believed kings to be of superhuman extraction and to possess superhuman virtues

justly maintained their divine right to govern mankind, and justly asserted that men were lawfully subject to them, and could claim no more from them than they were bound themselves to render to the brute creation, that is, just and kind treatment, so far as it was compatible with an absolute right of dominion. When however the conclusions of one set of premises are appended to premises entirely opposite, the incongruity would be truly ludicrous, were not its consequences too mischievous to allow of laughter. It is among the most humiliating instances of human folly, that Christians, while holding as one of the first principles of their religion the common descent of all mankind, their common sinful nature, and common need of being born again in Christ, should adopt a conclusion which rested wholly on their supposed different extraction, and on the high purity and excellence of some particular races contrasted with the degraded state of others. To us who admit of no such differences it is a conclusion little better than monstrous; and the very fact that no beings exist in the world who enjoy a natural superiority over mankind, and that no one race of mankind possesses, except from accidental causes, such a superiority over another, shows decisively that God has given to men the right of self government, and that as no one race can claim dominion as its peculiar birthright, so all lawful power over them is derived solely from their own consent, and is a mere matter of arrangement for the general benefit. Mankind therefore have a right to govern themselves, that is to say, society is the supreme power on earth, and the ordinances of society, or the laws and the commands of magistrates who act in the name and for the welfare of the society, are binding upon all the individual members of it; but neither has any one national society any authority to govern another, nor still less have magistrates who are but the officers of society, any right to rule contrary to the will of that society, or to exercise any greater power than it may authorize. And if such magistrates, by the physical force of a body of men purposely kept distinct from the interests and feelings of the community, exercise and maintain a despotic power over society, it is a state as monstrous as if wild beasts were to occupy any country to the exclusion of mankind; and the social body would be as fully justified in delivering itself from the unnatural violence of one of these brute enemies as of the other. The Christian Scriptures indeed enjoin conscientious submission to government on the part of individuals, resting this duty on the divine authority vested in it, as the representative on earth of our supreme moral Governor. They strongly condemn the doctrines of the Fifth Monarchy men, and of the ancient Jews, who held that the saints were not subject to any earthly society, especially when it consisted of heathens, because they had one only King in heaven. They discourage the notion so common amongst

religious bigots, that there is something profane in political institutions with which the servants of God should not intermeddle. On the contrary, the apostles teach that these political institutions are God's appointed means of governing the world, and that he so highly regards them as to invest them with one of his own attributes, the dispensation of good to the well disposed, and of punishment to the evil doer. If they are perverted from fulfilling these purposes, they are faulty and require amendment, and every servant of God should use his best endeavours to restore them to their designed purity. But that they who had so perverted them should be allowed to profit by their own wrong, that they should in spite of nature transfer the principles of government exercised over beings naturally inferior to the government of beings naturally equal; and that this violation of the manifest laws of God's providence, and obstruction of his declared will for the perfecting of human society, should defend itself by arguments grounded upon falsehood and idolatry, and then claim to be sanctioned by divine truth, affords altogether a melancholy instance of the art with which the great enemy of all goodness employs the pretext of respect for the Gospel, when he would most effectually prevent the Gospel from bringing forth its proper fruits.

And now I would briefly recapitulate the proofs of my original position, that it is a direct Christian duty to grant the claims of the Roman Catholics, and a direct sin, however ignorantly committed, to endeavour to procure the rejection of them. We conquered Ireland unjustly, and have perpetuated the evils, and consequently the guilt, of our first conquest. We refuse to admit the Irish nation into the pale of our civil society, whilst, by admitting into it those Protestant military colonies, by which we have from time to time garrisoned Ireland, we keep up a broad line of distinction between union and conquest, between the small minority whom we make our fellow-citizens, and the majority whom we treat as subjects. We plead the inconveniences to ourselves of a connection with Ireland on equal and just terms, while we effected in the first instance, and still insist on maintaining a connexion on unequal and unjust terms. We talk of the sin of uniting ourselves with Papists, yet we force Papists to belong to us; and we plead the idolatry of the Catholics as a reason for not doing them justice, when our own injustice has been the cause of this idolatry still existing; and had it not been for us, Ireland would in all human probability have been at this moment Protestant. We confound an entire national society with particular orders or professions of society, and sacrifice the rights of one nation to the interests of another, because the interests of a part of a nation may lawfully be sacrificed to the paramount rights of the whole. We attempt sometimes to justify our con-

duct by an argument, which, if acted upon in private life, would cause a man to be banished from all honest society; namely, that we are not bound to repair an injustice done by others, even though we continue to reap the profits of it. We attempt at other times to defend it by transferring conclusions, legitimately drawn from premises which we acknowledge to be false, to the very contrary premises which we acknowledge to be true. And we individually, that is, the clergy, gentry, farmers, and shopkeepers of this country, make ourselves each separately guilty of the injustice which we have committed as a nation, by calling upon our rulers to persevere in this wickedness, when they appear inclined to relieve us and our posterity from the curse which it must entail upon us, and to return at last to the path of duty.

It is not therefore the advocates, but the enemies of the Catholics who are preferring state policy to their Christian duty; it is not their advocates who would sacrifice the Protestant religion to the views of worldly expediency, but their adversaries, who would violate the plain duties of our common Christianity, rather than consent to the political evil of abandoning Ireland to herself, if their consciences will not permit them to treat it with justice. The plea of religion is wholly foreign to the question, except upon such grounds as would authorize direct persecution. If the believers in a true religion claim a title to restrain those who are in error from the enjoyment of their natural rights, in order to have a greater chance of converting them to the truth; then also they may pretend to persecute them directly with the same object, and there is no doubt that a thorough persecution will generally root out the doctrines against which it is directed. Or if they claim a natural superiority on account of the truth of their religion, so that they are fitted to govern unbelievers or heretics, on the same principles that men govern children, this is a pretension far less reasonable than if we were to claim dominion over those nations whose constitutions were unfavorable to the welfare of their people, or, whose moral character we might judge to be inferior to our own. What human power can pronounce authoritatively upon the truth of a religion, when every nation will with equal zeal maintain the truth of its own? Or does Christ authorize his servants as such to assume the office of judging the world, until the day when he shall himself appear to pronounce the judgment?

Hitherto then I have argued the Question solely on the ground of justice: and have shown, that a third part nearly of the inhabitants of the whole empire, containing in themselves all the different elements of a nation, locally distinct, differing in race, and a large part of them in language also, from the people of Great Britain, cannot be considered

as necessarily forming only a part of our national society, on whom we as the majority may impose what rules we will, while they have no other duty but submission. We are bound either to treat them fairly, or not to meddle with them at all; and if our constitution must be altered before they can be members of it, we are bound to alter it; as we, by making them subjects unjustly, contracted voluntarily the obligation to make them citizens; or else we are labouring at this hour under the guilt of our ancestors' usurpations. But although this would be the plain path of duty under any circumstances, yet it would be a most painful alternative, had we to choose between the overthrow of our religious institutions, and the dismemberment of the empire. No national evil that did not involve national sin could be greater in my judgment than the destruction of our Protestant Church Establishment. That union of Church and State, which so many good men lament and some condemn, appears to me to be far too powerful a means of diffusing the blessings of Christianity to be lightly broken asunder; and although I earnestly desire to see the actual abuses of that union remedied, yet even now the good which it is daily working is such as to make every sincere Christian regard at least with anxiety the prospect of its dissolution. I have said thus much, because the advocates of the Catholic claims are often accused of indifference to the safety of our own Establishment. With whatever justice this may be imputed to some of their number, I beg in my own case to protest against the charge as wholly groundless and untrue. I think certainly, that even the existence of our Establishment would be too dearly purchased, if it could only be upheld by injustice; I should be unwilling to do evil that good might come; to call upon Satan to cast out Satan. But our Protestant Church is one of the greatest blessings with which England has been favoured; and may it exist secure from every enemy under the care of its divine Head, and trusting in its lawful arms, the truth of its doctrines, and the holiness of its members!

With this feeling, not less sincere than theirs who express most loudly their fears for its actual safety, it is to me a matter of deep joy, that the very course which justice calls on us to follow, should be also that which is most likely to ensure the safety of the Protestant Church, and to extend the influence of its doctrines: and that the very act which does justice to Ireland, holds out also the fairest promise of her moral and spiritual improvement. So universally true is our Lord's declaration, that if we seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, all other things shall be added unto us; if we do our duty without fear of the consequences, we shall most surely gain those advantages, which had they tempted us to flinch from our duty we should for ever have forfeited.

Now at the commencement of this argument I am willing to take the picture of Ireland and the Irish Catholics from those who think most unfavourably of them. I am willing to suppose that the Irish race are deeply tainted with barbarism; that they know little of obedience to law; that they are the slaves of passion and feeling, and by consequence deficient in the highest qualification of human nature, self-denying virtue founded upon a high-principled sense of duty to God and man. I would allow also, that in no part of Europe does the Roman Catholic religion exist in a more aggravated form; nowhere are its superstitions more gross, or its bigotry more ferocious; nowhere is it a more fearful corruption of Christ's Gospel. But with this unpromising race and with this dreadful religion we have chosen to connect ourselves; and we have thus deprived ourselves of the right to regard them with mere disgust and abhorrence; we must endeavour to better them, and the more so as the virulence of the evil is in a great degree to be attributed to our own neglect or absolute ill treatment. Now how are they to be bettered, or can they not be bettered at all? They can be bettered, for the Roman Catholic religion wears so different an aspect in different countries, that it may evidently be influenced by external causes: and they who believe in the common origin of all mankind, must conclude that all important moral differences, between one race and another, may be gradually removed as they have been created; and that as unfavourable circumstances made them differ, so a happier system and better institutions may in time restore their original equality. Now a religion may be externally influenced either by forcible or by gentle measures; by persecution, or by persuasion and example. I will not insult any of my readers by enlarging on the utter wickedness of the first of these means; but will at once proceed to consider those others which we may and ought to use. If we wish to influence any one by our arguments or by our practice, should we be most likely to succeed if previously he regarded us with suspicion and ill will, or if he were living on friendly terms with us? The question may seem too simple to be seriously asked; and yet there are some who believe that Protestantism is less likely to win its way among the Irish Catholics, when being treated justly and kindly they will regard its professors as countrymen and friends, than it is at this moment, when it is looked upon as the badge of an enemy, and when its name is indissolubly associated with hostility and oppression. But let us see what I mean by saying that Protestantism will win its way in Ireland if the claims of the Catholics are granted. There will not be many direct conversions; not many who will say in so many words that they abjure the errors of popery, and go over to the Protestant Church: there will be

very little of this on either side, for there are stronger feelings in men's minds opposed to a professed change of religion than any that can be brought in favour of it. The nominal conversion of the heathen world to Christianity is a misleading example: for heathenism was not a matter of conscience with most of its votaries, and wanted many of the strongest links by which all forms of Christianity, and even Mohammedanism itself, are bound to the hearts and minds of their respective professors. Thus in modern Europe, wherever Catholics and Protestants have been mixed largely together, as in Germany, France, and Switzerland, neither religion has nominally gained much over the other; and in those cantons of Switzerland in particular which are divided between Catholics and Protestants, the Catholic parishes have in general continued to be Catholic, and the Protestant to be Protestant, without the limits of either faith having been enlarged by proselytism. In fact, if men of different religions are to live together in peace, they must abstain from a direct interference with each other's tenets; just as in marriages between two persons of different persuasions, an arrangement is commonly made which limits the influence of either parent over their common children, and determines that some shall be brought up in the opinions of their father, and others in those of their mother. But although direct renunciations of the Roman Catholic tenets are likely to be few, yet the general approximation of those tenets to the faith of Protestants is likely to be very considerable. For this experience is our warrant; inasmuch as the Roman Catholic religion exists in its most corrupted form in those countries where there are either no Protestants, as in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, or where from political animosities Protestants are regarded with suspicion and abhorrence, as in Ireland. On the contrary, where Protestants are numerous, and are living on friendly terms with Catholics, there the Catholic religion exists in a very improved state, and its worst abuses are practically done away with. I have now before me two Catechisms: the one a Spanish one, printed at Valladolid, apparently during the war with Napoleon, but the date of the year is not given; the other printed at Rheims in 1822, and circulated by the orders of the Archbishop of Rheims, for the use of his diocese. Much certainly that is offensive to a Protestant ear may be found even in the latter; yet the difference in tone between it and the Spanish Catechism is very remarkable; and sufficiently shows that the Roman Catholic religion is not always practically one and the same, although its members, if pressed on the point by Protestants, might think themselves bound to assert its unchangeableness. For example, in the Spanish Catechism, after the catechumen has expounded the several Articles of the Apos-

tles' Creed, the catechist proceeds to ask, whether there are any other things which he believes? To which the answer is given,* "Yes, father; every thing contained in the Holy Scriptures, and every thing revealed by God to his Church." "And what things are these?" proceeds the catechist. "That," replies the catechumen, "you should not ask of me, who am ignorant. There are Doctors in our holy Mother Church, who will know how to answer it." "You say well," resumes the catechist, "that it becomes the Doctors of the Church and not such as you to give an account of the extent of all the points of faith. It is enough for you to give an account of the Articles as contained in the Creed." And again in another place, the catechumen, after enumerating the several means of grace, mentions as the last and most powerful,† "the making choice of a wise, virtuous, and prudent confessor, and obeying him in every thing." "You say well," rejoins the catechist, "and remember to act accordingly; for such a confessor will be like an angel, who will guide you by proposing to you these and other means of grace," &c. Now to the first of these extracts there is nothing at all similar in the French Catechism; and with regard to the confessor, all that is said is a practical rule at the end of the Article on Confession, recommending every one to choose a good confessor, who may question them, instruct them in their duties, and be a check on them; and advising them "to listen to his counsels, and follow them with docility." Again, in the French Catechism the nature of the honour paid to the Virgin Mary and the Saints is carefully defined; and it is expressly said, that we may not worship either the Virgin, or the Saints and Angels, but God alone: nor may we pray to them to give us grace, but to pray for it to God in our behalf; and that the cross and the images of the Saints are not to be respected in themselves; for they have in them no divinity and no virtue; Catholics address to them no prayers, and put no trust in them; but they may be honoured for the sake of those whom they represent to us. But in

* Si, Padre, todo lo que está en la Sagrada Escritura, y quanto Dios tiene revelado á su Iglesia. P. Qué cosas son estas? R. Eso no me lo pregunteis á mi, que soy ignorante: Doctores tiene la santa Madre Iglesia, que lo sabrán responder. M. Bien decis, qué a los Doctores conviene, y no á vosotros, dar cuenta por extenso de las cosas de la Fé: á vosotros bástaos darla de los Articulos como se contienen en el Credo.

† Por decir uno que abraza muchos, el elegir un confesor sábio, virtuoso, y prudente, y sujetarse á el en todo. M. Bien decia. Hacedlo pues vosotros asi, pues este os será como un Angel, que os guiará, proponiendo-os estos y otros medios, &c.

I have inserted the original words of these passages, because, as my knowledge of Spanish is exceedingly slight, I may possibly have committed some mistakes in my translation of them; although I believe I have not mistaken the exact sense.

the Spanish Catechism there are none of these explanations, and it is simply said that we should honour the images of the Virgin, and of the Saints, and pray to the Angels and Saints, as to our mediators. Finally, in the French Catechism there is at the end of every Article a list of passages from the Scripture bearing on the subject of the Article, which can only be inserted in order to encourage the study of very large parts of the Scripture at least, if it does not imply the recommendation of the whole volume. There is not a word in the Spanish Catechism, on the other hand, which refers the reader to the Bible, or would lead him to consider the study of the Scriptures as useful to him. And this brings me to a difference in the Roman Catholic religion as it exists in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, on the one hand, and in Italy on the other, of which every one who has travelled through these countries may speak from his own knowledge. In the three former, crucifixes by the road side are sufficiently common; but images of the Virgin and the Saints are comparatively rare; while in Italy these last are more frequent than the crucifix. Again, most of the modern paintings in the French Churches are taken from Scriptural subjects: and what is perhaps even more remarkable, amongst a collection of thirty or forty coloured prints of the cheapest description which I looked over in a shop at Cologne in June last, there was not one relating to any legend of the Saints or the Virgin, but the subjects of all were taken from the New Testament. Whereas at Rome and in its neighbourhood the pictures and legends of the Saints are far more numerous on the walls of the Churches, by the road sides, in shops, and in houses, than pictures relating to our Lord, or that are taken from the Old or New Testament. Now it may be very true that a French or German priest, if pressed by a Protestant, would declare that the faith of his Church was one and unchangeable, and that the Catholics of Italy held the same doctrines as himself: but still the practical effect is infinitely different, if the parts of these doctrines which are prominently brought forward be in one country the main truths of Christianity which Catholics hold in common with Protestants, and in another their own peculiar corruptions of it. And this more Christian aspect of the Roman Catholic faith exists in every country where it has been much in contact with Protestantism, *except in Ireland;* while there, on the contrary, it presents itself in its very worst form. This is in itself a phenomenon; and this alone, if duly considered, should induce every man who is anxious for the religious improvement of his countrymen to promote the admission of the Irish Catholics to their civil rights. Wherever Catholics and Protestants have lived together on a friendly footing, the influence of Protestantism has been insensibly operating, and has

practically improved the character of Catholicism; but where they have lived together as a degraded and a persecuting caste; while the one has groaned under a system of exclusion, and the other exulted in the enjoyment of its ascendancy, there has been no room for the exercise of any beneficial influence; men's religion has become their party also; and thus its most distinctive peculiarities have been rather obstinately maintained than softened or abandoned. Yet the Irish Protestant Church is wealthy and learned; and has numbered amongst its ministers some of the most apostolical men who have ever borne the Christian name. Under any other circumstances their talents and their virtues, and the political influence of their Church, might have attracted the respect and love of the Catholics, might have drawn them into a cordial union in the works of charity and public utility, and might in time have induced them to tolerate, if not, like the Catholics of Germany, to encourage, the circulation of the Scriptures amongst their people. But in Ireland the system of ascendancy has poisoned every thing; and while the Catholic regarded the Protestant as an oppressor, and the Protestant looked upon the Catholic as meditating insurrection, both were repelled from all approaches to union; and each was forward to hurl upon the other the names of heretic and idolater.

Nor should it be forgotten, that if the influence of Protestantism has improved the Catholic religion in Germany, it might be expected, if it were once disentangled from its encumbering armour of ascendancy, to produce a much stronger effect in Ireland. That which the Puritans charged upon the Church of England as its crime, has always recommended it to the Catholics as the least offensive of the Protestant Churches; I mean its form of Church government, its Liturgy, and its ceremonies. Hitherto the objects of our Reformers, in avoiding all needless departure from the doctrines and discipline of the Church of Rome, have not been fully answered; their policy has perhaps disgusted more Protestants than it has conciliated Catholics. I do not mean therefore to urge that it was blameable; but it will be a great reproach to ourselves if, after having suffered so long from its ill effects, as exemplified in our bitter dissensions with the Puritans, we do not now avail ourselves of the opportunity which Ireland affords, to realize some of its intended benefits. A Puritan clergy in Ireland, or a clergy at all partaking of the spirit of Puritanism, would be an evil which the Government should carefully watch over, and to the utmost of its power vigorously prevent. There should be no furious commentaries on the Apocalypse, no raving about the sin of tolerating idolaters. The deep folly of such conduct can hardly be an excuse for its utter uncharitableness, and the incalculable mischief of its consequences. Our language to the Roman Catholics should be that of St. Paul to the



Jews: "Believest thou the Prophets? I know that thou believest." "After the way that you call heresy, so worship we the God of our fathers, believing none other things than those which the Prophets and Moses did say should come." "You have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge." You are our brethren, "yours are the fathers," and "if concerning the Gospel you are at all our enemies, yet are you beloved for the fathers' sake," even those same fathers,* who in their heroic zeal for Christ's sake became the fathers of this very nation in Christ, and "in Christ Jesus have begotten us through the Gospel." And if they receive our charity with unkindness, against all example; if our Church after all shall produce less effect upon them than has been wrought by other Protestant communions, whose differences with them are more universal, we shall then at least be entitled to say, what at present would be an impious mockery, "Your blood be upon your own heads, we are clean." We have at last presented truth to you fairly, not as your oppressors and persecutors, from whose hands even truth herself must be received with suspicion, but as your countrymen and brethren, not pretending to have dominion over your bodies, but if it might be, willing to deliver your minds from error, and to be helpers of your joy. If you reject it now, you reject not us, but the truth itself: your fall will be your own fault, and we shall be no more guilty of having thrown a stumbling-block in your way, by uniting truth of religious profession with the practice of iniquity and oppression.

The answer to all this is the mere repetition of the assertion, "that popery is unchanged and unchangeable." It is in vain that we appeal to facts, and shew that it is not unchanged in practice; that in some countries it is practically Christianity mixed with some errors, while in others it is practically idolatry and superstition bearing the name of Christianity: that the German Catholics who circulate the Scriptures are not exactly the same sort of persons as the Italian Catholics who carefully proscribe them: that the Catholic Kings of Saxony, who being absolute Sovereigns of a Protestant people have left the Protestant Church Establishment in Saxony uninjured and unmolested for a hundred years; and the reigning monarch in particular, who by a recent law will allow no convert from Protestantism to be received into the Catholic Church till after an interval of some months after his declaring his change, or without producing a certificate from his Protestant minister that he had tried without effect to shake his conviction; that these Catholic princes do not exactly resemble that picture of a persecuting bigot, which we from the single example of James the

* Pope Gregory and Augustine.

religious bigots, that there is something profane in political institutions with which the servants of God should not intermeddle. On the contrary, the apostles teach that these political institutions are God's appointed means of governing the world, and that he so highly regards them as to invest them with one of his own attributes, the dispensation of good to the well disposed, and of punishment to the evil doer. If they are perverted from fulfilling these purposes, they are faulty and require amendment, and every servant of God should use his best endeavours to restore them to their designed purity. But that they who had so perverted them should be allowed to profit by their own wrong, that they should in spite of nature transfer the principles of government exercised over beings naturally inferior to the government of beings naturally equal; and that this violation of the manifest laws of God's providence, and obstruction of his declared will for the perfecting of human society, should defend itself by arguments grounded upon falsehood and idolatry, and then claim to be sanctioned by divine truth, affords altogether a melancholy instance of the art with which the great enemy of all goodness employs the pretext of respect for the Gospel, when he would most effectually prevent the Gospel from bringing forth its proper fruits.

And now I would briefly recapitulate the proofs of my original position, that it is a direct Christian duty to grant the claims of the Roman Catholics, and a direct sin, however ignorantly committed, to endeavour to procure the rejection of them. We conquered Ireland unjustly, and have perpetuated the evils, and consequently the guilt, of our first conquest. We refuse to admit the Irish nation into the pale of our civil society, whilst, by admitting into it those Protestant military colonies, by which we have from time to time garrisoned Ireland, we keep up a broad line of distinction between union and conquest, between the small minority whom we make our fellow-citizens, and the majority whom we treat as subjects. We plead the inconveniences to ourselves of a connection with Ireland on equal and just terms, while we effected in the first instance, and still insist on maintaining a connexion on unequal and unjust terms. We talk of the sin of uniting ourselves with Papists, yet we force Papists to belong to us; and we plead the idolatry of the Catholics as a reason for not doing them justice, when our own injustice has been the cause of this idolatry still existing; and had it not been for us, Ireland would in all human probability have been at this moment Protestant. We confound an entire national society with particular orders or professions of society, and sacrifice the rights of one nation to the interests of another, because the interests of a part of a nation may lawfully be sacrificed to the paramount rights of the whole. We attempt sometimes to justify our con-

duct by an argument, which, if acted upon in private life, would cause a man to be banished from all honest society; namely, that we are not bound to repair an injustice done by others, even though we continue to reap the profits of it. We attempt at other times to defend it by transferring conclusions, legitimately drawn from premises which we acknowledge to be false, to the very contrary premises which we acknowledge to be true. And we individually, that is, the clergy, gentry, farmers, and shopkeepers of this country, make ourselves each separately guilty of the injustice which we have committed as a nation, by calling upon our rulers to persevere in this wickedness, when they appear inclined to relieve us and our posterity from the curse which it must entail upon us, and to return at last to the path of duty.

It is not therefore the advocates, but the enemies of the Catholics who are preferring state policy to their Christian duty; it is not their advocates who would sacrifice the Protestant religion to the views of worldly expediency, but their adversaries, who would violate the plain duties of our common Christianity, rather than consent to the political evil of abandoning Ireland to herself, if their consciences will not permit them to treat it with justice. The plea of religion is wholly foreign to the question, except upon such grounds as would authorize direct persecution. If the believers in a true religion claim a title to restrain those who are in error from the enjoyment of their natural rights, in order to have a greater chance of converting them to the truth; then also they may pretend to persecute them directly with the same object, and there is no doubt that a thorough persecution will generally root out the doctrines against which it is directed. Or if they claim a natural superiority on account of the truth of their religion, so that they are fitted to govern unbelievers or heretics, on the same principles that men govern children, this is a pretension far less reasonable than if we were to claim dominion over those nations whose constitutions were unfavorable to the welfare of their people, or, whose moral character we might judge to be inferior to our own. What human power can pronounce authoritatively upon the truth of a religion, when every nation will with equal zeal maintain the truth of its own? Or does Christ authorize his servants as such to assume the office of judging the world, until the day when he shall himself appear to pronounce the judgment?

Hitherto then I have argued the Question solely on the ground of justice: and have shown, that a third part nearly of the inhabitants of the whole empire, containing in themselves all the different elements of a nation, locally distinct, differing in race, and a large part of them in language also, from the people of Great Britain, cannot be considered

as necessarily forming only a part of our national society, on whom we as the majority may impose what rules we will, while they have no other duty but submission. We are bound either to treat them fairly, or not to meddle with them at all; and if our constitution must be altered before they can be members of it, we are bound to alter it; as we, by making them subjects unjustly, contracted voluntarily the obligation to make them citizens; or else we are labouring at this hour under the guilt of our ancestors' usurpations. But although this would be the plain path of duty under any circumstances, yet it would be a most painful alternative, had we to choose between the overthrow of our religious institutions, and the dismemberment of the empire. No national evil that did not involve national sin could be greater in my judgment than the destruction of our Protestant Church Establishment. That union of Church and State, which so many good men lament and some condemn, appears to me to be far too powerful a means of diffusing the blessings of Christianity to be lightly broken asunder; and although I earnestly desire to see the actual abuses of that union remedied, yet even now the good which it is daily working is such as to make every sincere Christian regard at least with anxiety the prospect of its dissolution. I have said thus much, because the advocates of the Catholic claims are often accused of indifference to the safety of our own Establishment. With whatever justice this may be imputed to some of their number, I beg in my own case to protest against the charge as wholly groundless and untrue. I think certainly, that even the existence of our Establishment would be too dearly purchased, if it could only be upheld by injustice; I should be unwilling to do evil that good might come; to call upon Satan to cast out Satan. But our Protestant Church is one of the greatest blessings with which England has been favoured; and may it exist secure from every enemy under the care of its divine Head, and trusting in its lawful arms, the truth of its doctrines, and the holiness of its members!

With this feeling, not less sincere than theirs who express most loudly their fears for its actual safety, it is to me a matter of deep joy, that the very course which justice calls on us to follow, should be also that which is most likely to ensure the safety of the Protestant Church, and to extend the influence of its doctrines: and that the very act which does justice to Ireland, holds out also the fairest promise of her moral and spiritual improvement. So universally true is our Lord's declaration, that if we seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, all other things shall be added unto us; if we do our duty without fear of the consequences, we shall most surely gain those advantages, which had they tempted us to flinch from our duty we should for ever have forfeited.

Now at the commencement of this argument I am willing to take the picture of Ireland and the Irish Catholics from those who think most unfavourably of them. I am willing to suppose that the Irish race are deeply tainted with barbarism; that they know little of obedience to law; that they are the slaves of passion and feeling, and by consequence deficient in the highest qualification of human nature, self-denying virtue founded upon a high-principled sense of duty to God and man. I would allow also, that in no part of Europe does the Roman Catholic religion exist in a more aggravated form; nowhere are its superstitions more gross, or its bigotry more ferocious; nowhere is it a more fearful corruption of Christ's Gospel. But with this unpromising race and with this dreadful religion we have chosen to connect ourselves; and we have thus deprived ourselves of the right to regard them with mere disgust and abhorrence; we must endeavour to better them, and the more so as the virulence of the evil is in a great degree to be attributed to our own neglect or absolute ill treatment. Now how are they to be bettered, or can they not be bettered at all? They can be bettered, for the Roman Catholic religion wears so different an aspect in different countries, that it may evidently be influenced by external causes: and they who believe in the common origin of all mankind, must conclude that all important moral differences, between one race and another, may be gradually removed as they have been created; and that as unfavourable circumstances made them differ, so a happier system and better institutions may in time restore their original equality. Now a religion may be externally influenced either by forcible or by gentle measures; by persecution, or by persuasion and example. I will not insult any of my readers by enlarging on the utter wickedness of the first of these means; but will at once proceed to consider those others which we may and ought to use. If we wish to influence any one by our arguments or by our practice, should we be most likely to succeed if previously he regarded us with suspicion and ill will, or if he were living on friendly terms with us? The question may seem too simple to be seriously asked; and yet there are some who believe that Protestantism is less likely to win its way among the Irish Catholics, when being treated justly and kindly they will regard its professors as countrymen and friends, than it is at this moment, when it is looked upon as the badge of an enemy, and when its name is indissolubly associated with hostility and oppression. But let us see what I mean by saying that Protestantism will win its way in Ireland if the claims of the Catholics are granted. There will not be many direct conversions; not many who will say in so many words that they abjure the errors of popery, and go over to the Protestant Church: there will be

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proceeded against according to the statutes. And if they subscribe, inquiry shall be made what care they take for the instruction of the said children in the Catechism established in the Book of Common Prayer. And all Ordinaries shall censure those whom they find negligent in the said instruction; and if shall appear that the parents of the said children do forbid such schoolmasters to bring them up in the doctrine of the Church of England, they shall notwithstanding do their duty; and if thereupon the said parents shall take away their children, the said schoolmasters shall forthwith give up their names unto the Bishop of the diocese, who shall take care to return them to the Justices of Assize in manner and form aforesaid. And because some may cunningly elude this decree, by sending their children to be bred beyond the seas, therefore we ordain, that the churchwardens and other sworn ecclesiastical officers shall likewise make careful inquiry, and give in upon their oaths at all Visitations, the names of such recusants' children who are so sent beyond the seas to be bred there, or whom they probably suspect to be so sent: which names as aforesaid shall be given up to the Bishop, and from him returned to the Judges as aforesaid, that their parents, who so send them, may be punished according to law. Provided always, that this Canon shall not take away or derogate from any power or authority already given or established by any other Canon now in force.

"And all the said complaints or certificates shall be presented up to the Judges in their several circuits by the Bishop's Registrar, or some other of his deputies immediately after the publishing of his Majesty's commission, or at the end of the charge, which shall then be given by the Judge. And this upon pain of suspension for three months.

"This sacred Synod doth earnestly entreat the said Reverend Justices of Assize, to be careful in the execution of the said laws committed to their trust, as they will answer to God for the daily increase of this gross kind of superstition. And further, we do also exhort all Judges, whether ecclesiastical or temporal, upon the like account, that they would not admit in any of their courts any vexatious complaint, suit or suits, or presentments against any minister, churchwardens, questmen, sidemen, or other church-officers for the making of any such presentments.

"And lastly, we enjoin that every Bishop shall once in every year send into his Majesty's high court of Chancery, a *significavit* of the names and surnames of all such recusants who have stood excommunicated beyond the time limited by the law, and shall desire that the writ *De excommunicato capiendo* might be at once sent out against them all

ex officio. And for the better execution of this decree, this present Synod doth most humbly beseech his most sacred Majesty, that the officers of the said high court of Chancery, whom it shall concern, may be commanded to sent out the aforesaid writ from time to time as is desired, for that it would much exhaust the particular estates of the Ordinaries, to sue out several writs at their own charge. And that the like command also may be laid upon the Sheriffs and their deputies, for the due and faithful execution of the said writs, as often as they shall be brought unto them.

"And to the end that this Canon may take the better and speedier effect, and not to be deluded or delayed; we further decree and ordain, that no popish recusant, who shall persist in the said sentence of excommunication beyond the time prescribed by law, shall be absolved by virtue of any appeal in any ecclesiastical court, unless the said party shall first in his or her own person, and not by a proctor, take the usual oath, *De parendo Juri, et stando mandatis Ecclesiæ.*"

From Canon V. Against Sectaries.

"Whereas there is a provision now made by a Canon for the suppressing of Popery, and the growth thereof, by subjecting all popish recusants to the great severity of ecclesiastical censures in that behalf: this present Synod well knowing that there are other sects which endeavour the subversion both of the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England no less than Papists do, although by another way; for the preventing thereof, doth hereby decree and ordain, that all those proceedings and penalties which are mentioned in the aforesaid Canon against popish recusants as far as they shall be applicable, shall stand in full force and vigour against all Anabaptists, Brownists, Separatists, Familists, or other sect or sects, person or persons whatsoever, who do or shall either obstinately refuse or ordinarily, not having a lawful impediment, (that is, for the space of a month,) neglect to repair to their parish churches or chapels where they inhabit, for the hearing of divine service established, and receiving of the holy communion according to law.

"And we do also further decree and ordain, that the clause contained in the Canon now made by this Synod against the books of Socinianism, shall also extend to the makers, importers, printers, and publishers, or dispersers of any book, writing, or scandalous pamphlet devised against the discipline and government of the Church of England, and

unto the maintainers and abettors of any opinion or doctrine against the same.

"And further, because there are sprung up among us a sort of factious people, despisers and depravers of the Book of Common Prayer, who do not according to the law resort to their parish church or chapel to join in the public prayers, service and worship of God with the congregation, contenting themselves with the hearing of sermons only, thinking thereby to avoid the penalties due to such as wholly absent themselves from the Church. We therefore for the restraint of all such wilful contemners or neglecters of the service of God, do ordain, that the church or chapel-wardens, and questmen, or sidemen of every parish, shall be careful to inquire out all such disaffected persons, and shall present the names of all delinquents at all Visitations of Bishops, and other Ordinaries; and that the same proceedings and penalties mentioned in the Canon aforesaid respectively shall be used against them as against other recusants, unless within one whole month after they are first denounced, they shall make acknowledgment and reformation of that their fault. Provided always, that this Canon shall not derogate from any other Canon, law, or statute in that behalf provided against those sectaries."

These Canons have been censured indeed by both Houses of Parliament, during the civil war; and they are expressly declared not to have the sanction of Parliament by a Clause in a Statute passed after the Restoration, cap. xii. anno 13 Car. II. § 5. But the Church has never disavowed them, and they are thus still on a footing with her other Canons which have not received the sanction of Parliament, and therefore are not accounted part of the law of the land.

But they who charge on all the Roman Catholics of the present day the persecuting doctrines of the Council of Trent, are liable to another retort. In the Apology of Bishop Jewell there occurs the following passage:—"Ex illo" (Verbo, scil. a Christo patefacto et ab Apostolis propagato) "nos solo omne genus veterum hæreticorum, quos isti nos aiunt ab inferis revocasse, condemnamus, et Arianos, Eutychianos, Marcionitas, Ebionæos, Valentinianos, Carpocratianos, Tatianos, Novatianos, eosque uno verbo omnes, qui vel de Deo Patre, vel de Christo, vel de Spiritu Sancto, vel de ullâ aliâ parte Religionis Christianæ impie senserunt, quia ab Evangelio Christi coarguuntur, impios et perditos pronuntiamus, et usque ad inferorum portas detestamur; *nec id solum, sed etiam si forte erumpant uspiam, et sese prodant, eos legitimis et civilibus suppliciis severi et sino coercemus.*" Now Jewell's Apology, to use the words of Bishop Randolph, "is said to have been

published with the consent of the Bishops, and was always understood to speak the sense of the whole Church, in whose name it was written :" and this work expressly declares, and boasts that the Church of England, "severally and earnestly checks by secular and legal punishments," (and the term *suppliciis* is most naturally to be understood of capital punishments,) all who in her opinion hold impious doctrines with regard to any point of the Christian religion. Nor is this all, for this very work of Jewell's containing this avowal of persecution was reprinted by Bishop Randolph in 1792, and again in 1812, amongst a Collection of Tracts, Catechisms, &c., whose express object was to convey the genuine sense of the Church of England. (See the Preface to the Enchiridion Theologicum, Oxford, 1812.) And yet should we not repel it as a calumny only excusable from the utter ignorance which it implied, if a Nestorian or Polish Socinian, unacquainted with the toleration actually enjoyed in England, and the actual sentiments of its members, were to assert that the Church of England is a persecuting Church, and thinks it her duty to burn all those whom she judges to be heretics?

The Catholics, it is true, are entangled by a difficulty which we do not feel, in their tenet of the infallibility of the Church. I call it an entanglement and a difficulty, for that is the true light in which to consider it. The tenet of the infallibility of the Church does not really keep the Catholics in perpetual ignorance, but it embarrasses them in the expression of their sentiments, and gives Protestants a means of unfairly perplexing and misrepresenting them. That is to say, that such being the tenet of the Church to which he belongs, an individual Catholic does not like directly to disavow it: his habitual respect for the Church makes him inclined generally to admit her infallibility; so that when he meets with particular decisions whose truth he cannot in his own mind allow, he would rather express his disbelief practically and indirectly, than by stating it directly permit himself to be charged with the conclusion, that then he must admit the Church to be fallible. It would be rather hard to tax the mathematicians of France and Italy with believing that the earth is the centre of the solar system; yet the Jesuits who edited Newton's Principia thought it right to declare in their Preface, that although in order to illustrate Newton's reasoning they were obliged to assume the truth of his premises, yet they did not mean to deny the doctrine of the Church, which had declared the earth to be immoveable. No one is misled by such language in this instance: and if we dealt fairly with the Catholics we should in moral and political matters also believe their practice and the general tenor of their language, although they have not renounced,

and perhaps would not renounce, if called upon to do so, the general tenet of the Church with which their practice and sentiments may be inconsistent. We may call this if we will inconsistency or self deceit: but a similar state of mind is very common amongst those who are not Catholics; and it is certainly unjust either to tax them with consequences which they do not acknowledge, however legitimately drawn from their premises; or to represent them as insincere and unworthy of confidence in the ordinary duties and business of life, because in one of the most intricate parts of human duty they may not have traced their path clearly and boldly. I call it one of the most intricate parts of human duty, where a man is divided between his respect for the authority, and the inability of his reason to admit what that authority has declared: where he cannot practically agree, yet the public and direct expression of disagreement would break through ties which he holds most sacred. In these circumstances, which are incident more or less to all men in their relations with societies, but most of all in their relations with their Church or religious society, it is perfectly easy to silence or perplex an adversary, but not so to convince him, and release him from his entanglement. If we wish really to remove a tenet which is a certainly a great impediment to the improvement of the Roman Catholic Church, we must not appeal to it on every occasion as rendering improvement impossible and incredible: we must welcome and encourage every effort of individuals to release themselves from it, although they cannot distinctly disavow it without separating from a Church which they reverence; and the Church itself has no means of expressing its voice, since no General Council is likely to be ever again called together.

If I were writing politically I should hardly dwell longer on this part of the subject; but viewing the restoration of Catholics to their civil rights as opening, with God's blessing, the fairest prospect of their religious improvement, and considering that the realizing or disappointment of this prospect will mainly depend upon the conduct of the Protestant clergy, I am anxious to combat the notion that the Roman Catholic religion is unchangeable and incurable, and that our business is only to try to gain individual converts from it, not to improve it by peaceful influence judiciously exerted. Now I believe that avowed proselytism will do very little in converting individuals, whilst it will irritate the bulk of the Roman Catholic Church, will keep alive a spirit of controversy always most unfavourable to the arriving at truth, and will confirm and aggravate those obnoxious tenets which we wish to do away with. On the contrary, our object should be to lead the Catholics first to alter practically the character of their religion by dwelling chiefly

on those points which they hold as Christians, and avoiding as much as possible to draw their attention to their peculiar tenets as Roman Catholics. We should try to foster that state of mind so beautifully depicted in a little work equally pious and eloquent, in which the sincere Catholic priest, who dares not in his humility renounce the communion of his Church, is represented as converted from its errors to all purposes of his soul's salvation by sinking all minor points, and dwelling entirely on the love of Christ. We should study the gradual progress of the corruptions of Popery, and observe how large a portion of them grew out of the common superstition and common vices of human nature, deepening with the deeper ignorance of the times, and likely to be first softened and finally dispelled with the progressive brightening of Christian light. We should direct our particular attention to the band which has united these into one mass, and thus given them a greater than their natural power of evil, a longer than their natural term of existence. Then we should see that this band, I mean the doctrines of the authority of the Church, and of the Papal supremacy, was first formed by honest ignorance upon principles whose falsehood we have ourselves hardly yet discovered, was then strengthened by men of great ability and lofty views, as a powerful means of counteracting the violences and abuses of the times; and was lastly maintained as an instrument of the lowest covetousness and ambition, and was thus wearing its most odious form when it was first exposed to a general attack. The attack of the Reformation was thus vehement, for the evil which it assailed was monstrous: but this vehemence excited the angry passions to defend what the baser passions had before maintaned from interest, and frightened the humble and the ignorant by denouncing as a mass of iniquity, what to them amidst all its evils had still imparted some drops of the water of life. Those in authority insisted that the system was one and indivisible, because the tainted part which would otherwise have been instantly cut out, was that which they most desired to keep: those who were engaged in the controversy as usual lost sight of truth in their ardour for victory, and defended error because their opponents had attacked it; while the ignorant shrunk from the sin of heresy, and trembled at the thought of abandoning the Catholic Church of Christ. The Reformers on the other hand shared on many points the mistaken views of their adversaries, and therefore combated them unskilfully. What was a departure from Christian unity, what was the Church of Christ, and how its relations with corrupt forms of civil government had rendered the language of the New Testament in some respects inapplicable now, were questions which in the sixteenth men were too recently awakened from a long sleep of ignorance to be

able to answer. To these must be added the evils occasioned by a misunderstanding of the nature and uses of the Old Testament; and the perpetual reference to the Jewish covenant as an authority for institutions and practices among Christians. Hence the cry of idolatry so loudly raised against the Church of Rome, and the bitter intolerance with which its worship and its members were regarded. Meantime national and political animosities mingled themselves with the religious dissension, and the breach between Catholics and Protestants became decided throughout Europe. A period of peace succeeded, of external peace, but with no approximations towards union. Other objects occupied the chief place in the attention of mankind; commerce was greatly extended; the useful arts, the physical sciences, and all the branches of general literature, were assiduously cultivated. Men's minds were engrossed with the present, forgetful of its indissoluble connexion with the past and the future. In the preceding age religious controversy had been loud, and religious bigotry ferocious: it was succeeded by religious indifference; and thus the ignorance on this point remained as a single dark spot amidst the rapidly advancing light of secular knowledge. The effects of this secular knowledge, for knowledge it really was, were felt in that great convulsion from which we have lately recovered, and to whose beneficent severity we and our children to the most distant times may look back with gratitude. Evils which the Reformation was powerless to remedy, have now been swept away; and never was so fair a prospect of universal improvement opened upon mankind before. One thing was wanting in the great crisis which we have witnessed; the heavenly wisdom which the Gospel gives us, purified from all the corruptions of earthly ignorance, and united in just society as the companion and directress of political wisdom. Enlightened and benevolent statesmen * saw in Christianity as presented to their view, nothing but a system to maintain ignorance and iniquity: humble and devout Christians shrank from the truest views of social improvement because they were advocated by unbelievers. It was a bitter price that we paid for the ignorance that had so long neglected to develope the principles of the Gospel, and for the baseness which had corrupted them. During the last century then, Christianity was too much ne-

* I allude particularly to Turgot and Malesherbes; the notes of Condorcet on Pascal's Pensées also strongly illustrate the statements in the text. In the note on the 53rd clause of the 17th Article of the "Pensées," part 2., the various evil principles and actions which have either made a part of the institutions of countries nominally Christian, or have generally existed uncondemned by the ministers of Christianity, are stated with a force and purity which one would rather expect to find in Pascal than in his commentator.

glected by the public mind throughout Europe to afford any chance of clearing it from the abuses and erroneous notions which had encumbered it. In an earlier century the political knowledge and experience, the liberal views, and the dispassionate judgment required for so great a work, had been generally wanting; now they existed, but were directed to other objects. The work still remains to be done, to apply the full lights of modern knowledge to the true development of the principles of the Gospel as applicable to man in a state of civil society; and thus and thus only will Protestants and Catholics be brought to a true Christian union; retaining if they will their separate social existence, but co-operating cordially in their one great work, to prepare themselves by establishing God's kingdom on earth for the everlasting enjoyment of it in heaven.

Then the very corner stone of Roman Catholic intolerance, the opinion that there is no salvation out of the pale of the Church, may be stripped of all its mischief, and reduced to the simple expression of a great Scriptural truth, that God's covenanted mercies can only be promised to such as are within the covenant; that in the ark of Christ's Church alone is certain safety, and without it all is a dark wilderness of doubt and danger. The evil of the proposition has arisen from the false opinion that Christ's redeemed people must all form one separate ecclesiastical society, when we know that God's created people are not required to form one separate civil society. Had the countries in which Christianity was first preached been as now politically unconnected with each other, the confusion never would have arisen: for then the Christians in one nation must have formed a society avowedly distinct from those in another. Spiritually indeed they would have been one society, inasmuch as they would have had the same divine Head, the same indwelling Spirit, the same hope, and the same God; but externally they would have been perfectly independent, and competent like all other societies to form their own rules and appoint their own officers. But the first Christians being accidentally members of the same political society, naturally regarded themselves as forming also only one ecclesiastical society: and as their civil sovereign resided at Rome, so they looked to the same place for their ecclesiastical head; just as the branch religious societies in our several counties are subordinate to a central and supreme society in London. That which has always happened soon comes to be considered as necessary; and therefore because the Church had in point of fact been one society, it was declared that it essentially and necessarily was so: because the head of the central society at Rome was naturally the head of all the provincial societies, it was made out that his supremacy was not accidental



and temporary, but necessary and perpetual. But a perpetual and necessary head of the Church was certainly Christ's vicar: and for so great an office it might well be supposed that an extraordinary portion of Christ's Spirit would be vouchsafed to him. The conclusion indeed was reasonable; and had Christ's servants been designed to form of necessity one society, had it been their Lord's pleasure, that that should be without the common right of all other societies, the right of self-government, and be of necessity subject to one head, it is probable that this head would have been clearly marked out for his office by possessing superior gifts and graces, just as men are thus clearly marked out for authority over children, and dominion over the brute creation. And therefore the fact, that the bishops of Rome have not possessed this perpetual superiority of goodness and wisdom, renders it probable that they were not designed to be the perpetual heads of the Church, and that Christians as such possess the same rights of self-government in ecclesiastical society, which they enjoy as men in civil society. Now Protestants have seen and allowed all this as far as the supremacy of the Pope is concerned, but by retaining themselves a portion of the original error of Popery they have found it more difficult to combat the conclusions which that error gave rise to. They shared the error of the Catholics in supposing that the Church must be one society in a sense differing from that in which all mankind are one society; and therefore in order to acquit themselves of what they called the sin of schism, in separating from the Church, they charged that Church with idolatry, that they might represent it as a greater sin to remain in communion with it. Whereas had they remembered that the members of one nation are connected as Christians with the members of another nation only in the same way that they are connected with them as men; redeemed and sanctified by the same God, as the same God also created them; with the same spiritual, as they have the same natural faculties; and aiming at one common perfection of the former as they do of the latter; with one common law of reason binding them as men, and one common law of the Spirit binding them as Christians, but left equally as Christians and as men, to form their own municipal or particular laws, and to determine that form of government by which they may respectively judge their common objects most likely to be obtained in their own case, independence would have implied no schism, nor would they have sought to aggravate the errors of their neighbours in order to make out a just ground of quarrel, when their forming themselves into a distinct society was no breach of charity, and should have been considered as no quarrel at all.

The Roman Catholics then are right in maintaining, that out of

Christ's Church there is no covenanted salvation: but they are wrong, and many Protestants share in their error, in mistaking the accidental state of the Church at its first origin for something essential to its nature: as if, because it was one society then in the strictest sense of the term, it must be in some other than a spiritual sense one society now. In that spiritual sense indeed it is ever one: but in that sense all are members of it, to how many soever subordinate forms of Christian society they may respectively belong, so long as they acknowledge the same Maker and Saviour and Sanctifier, so long as they are one with each other, not in forms and regulations, but in principle and in spirit, in the Father and in the Son. And therefore when sincere Protestants* would acknowledge as members of the Catholic Church of Christ those societies of Christians only which are governed by Bishops, on the ground that amongst them alone the apostolical succession is preserved, there appears a misapprehension of the true nature of a spiritual society, and a participation in the same erroneous views which have led the Romanists to exclude from *their* sense of the Catholic Church all who will not acknowledge the succession of the Popes from St. Peter the chief of the apostles.

The principle which we should follow in our endeavours to purify the Roman Catholic religion, might be exemplified in numerous other instances: but it will better suit my present limits if I state once more what it is, and show the bearing of what I have last written upon my general subject. The principle is this; that we should trace the errors of the Catholics to their origin, and should thus perceive how much of them is mere corruption, that is, error introduced for an interested or ambitious purpose; how much arises from ignorance or misconception, and what the misconception was; and, above all, how much of truth is mixed with the error, and may be extracted from it by a careful and delicate analysis. In doing this we should also observe how far Protestants have either condemned the whole of a tenet of the Romish Church, without discrimination, or themselves retain the original error which gave birth to it, and therefore contend against it on wrong grounds. We should consider that our true object is not to convert Catholics to Protestantism, but to perfect their views and our own to the full wisdom and holiness of Christianity, although we may each remain distinct societies, and retain different rites and internal regula-

* I allude to a Sermon published two or three years since, by the Rev. Walter Hook, of Christ Church, Oxford. I have the less scruple in mentioning his name, as I know him to be a sincere and zealous minister of Christ; and my belief that his views on one point are erroneous, does not interfere with my high respect for his character.

tions. We should substitute inquiry for controversy; not wishing to bring them over to our side, but that both they and we should be on the side of truth, renouncing our errors, and clearing our views when indistinct and imperfect. "Whereunto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing:" that is to say, while aspiring to more perfect knowledge, let not those who are more advanced despise their more backward brethren, but let both walk in the same rule of Christian holiness, and with the same spirit of Christian charity.

And for the application of all this to the great Question which now engrosses the whole mind of England; I wish to impress upon the Christian opponents of concession, that while I maintain the positive duty of granting the Catholic claims as an act of simple justice, it is also with the most deliberate conviction, that thus and thus only can the spiritual improvement of our Catholic countrymen ever be effected. If Protestants will not endure to hear the language of impartiality and charity towards the Catholics, if they will only look upon them as men without truth, and without humanity, as ferocious bigots and blasphemous idolaters, do they think that the Catholics can be more favourably disposed to them, when over and above the irreligious prejudices they must entertain against them the galling sense of national and civil injustice? What Protestant missionary, however holy and eloquent, can have any chance of influencing men, who are not only daily reviled by Protestants, but actually degraded and oppressed by them; are treated as aliens in their own land, as unfit and unworthy to become citizens of their own country? They who are most zealous in their endeavours to convert the slaves in the West Indies to Christianity, are also most eager to effect their temporal deliverance: they are regarded therefore as friends, and the Gospel is doubly loved for the sake of those who offer the knowledge of it. Would the negroes listen to a mission of tyrannical overseers, who spoke to them with the whip in one hand and the Bible in the other; or to a set of plantation proprietors, who had most steadily refused to adopt every measure recommended by the government of Britain for the improvement of their temporal condition? We have a great, a solemn duty to perform towards our Irish brethren; we have connected them with ourselves, and therefore we are bound first to do them justice, and then to do them kindness: to labour at this eleventh hour to atone for the long day during which we have not only neglected to do them good, but have heaped upon them evil alike physical and moral.

The great numerical majority of the clergy of England are united against doing an act of Christian justice, and Christian wisdom: and

they tax their opponents with acting upon worldly views, and sacrificing their religion to political expediency. I will not retort by impugning the motives of those who think differently from me, nor by depreciating their understandings. I know that there are amongst them men who are not to be surpassed in holiness of life, or in vigour of natural abilities. But what they do want, and I speak it neither reproachfully nor insultingly, is acquired knowledge and impartiality. It is notorious that a large portion of them abstain habitually upon principle from the study of politics; and how can they possibly understand what they have refused to learn? And what is the ordinary education of a clergyman? The history of his own country, except in a mere abridgment, forms no part of his necessary studies either at school or at the university; still less does it generally occupy his attention when he begins to prepare himself for his own profession. Many persons certainly read much more than they are compelled to do; but not the majority; and in point of fact, I should not underrate the historical knowledge of the mass of the clergy, if I supposed them to have read Hume, perhaps with Smollett's Continuation, Clarendon, and Burnet's History of the Reformation. Of the Laws and of the progress of our Constitution of England they know but little; and of the history of the other nations of Europe their knowledge is commonly still more limited. The *impressions* which they gain from the writers I have mentioned, for with the mass of readers the tone of an author's sentiments leaves a much deeper impression than his detail of facts, are all in favour of Toryism, or against the Catholics; and these in the present state of affairs belong to the same party, and lead to the same political conduct. Their professional studies tend to produce the same bias: their making the thirty-nine Articles the text book for a large portion of their theological reading, accustoms them to look at religion controversially; they learn what are the arguments by which the Catholics are to be combated; and the obnoxious tenets of the Romish Church are brought before their eyes in their most offensive form, while the good parts of the system, and the causes which led to its errors, and which, although they do not make them less errors, yet would often moderate our dislike and suspicion of those who held them, are not presented to them. With this previous education, if they travel for a short time* on the continent of

* A longer residence abroad might perhaps lead to a different result. I was told two years ago by an English Clergyman who has resided at Rome since the year 1814, that he settled there with a strong impression against the Roman Catholic religion, and against granting the claims of the Catholics of Ireland: that his sense of the evils and errors of the Catholic religion had become continually stronger and stronger; but his opinion with regard to the Catholic Question was wholly changed:

Europe, and particularly if they visit Italy, they return home with prejudices increased and ignorance unenlightened. With little knowledge of the history and literature of the countries they travel through, and with few personal acquaintances among the people to soften their feelings towards them, they catch directly at those gross exhibitions of superstition which are so common, and think that they have now a confirmation of all their former notions of the monstrous nature of Popery.

On their return home they settle mostly in country parishes, and the little time they can spare from their pastoral duties for pursuing their own studies, is naturally devoted to works on divinity. In this state of mind and with this previous education, the Catholic Question presents itself to their notice: a question involving at once the first principles of civil society; and requiring a copious knowledge of the history of the Christian Church, of the constitution and parties of England, of the history and institutions of several of the nations of the Continent. They who have never considered great political questions, nor have examined the origin of civil society, and the rights and duties of individuals as members of it, cannot appreciate the sin of that flagrant injustice which we have offered to the Catholics of Ireland. They who know not the history of the Christian Church, are ignorant of the causes which led successively to the growth of Popery, and know not the probability of its improvement, if its nature be thoroughly understood, and a suitable plan of dealing with it be devised. They who have never studied the contests of our parties, and the vicissitudes of our government, are not aware that in their sense of the term we have no constitution at all; that we have no code in which the principles of our government were at once fully laid down, and the whole social edifice constructed according to them; but that what we call our constitution is a state of things resulting from various successive struggles, each of which had its own particular object, and led to its own particular reform. Thus the struggle which ended at the Revolution of 1688, was substantially and in principle, whether the crown or

and he was satisfied that there was no prospect of relieving Ireland from its superstitions, but by granting to the Catholics their civil rights, and so alienating them from their dependence on Rome by uniting them on equal terms to their Protestant countrymen.

In confirmation of this view of the subject, I know that some of the principal members of the Papal Government, in conversation with an individual totally unconnected with England, have expressed their apprehensions lest the Catholic claims should be granted; as the influence actually enjoyed by the Pope, in Ireland, would then be superseded in the minds of the Irish by natural feelings of attachment to their country and constitution.

the nation as represented in Parliament should possess the effective control of our government; and all the enactments against Catholics were merely accidental, and arose partly out of the circumstance that the popular party in the last two reigns had consisted chiefly of Puritans; partly because persecution of Popery was the only point in which the Tories could sympathize with the Whigs; and they were glad by their zeal against the Catholics to compensate for their long oppression of the Protestant Dissenters; and partly because the great reliance of the two last Stuart princes was on the support of the Catholic despotism of France. But so little are the principles of Roman Catholics necessarily adverse to civil liberty, that had the quarrels between the Guelphs and Ghibelines lasted for three centuries longer, we should have seen the Pope supporting and supported by the free Republics of Italy in a contest against the Protestant tyranny and high monarchical doctrines of the emperors of Germany. They who know the Roman Catholic religion only from the naked statement of its worst tenets as exhibited in the works of Protestant controversialists—and are ignorant of what it is and has been in practice for the last hundred and fifty years wherever it has been placed in peaceful contact with Protestantism—judge of it naturally from the tendency of its most offensive principles, supposing that all men will carry their principles into practice, and ignorant of the checks and palliatives which in actual life neutralize their virulence. Not feeling therefore the sin of national injustice, not understanding the nature of Catholicism, not acquainted with our parties and their struggles, not familiar with the actual state of the Catholic Religion in other countries, they act upon one impression only, which their education and professional studies have alike fostered, that Popery is an unchristian thing, and that nothing should be done to favour it. Influenced by this impression themselves they impart it to their parishioners, whose ignorance is more complete, and their passions more violent; and thus a clamour is raised, powerful from the numbers that join in it, and respectable from the honesty of their motives; but worth nothing in determining the merits of the Question, as the knowledge of those who raise it is so little proportioned to their zeal. I know that it savours of arrogance to claim a superiority of knowledge over those who differ from us; and the carvers among the lions would no doubt represent the matter differently. Yet the statement which I have given of the ordinary education and studies of the most active class of our opponents is one which they themselves cannot deny; nor can it be denied on the other hand, that all those statesmen who have most considered the Question, and whose means of information have been the fullest, have, with

an unanimity unparalleled on any other public measure, agreed in their judgment, that the claims of the Catholics should be granted. The accession of the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Peel to this distinguished band has given to the argument from authority a force which admits of no further increase. The leading ministers of the country who had for many years opposed concession, have exposed themselves, without any conceivable motive but the conscientious conviction of fuller knowledge to all the vulgar odium which attaches to every change of opinion, and have offended a powerful party, whose devoted attachment they had hitherto possessed, in order to add their voice to the consenting wisdom of all our other great statesmen, and to declare that the claims of the Catholics should be opposed no longer. Here then we find the warmest opponents of the Catholics to be men whose political knowledge is from education and profession greatly defective; while on the other hand those who have united the greatest natural abilities with the fullest information are unanimous in advocating their cause. And if it be urged that it is a religious question rather than a political one, and that on points of religion no authority can be superior to that of the clergy, I will answer, that this argument is either false or inapplicable. It is false that it is a religious question, in that only sense in which the clergy could be the best judges of it; namely, if the point at issue were, whether the doctrines of the Catholic or the Protestant Church were most agreeable to Scripture. A religious question indeed it is in another sense, inasmuch as every question of practice concerns our religious duty to God, and every act of injustice, every stumbling-block that is thrown in the way of our neighbour's spiritual improvement, is a sin for which we must answer at God's judgment seat. But in the discernment of our duties as members of civil societies, the clergy assuredly are not the best judges; because the origin, rights, and successive revolutions of civil societies they avowedly neglect to study.

In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to treat the Question as a religious one; to urge the granting of the Catholic claims as in itself a necessary act of Christian justice, and as the only means by which we may be enabled to perform to our Irish brethren hereafter our bounden duty of Christian charity, in advancing their physical, moral, and spiritual good. I have never forgotten that I am a Christian minister myself, and that those whose attention to my arguments I most wish to gain, are Christian ministers also. Earnestly, solemnly, would I entreat them to believe, that my love for our common faith is not less than theirs, and my desire to promote the kingdom of our common Master not less sincere; that the principles which I have main-

tained I believe to be those of Christ's Gospel, and that certainly the more often and attentively I have studied that Gospel, I have been the more fully satisfied of their truth.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the foregoing pages were written some letters written by Mr. Faber, and published in the St. James's Chronicle, are considered by many persons to contain arguments against concession to the Catholics, which on religious grounds are unanswerable. Those letters had not seemed to me to deserve any particular attention. I was besides unwilling to enter into controversy with an individual, for whose character as a Christian I had been accustomed to feel much respect. But as others judge differently of Mr. Faber's reasoning, I request their candid attention to the following attempt to reply to it.

Mr. Faber's views of the Catholic Question and mine differ at the very outset. He throws aside the argument from right "as a palpable folly," "because no individual possesses any abstract right to the possession of political power." And having thus decided that no man can urge concession to the Catholic claims as a point of duty, he considers that it can only be defended by arguments drawn from expediency, and from terror; meaning by expediency that some motive which is in private life called self-interest; and by terror, the feeling that weakly shrinks from difficulty and danger. He thus denies that any man can advocate the Catholic claims on the grounds of Christian principle, and using the terms "expediency and terror" in a sense which makes them synonymous with two of the very basest of human motives, he fastens a severe and uncandid imputation upon those who differ from him.

I on the contrary maintain, that the argument from right is perfectly decisive of the whole Question; because nations and societies of men large and varied enough in their elements to form distinct nations, have an eternal right to possess political power over themselves; and if they unite with other societies, it follows that as each when separate had a right to the *whole* government of *itself*, so each when united has a right to *a share* of the government of *itself and its associate*.

I further maintain, that the argument from charity, or a regard to the general welfare of the society to which we belong, is no less decisive than the argument from right: that the welfare of this whole nation both temporal and spiritual will be highly advanced by the removal of a perpetual cause of discord between two important parts of it, and the con-

sequent growth of "peace and happiness, religion and piety," as the natural fruits of an act founded on "truth and justice." And this argument from charity is in all national questions of internal policy another name for the argument from expediency. For where no foreign nation is concerned, the welfare of his country, or what is most expedient for the good of that country, is to a statesman precisely the object which as a member of it he is most bound to promote; and to aim at which is not selfishness, but comprehensive charity.

I maintain thirdly, that the dread of occasioning physical and moral evil to others, especially when we ourselves shall partake perhaps of the moral evil, but are not likely to be affected by the physical, is a most honourable and Christian terror; and that he who is without it is in a degraded state both intellectually and morally. And the terror of provoking a civil war in Ireland, the terror of sweeping slaughter, conflagration, massacres, and executions; the terror of letting loose without restraint all the worst passions of human nature, while they themselves would be living in peace, and would be certain of political victory without incurring any personal risk or suffering, this is the terror which the legislators and ministers of England are reproached with, as if it were no other than the low and unworthy fear which shrinks from danger.

So much then for what Mr. Faber calls "the palpable folly" of the argument from right; and so much for his assertion that "the argument from expediency involves in its very nature a total disregard to moral honesty, if such moral honesty stand in the way of fancied convenience:" and "the argument from terror avowedly reposes on a disgraceful confession of the most degrading moral cowardice."

But having thus disposed of these arguments *for* concession, he proceeds to bring forward what he considers a decisive argument *against* it; namely, the argument from "religious responsibility." Of this, he says, he has never heard the slightest mention; but, on the contrary, "he has sometimes noted the objection that the question is purely political, and that it has no concern with religion." Now I agree so far with Mr. Faber, that I think we do hear too little "mention of our religious responsibility;" that is, that we are not enough accustomed to consider ourselves responsible to God for all our actions whether in private life or in public: and liable to his judgment alike for national and political as for individual injustice, when we make it our own act by instigating it, or trying to prevent its removal. In this sense therefore I think that the Catholic Question has a great deal to do with religion. But if those who say it has no concern with religion mean, as Mr. Faber must know that they do mean, that in doing justice to our neigh-

bour the consideration of his religious belief is wholly foreign to the question; and that a judge who were to make a lawsuit between a Catholic and a Protestant a religious question in Mr. Faber's sense of the term, and were to regard not the merits of the case but the religious belief of the parties, would not be more "religiously responsible" for his unjust judgment, than the government which should decide a dispute between a Catholic and a protestant people on these same grounds, then they mean no more than is perfectly true, and Mr. Faber has said nothing that can shake their statement.

Let us see however what his arguments *against* concession from "religious responsibility" is built upon. The members of both Houses of Parliament before they take their seats make an oath, in which is contained the following clause. "I do believe that the invocation or adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are *superstitious and idolatrous.*" Therefore, says Mr. Faber, every Member of both Houses has sworn that he believes Popery to be idolatry: and to vote therefore "for a national union with the Romanists" is to vote "for a national union with those whom he has declared to be idolaters;" that is to say, it is to vote "for the perfect ingraftation of idolatry" upon what Mr. Faber and others "have fondly deemed their exclusively Protestant constitution." And in order to extend this argument to those who are not members of the Legislature, he reminds all persons who have subscribed to the thirty-nine Articles, that is, all the clergy and all graduates at both universities, that "our national Church in her accredited Homilies (Homilies recognised in her Articles) has pronounced Popery to be idolatry."

I believe I have stated Mr. Faber's argument fully and fairly. Now although I have subscribed the Articles, in which the Homilies are recognised, yet I do not feel myself at all bound to think or to call the Roman Catholic religion "idolatry," in Mr. Faber's meaning of the term; nor should I feel myself bound to do so, if I had taken the oath imposed on all Members of Parliament. And if I did believe that Popery was idolatry, I should no less think that concession to the claims of the Roman Catholics of Ireland was, in our circumstances, a positive Christian duty. These several statements I am now to endeavour to justify.

I have subscribed to the thirty-fifth Article of the Church of England, which declares that "the second book of Homilies doth contain a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for *these* times, as doth the former book of Homilies:" "and therefore," it proceeds, "we judge them to be read in churches by the ministers, diligently and distinctly, that they may be understanded of the people." In saying that a book

"doth contain a godly and wholesome doctrine," do I pledge myself to maintain the justice of the exact degree of condemnation which it attaches to those who hold the opposite doctrine? nay, do I even pledge my assent to all the doctrine which it may itself contain? The Homilies do "contain a godly and Christian doctrine," for they contain the doctrines of the Gospel, and their predominant character is according to that Gospel. But may these doctrines never be stated with some exaggeration, and may they not be accompanied with too fierce a tone of condemnation against those who differ from them? Jewell's Apology contains a "godly and Christian doctrine," but do I by saying this, pledge my approbation or assent to that passage which I have already extracted, in which he declares that the Church of England detests all whom it considers heretics, to the gates of hell, and punishes them by the secular arm wherever it can find them? Nay, with regard to the Homilies, I conceive, that the omission of the Bishops for many years past to enforce "the diligent reading of them in the churches" expresses their belief as well as that of the majority of the clergy, that although they were necessary for the times to which the epithet "*these*" was applicable when the Article was written, yet that the word "*these*" has not a perpetually varying application, so as to signify all times from the sixteenth century downwards. And for those who extol the Revolution of 1688 with a claim of such exclusive attachment to it, do they conceive themselves bound to admit all the doctrines of the "Homily against Rebellion?"

"But the Members of both Houses of Parliament have sworn that they believe Popery to be idolatry." They have sworn no such thing, but simply, "that the invocation or adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are superstitious and idolatrous." The *adoration* of any creature, that is to say, the putting any created being in the place of God, and worshipping him as the Author of spiritual good, would certainly be idolatry; but this adoration the Roman Catholic Church disclaims as earnestly as we do. "D. Peut-on adorer les anges et les saints? R. Non, on ne peut adorer que Dieu seul; mais nous honorons et nous invoquons les anges et les saints comme les amis et les serviteurs de Dieu. D. Adorons-nous la Très-Sainte Vierge? R. Non, il n'est pas plus permis d'adorer la Très-Sainte Vierge que les autres saints; mais nous l'honorons d'un manière plus particulière que les saints et les anges." *Catechisme imprimé par ordre de son Excellence Monseigneur l'Archevêque de Rheims, pour l'usage de son Diocèse. Rheims*, 1822. *p.* 112, 113. The *invocation* of creatures after they have departed from this world and no longer stand to us in any human relation, is so apt to border upon worship, and as it is

now used in the more ignorant Roman Catholic countries, so often becomes worship, that it may justly be termed *in practice*, that is, *as it is now used in the Church of Rome*, superstitious and idolatrous. In practice it is idolatrous: but does it therefore follow that the whole Roman Catholic Religion is to be branded as idolatry, that is as an apostacy from the worship of God and the substitution of some creature or creatures in the place of God, because one of its doctrines is superstitious and of dangerous consequence, and leads amongst the ignorant to idolatrous practice, not necessarily or designedly, but from its exceeding liability to abuse? If Popery be idolatry, it is not a true religion grievously corrupted, but a false religion altogether: nay, it is worse than Mahommedanism, for even Mahommedans worship one eternal, invisible, and spiritual God, the Maker and Preserver of all things visible and invisible. Now if this has been the language of some individuals in the Church of England, it has certainly not been the general sense of her members: they have held that the Church of Rome was a true Church, although grievously corrupted; that the Church of Rome has "erred," to use the language of the nineteenth Article, "in matters of faith," like the Churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch; but that it has not therefore wholly forfeited the character of a Christian Church, any more than they. I need hardly remind my readers of the sentiments of Hooker, which exposed him indeed to the censure of the Puritans of those days, that the Church of Rome is a Christian Church, and holds the foundation of Christian faith, although some of her doctrines deny that foundation by consequence. Such in my judgment is the true construction of the clause in the oath taken by members of the Legislature; they swear that they believe one of her doctrines to be in practice idolatrous, not that her whole system is idolatry.

But now admitting, for the sake of argument, that Popery is idolatry in Mr. Faber's sense of the term, still his conclusion, that the Catholic Claims cannot be granted without sin, would not follow from this admission. Indeed the conclusion in his two first Letters is throughout assumed, without even an a tempt to prove it; and it is only in his third Letter, when some friend had reminded him of this omission, that he endeavours to make out his case. He first of all appeals to the Old Testament, "in which an union of *any* description with idolatry is clearly forbidden to the Israelites, on the broad and general ground, that such union would infallibly seduce the people into the practices of their associates;" and "the ground of this prohibition," he thinks, "is of universal application;" but as "it may be captiously said" that the case of the Israelites is peculiar, he forbears to press this argument, and "turns forthwith to the New Testament."

If I wished to avoid replying to any part of Mr. Faber's statement, I might content myself with observing, that the argument from the Old Testament is one which he does not himself press, although he still asserts that it is of universal application." But his admirers will perhaps believe his assertion, although he does not urge the proof of it; and if they are candid, I ought not to leave them in error without attempting to lead them out of it. Now amongst the Jews, idolatry was a capital crime; and every one who was guilty of it was forthwith to be put to death. This was also ordered on the general principle, lest the Israelites should be seduced by evil example. Would Mr. Faber recommend this method of settling the Catholic Question, by a general massacre of all those whom he calls idolaters, after the example of Elijah and Jehu? The Israelites were told that the practice of idolatrous rites defiled the land, and union therefore was out of the question with those who were not even allowed to live. So that on this principle we should renew the scenes of 1780; burn all the Roman Catholic Chapels, and do as the mob then gladly would have done, put to death those who worship in them. We are already polluted, according to the Jewish law; and if I may, without seeming irreverence state the conclusions to which Mr. Faber's reasoning leads, the curse of God can only be avoided by the perpetration of the most atrocious acts of persecution and murder.

The truth is that the principles of the Old Testament are eternal, but the application of them wholly different under the Jewish and under the Christian dispensation. When we read the 109th Psalm in our Service, the application of the wishes of evil there contained must be wholly spiritual, otherwise our very prayer will be turned into sin. Our "enemies" (v. 19.) are sin and Satan: for men, however sinful, are not to be so regarded by us, till Christ the Saviour shall come as Christ the Judge. Till that great day the most wicked man alive is our brother; and for him as well as for us Christ has died. Christians indeed when formed into commonwealths may use the sword as the ministers of God's moral government; that is, they may punish crimes against society which heathen governments may punish also: for the sword is committed to them not as Christians but as men. But Christ's spiritual government has no sword, and the arms which they may use as Christians are wholly spiritual. And as idolatry is a spiritual crime, it may be opposed by us only with spiritual weapons; the penalties and restraints which we may use as men against moral offenders, we may not apply as Christians against spiritual offenders without presumption. "The Son of Man has not come to destroy men's lives but to save."

I must now follow Mr. Faber to his argument from the New Testament: which is grounded, as one might have supposed, on the command of the Revelation to flee out of Babylon. Here he first assumes that Babylon means "a principle *or* a community manifestly idolatrous," that is, idolatrous in the literal sense, as worshipping others than God. Now in order to fix the interpretation of the commandment to "come out of Babylon," it makes some difference whether Babylon signifies a principle *or* a community; because if it means the former, the "coming out of her" must signify "*withdrawing ourselves from idolatrous principles*:" a duty certainly which no Christian ever disputed. But let it signify a community, and let the "coming out" be taken as a command to have no intercourse with such a community, because, as Mr. Faber says, "no penal plague or excision can descend upon the heads of the idolaters, which must not inevitably descend also upon the heads of the non-idolaters, their closely intimate and voluntary associates." That is, when idolaters and non-idolaters live in the same country, the visitations of war, pestilence, and famine cannot fall on the one without involving the other in their suffering. The conclusion from which is, that we should either separate locally from the Roman Catholics, or make them separate from us. Does Mr. Faber mean to recommend that we should migrate to America, or that we should adopt the milder alternative of the curse of Cromwell, and shut up all the English and Irish Catholics together, in Connaught? Or, to speak seriously, does he forget that we are nationally and politically associated with these idolaters already? that the Irish Catholics are already our countrymen, that they serve in our armies, man our fleets, practice in our courts of law, and pay taxes to our government? On his principle we should instantly banish them from amongst us: their presence must entail defeat on our armies, and shipwreck on our fleets; and their money certainly must be an accursed thing, which will bring down a judgment on us if we receive it. If this be his meaning, it would at least be honest. But to receive benefits from the society of idolaters, and yet to exclaim against the pollution of it; to get all we can from living with them, and only scruple about giving them any thing in return: is something like the piety of Saul, who destroyed utterly all that was vile and refuse of the spoil of the Amalekites, but spared the best of the oxen, and of the sheep, to sacrifice unto the Lord his God in Gilgal,—to keep up Protestant ascendancy.

Such are my answers to Mr. Faber's premises and his conclusion, so far indeed as I can make out what his conclusion is meant to be. My conclusion also shall be grounded on a precept in the New Testament, which, on the supposition that Catholics were idolaters, would be more

to the purpose than the quotation about coming out of Babylon. We are united actually in civil society with Catholics, and the question is, how we are to deal with them? Now St. Paul directs, that where Christians were married to unbelievers, that is, to idolaters, the Christian husband or wife should not propose to quit his or her unbelieving partner. "What knowest thou," is his truly Christian question, "whether thou shalt save thy wife or thy husband?" whether if you continue to live on affectionately with them, you may not be the means of converting them. But the parties thus continuing to live together, the terms of their union were settled not by their religious faith, but on principles of civil and social justice. The heathen husband must have had authority over his Christian wife, and must have had the supreme control over the education of his children; because natural and civil law declared that such were his rights as a man and as a citizen. So also should we be anxious to live on in peace with the Irish Catholics, as we are actually their countrymen. But this being so, our respective political rights must be decided on the universal principles of social and political justice, and not from the spiritual superiority which one party may possess over the other. Religion is not injured by our giving idolaters their rights as men and as citizens, but by our forgetting our own duty in either joining with them spiritually, or oppressing them politically.

I had purposed to make some comment upon the tone of Mr. Faber's Letters, and on the assumption which runs through them, that the advocates of concession to the Catholics are men who care little for religion. But instead of doing so, I have thought it better to look over my own answer, and carefully to erase every thing which might appear to be unkind or insulting in tone and expression there. Evil passions are never more apt to arise within us than when we are engaged in what we sincerely believe to be our duty; it shews strongly our corrupted nature, that it is so hard to keep our motives and feelings pure, even when our work is a good one.

Mr. Faber's opinions I think to be erroneous and mischievous; and as such I have done my best to answer him. Whatever he may think of the force of the answer, I trust that he will allow my sentiments to be as consistent with a sincere affection for Christianity as his own: and that a man may advocate the Catholic claims with other arguments than those founded on his interests or his fears.

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

[This Essay is extracted from the Edinburgh Review, for September, 1826; in which it originally appeared as the critique upon a volume entitled "LETTERS TO AN EPISCOPALIAN."]

WE have been suspected, we know, of being unfriendly to the Church of England. But we are not—at least on the present occasion. The causes which led to her great Reformation, we think indeed should still reform her more; and, with the fullest sense of the general soundness of her doctrines, and the benefits which her establishment has conferred on the community, it is impossible to look back to the history of that reformation, or round to the spread of sectarianism, and the infinite changes which have since been wrought on the whole frame of our society, without feeling that things may then have been necessary which are now prejudicial—and that much might be adopted in a hurried experiment which it would be improper to retain in a mature institution.

The subject is familiar enough in the mouths both of capable and incapable talkers:—but in reality it is little in their thoughts—nor do we hesitate to say, that we do not know any other, of nearly equal importance, on which the public mind is so ill informed, or to which it has been so little accustomed to direct a calm and scrutinizing attention, as the constitution of the Church of England, by law established. The author of the work before us is entitled therefore to our best thanks, for the vigorous effort which he has made to arouse this indifference, and to enlighten this ignorance. He has spoken out boldly, but yet temperately; and although we are far from agreeing with all his doctrines, we think that both the ability and the good spirit with which he writes are excellently fitted to open, with the happiest omens, that discussion which it is evidently his object to provoke.

The scope and object of his book may be stated in a single sentence. It is, to prove that all Religious Establishments, by which one particular form of worship is especially protected and favoured by the civil government, and in return is entirely subjected to its control, are at once contrary to the interests of religion and to those of civil society; that the consequences of what is called the Alliance of Church and State

are mischievous alike to *both* parties; that a State, as such, ought to be of no religion at all; and that therefore it ought not to identify itself with one sect, and to tolerate all others; but to protect all, and prefer, and discountenance none.

The importance, at least, of these propositions will be readily admitted—if we consider for a moment some of the many changes that would result from their practical adoption. In the *first* place, there would be an end of that phrase which is so familiarly used in the southern part of this island,—"the Constitution in Church and State." The King would no longer be the head of the Church; he would cease to possess the appointment of its bishops; nor would its faith and worship be any longer regulated and enforced by Act of Parliament. On the other hand, the ears of our Presbyterian countrymen would be no more scandalized by the expression of "Lords Spiritual," in the preamble of every statute enacted by the Legislature; Bishops, as such, would have no seats in Parliament; Test and Corporation Acts, Acts of Indemnity for not complying with their provisions, even the Toleration Act itself, would all cease to exist; civil penalties would no longer be annexed to religious offences; while the Church, freed from its state connexion, might exert, without reproach or question, the undoubted privilege of every society, by excommunicating, or, in plain English, by expelling such of its members as refused to comply with its regulations. Thus far our picture of the changes, which would follow, on the practical adoption of his principles, would agree with that of the author himself. In some respects, to which we shall allude hereafter, it would indeed embrace some points which he is not inclined to comprehend in it:—but even, according to his own view, the consequence of the destruction of the Church Establishment must be allowed to be of no mean importance, whether for good or for evil.

But what, it will be asked, are the mischiefs of the existing state of things, which make, in the author's opinion, a change of such magnitude desirable? His answer is, that they are of a twofold nature—both spiritual and temporal:—that it is absolutely contrary to the commands of Christ, and to the whole spirit of his institution, and practically most injurious to the purity of his religion, either to receive the assistance of the civil power to uphold the Gospel, or to submit to its authority in the government and internal regulation of the Church:—and that it is politically injurious, by necessarily creating disaffection to the State in all those who dissent from the Established Church; and by introducing a system of pains and penalties, and civil disqualifications, against persons guilty of no civil crime, but only differing in religious opinion.

Now, as to the unlawfulness and mischief of enforcing spiritual censures, propagating religious truths, or punishing religious errors, by temporal pains and penalties, we cordially agree with our author. These things are contrary to the spirit of Christianity; which, though far from viewing it as a matter of indifference, whether men's opinions on the highest of all subjects are right or wrong, has yet wisely directed, that for such points they shall be tried only by Him who cannot err; partly, we may venture to imagine, from the danger of mistaking truth for error, and error for truth, amidst the fallibity of human judgments; and much more, because the degree of blame attaching to the holder of a false opinion is a question utterly beyond the reach of man to determine. To what extent the prejudices of education or of habit may have darkened the mind, what secret immoral bias may have indisposed it to truth, or what criminal negligence may have made it omit the proper means of discovering it, are amongst the secrets of the human heart, which are only known to him who made it; and yet, without a knowledge of these, how is it possible to determine when error is justly punishable? Or, again, with regard to that immorality of life which is noticed by spiritual censures, it has been the general practice of legislators to consider much of the evil of human conduct as lying out of their jurisdiction; and none but fanciful and inexperienced men have ever attempted to remove the more delicate and internal disorders of the moral constitution, by the coarse instrument of legal penalties. The Christian religion, far from condemning this forbearance, tends rather to confirm it. As addressing the consciences of individuals, it does indeed dwell most strongly on the sinfulness of every evil thought, word, or action;—but, lest any should mistakenly conclude, that while insisting on the guilt of these things, it meant to point them out as fit objects of legal punishment, it has expressly divested itself of all temporal sanctions; and has so clearly refused to *extend* the province of the magistrate to things hitherto not within his jurisdiction, that the Quakers, as is well known, suppose that it designed even to *narrow* it, and to forbid temporal punishments even for those offences which had been always held justly liable to them. So far, therefore, as the author means to say, that *all civil penalties* are improperly applied to merely *religious offences*, we assent entirely to what he has said in the following spirited passage:—

"The Church of Rome has persecuted the most bitterly, and for the greatest length of time, chiefly because she has had the most, and the longest continued *power* to do so, and has existed during the ages of the greatest blindness, and ignorance, and barbarism; and it has been urged, that the right, and even the duty of persecution is one of her

most fundamental articles of faith. But what Protestant Church has ever, as a body, expressly renounced that right? The Inquisition is a most horrible tribunal; and it is one well accommodated, I confess, to the genius of the Romish persuasion; but it is no necessary part of Popery; and why should it not exist in a Protestant country? What disclaimer, for instance, is there in the articles of the English Church, of all right to erect or to sanction such a tribunal? What denial of all authority in Christian princes to restrain religious offences by the civil sword? It is notorious that persecution even of the severest kind, did take place under the Reformers, both in Britain and in other countries. The penalties, indeed, for religious offences were before long greatly *mitigated*, and in successive ages were more and more lightened; but the question now before us is, not respecting the *severity* exercised in any instance, but the *usurpation* committed. If the civil magistrate have no rightful jurisdiction whatever in religious concerns, it is quite as much an act of *injustice*, though of far less *cruelty*, to *fine* a Socinian as to *burn* him. If, therefore, the abolition of capital, and of all excessively cruel punishments, for religious offences, had been the result of a correct view of the character of Christ's kingdom—of the distinct provinces of civil government and religion,—then of course *all* those punishments, *all* exercise of secular authority in such matters would have been abolished at the same time, and would not only have been in practice actually abolished and withdrawn, but would have been pronounced to *have been in principle all along* utterly unjustifiable. The legislature would not only have *forborne* the exercise of any such interference, but would have disclaimed and protested against any *right* in any one to exercise it: whereas, the very passing of an *act* to repeal an act of this description, implies, that however *inexpedient* the legislature may consider it, they yet regard it as valid and regular till repealed, not as null and void all along; and yet, one who acknowledges Christ, and recognizes the true character and the rights of his kingdom, must acknowledge that the British King and Parliament have no more right to make or enforce laws for the government of Christ's kingdom—for the regulation, that is, of Christians in their spiritual concerns—than the Bishop of Rome, or the Emperor of Russia has, to make laws for the inhabitants of Great Britain. And I need hardly add, that as no secular coercion can properly be employed towards those who are the subjects of Christ's kingdom, considered as such, *i. e.*, in religious matters, so it would be utterly inconsistent with such a principle to employ force to *bring* into Christ's kingdom such as are *not* subjects of it—Pagans and Infidels. To persecute men (as the Infidel Jews and Heathens did) for *being* Christians, is a violation of the law of *natural mo-*

rality, which dictates that no man should be punished by the civil magistrate, for any thing which is no offence against civil society; to persecute men for *not* being Christians, or for not being orthodox Christians, is, besides this, a violation also of the *law of the kingdom of Christ*, who forbade the use of violent means in his cause."

But we have seen that the author of the Letters objects as strongly to the power exercised by the State in governing and controlling the Church, as to that exerted in behalf of the Church, in punishing heretics, unbelievers, and excommunicated persons with the civil sword. He insists on the profanation which religion must undergo by being made subservient to secular interests, and employed, as it so often has been, as an engine of State policy. Warburton, in his well-known Treatise on the "Alliance of Church and State," had mentioned, among the advantages of this alliance, that "there are peculiar conjunctures when the influence of religion is more than ordinarily serviceable to the State, which the magistrate cannot so well improve to the public advantage, unless he have the Church under his direction, to prescribe such public exercises of religion as the exigencies of the State require." On this curious argument, the author of the Letters remarks, with equal force and justice:—

"In plain English, the magistrate may prescribe *Te Deum* and Fasts, whenever it suits his purposes,—engage Christian ministers to preach down his political opponents,—obtain acquiescence in his measures, just or unjust, on pain of damnation,—and hurl against his enemies the terrors of the next world in addition to those of the sword. Belshazzar's profanation of the sacred vessels of the Temple at an idolatrous feast, was nothing to this! One would think the good bishop had forgotten on which side he was writing. If any one be convinced, by such an argument, of any thing but the *danger* to Christ's religion, by placing it thus under the control of the civil governor, I can devise no process of reasoning that is likely to undeceive him."

Nor does he omit to notice the particular "State Prayers" and "State Festivals," which are enjoined in the Church of England:—

"The regular appointed prayers for the *long life* of the King, stand in strange contrast, methinks, with the setting aside for a solemn *thanksgiving* (as you are sure, in the regular course of things, must be done,) the *day of his death*, *i. e.*, the day on which his successor will begin to reign. It might be suspected not without a show of reason, that if King William, instead of safely landing his forces on the 5th of November, had been on that day drowned in a storm, you would have been at this time solemnly celebrating that event, and repeating a form of thanksgiving to Almighty God, for having a second time, on that

day, overthrown in a miraculous manner, a wicked and treasonable attempt on the Royal House of Stuart. This, I say, might have been suspected, even had the Church been in all such cases left to her own discretion; but the suspicion amounts almost to a certainty, when it is considered that all these things are dictated by those in power for the time being."

To the same subject belongs his complaint of the Unalterableness of the Church Liturgy and Articles; so that, as he most truly observes:—

"The members of the Church of England are even in a greater strait than the Church of Rome, whose pretence to infallibility only compels them to maintain, *in theory*, that each of their institutions *was* perfect at the time when it was established; whereas you," he continues, addressing himself to the members of the Church of England, "have to maintain, *in practice*, the unerring rectitude of your own, not only originally, but *for ever*. *They* may say, this is *no longer* expedient; but *your* institutions are like "the law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not," even after two or three centuries. For you *cannot* alter anything *without* the cooperation of the civil power; and *with* it you are too wise to take any such steps;—lest, when once called in, it should do more than you would wish."

Some very sensible remarks occur with regard to the English laws relating to marriages.

"Marriage consists, in our view, of two things—a civil contract, which makes the offspring legitimate in the eye of the law, and involves temporal obligations, and a vow before God. Now, with respect to the first, it ought to be competent to persons of all persuasions to form the civil contract, without any violence to their religious principles, however erroneous, and without any interference with religious rites whatever. Oliver Cromwell was right, for once, in causing this civil contract to be made before the civil magistrate. Neither Jews, nor Turks, nor Christians, can object to this, if they choose to live under the laws of the land. The magistrate, therefore, ought to certify and register the due contraction of this engagement. But as for the religious rite, that should be left to the religious community to which each person belongs. I cannot but think in the case, for instance, of the Unitarians, that there is both a species of persecution and of profanation committed. I need not tell you that I abhor the faith of the Unitarians;—so I do that of the infidel Jews and Mahometans;—but I think that none of these should be *compelled*, in order to contract a marriage, to be witnesses and partakers of a ceremony which their conscience condemns; and it is, under these circumstances, a degradation of the minister, and a profanation of the ceremony, that it

should take place. * * * But many of the English clergy seem to think, with Paley, that the solemnization of a marriage by a Justice of the Peace, (though without *forbidding* any previous or subsequent religious ceremony which the consciences of the parties might dictate,) was calculated to degrade the clergy. They *stickle* for their exclusive right of solemnizing marriage between those who think the ceremony blasphemous, and who blaspheme the doctrines implied in it! One has scarcely patience with men who thus perversely glory in degradation. They remind me in many points of the dog in the fable, who mistook the clog round his neck for a badge of honorable distinction."

What has been done, and what is likely to be done hereafter, with regard to the disgraceful state of things here alluded to, affords a fair sample of the pertinacity with which a certain party successfully defend every abuse in the ecclesiastical institutions of England. Once and again have the Unitarians petitioned Parliament to be allowed the indulgence actually enjoyed by the Jews and Quakers, that of legally solemnizing their own marriages, without employing the ministers or the ritual of the English Established Church. Once and again have their petitions been rejected! One learned prelate is reported to have said, that he would not give them credit for any scruples of conscience about the matter! And Parliament itself seemed to be of opinion, that it was better that their consciences should suffer violence, than that the venerable rust which, during two centuries and a half, has incrusted the institutions of the Church should be injured by any profane attempts to purify them. So the question rests for the present. But as the Unitarians will probably persevere, their individual complaint is likely in time to be listened to; and, in the usual comprehensive spirit of our legislation, we shall have a sort of *privilegium* enacted, to redress that particular grievance—the enemies of reform gladly yielding thus far, in order to obviate a more alarming evil, the removal of abuses by a general law founded on the plain principles of wisdom and justice. Nor is their policy a bad one; for, amidst the prevailing selfishness of mankind, general principles have little chance of finding an advocate, when once individual interests are satisfied.

In addition to the injury thus sustained by the Church, from their undue exercises of authority on the part of the State, the author of the Letters maintains that the State suffers in its turn. On this point his remarks are extremely ingenious, and substantially just; at least, they are quite sufficient to show that an Established Church, which is objectionable in many of its practices, and exclusive in its terms of communion, is necessarily a dead weight on the shoulders of any go-

vernment which supports it. Warburton had quoted these words from the Icon Basilike :—

"Touching the government by Bishops, the common jealousie hath been, that I am earnest and resolute to maintain it, not so much out of piety, as policy and reasons of state. Wherein so far indeed reason of state doth induce me to approve that government above any other, as I find it impossible for a prince to preserve the state in quiet, unless he have such an influence upon churchmen, and they such a dependence on him, as may best restrain the seditious exorbitances of ministers' tongues, who, with the keys of heaven, have so far the keys of the people's hearts, as they prevail much by their oratory to let in or shut out both peace and loyalty."

Upon this the author of the Letters proceeds. "Now the magistrate, by admitting and excluding to the exercise of their function such ministers as he thinks fit, has certainly a great control over the *members of that church which he so governs;* but what influence will this give him over *Dissenters? Their* ministers will have all that independent influence over *their* flocks, from which he dreads such danger to the State. But why should it be expected that this influence should be exerted in hostility to the existing government? I see no reason to apprehend this *as long as the Church is left in its original, independent condition;* but as soon as the civil magistrate identifies himself with the Church, to which Dissenters are necessarily opposed, by making himself the head of their adversaries, he himself *makes* them *his* enemies." The alliance of Church and State, necessarily drives the enemies of the Church to be enemies of the State likewise; and thus occasions the very evil from which it professes to secure us. This is no imaginary case. Experience has shown that the religion of the Presbyterians is not necessarily hostile to the British constitution; but the blow which it aimed at the Church of England, in the reign of Charles I., necessarily *passed through the sides* of the regal power, *because* the regal power stood before it as an ally. Being the *natural* enemies of the Church, they were *made* enemies of the State; and it is possible they might not have resorted to violent means, had the Church possessed no coercive power, but might have been content to employ arguments, when arguments alone were opposed to them. At any rate, they would have had no excuse for so acting; but when the Church is endued with coercive power, she loses her privilege, and must expect that coercive power will be employed against her. "Put up thy sword into its sheath; for all *they that take the sword shall perish by the sword.*"

If therefore the magistrate would effectually preclude, instead of in-

creasing the danger in question, he must do his work thoroughly; he must not only prohibit but completely extirpate, by a vigorous persecution, all religions except the one established. *Half measures* generally defeat both the objects they aim at. "Dismiss your prisoners without ransom," said the old Samnite to Pontius, the general who had captured a Roman army; "if this does not please you, kill them all; and take away either their will, or their power to hurt you." Instead of this, he made them pass under the yoke, and dismissed them ardent and implacable foes.

These evils in the existing state of things, with some others which we have not room to notice, induce the author of the Letters to wish for a total change of system. The alteration which he proposes is indeed sufficiently simple; he would remedy the mischiefs which he laments, by entirely dissolving the connection between the State and the Church. The Church should regulate its own concerns with the same freedom that is enjoyed by the Universities, and should ask of the State no other favour than that protection which a government is bound to grant to every class of its subjects. But, it may be asked, does the author seriously think that the Church will ever be persuaded to pay the necessary price for obtaining this freedom? His answer is, that she has paid the price for it already; that from the moment the State consented to tolerate Dissenters, he terms of the alliance between it and the Church were broken, and that the Church may now, in all fairness, pack up its goods and chattels, and remove to some freer station, where it may enjoy them, without being subject to any control.

That such a prospect is no more than the dream of a warm imagination, the author himself, we suspect, must be fully aware. He cannot possibly expect that any class of the State's servants will be allowed to resign their commissions, and yet to retain the full pay and emoluments of active service. If they talk of the profanation of being governed by secular authority, the civil power may well reply to them, in the words of the Emperor Frederick the First, "Episcoporum ego quidem non affecto hominium—si tamen eos, de nostris regalibus, nil delectat habere. Qui si gratanter audierint, Quid tibi et Regi? consequenter quoque ab Imperatore non pigeat audire, Quid tibi et possessioni?"

But the author of the Letters denies that the clergy are to be considered as the servants of the State, or that they depend upon that character for their emoluments. "How the Church of England," he says, "came into possession of that property which her officers now hold, is an inquiry which may serve to amuse those who delight in antiquarian researches; but it is not relevant to the present question. The actual right of the Church to her property is founded, (like that of

individuals to theirs) in *Possession.*" The shallowness of this, however, is obvious. Possession may do much for individuals; but when it is pleaded in *behalf of an order*, the question must always be, by what titles and what authority that order is constituted. "The right of *the Church* to her property," says the author,—but of what Church? Of the Church *of* England? But is it not plain, that from the moment that the national establishment is dissolved, there must cease to be any Church *of* England? Who ever heard of the Church *of* the United States of America? There might be an Episcopal Church of the Thirty-nine Articles *in* England; but on what grounds such a society, however learned and respectable, could pretend to claim property provided only for the National Church *of* England, we must leave to others to discover.

But let us suppose, for an instant, that the Episcopalians of the Thirty-nine Articles were suffered to usurp the property of the National Church, is the constitution of their sect, for such it would then become, calculated to hold out any reasonable hope of its reforming itself, when released from the control of Parliament? We rather think, that as soon as it was no longer supported by the laws made by Parliament for its direction, it would instantly fall to pieces. For where would the power of legislating for it exist? In the two houses of Convocation? or in the Synods of the provinces of Canterbury and York? Or would the Bishops assemble to hold a new Provincial Council? Any of these authorities might indeed fully represent *the clergy*; but all would be very unfit, in the present times, to legislate for *the Church*; of which, as Burke most truly observes, "*the Laity* is as much an essential integral part, and has as much its duties and its privileges, as the clerical member." Or does the author of the Letters believe, that the clergy, already secure of the enjoyment of their revenues, would consent to the formation of a General Assembly, like that of the Church of Scotland, and thus, in some measure, restore the Church to the freedom of its original constitution? Highly as we respect many of their number, we are greatly mistaken, if they would not, as a body, shrink with horror from any such proposal. What between real conscientious scruples, and that love of power common to all men, and from which the clergy assuredly have not been more exempt than the rest of mankind, we believe that they would never allow the lay members of their Church to assist in the revision of its liturgy and articles, or to claim their just share in the general management of its concerns.

There are some, however, to whom, instead of an objection, it would be a chief motive for pressing what the author calls the Emancipation of the Church—that, in such an emancipation, the alienation of the

Church revenues is necessarily involved. These persons do not wish to see the Ecclesiastical Establishment reformed, but utterly overthrown; and its abuses answer their purpose, as tending to make the existing system unpopular. To us, on the contrary, it appears a resource of the highest value, that so large a mass of property is set apart by the actual laws of England, for the promotion of the physical and moral good of the people, by means so well calculated to effect it. We would call upon Parliament not to interfere with so benevolent an object, but to strive to realize it;—to make the Church in practice what it is in theory;—to be bold and decisive in reforming, but above all things, to shrink from subverting the institution of a regularly endowed parochial clergy. It is no ordinary national benefit, to have a number of well-educated men dispersed over every part of the kingdom, whose especial business it is to keep up and enforce the knowledge of those most exalted truths which relate to the duties of man, and to his ultimate destiny; and who, besides, have a sort of general commission to promote the good of those among whom they are settled, in every possible manner; to relieve sickness and poverty, to comfort affliction, to counsel ignorance, to compose quarrels, to soften all violent and uncharitable feelings, and to reprove and discountenance vice. This, we say, is the *theory* of the business of a parochial clergy. That the *practice* should always come up to it, it would be utter folly to assert, or to expect; but such is the innate excellence of Christianity, that even now, amidst all the imperfections of the existing Establishment, its salutary effects are clearly felt; and in those numerous parishes, in different parts of England, in which there is no gentleman resident, the benefits of securing the residence of a well-educated man, with no other trade but that of doing good to the minds and bodies of his neighbours, are almost incalculable. It should be remembered, too, that it is one natural but most unfortunate effect of the English Poor-Laws, to generate harsh and unkindly feelings between the laboring classes and the farmers, by whom, in agricultural parishes, the greatest portion of the Poor-rates is paid. In many places, therefore, the clergyman stands, as it were, as a mediator between the poor and their richer neighbours, inclined to protect and relieve the one, from the beneficent spirit of his profession, yet enough connected with the other, by his own rank in society and habits of life, as to be unapt to encourage an idle and profligate pauperism.

There are other points, too, which might be mentioned, and which are not unworthy of the notice of an enlightened statesman. In retired parishes, the family of the clergyman is often a little centre of civilization, from which gleams of refinement of manners, of neatness, of taste,

as well as of science and general literature, are diffused through districts into which they would otherwise never penetrate. And be it observed, that these are the very parts of the country which nothing but an endowed parochial clergy could regularly and permanently influence. In large towns, indeed, and in wealthy and populous districts, the unpaid zeal of individuals might often supply the place of a minister, appointed and maintained by public authority. But in remote country parishes, where there are no inhabitants but farmers, and one or two small shop-keepers, besides the population of day laborers, it would most commonly be impossible to find an individual willing or qualified to undertake such high and important duties. Such districts would at the best receive only occasional visitations from some itinerant instructor, who certainly could ill confer all those various benefits, temporal and spiritual, which might be derived from a resident minister of only equal zeal and capacity.

These are the objects for which *we* desire to retain a religious Establishment; and which we would steadily keep in view as our best guide while reforming the actual institutions of the Church of England. It is evidently most desirable, that the Church should be completely identified with the people; that it should not only be uncorrupt, but should be generally acknowledged to be so; that while its terms of Communion were made as comprehensive as possible, so as to include conscientious members of almost every denomination of Christians, it should be most uncompromising in the standard of moral excellence, to which it required its ministers to conform; and should watch over their previous education as well as their subsequent course of life, with the most zealous care. The reforms which we desire, would remove the evils so well represented by the author of the work before us, without involving the total destruction of the establishment, like the changes which he himself proposes. Briefly, then, but not heedlessly, we proceed to notice some points in the actual constitution of the English Church, which our very remoteness from its sphere of action has enabled us perhaps to observe more calmly, and to judge more impartially.

I. The Church of England is unpopular. It is connected with the Crown and the Aristocracy; but it is not regarded with affection by the mass of the people; and this circumstance greatly lessens its utility, and has powerfully contributed to multiply the number of Dissenters. To this day it feels the effects of the peculiar conjuncture at which it was established. It was the child of the Civil Government, when that Government was a Despotism; and it learnt to echo the language and to copy the arbitrary proceedings of its patrons, till it shared with

them the indignation of the people, and fell with them in one common overthrow. Thus the Church has never thoroughly harmonized with the popular part of our Constitution; and we have been often amused by observing the soreness with which some English clergymen still speak of the House of Commons and its Committees—as if the terrors of the long Parliament were still haunting their memories. This notorious spirit of Toryism would of itself tend to alienate the affections of the people from the clergy as a body; but other causes have combined to aggravate the mischief. The system of Church patronage, for instance, while it makes many of the clergy directly dependent upon the rich and the great, makes all of them independent of popular favour; and their course of life keeps them somewhat remote from the contact of public opinion. Again, the rank which the English clergy hold in society is often prejudicial to their influence with the poor. Birth, habit and education, have identified them with the higher orders; they share their feelings, and enjoy their pleasures; and they sometimes are ignorant, from mere inexperience, of the language and manner which are most intelligible to the common people, and most readily find the way to their hearts. Hence has arisen the peculiar unpopularity of their style and manner of preaching. It trembles to offend a cultivated taste and a critical judgment; it is generally, therefore, free from gross extravagances, but is, beyond all other preaching, tame, and unimpressive to uneducated minds. The same character prevails in their writings; their tracts intended for circulation amongst the poor, are mostly stiff, and have about them an air of lecturing and prosing, like that of a condescending superior, addressing readers almost of a different species from himself.

Other causes have their weight with the middling classes of society in indisposing them to the existing establishment. The great incomes and the pluralities enjoyed by the higher clergy cannot but appear excessive; the difficulty of procuring places of worship, and ministers of the Established Church, to meet the increased population of the country in large towns and in manufacturing districts, argues something deficient in its actual constitution; and wherever the blame *ought* most to fall, the general impression is unfavourable to the Church from the feeling, that while it absorbs a large part of the revenue of the country, it does not sufficiently perform its work. The old laws against Conventicles, and the inflexible strictness with which the service of the Church is confined to the prescribed forms of the Liturgy, place its ministers also at a disadvantage, when opposed to the unfettered and flexible activity of the Dissenters. Whilst any other Christian teacher may address an audience wherever he can find one, and

in the language which he may judge most appropriate to the occasion, a clergyman of the Establishment may preach only within the walls of his parish church; nay, he may not preach there, unless he choose also to read the morning or evening prayer at the same time—a regulation which makes it impossible to open the churches to any purpose in country parishes, on any other day than Sunday. We are not now discussing the propriety or impropriety of these and similar regulations; we are only asserting, that they tend to make the Church less popular than we wish it to be; and when it is notorious that no steps have been taken for the last two centuries to amend or improve its institutions, it is not unnatural that it should be taxed with indolence and indifference, and with thinking more of its dignity than of its duties.

II. Unpopularity, however, is not always a sure criterion of demerit; but we have now to notice some things in the present state of the Church, which are bad in themselves, independent of any effect which they may produce on public opinion. The Church of England is exclusive; and has in many instances provoked the separations from it, which it affects at once to lament and to condemn. This, in a national Church, is no light evil; inasmuch as it deprives a large portion of the people of the benefits of some most important public institutions; and, so far as the Government is the supporter of the Church, it makes a number of persons dissatisfied and discontented with the Government also. To be a public minister of religion must be an office sought after by some of the purest and best men in the country; and it is to be lamented that any of this description should, without the clearest necessity, be forbidden to aspire to it. Nor can those who most admire the public schools and universities of England, represent it very consistently as no grievance to be excluded from all participation in their benefits.

But the Church of England has been apt to congratulate itself on its tolerant and liberal spirit, because it does not ask for the direct infliction of pains and penalties upon Dissenters, nor that they should be deprived of the liberty of forming distinct societies of their own. No doubt, this is liberality, when compared with the conduct of the Church in former times. It is a wonderful improvement on the persecutions of Parker and Whitgift, on the language of the Canons of 1603,* and

* We might quote, in proof of this, every one of the twelve Canons of the very first chapter or division, entitled, "De Ecclesiâ Anglicanâ," all of which denounce excommunication, *ipso facto*, on persons maintaining the several opinions there condemned. And if we turn to the 65th Canon, we shall find that the Church earnestly desired to see its excommunications enforced by the civil magistrate's writ "De Excommunicato capiendo," by which the person of the offender was consigned to prison. It should be particularly observed, that the 5th Canon condemns to excommu-

the Synods of 1640.* It is certainly less odious in a government to allow those who complain of its tyranny to emigrate peaceably, than to shut up every door against their escape, and then to subject them to fine, imprisonment, and death! But if we were to see nearly half the inhabitants of any country preferring a voluntary banishment to a longer abode in their native land, we should not be much inclined to hold up the government of such a nation as a pattern of mildness and liberality. And here it seems to us, that the author of the Letters has done the civil power injustice, when he complains of its imposing a Liturgy and Articles upon the Church by its secular authority. On the contrary, the error of the civil power in England has been to receive and sanction, much too passively, the Articles which the Clergy have tendered to its acceptance. When the House of Commons, in the reign of Elizabeth, delayed for some time to pass the Act to legalize the Articles of Religion submitted to them by the Bishops, Archbishop Parker expressed his displeasure at this hesitation, as if religion were a matter in which they had no right to exercise their own freedom of judgment. Nor can it be doubted that Parliament, at almost any period of our history since the Reformation, would have readily consented to any alterations in matters purely spiritual, which the Bishops and the great body of the clergy might have recommended to be made. We repeat, therefore, that the needless multiplication of terms of conformity, which has caused so large a portion of the people to dissent from the Church of England, is principally, and almost entirely the fault of the clergy; and that the civil power is only to be blamed for sanctioning too negligently whatever they thought proper to frame.

nication all those who should affirm that *any one* of the 39 Articles was, in *any part* erroneous! Could the Pope himself have done more?

* These Synods were held at London and York, and consisted of the Bishops and clergy of both provinces—of Canterbury and York. Their Canons are 17 in number, and subjoined to them is the royal assent, fully approving and ratifying all their provisions. The third Canon is directed against Popery; and, amongst other things, it strictly enjoins that the children of Popish recusants shall be brought up by Church of England schoolmasters, in the doctrine of the Church of England, notwithstanding the prohibition of their parents; and if the parents should then take away the children from the school, their names should be given up to the Bishop of the diocese, who was to return them to the Judges at the Assizes, to be punished according to the Statutes. And the fifth Canon specially makes all the penalties and proceedings enacted against the Roman Catholics applicable to all Protestant Dissenters, or to any persons who should refuse or neglect to attend their parish churches for the space of a month, without some lawful impediment.

These detestable provisions are to be found in a collection of the Articles, Canons, Orders, &c. of the Church of England, published by Sparrow in 1671, with the object, as his title-page declares, "*to vindicate the Church of England.*"

But it is contended, that, in a National Church, *there must be* one uniform doctrine taught, and one form of worship universally enjoined. We are far from meaning to enter into a theological discussion, which would be the most unfitted to these pages; but we may still observe, that the essential articles of Christianity are allowed on all hands to be few, and on these all denominations of Christians, with one exception, are agreed; that although some violent spirits might insist on enforcing their own peculiar notions, even on points which they allowed to be of subordinate importance, yet that many would see the reasonableness of forbearing to teach such doctrines, so long as they were permitted freely to acknowledge their belief of them; that on matters of Church government, disputes have been mainly engendered by the intermixture of something not essentially connected with the question; as for example, the inveteracy of our forefathers against Episcopacy, arose chiefly out of its connexion with Prelacy; because Bishops happened accidentally to be invested with great temporal power and splendour, and, instead of being chosen by other Bishops, and with the consent of the clergy and people, were merely nominated by the Crown; and that thus institutions, which in their corrupted state were rejected with abhorrence, might, when stript of these additions, be admitted without scruple; we should not hesitate also to say, that the fancied inconvenience of having the pulpits filled at different times with men of different opinions, is greatly overrated; that in point of fact *they are*, and ever must be so filled; for no articles of religion can ever embrace all, or a hundredth part of the topics which are discussed in public preaching: and that the uniformity which subscription ensures, is much less important than that discordance, which it cannot prevent, in the tone of mind, in the moral opinions, nay in the very earnestness and seriousness of different ministers; so that the preaching of two men, both conscientiously subscribing to the same Confession of Faith, may lead their respective hearers to the most dissimilar views of religious duty; that indecent and personal controversy in the pulpit may be restrained by the proper authorities; but that the mere expression of different opinions on unessential points can produce no evil, so long as it is known that one good man will yet unavoidably differ in many of his sentiments and views of things from another, and that the agreement of men, so differing, in the main articles of Christian doctrine, is rather a satisfactory confirmation of *their* truth.

III. The government and external constitution of the Church of England are full of abuses, and bear divers marks of the mistaken notions and extreme misgovernment of the times in which they were formed, and of those which neglected to amend them. It may never

have occurred to some of our readers, that the Greek word which we translate "church," Ἐκκλησια, was the peculiar term used to denote the general assembly of the people in the old democracies; that it essentially expresses a "popularly constituted meeting;" and that such, in great measure, was the original constitution of the Christian society. We need not say with what different associations our English version of it is now connected; we need not ask what *popular* elements are left, in a body in which the people have no voice at all, either by themselves or their representatives; where the chief officers, the Bishops, are appointed by the Crown, and are accountable to no one but the Archbishops and the Crown, for the manner in which they discharge their trust. Anciently, indeed, the two Houses of Convocation may appear to some to have formed an Ecclesiastical Parliament—to have been respectively the aristocratical and democratical branches of the Legislature of the Church. But the truth is, that these represented, not the Church, but the clergy; and even in this character, the proportion which the deputies of the parochial clergy bore to those of the Chapters, and to the Archdeacons and other such dignitaries, in the Lower House of Convocation, was about the same which the representatives of free boroughs in the House of Commons bear to those who are nominated by the influence of Government or of the Aristocracy. We are far, therefore, from regretting, that the Convocation is become no better than a name; but certainly, its virtual annihilation has left the mass of the members of the Church, both lay, and clerical, without any means of expressing their sentiments as a body; and the Church now deserves as little to be called a Society, as the army or the navy. Its actual governors, the Bishops, appointed by the Crown, and out of all proportion too few for the extent and population of England, afford about as apt an image of primitive Episcopacy, as the Consuls under the Roman empire did of the consular government of the old commonwealth. Nominated as they now are, assisted by no ecclesiastical council, accountable to no general assembly of the Church, it were most dangerous to strengthen their powers, or even to wish that they should exert to the utmost those which they actually possess.

Then comes the system of Pluralities and of Dispensations—the relics of the worst times of Popery, which the Protestant Church of England retains, even in the nineteenth century. One person may hold two benefices, if they are within forty miles of one another; and the distance is always computed, not by the number of miles along the road, but as if the incumbent could fly with the crow, or ride on a steeple-hunt from one of his cures to the other; to say nothing of the ab-

surdity of fixing on such a distance as the maximum to be allowed by law; for if a minister can discharge his duties in a parish forty miles distant from him, he may just as easily fulfil them in one that is four hundred. Again, those persons who have taken degrees in civil law, and the domestic chaplains of Noblemen, are permitted to hold two benefices. In the one case, this indulgence was granted to encourage a study which the clergy in ancient times always laboured to propagate; but now, amid the ignorance of the civil law which prevails in England, and when the degree of Doctor of Laws does not necessarily imply an acquaintance with its simplest rudiments, its continuance is utterly ridiculous. In the other, it marks how little the Reformation in England was able to correct abuses patronized by the aristocracy; while the readiness with which the friends of the Church* acquiesced in them shows how greatly they wanted some of the most essential qualities in the character of perfect reformers. We notice the number of exempt jurisdictions, or of particular parishes, and in some instances large districts, not subject to the authority of any Bishop, merely as examples of evident abuses, even according to Episcopal principles,† and as showing again how imperfectly the Reformation in England was effected.

We shall next mention the total want of any system of education, peculiarly fitted for those who are to become ministers of the Church. It is not saying too much, to say, that the public schools at which boys

* "For," says Hooker, while arguing in defence of the privileges granted to the chaplains of noblemen, "we are not to dream in this case of any platform *which bringeth equally high and low into parish churches*, nor of any constraint to maintain, at their own charge, those sufficient for that purpose; *the one so repugnant to the majesty and greatness of English nobility;* the other so improbable and unlikely to take effect, that they which mention either or both, seem not indeed to have conceived what either is."—*Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book V. § 81.

The eloquence of Hooker has been deservedly praised; but the justice of the epithet "Judicious," which his admirers have attached to his name, is rather more questionable. Certainly there never was a more thorough-going advocate of things established, than he has shown himself in the whole Fifth Book, forming more than a third part of the entire Ecclesiastical Polity.

† Most of these, we suspect, were mere jobs from their very origin. There is still extant a Correspondence between Richard the Third, the Pope, and the Archbishop of York, relative to the erection of Middleham, in Yorkshire, into a deanery, with a peculiar jurisdiction, independent of the Diocesan. Richard, when Duke of Gloucester, had resided for some time at his castle of Middleham; and contracting a fondness for the place, he took this method of showing it; and the Pope and the Archbishop, as might be expected from the lax principles of the Church in those days, seem to have made no difficulty in consenting to gratify him.

in England commonly remain till sixteen or eighteen, do not so much as furnish the rudiments of a *clerical* education. The Universities, again, profess to know no distinctions between the future professions of those who solicit academical degrees; and they are quite right not to do so. They require of all who present themselves at their examinations, a certain portion of religious knowledge as Christians; but they do not pretend to say that this is a sufficient qualification for Christian *teachers*. The sole provision made at the Universities for the peculiar instruction of those who are designed for the Church, consists in the Lectures of the Divinity Professors; a certificate of having attended which is, we believe, always required by the Bishops, at the ordination of any person who has belonged to either University. It is with sincere pleasure that we bear testimony to the zealous and able exertions of the individual who now fills the Divinity Chair at Oxford; as, in addition to his public Lectures, he has formed a smaller class of students, who attend him voluntarily, and whom he examines as to their proficiency in such books as he has before recommended to their perusal. This is a practice worthy of the spirit and good sense of him who has first introduced it; but be it observed that this only benefits the few. Attendance on these Lectures is entirely voluntary; and we do not want the means of furnishing instruction for those who desire it, but of ensuring an adequate amount of knowledge in that far larger class, who will gain of their own accord the smallest quantity that will be tolerated.

In other professions, interest affords a sufficient stimulus to industry; and besides, a young man intended for the law, or for the study of medicine, has in fact, a distinct professional education to go through after leaving the University; whereas a young man intended for the Church, and quitting College, as is commonly the case at two-and-twenty, too often considers his education as completed, and employs the intervening year, before he is old enough to take orders, in travelling on the Continent, or in refreshing himself in some way or other, after the fatigues of his academical studies. All that he must necessarily do, is to prepare himself for his examination by the Bishop's chaplain, previous to his ordination; and if he is idle, and conscious of his own ignorance, he tries to be ordained in a diocese where the chaplain has the reputation of not being over strict, and where he may pass the ordeal with little danger. For, the legal standard of the qualifications required in a candidate for orders being fitted only to the general ignorance of the Elizabethan age, every examining chaplain is obliged to fix a standard of his own; and thus a candidate, whom one Bishop

might dismiss as utterly incompetent, may be ordained without difficulty by another. In other professions also, a man's gradual advancement is somewhat dependent on his continued exertions; he cannot, at least, safely afford to remain stationary, far less to go backward in knowledge, after he has once commenced his career. But when a clergyman is once ordained priest, his qualifications are subjected to no further trial; all is then left to his own sense of duty; and it often happens, with careless and unprincipled individuals, than they are worse divines at forty than they were at four-and-twenty. In such cases as these, the effect, we will not say of having been educated, but of having passed a certain portion of time at the Universities, is nothing but evil. Habits of dissipation and self-indulgence are acquired, and those aristocratical feelings which, in weak and vicious minds, are merely odious, are strongly confirmed. Thus, some of the English clergy are, above all other Christian ministers, unfit for their station. Without being superior to the humblest dissenting teachers in secular learning, they are incomparably inferior to them in that familiarity with the Scriptures, for the absence of which, in a minister of the gospel, not the greatest learning could compensate. But this is the universal characteristic of the English system of education, that while it produces some individuals of the rarest excellence, its failure in unfavourable cases is most complete.

Such, then, are the principal points in the actual state of the Church of England, which seems to us to demand the attention and the reforming hand of the national Legislature. No other power can undertake so great a work; and to no other, in our opinion, should it ever be intrusted. For, what though the State has, on some occasions, as the author of the Letters justly remarks, abused its sovereign authority, and by the appointment of State fasts and festivals has really done an injury to the character of the Church, yet the words of Burke are here most applicable, that "it is not so much by the assumption of unlawful powers, as by the unwise and unwarrantable use of those which are most legal that governments oppose their true end and object; for there is such a thing as tyranny as well as usurpation. So, that after all, it is a moral and virtuous discretion, and not any abstract theory of right, which keeps governments faithful to their ends."* It is the exercise of this "moral and virtuous discretion," to which we look forward with hope, for the purification of the Church of England from all those spots and stains which the State, for its own purposes, has thrown upon it, no less than from those which had their origin in its own negligence or ignorance. And in our judgment, the true friends to the Church

* Speech on the Unitarian Petition, Works, Vol. X. 8vo edit.

should join their exertions to procure, not its emancipation from the State, but its reform by the State; as the first would involve its certain destruction as a national institution; while from the other, both in this character, and as a spiritual society, it would derive at once purity and energy.

If, in any part of our preceding strictures, we may seem to have spoken too strongly, let the peculiar circumstances of the case plead our apology. The Government has been so long accustomed to regard the Church establishment as a thing not to be touched, that nothing will ever arouse them from this apathy but the strongest representation of the evils which they are neglecting to remove. On the other hand, we have endeavoured to treat the subject seriously and calmly, not only from our own sense of its importance, but to convince, if possible, the advocates of existing abuses, that those who wish their removal, are not all the enemies of religion or of religious establishments; that they are neither fanatical enthusiasts, nor infidels, nor jacobins, nor hold any principles inconsistent with the sincerest attachment to the main doctrines of Christianity, as held by the Church of England itself. We are not now called upon to state the particular nature and precise extent of the reforms which we deem desirable; our opinions, indeed, on this point, may be partly gathered from the list of evils which we have given; but the main object at present to be accomplished, is to draw the public attention to the state of the Church, and to show to every man's understanding that it ought not to be left as it is. Above all, we wish to dispel that cloud of prejudice which, on this question, besets the minds of so large a portion, not of the clergy only, but of the gentlemen of England; to expose some of those parrot-like phrases, which, to the disgrace of human reason, so often bind men's minds with a secret and sovereign charm. Such are the expressions which we so often hear of the "Constitution in Church and State," of its "venerable Establishment," of its "heroic Martyrs," its "pious and learned Reformers," and of "the mild and tolerant spirit of its Doctrines and its Ministers." We call these parrot-like phrases, because, as they are commonly used, they are all either untrue or irrelevant. "The Constitution in Church and State!" Why, it is like the feet of the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, which were made part of iron, and part of miry clay; the State strong and sound, gradually perfected by the care of successive generations, carefully watched and continually repaired;—the Church patched up in a hurry three hundred years ago, out of elements confessedly corrupted, and ever since allowed to subsist, unlooked to and unmended, as if, like the water of the Thames, it would grow pure by the mere lapse of time. We would ask, who

would wish to live under our Political Government, such as it was when our Church Government was established? And if the former has required, since that time, a series of improvements, can we believe that the experience and added light of three hundred years, could now add nothing to the perfect excellence of the latter? "The venerable Establishment!" We would ask, whether the venerable Cathedral Churches of that establishment have sustained injury from the cleaning, repairing, and removing of deformities, to which the taste and liberality of so many of our Deans and Chapters have been of late years so happily directed? or whether the ornaments added in the reigns of Elizabeth and James the First, were all so pure and so judicious, that it would have been barbarism and folly to meddle with them? The Church of England *has* no doubt had its "heroic martyrs;" but so has the Church of Rome: and so have all Christian communions; and besides, is it not a little preposterous to invoke the names of those who died in the cause of reformation, in aid of an argument that their example of reform should never be followed again? It has had too "its pious and learned reformers," and wish that it would produce some more—equal in piety, and superior in judgment and enlightened views, to those of the sixteenth century.

A real knowledge of those times—not such a mere heap of prejudices as so many pick up from Isaac Walton, and other such sources—would enable us to appreciate their excellences and their defects; would show us that we may admire them far more safely than imitate them; that though no period has produced a greater display of ability, yet that our additional experience of two hundred and fifty years gives us the same superiority of judgment over them, that many an ordinary schoolmaster possesses over a very clever boy; who, if he were as old as his master, would in all points surpass him. Such a knowledge, too, would enable us justly to appreciate the panegyrics which have been passed on the "mild and tolerant spirit" of the Church of England. It would tell us of the continued persecutions which disgraced the reign of Elizabeth, and of those which added an additional brand of infamy to that dark period between the Restoration and the Revolution. It would show us, above all, that in the sixteenth century a comprehensive spirit of Christian charity was unknown to all parties; and that the judgment even of the best men of that age, as to the number and nature of the points to be insisted on as terms of communion, is of very little value.

Thus, when the merits of the Church of England are reduced to their just proportions, and no longer magnified to our eyes by the mists of our own ignorance, the faults of its institutions will appear in their true colours, and we shall wonder by what strange infatuation they can

have been so long mistaken for excellences. Then it will be time to discuss more particularly the exact nature of the reforms best adapted to the state of the case: with what limitations the two grand principles of rendering the constitution of the Church more popular and more effective, and of making its terms of communion more comprehensive, should be followed up in practice. So slowly does truth force its way, in opposition to existing prejudices and interests, that we dare not indulge the hope of seeing such a reform accomplished in our days. Yet a little impulse is sometimes sufficient to set in motion the stream of public opinion, which, gathering force year after year, from continual accessions of experience and reflection, swells at last into an irresistible current, and sweeps away the stubbornest mudbanks of corruption and error.

TRACTS FOR THE TIMES.

This article comprises the INTRODUCTION to the Sermons on "*Christian Life, its Course, its Hindrances, and its Helps,*" with three illustrative Notes from the same volume.

"As far as the principle on which Archbishop Laud and his followers acted went to reactuate the idea of the Church, as a coordinate and living power by right of Christ's institution and express promise, I go along with them; but I soon discover that by the Church, they meant the clergy, the hierarchy exclusively, and then I fly off from them in a tangent. For it is this very interpretation of the Church, that, according to my conviction, constituted the first and fundamental apostasy; and I hold it for one of the greatest mistakes of our polemic divines, in their controversies with the Romanists, that they trace all the corruptions of the gospel faith to the Papacy."—COLERIDGE. *Literary Remains.*

Among the helps of Christian life, the highest place is due to the Christian Church and its ordinances. I hold the revival of the Church of Christ in its full perfection, to be the one great effort to which all our efforts should be directed. This belief was impressed most strongly upon me, by the remarkable state of affairs and of opinions in this country some years ago; and everything since that time has confirmed it in my mind more and more.

But the movement had begun earlier; nor should I object to call it a movement towards "something deeper and truer than satisfied the last century."* It began, I suppose, in the last ten years of the last century, and has ever since been working onwards, though for a long time slowly and secretly, and with no distinctly marked direction. But still, in philosophy and general literature, there have been sufficient proofs that the pendulum, which for nearly two hundred years had been swinging one way, was now beginning to swing back again; and as its last oscillation brought it far from the true centre, so it may

* Newman's Letter to Dr. Jelf, p. 27.

be, that its present impulse may be no less in excess, and thus may bring on again, in after ages, another corresponding reaction.

Now if it be asked what, setting aside the metaphor, are the two points between which mankind has been thus moving to and fro; and what are the tendencies in us which, thus alternately predominating, give so different a character to different periods of the human history; the answer is not easy to be given summarily, for the generalization which it requires is almost beyond the compass of the human mind. Several phenomena appear in each period, and it would be easy to give any one of these as marking its tendency; as, for instance, we might describe one period as having a tendency to despotism, and another to licentiousness: but the true answer lies deeper, and can be only given by discovering that common element in human nature which, in religion, in politics, in philosophy, and in literature, being modified by the subject matter of each, assumes in each a different form, so that its own proper nature is no longer to be recognised. Again, it would be an error to suppose that either of the two tendencies which so affect the course of human affairs were to be called simply bad or good. Each has its good and evil nicely intermingled; and taking the highest good of each, it would be difficult to say which was the more excellent;—taking the last corruption of each, we could not determine which was the more hateful. For so far as we can trace back the manifold streams, flowing some from the eastern mountains, and some from the western, to the highest springs from which they rise, we find on the one side the ideas of truth and justice, on the other those of beauty and love:—things so exalted, and so inseparably united in the divine perfections, that to set either two above the other were presumptuous and profane. Yet these most divine things separated from each other, and defiled in their passage through this lower world, do each assume a form in human nature of very great evil: the exclusive and corrupted love of truth and justice becomes in man selfish atheism: the exclusive and corrupted worship of beauty and love becomes in man a bloody and a lying idolatry.

Such would be the general theory of the two great currents in which human affairs may be said to have been successively drifting. But real history, even the history of all mankind, and much more that of any particular age or country, presents a picture far more complicated. First, as to time: as the vessels in a harbour, and in the open sea without it, may be seen swinging with the tide at the same moment in opposite directions; the ebb has begun in the roadstead, while it is not yet high water in the harbour; so one or more nations may be in advance of or behind the general tendency of their age, and

from either cause may be moving in the opposite direction. Again, the tendency or movement in itself is liable to frequent interruptions, and short counter-movements: even when the tide is coming in upon the shore, every wave retires after its advance; and he who follows incautiously the retreating waters, may be caught by some stronger billow, overwhelming again for an instant the spot which had just been left dry. A child standing by the sea shore for a few minutes, and watching this, as it seems, irregular advance and retreat of the water, could not tell whether it was ebb or flood: and we, standing for a few years on the shore of time, can scarcely tell whether the particular movement which we witness is according to or against the general tendency of the whole period. Farther yet, as these great tendencies are often interrupted, so are they continually mixed: that is, not only are their own good and bad elements successively predominant, but they never have the world wholly to themselves: the opposite tendency exists, in an under-current it may be, and not lightly perceptible; but here and there it struggles to the surface, and mingles its own good and evil with the predominant good and evil of its antagonist. Wherefore he who would learn wisdom from the complex experience of history, must question closely all its phenomena, must notice that which is less obvious as well as that which is most palpable, must judge not peremptorily or sweepingly, but with reserves and exceptions; not as lightly overunning a wide region of truth, but thankful if after much pains he has advanced his land-marks on a little; if he has gained, as it were, but one or two frontier fortresses, in which he can establish himself for ever.

Now, then, when Mr. Newman describes the movement of the present moment as being directed towards "something better and deeper than satisfied the last "century," this description, although in some sense true, is yet in practice delusive; and the delusion which lurks in it is at the root of the errors of Mr. Newman and of his friends. They regard the tendencies of the last century as wholly evil, and they appear to extend this feeling to the whole period of which the last century was the close, and which began nearly with the sixteenth century. Viewing in this light the last three hundred years, they regard naturally with excessive favour the preceding period with which they are so strongly contrasted; and not the less because this period has been an object of scorn to the times which have followed it. They are drawn towards the enemy of their enemy, and they fancy that it must be in all points their enemy's opposite. And if the faults of its last decline are too palpable to be denied, they ascend to its middle and its earlier course, and finding that its evils are there less flagrant, they abandon them-

selves wholly to the contemplation of its good points, and end with making it an idol. There are few stranger and sadder sights than to see men judging of whole periods of the history of mankind with the blindness of party-spirit, never naming one century without expressions of contempt or abhorrence, never mentioning another but with extravagant and undistinguishing admiration.

But the worst has yet to come. The period which Mr. Newman and his friends so disliked, had, in its religious character, been distinguished by its professions of extreme veneration for the Scriptures: in its quarrel with the system of the preceding period it had rested all its cause on the authority of the Scripture,—it had condemned the older system because Scripture could give no warrant for it. On the other hand, the partizans of the older system protested against the exclusive appeal to Scripture: there was, as they maintained, another authority in religious matters; if their system was not supported in all its points by Scripture, it had at least the warrant of Christian antiquity. Thus Mr. Newman and his friends found that the times which they disliked had professed to rely on Scripture alone; the times which they loved had invested the church with equal authority. It was natural then to connect the evils of the iron age, for so they regarded it, with this notion of the sole supremacy of Scripture; and it was no less natural to associate the blessings of their imagined golden age with its avowed reverence for the Church. If they appealed only to Scripture, they echoed the language of men whom they abhorred; if they exalted the Church and Christian antiquity, they sympathized with a period which they were resolved to love. Their theological writings from the very beginning have too plainly shown in this respect the force both of their sympathies and their antipathies.

Thus previously disposed, and in their sense or apprehension of the evils of their own times already flying as it were for refuge to the system of times past, they were overtaken by the political storm of 1831, and the two following years. That storm rattled loudly, and alarmed many who had viewed the gathering of the clouds with hope and pleasure; no wonder, then, if it produced a stormy effect upon those who viewed it as a mere calamity, an evil monster bred out of an evil time, and fraught with nothing but mischief. Farther, the government of the country was now for the first time for many years in the hands of men who admired the spirit of the age nearly as much as Mr. Newman and his friends abhorred it. Thus all things seemed combined against them: the spirit of the period which they so hated was riding as it were upon the whirlwind; they knew not where its violence might burst; and the government of the country was, as they thought, driving

wildly before it, without attempting to moderate its fury. Already they were inclined to recognise the signs of a national apostacy.

But from this point they have themselves written their own history. —Mr. Perceval's letter to the editor of the Irish Ecclesiastical Journal, is really a document of the highest value. It acquaints us, from the very best authority, with the immediate occasion of the publication of the Tracts for the Times, and with the objects of their writers. It tells us whither their eyes were turned for deliverance; with what charm they hoped to allay the troubled waters. Ecclesiastical history would be far more valuable than it is, if we could thus learn the real character and views of every church, or sect, or party, from itself, and not from its opponents.

Mr. Perceval informs us, that the Irish Church Act of 1833, which abolished several of the Irish Bishoprics, was the immediate occasion of the publication of the Tracts for the Times; and that the objects of that publication were, to enforce the doctrine of the apostolical succession, and to preserve the Prayer Book from "the Socinian leaven, with which we had reason to fear it would be tainted by the parliamentary alteration of it, which at that time was openly talked of." But the second of these objects is not mentioned in the more formal statements which Mr. Perceval gives of them; and in what he calls the "matured account" of the principles of the writers, it is only said, "whereas, there seems great danger at present of attempts at unauthorized and inconsiderate innovation as in other matters so especially in the service of our Church, we pledge ourselves to resist any attempt that may be made to alter the Liturgy on insufficient authority: without the exercise of the free and deliberate judgment of the Church on the alterations proposed." It would seem, therefore, that what was particularly deprecated was "the alteration of the Liturgy on insufficient authority," without reference to any suspected character of the alteration in itself. But at any rate, as all probability of any alteration in the Liturgy vanished very soon after the publication of the Tracts began, the other object, the maintaining the doctrine of the apostolical succession, as it had been the principal one from the beginning, became in a very short time the only one.

The great remedy, therefore, for the evils of the times, the "something deeper and truer than satisfied the last century," or, at least, the most effectual means of attaining to it, is declared to be the maintenance of the doctrine of apostolical succession. Now let us hear, for it is most important, the grounds on which this doctrine is to be enforced, and the reason why so much stress is laid on it. I quote again from Mr. Perceval's letter.

"Considering, 1. That the only way of salvation is the partaking of the body and blood of our sacrificed Redeemer;

"2. That the mean expressly authorized by him for that purpose is the holy sacrament of his supper;

"3. That the security by him no less expressly authorized, for the continuance and due application of that sacrament, is the apostolical commission of the bishops, and under them the presbyters of the church;

"4. That under the present circumstances of the church in England, there is peculiar danger of these matters being slighted and practically disavowed, and of numbers of Christians being left or tempted to precarious and unauthorized ways of communion, which must terminate often in vital apostasy;

"We desire to pledge ourselves one to another, reserving our canonical obedience, as follows:—

"1. To be on the watch for all opportunities of inculcating, on all committed to our charge, a due sense of the inestimable privilege of communion with our Lord, through the successors of the apostles, and of leading them to the resolution to transmit it, by his blessing, unimpaired to their children."

Then follow two other resolutions: one to provide and circulate books and tracts, to familiarize men's minds with this doctrine; and the other, "to do what lies in us towards reviving among churchmen the practice of daily common prayer, and more frequent participation of the Lord's Supper."

The fourth resolution, "to resist unauthorized alterations of the Liturgy," I have already quoted: the fifth and last engages generally to place within the reach of all men, accounts of such points in our discipline and worship as may appear most likely to be misunderstood or undervalued.

These resolutions were drawn up more than seven years ago, and their practical results have not been contemptible. The Tracts for the Times amount to no fewer than ninety; while the sermons, articles in reviews, stories, essays, poems, and writings of all sorts which have enforced the same doctrines, have been also extremely numerous. Nor have all these labours been without fruit; for it is known that a large proportion of the clergy have adopted, either wholly or in great part, the opinions and spirit of the Tracts for the Times; and many of the laity have embraced them also.

It seems also, that in the various publications of their school, the object originally marked out in the resolutions quoted above, has been followed with great steadiness. The system has been uniform, and its

several parts have held well together. It has, perhaps, been carried on of late more boldly, which is the natural consequence of success. It has in all points been the direct opposite of what may be called the spirit of English protestantism of the nineteenth century; upholding whatever that spirit would depreciate; decrying whatever it would admire. A short statement of the principal views held by Mr. Newman and his friends, will show this sufficiently.

"The sacraments, and not preaching, are the sources of divine grace." So it is said in the Advertisement prefixed to the first volume of the Tracts for the Times, in exact conformity with the preamble to the resolutions, which I have already quoted. But the only security for the efficacy of the sacraments, is the apostolical commission of the bishops, and under them, of the presbyters of the Church. So it is said in the preamble to the resolutions. These two doctrines are the foundation of the whole system. God's grace, and our salvation, come to us principally through the virtue of the sacraments; the virtue of the sacraments depends on the apostolical succession of those who administer them. The clergy, therefore, thus holding in their hands the most precious gifts of the Church, acquire naturally the title of the Church itself; the Church, as possessed of so mysterious a virtue as to communicate to the only means of salvation their saving efficacy, becomes at once an object of the deepest reverence. What wonder if to a body endowed with so transcendant a gift there should be given also the spirit of wisdom to discern all truth; so that the solemn voice of the Church in its creeds, and in the decrees of its general councils, must be received as the voice of God himself. Nor can such a body be supposed to have commended any practices or states of life which are not really excellent; and the duty either of all Christians, or of those at least who would follow the most excellent way. Fasting, therefore, and the state of celibacy, are the one a Christian obligation, the other a Christian perfection. Again, being members of a body so exalted, and receiving our very salvation in a way altogether above reason, we must be cautious how we either trust to our individual conscience rather than to the command of the Church, or how we venture to exercise our reason at all in judging of what the Church teaches; childlike faith and childlike obedience are the dispositions which God most loves. What, then, are they who are not of the Church, who do not receive the Sacraments from those who can alone give them their virtue? Surely they are aliens from God, they cannot claim his covenanted mercies; and the goodness which may be apparent in them, may not be a real goodness; God may see that it is false, though to us it appears sincere; but it is certain that they do not possess the only

appointed means of salvation; and therefore, we must consider their state as dangerous, although we may not venture to condemn them.

I have not consciously misrepresented the system of Mr. Newman and his friends in a single particular; I have not to my knowledge expressed any one of their tenets invidiously. An attentive reader may deduce, I think, all the subordinate points in their teaching from some one or more of the principles which I have given; but I have not wilfully omitted any doctrine of importance. And, in every point, the opposition to what I may be allowed to call the protestantism of the nineteenth century is so manifest, that we cannot but feel that the peculiar character of the system is to be traced to what I have before noticed—the extreme antipathy of its founders to the spirit which they felt to be predominate in their own age and country.

It is worth our while to observe this, because fear and passion are not the surest guides to truth, and the rule of contraries is not the rule of wisdom. Other men have been indignant against the peculiar evils of their own time, and from their strong impression of these have seemed to lose sight of its good points; but Mr. Newman and his friends appear to hate the nineteenth century for its own sake, and to proscribe all belonging to it, whether good or bad, simply because it does belong to it.—This diseased state of mind is well shown by the immediate occasion of the organization of their party. Mr. Perceval tells us that it was the Act for the dissolution of some of the Irish bishoprics, passed in 1833, which first made the authors of the Tracts resolve to commence their publication. Mr. Perceval himself cannot even now speak of that Act temperately; he calls it "a wanton act of sacrilege," "a monstrous act," "an outrage upon the Church;" and his friends, it may be presumed, spoke of it at the time in language at least equally vehement. Now, I am not expressing any opinion upon the justice or expediency of that Act; it was opposed by many good men, and its merits or demerits were fairly open to discussion; but would any fair and sensible person speak of it with such extreme abhorrence as it excited in the minds of Mr. Perceval and his friends? The act deprived the Church of no portion of its property; it simply ordered a different distribution of it, with the avowed object on the part of its framers of saving the Church from the odium and the danger of exacting Church Rates from the Roman Catholics. It did nothing more than what, according to the constitution of the Churches of England and Ireland, was beyond all question within its lawful authority to do. The King's supremacy and the sovereignty of Parliament may be good or bad, but they are undoubted facts in the constitution of the Church of England, and have been so for nearly three hundred years. I repeat that I am

stating no opinion as to the merits of the Irish Church Act of 1833; I only contend, that no man of sound judgment would regard it as "a monstrous act," or as "a wanton sacrilege." It bore upon it no marks of flagrant tyranny; nor did it restrain the worship of the Church, nor corrupt its faith, nor command or encourage any thing injurious to men's souls in practice. Luther was indignant at the sale of indulgences; and his horror at the selling Church pardons for money was, by God's blessing, the occasion of the Reformation. The occasion of the new counter-reformation was the abolition of a certain number of bishoprics, that their revenues might be applied solely to church purposes; and that the Church might so be saved from a scandal and a danger. The difference of the exciting cause of the two movements gives the measure of the difference between the Reformation of 1517, and the views and objects of Mr. Newman and his friends.

There are states of nervous excitement, when the noise of a light footstep is distracting. In such a condition were the authors of the Tracts in 1833, and all their subsequent proceedings have shown that the disorder was still upon them. Beset by their horror of the nineteenth century, they sought for something most opposite to it, and therefore they turned to what they called Christian antiquity. Had they judged of their own times fairly, had they appreciated the good of the nineteenth century, as well as its evil, they would have looked for their remedy not to the second or third or fourth centuries, but the first; they would have tried to restore, not the Church of Cyprian, or Athanasius, or Augustine, but the Church of St. Paul and of St. John. Now, this it is most certain that they have not done. Their appeal has been not to Scripture, but to the opinions and practices of the dominant party in the ancient Church. They have endeavoured to set those opinions and practices, under the name of apostolical tradition, on a level with the authority of the Scriptures. But their unfortunate excitement has made them fail of doing even what they intended to do. It may be true that all their doctrines may be found in the writings of those whom they call the fathers; but the effect of their teaching is different because its proportions are altered. Along with their doctrines, there are other points and another spirit prominent in the writings of the earlier Christians, which give to the whole a different complexion. The Tracts for the Times do not appear to me to represent faithfully the language of Christian antiquity; they are rather its caricature.

Still more is this the case, when we compare the language of Mr. Newman and his friends with that of the great divines of the Church of England. Granting that many of these believed firmly in apostolical succession; that one or two may have held general councils to be

infallible; that some, provoked by the extravagances of the puritans, have spoken over-strongly about the authority of tradition: yet the whole works, even of those who agree with Mr. Newman in these points, give a view of Christianity different from that of the Tracts, because these points, which in the Tracts stand forward without relief, are in our old divines tempered by the admixture of other doctrines, which, without contradicting them, do in fact alter their effect. This applies most strongly, perhaps, to Hooker and Taylor; but it holds good also of Bull and Pearson. Pearson's exposition of the article in the Creed relating to the Holy Catholic Church is very different from the language of Mr. Newman: it is such as, with perhaps one single exception, might be subscribed by a man who did not believe in apostolical succession.* Again, Pearson is so far from making the creeds an independent authority, coordinate with Scripture, that he declares, contrary, I suppose, to all probability, that the Apostles' Creed itself was but a deduction from our present Scriptures of the New Testament.† Undoubtedly the divines of the seventeenth century are more in agreement with the Tracts than the Reformers are; but it is by no means true that this agreement is universal. There is but one set of

* The sixth and last mark which he gives of the unity of the Church is, "the unity of discipline and government." "All the Churches of God have the same pastoral guides appointed, authorized, sanctified, and set apart by the appointment of God, by the direction of the Spirit, to direct and lead the people of God in the same way of eternal salvation; as, therefore, there is no Church where there is no order, no ministry, so where the same order and ministry is, there is the same Church. And this is the unity of regiment and discipline." Pearson on the Creed, Art. IX. p. 341. It would be easy to put a construction upon this paragraph which I could agree with; but I suppose that Pearson meant what I hold to be an error. Yet how gently and generally is it expressed; and this doubtful paragraph stands alone amidst seventeen folio pages on the article of the Holy Catholic Church. And in his conclusion, where he delivers what "every one ought to intend when they profess to believe the Holy Catholic Church," there is not a word about its government; nor is Pearson one of those interpreters who pervert the perfectly certain meaning of the word "Catholic" to favour their own notions about Episcopacy. I could cordially subscribe to every word of this conclusion.

† To believe, therefore, as the word stands in the front of the Creed, . . . is to assent to the whole and every part of it as to a certain and infallible truth revealed by God, . . . and delivered unto us in the writings of the blessed apostles and prophets immediately inspired, moved, and acted by God, out of whose writings this brief sum of necessary points of faith was first collected." P. 12. And in the paragraph immediately preceding, Pearson had said, "The household of God is built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, who are continued unto us only in their writings, and by them alone convey unto us the truths which they received from God, upon whose testimony we believe." It appears, therefore, that Pearson not only subscribed the sixth Article of the Church of England, but also believed it.

writers whose minds are exactly represented by Mr. Newman and his friends, and these are the nonjurors.

Many reasons, therefore, concur to make it doubtful whether the authors of the Tracts have discovered the true remedy for the evils of their age; whether they have really inculcated "something better and deeper than satisfied the last century." The violent prejudice which previously possessed them, and the strong feelings of passion and fear which led immediately to their first systematic publications, must in the first instance awaken a suspicion as to their wisdom; and this suspicion becomes stronger when we find their writings different from the best of those which they profess to admire; and bearing a close resemblance only to those of the nonjurors. A third consideration is also of much weight: that their doctrines do not enforce any great points of moral or spiritual perfection which other Christians had neglected; nor do they, in any especial manner, "preach Christ." In this they offer a striking contrast to the religious movement, if I may so call it, which began some years since in the University of Cambridge. That movement, whatever human alloy might have been mingled with it, bore on it most clear evidence that it was in the main God's work. It called upon men to turn from sin and be reconciled to God; it emphatically preached Christ crucified. But Mr. Newman and his friends have preached as their peculiar doctrine, not Christ, but the Church; we must go even farther and say, not the Church, but themselves. What they teach has no moral or spiritual excellence in itself; but it tends greatly to their own exaltation. They exalt the sacraments highly, but all that they say of their virtue, all their admiration of them as so setting forth the excellence of faith, inasmuch as in them the whole work is of God, and man has only to receive and believe, would be quite as true, and quite as well-grounded, if they were to abandon altogether that doctrine which it is their avowed object especially to enforce—the doctrine of apostolical succession. Referring again to the preamble of their original resolutions, already quoted, we see that the two first articles alone relate to our Lord and to his Sacraments; the third, which is the great basis of their system, relates only to the Clergy. Doubtless, if apostolical succession be God's will, it is our duty to receive it and to teach it; but a number of clergymen, claiming themselves to have this succession, and insisting that, without it, neither Christ nor Christ's Sacraments will save us, do, beyond all contradiction, preach themselves, and magnify their own importance. They are quite right in doing so, if God has commanded it; but such preaching has no manifest warrant of God in it; if it be according to God, it stands alone amongst his dispensations; his prophets, and his apos-

tles had a different commission. "We preach," said St. Paul, "not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord; and ourselves your servants for Jesus' sake." It is certain that the enforcing apostolical succession as the great object of our teaching is precisely to do that very thing which St. Paul was commissioned not to do.

This, to my mind, affords a very great presumption that the peculiar doctrines of Mr. Newman and his friends, those which they make it their professed business to inculcate, are not of God. I am anxious not to be misunderstood in saying this. Mr. Newman and his friends preach many doctrines which are entirely of God; as Christians, as ministers of Christ's Church, they preach God's word; and thus, a very large portion of their teaching is of God, blessed both to their hearers and to themselves. Nay, even amongst the particular objects to which their own "Resolutions" pledge them, one is indeed most excellent—"the revival of daily common prayer, and more frequent participation of the Lord's Supper." This is their merit, not as Christians generally, but as a party, I use the word in no offensive sense; in this respect, their efforts have done and are doing great good. But they have themselves declared that they will especially set themselves to preach apostolical succession; and it is with reference to this, that I charge them with "preaching themselves;" it was of this I spoke, when I said that there was a very great presumption that their peculiar doctrines were not of God.

Again, the system which they hold up as "better and deeper than satisfied the last century" is a remedy which has been tried once already: and its failure was so palpable, that all the evil of the eighteenth century was but the reaction from that enormous evil which this remedy, if it be one, had at any rate been powerless to cure. Apostolical succession, the dignity of the Clergy, the authority of the Church, were triumphantly maintained for several centuries; and their full development was coincident, to say the least, with the corruption alike of Christ's religion and Christ's Church. So far were they from tending to realize the promises of prophecy, to perfect Christ's body up to the measure of the stature of Christ's own fulness, that Christ's Church declined during their ascendancy more and more;—she fell alike from truth and from holiness; and these doctrines, if they did not cause the evil, were at least quite unable to restrain it. For, in whatever points the fifteenth century differed from the fourth, it cannot be said that it upheld the apostolical succession less peremptorily, or attached a less value to Church tradition and Church authority. I am greatly understating the case, but I am content for the present to do so: I will not say that Mr. Newman's favourite doctrines were the very Antichrist

which corrupted Christianity; I will only say that they did not prevent its corruption,—that when they were most exalted, christian truth and christian goodness were most depressed.

After all, however, what has failed once may doubtless be successful on a second trial: it is within possibility, perhaps, that a doctrine, although destitute of all internal evidence showing it to come from God, may be divine notwithstanding;—revealed for some purposes which we cannot fathom, or simply as an exercise of our obedience. All this may be so; and if it can be shown to be so, there remains no other course than to believe God's word, and obey his commandments; only the strength of the external evidence must be in proportion to the weakness of the internal. A good man would ask for no sign from heaven to assure him that God commands judgment, mercy, and truth; whatsoever things are pure, and lovely, and of good report, bear in themselves the seal of their origin; a seal which to doubt were blasphemy. But the cloud and the lightnings and thunders, and all the signs and wonders wrought in Egypt and in the Red Sea, were justly required to give divine authority to mere positive ordinances, in which, without such external warrant, none could have recognised the voice of God. We ask of Mr. Newman and his friends to bring some warrant of Scripture for that which they declare to be God's will. They speak very positively and say, that "the security by our Lord no less expressly authorized for the continuance and due application of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, is the apostolical commission of the bishops, and under them the presbyters of the Church." They say that our Lord has authorized this "no less expressly" than he has authorized the Holy Supper as the mean of partaking in his body and blood. What our Lord has said concerning the communion, is not truly represented: he instituted it as one mean of grace among many; not as *the* mean; neither the sole mean, nor the principal. But allow, for an instant, that it was instituted as *the* mean; and give this sense to those well-known and ever memorable words in which our Lord commanded his disciples to eat the bread and drink of the cup, in remembrance of him. His words commanding us to do this are express; "not less express," we are told, is his "sanction of the apostolical commission of the bishops, as the security for the continuance and due application of the Sacrament." Surely these writers allow themselves to pervert language so habitually, that they do not consider when, and with regard to whom, they are doing it. They say that our Lord has sanctioned the necessity of apostolical succession, in order to secure the continuance and efficacy of the sacrament, "no less expressly" than he instituted the sacrament itself. If they had merely asserted that he had

sanctioned the necessity of apostolical succession, we might have supposed that, by some interpretation of their own, they implied his sanction of it, from words which, to other men, bore no such meaning. But in saying that he has "expressly sanctioned it," they have, most unconsciously I trust, ascribed their own words to our Lord; they make him to say what he has not said, unless they can produce* some other credible record of his words besides the books of the four evangelists, and apostolical epistles.

That their statement is untrue, and being untrue, that it is a most grave matter to speak untruly of our Lord's commands, are points absolutely certain. But if they recall the assertion, as to the expressness of our Lord's sanction, and mean to say, that his sanction is implied, and may be reasonably deduced from what he has said, then I answer, that the deduction ought to be clear, because the doctrine in itself bears on it no marks of having had Christ for its author. Yet so far is it from true, that the necessity of apostolical succession, in order to give efficacy to the sacrament, may be clearly deduced from any recorded words of our Lord, that there are no words† of his from which it can be deduced, either pro-

* "Scripture alone contains what remains to us of our Lord's teaching. If there be a portion of revelation sacred beyond other portions, distinct and remote in its nature from the rest, it must be the words and works of the eternal Son Incarnate. He is the one Prophet of the Church, as he is our one Priest and King. His history is as far above any other possible revelation, as heaven is above earth; for in it we have literally the sight of Almighty God in his judgments, thoughts, attributes, and deeds, and his mode of dealing with us his creatures. Now, this special revelation is in Scripture, and in Scripture only: tradition has no part in it."—*Newman's Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church.* Pp. 347, 348.

† Since this was written, I have found out, what certainly it was impossible to anticipate beforehand, that our Lord's words, "Do this in remembrance of me," are supposed to teach the doctrine of the priest's consecrating power. But the passage to which I refer is so remarkable that I must quote it in its author's own words. Mr. Newman observes, that three out of the four Gospels make no mention of the raising of Lazarus. He then goes on, "As the raising of Lazarus is true, though not contained at all in the first three Gospels; so the gift of consecrating the Eucharist may have been committed by Christ to the priesthood, though only indirectly taught in any of the four. Will you say I am arguing against our own Church, which says the Scripture 'contains all things necessary to be believed to salvation?' Doubtless, Scripture *contains* all things necessary to be *believed;* but there may be things *contained* which are not *on the surface*, and things which belong to the *ritual*, and not to *belief*. Points of faith may lie *under* the surface: points of observance need not be in Scripture *at all*. The consecrating power is a point of ritual, yet it *is* indirectly taught in Scripture, though not brought out, when Christ said, 'Do this,' for he spake to the apostles, who were priests, not to his disciples generally."—*Tracts for the Times.* Tract 85.

This passage is indeed characteristic of the moral and intellectual faults which I

bably or plausibly; none with which it has any, the faintest, connexion; none from which it could be even conjectured that such a tenet had ever been in existence. I am not speaking, it will be observed, of apostolical succession simply; but of the necessity of apostolical succession, as a security for the efficacy of the sacrament. That this doctrine comes from God, is a position altogether without evidence, probability, or presumption, either internal or external.

On the whole, then, the movement in the church, excited by Mr. Newman and his friends, appears to be made in a false direction, and

have alluded to as marking the writings of the supporters of Mr Newman's system. But what is become of the assertion, that this security of the apostolical commission was "expressly authorized" by our Lord, when it is admitted that it is only indirectly taught in Scripture? And what becomes of the notion, that what our Lord did or instituted may be learned from another source than Scripture, when Mr. Newman has most truly stated, in the passage quoted in the preceding note, that our Lord's history, the history of his words and works, "is in Scripture, and Scripture only: tradition has no part in it?" I pass over the surprising state of mind which could imagine a distinction between things necessary to be believed, and necessary to be done; and could conceive such a distinction to be according to the meaning of our article. It would appear that this shift has been since abandoned, and others, no way less extraordinary, have been attempted in its place; for an extraordinary process it must be which tries to reconcile Mr. Newman's opinions with the declaration of the sixth article. But now for Mr. Newman's scriptural proof, that our Lord "committed to the priesthood the gift of consecrating the Eucharist." "When Christ said, 'Do this,' he spake to the apostles, who were priests, not to his disciples generally." This would prove too much, for it would prove that none but the clergy were ordered to receive the communion at all: the words, "Do this," referring, not to any consecration, of which there had been no word said, but to the eating the bread, and drinking of the cup. Again, when St. Paul says, "the cup which we bless,"—"the bread which we break," it is certain that the word, "we," does not refer to himself and Sosthenes, or to himself and Barnabas, but to himself and the whole Corinthian church; for he immediately goes on, "for we, the whole number of us," οἱ πολλοὶ, compare Romans xii. 5, "are one body, for we all are partakers of the one bread." Thirdly, Tertullian expressly contrasts the original institution of our Lord with the church practice of his own day, in this very point. "Eucharistiæ sacramentum et in tempore victus, et omnibus mandatum a Domino, etiam antelucanis cœtibus nec de aliorum manu quam præsidentium sumimus." *De Coronâ Militis*, 3. I know that Tertullian believes the alteration to have been founded upon an apostolical tradition; but he no less names it as a change from the original institution of our Lord; nor does he appear to consider it as more than a point of order. Lastly, what shadow of probability is there, and is it not begging the whole question, to assume that our Lord spoke to his apostles as priests, and not as representatives of the whole christian church? His language makes a distinction between his disciples and those who were without; it repels it as dividing his disciples from each other His twelve disciples were the apostles of the church, but they were not priests. In such matters our Lord's words apply exactly, "One is your Master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren."

to be incapable of satisfying the feeling which prompted it. I have not noticed other presumptions against it, arising from the consequences to which the original doctrines of the party have since led, or from certain moral and intellectual faults which have marked the writings of its supporters. It is enough to say, that the movement originated in minds highly prejudiced before hand, and under the immediate influence of passion and fear; that its doctrines, as a whole, resemble the teaching of no set of writers entitled to respect, either in the early church, or in our own; that they tend not to Christ's glory, or to the advancement of holiness, but simply to the exaltation of the clergy; and that they are totally unsupported by the authority of Scripture. They are a plant, therefore, which our heavenly Father has not planted; a speaking in the name of the Lord what the Lord has not commanded; hay and stubble, built upon the foundation of Christ, which are good for nothing but to be burned.

I have spoken quite confidently of the total absence of all support in Scripture for Mr. Newman's favorite doctrine of "the necessity of apostolical succession, in order to ensure the effect of the sacraments." This doctrine is very different from that of the Divine appointment of episcopacy, as a form of government, or even from that of the exclusive lawfulness of that episcopacy which has come down by succession from the apostles. Much less is it to be confounded with any notions, however exalted, of the efficacy of the sacraments, even though carried to such a length as we read of in the early church, when living men had themselves baptized as proxies for the dead, and when a portion of the wine of the communion was placed by the side of a corpse in the grave. Such notions may be superstitious and unscriptural, as indeed they are, but they are quite distinct from a belief in the necessity of a human priest to give the sacraments their virtue. And, without going to such lengths as this, men may over-estimate the efficacy of the sacraments, to the disparagement of prayer, and preaching, and reading the Scriptures, and yet may be perfectly clear from the opinion which makes this efficacy depend immediately on a human administrator. And so, again, men may hold episcopacy to be divine, and the episcopacy of apostolical succession to be the only true episcopacy, but yet they may utterly reject the notion of its being essential to the efficacy of the sacraments. It is of this last doctrine only that I assert, in the strongest terms, that it is wholly without support in Scripture, direct or indirect, and that it does not minister to godliness.

In truth, Mr. Newman and his friends are well aware that the Scripture will not support their doctrine, and therefore it is that they have proceeded to such lengths in upholding the authority not of the creeds

only but of the opinions and practices of the ancient church generally; and that they try to explain away the clear language of our article, that nothing "which is neither read therein, in holy Scripture, nor may be proved thereby, is to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." It would be one of the most unaccountable phenomena of the human mind, were any man fairly to come to the conclusion that the Scriptures and the early church were of equal authority, and that the authority of both was truly divine. If any man resolve to maintain doctrines and practices as of divine authority, for which the Scripture offers no countenance, they of course are driven to maintain the authority of the Church in their own defence; and where they have an interest in holding any particular opinion, its falsehood, however palpable, is unhappily no bar to its reception. Otherwise it would seem that the natural result of believing the early church to be of equal authority with the Scripture, would be to deny the inspiration of either. For two things so different in several points as the Christianity of the Scriptures and that of the early church, may conceivably be both false, but it is hard to think that they can both be perfectly true.

I am here, however allowing, what is by no means true, without many qualifications, that Mr. Newman's system is that of the early church. The historical inquiry as to the doctrines of the early church would lead me into far too wide a field; I may only notice, in passing, how many points require to be carefully defined in conducting such an inquiry; as, for instance, what we mean by the term "early church," as to time; for that may be fully true of the church in the fourth century, which is only partially true of it in the third, and only in a very slight degree true of it in the second or first. And again, what do we mean by the term "early church" as to persons; for a few eminent writers are not even the whole clergy; neither is it by any means to be taken on their authority that their views were really those of all the bishops and presbyters of the Christian world: but if they were, the clergy are not the church, nor can their judgments be morally considered as the voice of the church, even if we were to admit that they could at any time constitute its voice legally. But, for my present purpose we may take for granted that Mr. Newman's system as to the preeminence of the sacraments, and the necessity of apostolical succession to give them their efficacy, was the doctrine of the early church; then I say that this system is so different from that of the New Testament, that to invest the two with equal authority is not to make the church system divine, but to make the scriptural system human; or,

at the best, perishable and temporary, like the ceremonial law of Moses. Either the church system must be supposed to have superseded the scriptural system,* and its unknown authors are the real apostles of our present faith, in which case we do not see why it should not be superseded in its turn, and why the perfect manifestation of Christianity should not be found in the Koran, or in any still later system; or else neither of the two systems can be divine, but the one is merely the human production of the first century, the other that of the second and third. If this be so, it is clearly open to all succeeding centuries to adopt whichever of the two they choose, or neither.

To such consequences are those driven who maintain the divine authority of the system of Mr. Newman. Assuredly the thirst "for something deeper and truer than satisfied the last century" will not be allayed by a draught so scanty and so vapid; but after the mirage has beguiled and disappointed him for a season, the traveller presses on the more eagerly to the true and living well.

In truth, the evils of the last century were but the inevitable fruits of the long ascendancy of Mr. Newman's favourite principles. Christ's religion had been corrupted in the long period before the Reformation, but it had ever retained many of its main truths, and it was easy, when the appeal was once made to Scripture, to sweep away the corruptions, and restore it in its perfect form; but Christ's church had been destroyed so long and so completely, that its very idea

* This has been most ably maintained by Rothe, *Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche und ihrer Verfassung*, Wittenberg, 1837, with respect to the origin of episcopacy. He contends that it was instituted by the surviving apostles after the destruction of Jerusalem, as an intentional change from the earlier constitution of the church, in order to enable it to meet the peculiar difficulties and dangers of the times. To this belongs the question of the meaning of the expression, οἱ ταῖς δωτήρεις τῶν Ἀποστόλων διατάξεσι παρακολουθηκότες, in the famous Fragments of Irenæus, published by Pfaff, from a manuscript in the library of Turin, and to be found in the Venice edition of Irenæus, 1734, vol. ii. *Fragmentorum*, p. 10. But then Rothe would admit that if the apostles altered what they themselves had appointed, it would follow that neither their earlier nor their later institutions were intended to be for all times and all places, but were simply adapted to a particular state of circumstances, and were alterable when that state was altered: in short, whatever institutions the apostles changed were shown to be essentially changeable; otherwise their early institution was defective, which cannot be conceived. And thus it may well be that the early church may have altered, in some points, the first institutions of the apostles, and may have been guided by God's Spirit in doing so; but the error consists in believing that the new institutions were to be of necessity more permanent than those which they succeeded; in supposing that either the one or the other belong to the eternal truths and laws of Christ's religion, when they belong, in fact, to the essentially changeable regulations of his church.

was all but lost, and to revive it actually was impossible. What had been known under that name,—I am speaking of Christ's church, be it observed, as distinguished from Christ's religion,—was so great an evil, that, hopeless of drawing any good from it, men looked rather to Christ's religion as all in all; and, content with having destroyed the false church, never thought that the scheme of Christianity could not be perfectly developed without the restoration of the true one. But the want was deeply felt, and its consequences were deplorable. At this moment men are truly craving something deeper than satisfied the last century; they crave to have the true church of Christ, which the last century was without. Mr. Newman perceives their want, and again offers them that false church which is worse than none at all.

The truths of the Christian religion are to be sought for in the Scripture alone; they are the same at all times and in all countries. With the Christian church it is otherwise; the church is not a revelation concerning the unchangeable and eternal God, but an institution to enable changeable man to apprehend the unchangeable. Because man is changeable, the church is also changeable; changeable, not in its object, which is for ever one and the same, but in its means for effecting that object; changeable in its details, because the same treatment cannot suit various diseases, various climates, various constitutional peculiarities, various external influences.

The Scripture, then, which is the sole and direct authority for all the truths of the Christian religion, is not in the same way, an authority for the constitution and rules of the Christian church; that is, it does not furnish direct authority, but guides us only by analogy; or it gives us merely certain main principles, which we must apply to our own various circumstances. This is shown by the remarkable fact, that neither our Lord nor his apostles have left any commands with respect to the constitution and administration of the church generally. Commands in abundance they have left us on moral matters; and one commandment of another kind has been added, the commandment, namely, to celebrate the Lord's Supper. "Do this in remembrance of me," are our Lord's words; and St. Paul tells us, if we could otherwise have doubted it, that this remembrance is to be kept up for ever. "As often as ye eat that bread or drink that cup ye do shew the Lord's death *till he come.*" This is the one perpetual ordinance of the Christian church, and this is commanded to be kept perpetually. But its other institutions are mentioned historically, as things done once, but not necessarily to be always repeated; nay, they are mentioned without any details, so that we do not always know what their exact form was in their original state, and cannot, therefore, if we would, adopt it as a

perpetual model. Nor is it unimportant to observe that institutions are recorded as having been created on the spur of the occasion, if I may so speak, not as having formed a part of an original and universal plan. A great change in the character of the deacon, or subordinate minister's office, is introduced in consequence of the complaints of the Hellenist Christians: the number of the apostles is increased by the addition of Paul and Barnabas, not appointed, as Matthias had been, by the other apostles themselves, but by the prophets and teachers of the church of Antioch. Again, the churches founded by St. Paul were each, at first, placed by him under the government of several presbyters; but after his imprisonment at Rome, finding that they were become greatly corrupted, he sends out single persons, in two instances, with full powers to remodel these churches, and with authority to correct the presbyters themselves: yet it does not appear that these especial* visitors were to alter permanently the earlier constitution of the churches; nor that they were sent generally to all the Churches which St. Paul had founded. Indeed, it appears evident from the epistle of Clement, that the original constitution of the church of Corinth still subsisted in his time; the government was still vested not in one man, but in many.† Yet a few years later the government of a single man, as we see from Ignatius, was become very general; and Ignatius, as is well known, wishes to invest it with absolute power.‡ I believe that

* The command, "to appoint elders in every city," is given to Titus, according to Paul's practice when he first formed churches of the Gentiles, Acts xiv. 2. Nor did Timothy, or Titus, remain permanently at Ephesus, or in Crete. Timothy, when St. Paul's second Epistle was written to him, was certainly not at Ephesus, but apparently in Pontus; and Titus, at the same period, was gone to Dalmatia: nor indeed was he to remain in Crete beyond the summer of the year in which St. Paul's Epistle was written; he was to meet Paul, in the winter, at Nicopolis.

† Only elders are spoken of as governing the church of Corinth. It is impossible to understand clearly the nature of the contest, and of the party against which Clement's Epistle is directed. Where he wishes the heads of that party to say, *εἰ δέ τινες ἐν στάσει καὶ ἔριδι καὶ σχίσματι ἐπιχωρῶ, ἀπειμι οὗ ἐὰν βούλησθε, καὶ ποιῶ τὰ προστασσόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους*, c. 54, it would seem as if they had been endeavouring to exercise a despotic authority over the church, in defiance of the general feeling, as well as of the existing government, like those earlier persons at Corinth whom Paul describes, in his second Epistle, xi. 20; and like Diotrephes, mentioned by St. John, 3 Epist. 9, 10. But in a society where all power must have depended on the consent of those subject to it, how could any one exercise a tyranny against the will of the majority, as well as against the authority of the apostles? And *τὰ προστασσόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους* must signify, I think, "the bidding of the society at large." Compare for this use of *πλῆθος*, Ignatius, Smyrn. 8: Trallian. 1, 8. A conjecture might be offered as to the solution of this difficulty, but it would lead me into too long a discussion.

‡ Insomuch that he wished all marriages to be solemnized with the consent and approbation of the bishop, *μετὰ γνώμης τοῦ ἐπισκόπου*, that they might be "according

he acted quite wisely according to the circumstances of the church at that period; and that nothing less than a vigorous unity of government could have struggled with the difficulties and dangers of that crisis. But no man can doubt that the system which Ignatius so earnestly recommends was very different from that which St. Paul had instituted fifty or sixty years earlier.

On two points, however,—points not of detail, but of principle,—the Scripture does seem to speak decisively. 1. The whole body of the church was to take an active share in its concerns; the various faculties of its various members were to perform their several parts: it was to be a living society, not an inert mass of mere hearers and subjects, who were to be authoritatively taught, and absolutely ruled by one small portion of its members. It is quite consistent with this, that, at particular times, the church should centre all its own power and activity in the persons of its rulers. In the field, the imperium of the Roman consul was unlimited; and even within the city walls, the senate's commission, in times of imminent danger, released him from all restraints of law; the whole power of the state was, for the moment, his, and his only. Such temporary despotisms are sometimes not expedient merely, but necessary: without them society would perish. I do not, therefore, regard Ignatius's epistle as really contradictory to the idea of the church conveyed to us in the twelfth chapter of Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians: I believe that the dictatorship, so to speak, which Ignatius claims for the bishop in each church, was required by the circumstances of the case; but to change the temporary into the perpetual dictatorship, was to subvert the Roman constitution; and to make Ignatius's language the rule, instead of the exception, is no less to subvert the Christian church. Wherever the language of Ignatius is repeated with justice, there the church must either be in its infancy, or in its dotage, or in some extraordinary crisis of danger; wherever it is repeated, as of universal application, it destroys, as in fact it has destroyed, the very life of Christ's institution.

But, 2, the Christian church was absolutely and entirely, at all times, and in all places, to be without a human priesthood. Despotic government and priesthood are things perfectly distinct from one another. Despotic government might be required, from time to time, by this or that portion of the Christian church, as by other societies; for government is essentially changeable, and all forms, in the manifold varieties of the condition of society, are, in their turn, lawful and bene-

to God, and not according to passion;" *κατὰ Θεὸν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.—Ad. Polycarp.* 5.

ficial. But a priesthood belongs to a matter not so varying—the relations subsisting between God and man. These relations were fixed for the Christian church, from its very foundation, being, in fact, no other than the main truths of the Christian religion; and they bar, for all time, the very notion of an earthly priesthood. They bar it, because they establish the everlasting priesthood of our Lord, which leaves no place for any other; they bar it, because priesthood is essentially mediation; and they establish one Mediator between God and man—the Man Christ Jesus. And, therefore, the notion of Mr. Newman and his friends, that the sacraments derive their efficacy from the apostolical succession of the minister, is so extremely unchristian, that it actually deserves to be called antichristian: for there is no point of the priestly office, properly so called, in which the claim of the earthly priest is not absolutely precluded.* Do we want him for sacrifice? Nay, there is no place for him at all; for our one atoning Sacrifice has been once offered; and by its virtue we are enabled to offer daily our spiritual sacrifices of ourselves, which no other man can by possibility offer for us. Do we want him for intercession? Nay, there is One who ever liveth to make intercession for us, through whom we have access to προσαλωγήν, admission to the presence of the Father, and for whose sake, Paul, and Apollos, and Peter, and things present, and things to come, are all ours already. His claim can neither be advanced nor received without high dishonour to our true Priest, and to his blessed gospel. If circumcision could not be

* In order to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding, it is proper to repeat that the English word "priest" has two significations,—the one, according to its etymology, through the French *prêtre*, or *prestre*, and the Latin *presbyterus*, from the Greek πρεσβύτερος; in which sense it is used in our Liturgy and Rubrics, and signifies merely "one belonging to the order of Presbyters," as distinguished from the other two orders of bishops and deacons. But the other signification of the word "priest," and which we use, I think, more commonly, is the same with the meaning of the Latin word *sacerdos*, and the Greek word ἱερεὺς and means, "one who stands as a mediator between God and the people, and brings them to God by the virtue of certain ceremonial acts which he performs for them, and which they could not perform for themselves without profanation, because they are at a distance from God, and cannot, in their own persons, venture to approach towards him." In this sense of the word "priest," the term is not applied to the ministers of the Christian church, either by the Scripture, or by the authorized formularies of the Church of England; although, in the other sense, as synonymous with Presbyters, it is used in our Prayer Book repeatedly. Of course, not one word of what I have written is meant to deny the lawfulness and importance of the order of Presbyters in the church: I have only spoken against a priesthood, in the other sense of the word, in which a "priest" means "a mediator between God and man;"—in that sense, in short, in which the word is not a translation of πρεσβύτερος, but of ἱερεύς.

practised, as necessary, by a believer in Christ, without its involving a forfeiture of the benefits of Christ's salvation; how much more does St. Paul's language apply to the invention of an earthly priesthood—a priesthood neither after the order of Aaron, nor yet of Melchizedek; unlawful alike under the law and the gospel.

It is the invention of the human priesthood, which falling in, unhappily, with the absolute power rightfully vested in the Christian church during the troubles of the second century, fixed the exception as the rule, and so in the end destroyed the church. It pretended that the clergy were not simply rulers and teachers,—offices which necessarily vary according to the state of those who are ruled and taught,—but that they were essentially mediators between God and the church; and as this language would have sounded too profanely,—for the mediator between God and the church can be none but Christ,—so the clergy began to draw to themselves the attributes of the church, and to call the church by a different name, such as the faithful, or the laity; so that to speak of the church mediating for the people did not sound so shocking, and the doctrine so disguised found ready acceptance. Thus the evil work was consummated; the great majority of the members of the church were virtually disfranchised; the minority retained the name, but the character of the institution was utterly corrupted.

To revive Christ's church, therefore, is to expel the antichrist of priesthood, which, as it was foretold of him, "as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God," and to restore its disfranchised members,—the laity,—to the discharge of their proper duties in it, and to the consciousness of their paramount importance; and all who value the inestimable blessings of Christ's church should labour in arousing the laity to a sense of their great share in them.* In particular, that discipline, which is one of the greatest of those blessings, never can, and, indeed, never ought to be restored, till the church resumes its lawful authority, and puts an end to the usurpation of its powers by the clergy. There is a feeling now awakened amongst the lay members of our Church, which, if it can but be rightly directed, may, by God's blessing, really arrive at something truer and deeper than satisfied the last century, or than satisfied the last seventeen centuries. Otherwise, whatever else may be improved, the laity will take care that church discipline shall continue to slumber, and they will best serve the Church by doing so. Much may be done to spread the knowledge of Christ's religion; new churches may be built; new ministers appointed to preach the word and administer the sacraments; those

* Christian Life; its Course, its Hindrances, and its Helps.—Sermons xxxviii. and xl.

may hear who now cannot hear; many more sick persons may be visited; many more children may receive religious instruction: all this is good, and to be received with sincere thankfulness: but, with a knowledge revealed to us of a still more excellent power in Christ's church, and with the abundant promises of prophecy in our hands, can we rest satisfied with the lesser and imperfect good, which strikes thrice and stays? But, if the zeal of the lay members of our Church be directed by the principles of Mr. Newman, then the result will be, not merely a lesser good, but one fearfully mixed with evil—Christian religion profaned by antichristian fables; Christian holiness marred by superstition and uncharitableness; Christian wisdom and Christian sincerity scoffed at, reviled, and persecuted out of sight. This is declared to us by the sure voice of experience; this was the fruit of the spirit of priestcraft, with its accompaniments of superstitious rites and lying traditions, in the last decline of the Jewish church; this was the fruit of the same spirit, with the same accompaniments, in the long decay of the Christian church; although the indestructible virtue of Christ's gospel was manifest in the midst of the evil, and Christ, in every age and in every country, has been known with saving power by some of his people, and his church, in her worst corruptions, has taught many divinest truths, has inculcated many holiest virtues.

When the tide is setting strongly against us we can scarcely expect to make progress; it is enough if we do not drift along with it. Mr. Newman's system is now at the flood; it is daily making converts; it is daily swelled by many of those who neither love it nor understand it in itself, but who hope to make it serve their purposes, or who like to swim with the stream. A strong profession, therefore, of an opposite system must expect, at the present moment, to meet with little favour; nor, indeed, have I any hope of turning the tide, which will flow for its appointed season, and its ebb does not seem to be at hand. But whilst the hurricane rages, those exposed to it may well encourage one another to hold fast their own foundations against it; and many are exposed to it in whose welfare I naturally have the deepest interest, and in whom old impressions may be supposed to have still so much force that I may claim from them, at least, a patient hearing. I am anxious to show them that Mr. Newman's system is to be opposed not merely on negative grounds, as untrue, but as obstructing that perfect and positive truth, that perfection of Christ's church, which the last century, it may be, neglected, but which I value and desire as earnestly as it can be valued and desired by any man alive. My great objection to Mr. Newman's system is, that it destroy's Christ's church, and sets up an evil in its stead. We do not desire merely to hinder the evil from

occupying the ground, and to leave it empty; that has been, undoubtedly, the misfortune, and partly the fault of Protestantism; but we desire to build on the holy ground a no less holy temple, not of our own devices, but according to the teaching of Christ himself, who has given us the outline, and told us what should be its purposes.

The true church of Christ would offer to every faculty of our nature its proper exercise, and would entirely meet all our wants. No wise man doubts that the Reformation was imperfect, or that in the Romish system there were many good institutions, and practices, and feelings, which it would be most desirable to restore amongst ourselves. Daily church services, frequent communions, memorials of our Christian calling continually presented to our notice, in crosses and way-side oratories; commemorations of holy men, of all times and countries; the doctrine of the communion of saints practically taught; religious orders, especially of women, of different kinds, and under different rules, delivered only from the snare and sin of perpetual vows;—all these, most of which are of some efficacy for good, even in a corrupt church, belong no less to the true church, and would there be purely beneficial. If Mr. Newman's system attracts good and thinking men, because it seems to promise them all these things, which in our actual Church are not to be found, let them remember, that these things belong to the perfect church no less than to that of the Romanists and of Mr. Newman, and would flourish in the perfect church far more healthily. Or, again, if any man admires Mr. Newman's system for its austerities, if he regards fasting as a positive duty, he should consider that these might be transferred also to the perfect church, and that they have no necessary connexion with the peculiar tenets of Mr. Newman. We know that the Puritans were taunted by their adversaries for their frequent fasts, and the severity of their lives; and they certainly were far enough from agreeing with Mr. Newman. Whatever there is of good, or self-denying, or ennobling, in his system, is altogether independent of his doctrine concerning the priesthood. It is that doctrine which is the peculiarity of his system and of Romanism; it is that doctrine which constitutes the evil of both, which overweighs all the good accidentally united with it, and makes the system, as such, false and antichristian. Nor can any human being find in this doctrine anything of a beneficial tendency, either to his intellectual, his moral, or his spiritual nature. If mere reverence be a virtue, without reference to its object, let us, by all means, do honour to the virtue of those who fell down to the stock of a tree; and let us lament the harsh censure which charged them with "having a lie in their right hand."*

* The language which Mr. Newman and his friends have allowed themselves to

What does the true and perfect church want, that she should borrow from the broken cisterns of idolatry? Holding all those truths in which the clear voice of God's word is joined by the accordant confession of God's people in all ages; holding all the means of grace of which she was designed to be the steward—her common prayers, her pure preaching, her uncorrupted sacraments, her free and living society, her wise and searching discipline, her commemorations and memorials of God's mercy and grace, whether shown in her Lord himself, or in his and her members;—looking lovingly upon her elder sisters, the ancient churches, and delighting to be in communion with them, as she hopes that her younger sisters, the churches of later days, will delight to be in communion with her;—what has she not, that Christ's bride should have? what has she not that Mr. Newman's system can give her? But, because she loves her Lord, and stands fast in his faith, and has been enlightened by his truth, she will endure no other mediator than Christ, she will repose her trust only on his word, she will worship in the light, and will abhor the words, no less than the works, of darkness. Her sisters, the elder churches, she loves and respects as she would be herself loved and respected; but she will not, and may not, worship them, nor even, for their sakes, believe error to be truth, or foolishness to be wisdom. She dare not hope that she can be in all things a perfect guide and example to the churches that shall come after her; as neither have the churches before her been in all things a perfect guide and example to herself. She would not impose her yoke upon future generations, nor will she submit her own neck to the yoke of antiquity. She honours all men, but makes none her idol; and she would have her own individual members regard her with honour, but neither would she be an idol to them. She dreads especially that sin of which her Lord has so emphatically warned her—the sin against the Holy Ghost. She will neither lie against him, by declaring that he is where his fruits are not manifested; nor blaspheme him, by saying that he is not where his fruits are. Rites and ordinances may be vain, prophets may be false, miracles may be miracles of Satan: but the signs of the Holy Spirit, truth and holiness, can never be ineffectual, can never deceive,

hold, in admiration of what they call reverential and submissive faith, might certainly be used in defence of the lowest idolatry; what they have dared to call rationalistic can plead such high and sacred authority in its favour, that if I were to quote some of the language of the "Tracts for the Times," and place by the side of it certain passages from the New Testament, Mr. Newman and his friends would appear to have been writing blasphemy. It seems scarcely possible that they could have remembered what is said in Matthew xv. 9—20, and who said it, when they have called it rationalism to deny a spiritual virtue in things that are applied to the body.

can never be evil; where they are, and only where they are, there is God.

There are states of falsehood and wickedness so monstrous, that, to use the language of Eastern mythology, the Destroyer God is greater than the Creator or the Preserver, and no good can be conceived so great as the destruction of the existing evil. But ordinarily in human affairs destruction and creation should go hand in hand; as the evergreen shrubs of our gardens do not cast their old leaves till the young ones are ready to supply their place. Great as is the falsehood of Mr. Newman's system, it would be but an unsatisfactory work to clear it away, if we had no positive truth to offer in its room. But the thousands of good men whom it has beguiled, because it professed to meet the earnest craving of their minds for a restoration of Christ's church with power, need not fear to open their eyes to its hollowness; like the false miracles of fraud or sorcery, it is but the counterfeit of a real truth. The restoration of the church is, indeed, the best consummation of all our prayers, and all our labours; it is not a dream, not a prospect to be seen only in the remotest distance; it is possible, it lies very near us; with God's blessing it is in the power of this very generation to begin and make some progress in the work. If the many good, and wise, and influential laymen of our Church would but awake to their true position and duties, and would labour heartily to procure for the church a living organization and an effective government, in both of which the laity should be essential members, then, indeed, the church would become a reality.* This is not Erastianism, or rather,

* The famous saying, "extra ecclesiam nulla salus," is, in its idea, a most divine truth; historically and in fact it may be, and often has been, a practical falsehood. If the truths of Christ's religion were necessarily accessible only to the members of some visible church, then it would be true always, inasmuch as to be out of the church would then be the same thing as to be without Christ; and, as a society, the church ought so to attract to itself all goodness, and by its internal organization, so to encourage all goodness, that nothing would be without its pale but extreme wickedness, or extreme ignorance; and he who were voluntarily to forfeit its spiritual advantages would be guilty of moral suicide: so St. Paul calls the church the pillar and ground of truth; that is, it was so in its purpose and idea: and he therefore conjures Timothy to walk warily in it, and to take heed that what ought to be the pillar and ground of truth should not be profaned by fables, and so be changed into a pillar of falsehood. But to say universally, as an historical fact, that "extra ecclesiam nulla salus," may be often to utter one of the worst of falsehoods. A ferry is set up to transport men over an unfordable river, and it might be truly said that "extra navem nulla salus;" there is no other safe way, speaking generally, of getting over: but the ferryman has got the plague, and if you go in the boat with him, you will catch it and die. In despair, a man plunges into the water, and swims across: would not the ferryman be guilty of a double falsehood who should

it is not what is commonly cried down under that name; it is not the subjection of the church to the state, which, indeed would be a most miserable and most unchristian condition; but it would be the deliverance of the church, and its exaltation to its own proper sovereignty. The members of one particular profession are most fit to administer a system in part, most unfit to legislate for it or to govern it: we could ill spare the ability and learning of our lawyers, but we surely should not wish to have none but lawyers concerned even in the administration of justice, much less to have none but lawyers in the government or in parliament. What is true of lawyers with regard to the state, is no less true of the clergy with regard to the church; indispensable as ministers and advisers, they cannot, without great mischief, act as sole judges, sole legislators, sole governors. And this is a truth so palpable, that the clergy, by pressing such a claim, merely deprive the church of its judicial, legislative, and executive functions; whilst the common sense of the church will not allow them to exercise these powers, and, whilst they assert that no one else may exercise them, the result is, that they are not exercised at all, and the essence of the church is destroyed.

The first step towards the restoration of the church seems to be the revival of the order of deacons; which might be effected without any other change in our present system than a repeal of all laws, canons, or customs which prohibit a deacon from following a secular calling, which confer on him any civil exemptions, or subject him to any civil disqualifications. The Ordination Service, with the subscription to the Articles, would remain perfectly unaltered; and as no deacon can hold any benefice, it is manifest that the proposed measure would in no way interfere with the rights or duties of the order of presbyters, or priests, which would remain precisely what they are at present. But the benefit in large towns would be enormous, if, instead of the present system of district visiting by private individuals, excellent as that is where there is nothing better, we could have a large body of deacons, the ordained ministers of the church, visiting the sick, managing charitable subscriptions, and sharing with their presbyter in those strictly clerical duties, which now in many cases, are too much for the health and powers of the strongest. Yet a still greater advantage would be found in the link thus formed between the clergy and laity by the revival of an order appertaining in a manner to both. Nor would it be a little thing that

call out to this man, "extra navem nulla salus," insisting that he had not swum over when he had, and saying that his boat would have carried him safely, whereas it would have killed him?

many who now become teachers in some dissenting congregation, not because they differ from our Articles, or dislike our Liturgy, but because they cannot afford to go to the universities, and have no prospect of being maintained by the church, if they were to give up their secular callings, would, in all human probability, be glad to join the church as deacons, and would thus be subject to her authorities, and would be engaged in her service, instead of being aliens to her, if not enemies.

When we look at the condition of our country; at the poverty and wretchedness of so large a portion of the working classes; at the intellectual and moral evils which certainly exist among the poor, but by no means amongst the poor only; and when we witness the many partial attempts to remedy these evils—attempts benevolent indeed and wise, so far as they go, but utterly unable to strike to the heart of the mischief; can any Christian doubt that here is the work for the church of Christ to do; that none else can do it; and that with the blessing of her Almighty Head she can. Looking upon the chaos around us, one power alone can reduce it into order, and fill it with light and life. And does he really apprehend the perfections and high calling of Christ's church; does he indeed fathom the depths of man's wants, or has he learnt to rise to the fulness of the stature of their divine remedy, who comes forward to preach to us the necessity of apostolical succession? Grant even that it was of divine appointment, still as it is demonstrably and palpably unconnected with holiness, as it would be a mere positive and ceremonial ordinance, it cannot be the point of most importance to insist on; even if it be a sin to neglect this, there are so many far weightier matters equally neglected, that it would be assuredly no Christian prophesying which were to strive to direct our chief attention to this. But the wholly unmoral character of this doctrine, which if it were indeed of God, would make it a single mysterious exception to all the other doctrines of the Gospel, is, God be thanked, not more certain than its total want of external evidence; the Scripture disclaims it, and Christ himself condemns it.

I have spoken of the system, and its chief author, simply as the maintainer of certain doctrines, not as maintaining them in any particular manner, far less as actuated by any particular motives. I believe him to be in most serious error. I believe his system to be so destructive of Christ's church, that I earnestly pray, and I would labour to the utmost of my endeavours, for its utter overthrow!

ADDENDA.

I. FAITH AND REASON.

"*It is strange that any persons should ever have been afraid of their understandings, and should have sought goodness through prejudice, and blindness, and folly.*"—For some time past the words "Rationalism" and "rationalistic" have been freely used as terms of reproach by writers on religious subjects; the 73d No. of the "Tracts for the Times" is entitled, "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Religion;" and a whole chapter in Mr. Gladstone's late work on Church Principles is headed "Rationalism." Yet we still want a clear definition of the thing signified by this name. The Tract for the Times says, "To rationalize, is to ask for *reasons* out of place; to ask improperly how we are to *account* for certain things; to be unwilling to believe them unless they can be accounted for, referred to something else as a cause, to some existing system as harmonising with them, or taking them up into itself. It is characterised by two peculiarities;—its love of systematising, and its basing its system upon personal experience, on the evidence of sense."—P. 2. Mr. Gladstone says more generally, "Rationalism is commonly, at least in this country, taken to be the reduction of Christian *doctrine* to the standard and measure of the human understanding." P. 37. But neither of these definitions will include all the arguments and statements which have been called by various writers "rationalistic;" and while the terms used are thus vague, they are often applied very indiscriminately, and the tendency of this use of them is to depreciate the exercise of the intellectual faculties generally. The subject seems to deserve fuller consideration than it has yet received; there is a real evil which the term rationalism is meant to denounce; but it has not been clearly apprehended, and what is good has sometimes been confounded with it, and denounced under the same name.

1. It is important to bear in mind the distinction which Coleridge enforces so earnestly between the understanding and the reason. I do not know whether Mr. Gladstone, in the passage quoted above, uses the word "understanding" as synonymous with reason, or in that stricter sense in which Coleridge employs it. But the writer of the Tract seems to allude to the stricter sense, when he calls it a characteristic of rationalism "to base its system upon personal experience, on the evidence of sense." If this be the case, then it would seem that

rationalism is the appealing to the decision of the understanding in points where the decision properly belongs, not to the understanding but to the reason. This is a great fault, and one to which all persons who belong to the sensualist school in philosophy, as opposed to the idealist school, would be more or less addicted. But then, this fault consists not in an over-estimating of man's intellectual nature generally, but in the exalting one part of it unduly, to the injury of another part; in deferring to the understanding rather than to the reason.

2. Faith and reason are often invidiously contrasted with each other, as if they were commonly described in Scripture as antagonists; whereas faith is more properly opposed to sight or to lust, being in fact a very high exercise of the pure reason; inasmuch as we believe truths which our senses do not teach us, and which our passions would have us, therefore, reject, because those truths are taught by Him in whom reason recognises its own author, the infallible source of all truth.

3. It were better to oppose reason to passion than to faith; for it may be safely said, that he who neglects his reason, and so far as he does neglect it, does not lead a life of faith afterwards, but a life of passion. He does not draw nearer to God, but to the brutes, or rather to the devils; for his passions cannot be the mere instinctive appetites of the brute, but derive from the wreck of his intellectual powers, which he cannot utterly destroy, just so much of a higher nature that they are sins, and not instincts, belonging to the malignity of diabolic nature, rather than to the mere negative evil of the nature of brutes.

4. Faith may be described as reason leaning upon God. Without God, reason is either overpowered by sense and understanding, and, in a manner overgrown, so that it cannot apprehend its proper truths; or, being infinite, it cannot discover all the truths which concern it, and therefore needs a farther revelation to enlighten it. But with God's grace strengthening it to assert its supremacy over sense and understanding, and communicating to it what of itself it could not have discovered, it then having gained strength and light not its own, and doing and seeing consciously by God's help, becomes properly faith.

5. Faith without reason, is not properly faith, but mere power worship; and power worship may be devil worship; for it is reason which entertains the idea of God—an idea essentially made up of truth and goodness, no less than of power. A sign of power exhibited to the senses, might through them, dispose the whole man to acknowledge it as divine; yet power in itself is not divine, it may be devilish. But when reason recognises that, along with this power, there exist also wisdom and goodness, then it perceives that here is God: and the

worship which, without reason, might have been idolatry, being now according to reason, is faith.

6. If this were considered, men would be more careful of speaking disparagingly of reason, seeing that is the necessary condition of the existence of faith. It is quite true that when we have attained to faith it supersedes reason; we walk by sunlight, rather than by moonlight; following the guidance of infinite reason, instead of finite. But how are we to attain to faith; in other words, how can we distinguish God's voice from the voice of evil? for we must distinguish it to be God's voice before we can have faith in it. We distinguish it, and can distinguish it no otherwise, by comparing it with that idea of God which reason intuitively enjoys, the gift of reason being God's original revelation of himself to man. Now, if the voice which comes to us from the unseen world agree not with this idea, we have no choice but to pronounce it not to be God's voice; for no signs of power, in confirmation of it, can alone prove it to be God. God is not power only, but power, and truth, and holiness; and the existence of even infinite power, does not necessarily involve in it truth and holiness also; else the notion of the world being governed by an evil being would be no more than a contradiction in terms; and the horrible strife of the two principles of Manicheism would be a mere matter of indifference; for if power alone constitute God, whichever principle triumphed over the other, would become God by the very fact of its victory; and thus triumphant evil would be good.

7. Reason, then, is the mean whereby we attain to faith, and escape the devil worship of idolatry; but the understanding is not a necessary condition of faith, and very often impedes it; for the understanding having for its basis the reports of sense and experience, has no direct way of arriving at things invisible, and rather shrinks back from that world with which it is in no way familiar. It has a work to do in regard to revelation, and an important work; but divine things not being its proper matter, its work concerning them must be subordinate, and its tendency is always to fall back from the invisible to the visible,—from matters of faith to matters of experience. Its work with respect to revelation, is this—that it should inquire into the truth of the outward signs of it; which outward signs being necessarily things visible and sensible, fall within its province of judgment. Thus understanding judges the external witnesses of a revelation: if miracles be alleged, it is the business of understanding to ascertain the fact of their occurrence; if a book claim to be the record of a revelation, it belongs to the understanding to make out the origin of this book, the time when it was written, who were its authors, and what is the first and gram-

matical meaning of its language. Or, again, if any men profess to be the depositories of divine truth, by an extraordinary commission from God, the understanding being familiar with man's nature and motives, can judge of their credibility—can see whether there are any marks of folly in them, or of dishonesty, or whether they are at once sensible and honest. And in all such matters, the prerogative of the understanding to judge is not to be questioned; for all such points are strictly within its dominion; and our Lord's words are of universal application, that we should render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, no less than we should render to God the things that are God's.

Faith may exist without the action of the understanding, but never without that of the reason. It may exist independent of the understanding, because faith in God is the natural result of the idea of God; and that idea belongs to the reason, and the understanding is not concerned with it. But when a special revelation has been given us, through human instruments, when the understanding is called in to certify the particular fact, that in such and such particular persons, writings or events, God has made himself manifest in an extraordinary manner; it is the human instrumentality which requires the judgment of the understanding; the bringing in of human characters, and sensible facts, which are matters of sense and experience; and, therefore, it is mere ignorance when Christians speak slightingly of the outward and historical evidences of Christianity, and indulge in very misplaced contempt for Paley and others who have worked out the historical proof of it. Such persons may observe, if they will, that where the historical evidence has not been listened to, there a belief in Christianity, properly so called, is wanting. Living examples might, I think, be named of men whose reason entirely acknowledges the internal proofs of a divine origin which are contained in the Christian doctrines, but whose understandings are not satisfied as to the facts of the Christian history, and particularly as to the fact of our Lord's resurrection. Such men are a remarkable contrast to those whose understandings are fully satisfied of the historical truth of our Lord's resurrection, but who are indifferent to, or actually deny, those doctrinal truths of which another power than the understanding must be the warrant. It is important to observe, therefore, that in a revelation involving, as an essential part of it, certain historical facts, there is necessarily a call for the judgment of the understanding, although in religious faith simply the understanding may have no place.

8. Now, then, the clearest notion which can be given of rationalism would, I think, be this; that it is the abuse of the understanding in subjects where the divine and the human, so to speak, are intermingled. Of human things the understanding can judge, of divine

things it cannot; and thus, where the two are mixed together, its inability to judge of the one part makes it derange the proportions of both, and the judgment of the whole is vitiated. For example, the understanding examines a miraculous history: it judges truly of what I may call the human part of the case; that is to say, of the rarity of miracles,—of the fallibility of human testimony,—of the proneness of most minds to exaggeration,—and of the critical arguments affecting the genuineness or the date of the narrative itself. But it forgets the divine part, namely, the power and providence of God, that He is really ever present amongst us, and that the spiritual world, which exists invisibly all around us, may conceivably, and by no means impossibly, exist, at some times, and to some persons, even visibly. These considerations, which the understanding is ignorant of, would often modify our judgment as to the human parts of the case. Things not impossible in themselves are believed upon sufficient testimony; and with all the carelessness and exaggeration of historians, the mass of history is notwithstanding generally credible. Again, with regard to the history of the Old Testament, our judgment of the human part in it requires to be constantly modified by our consciousness of the divine part, or otherwise it cannot fail to be rationalistic; that is, it will be the judgment of the understanding only, unchecked by the reason. Gesenius' Commentary on Isaiah is rationalistic, for it regards Isaiah merely as a Jewish writer, zealously attached to the religion of his country, and lamenting the decay of his nation, and anxiously looking for its future restoration. No doubts Isaiah was all this, and therefore Gesenius' Commentary is critically and historically very valuable; the human part of Isaiah is nowhere better illustrated; but the divine part of the prophecy of Isaiah is no less real, and the consciousness of its existence should actually qualify our feelings and language even with reference to the human part.

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rationalism is the appealing to the decision of the understanding in points where the decision properly belongs, not to the understanding but to the reason. This is a great fault, and one to which all persons who belong to the sensualist school in philosophy, as opposed to the idealist school, would be more or less addicted. But then, this fault consists not in an over-estimating of man's intellectual nature generally, but in the exalting one part of it unduly, to the injury of another part; in deferring to the understanding rather than to the reason.

2. Faith and reason are often invidiously contrasted with each other, as if they were commonly described in Scripture as antagonists; whereas faith is more properly opposed to sight or to lust, being in fact a very high exercise of the pure reason; inasmuch as we believe truths which our senses do not teach us, and which our passions would have us, therefore, reject, because those truths are taught by Him in whom reason recognises its own author, the infallible source of all truth.

3. It were better to oppose reason to passion than to faith; for it may be safely said, that he who neglects his reason, and so far as he does neglect it, does not lead a life of faith afterwards, but a life of passion. He does not draw nearer to God, but to the brutes, or rather to the devils; for his passions cannot be the mere instinctive appetites of the brute, but derive from the wreck of his intellectual powers, which he cannot utterly destroy, just so much of a higher nature that they are sins, and not instincts, belonging to the malignity of diabolic nature, rather than to the mere negative evil of the nature of brutes.

4. Faith may be described as reason leaning upon God. Without God, reason is either overpowered by sense and understanding, and, in a manner overgrown, so that it cannot apprehend its proper truths; or, being infinite, it cannot discover all the truths which concern it, and therefore needs a farther revelation to enlighten it. But with God's grace strengthening it to assert its supremacy over sense and understanding, and communicating to it what of itself it could not have discovered, it then having gained strength and light not its own, and doing and seeing consciously by God's help, becomes properly faith.

5. Faith without reason, is not properly faith, but mere power worship; and power worship may be devil worship; for it is reason which entertains the idea of God—an idea essentially made up of truth and goodness, no less than of power. A sign of power exhibited to the senses, might through them, dispose the whole man to acknowledge it as divine; yet power in itself is not divine, it may be devilish. But when reason recognises that, along with this power, there exist also wisdom and goodness, then it perceives that here is God: and the

worship which, without reason, might have been idolatry, being now according to reason, is faith.

6. If this were considered, men would be more careful of speaking disparagingly of reason, seeing that is the necessary condition of the existence of faith. It is quite true that when we have attained to faith it supersedes reason; we walk by sunlight, rather than by moonlight; following the guidance of infinite reason, instead of finite. But how are we to attain to faith; in other words, how can we distinguish God's voice from the voice of evil? for we must distinguish it to be God's voice before we can have faith in it. We distinguish it, and can distinguish it no otherwise, by comparing it with that idea of God which reason intuitively enjoys, the gift of reason being God's original revelation of himself to man. Now, if the voice which comes to us from the unseen world agree not with this idea, we have no choice but to pronounce it not to be God's voice; for no signs of power, in confirmation of it, can alone prove it to be God. God is not power only, but power, and truth, and holiness; and the existence of even infinite power, does not necessarily involve in it truth and holiness also; else the notion of the world being governed by an evil being would be no more than a contradiction in terms; and the horrible strife of the two principles of Manicheism would be a mere matter of indifference; for if power alone constitute God, whichever principle triumphed over the other, would become God by the very fact of its victory; and thus triumphant evil would be good.

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to the divine part of Scripture, that he sees God ever in it, and regards it truly as his word, his judgments of the human part in it are not likely to be rationalistic; and if his understanding decides according to its own laws, upon points within its own province, while his faith duly tempers it, and restrains it from venturing upon another's dominion, the result will, in all probability, be such as commonly attends the use of God's manifold gifts in their just proportions,—it will image, after our imperfect measure, the holiness of God and the truth of God.

It is very true, and should be acknowledged in the fullest manner, that for the study of the highest moral and spiritual questions another faculty than the understanding is wanting; and that without this faculty the understanding alone cannot arrive at truth. But it is no less true, that while there is, on the one side, a faculty higher than the understanding, which is entitled to pronounce upon its defects; "for he that is spiritual judgeth all things," ἀναχρίνει;) so there is a clamour often raised against it, not from above, but from below,—the clamour of mere shallowness, and ignorance, and passion. Of this sort is some of the outcry which is raised against rationalism. Men do not leap, *per saltum mortalem*, from ordinary folly to divine wisdom; and the foolish have no right to think that they are angels, because they are not humanly wise. There is a deep and universal truth in St. Paul's words, where he says, that Christians wish "not to be unclothed but clothed upon, that mortality may be swallowed up of life." Wisdom is gained, not by renouncing or despising the understanding, but by adding to its perfect work the perfect work of reason, and of reason's perfection, faith.

II. THE SIXTH CHAPTER OF THE GOSPEL BY JOHN.

The interpretation of John vi. 47—58, is of no small importance; for it is remarkable, that the highest notions with respect to the presence of our Lord in the Holy Communion often are grounded upon this passage, which yet in the judgment of others most decisively repels them.

The whole question resolves itself into this—are our Lord's words in this place coordinate with the Holy Communion, or subordinate to it? That is, do they and the communion alike point to some great truth superior to them both; or do our Lord's words in St. John point to the communion itself as their highest meaning?

The communion itself expresses a truth above itself by a symbolical action; the words of our Lord, in St. John, are exactly the same with

that symbolic action; it is natural, therefore, to understand them not as referring to it, but to the same* higher truth to which it refers also: and the more so as the communion is not once mentioned by St. John either in his Gospel or in his Epistles; but the idea which the communion expresses appears to have been familiar to his mind; at least, if we suppose that his mention of the blood and water flowing from our Lord's side in his Gospel, and his allusion again to the same fact in his Epistle, have reference in any degree to it, which seems to me most probable.

Our Lord repels the notion of a literal acceptation of his words, where he says,—"It is the spirit which profiteth, the flesh profiteth nothing; the words which I speak unto you, they are Spirit and they are life." It seems impossible, therefore to refer these words, which he tells us expressly are Spirit and life, to any outward act of eating and drinking as their highest truth and object.

But the words in the sixth chapter of St. John do highly illustrate

* The common tendency to make the Christian sacraments an ultimate end rather than a mean, is exhibited in the heading of the tenth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, in our authorised version, where we find the first verses described as stating, that "the Jews' sacraments were types of ours." Whereas, so far is it from the apostle's argument to represent our sacraments as the reality of which the Jews' sacraments were the type, that he is describing theirs and ours as coordinate with each other, and both alike subordinate to the same truth; and he argues that if the Jews, with their sacraments, did notwithstanding lose the reality which those sacraments typified, so we should take heed lest we, with our sacraments, should lose it also. The erroneous heading is not given in the Geneva Bible, where we have, on the contrary, the true observation; "the sacraments of the old fathers were all one with ours, for they respected Christ only." It is true that if no more were meant than that "the Jews' sacraments were like ours," there would be no reason to object to the expression; but apparently more is meant, as the word type seems to imply that what it is compared with is the reality, of which it is itself only the image; and one thing cannot properly be called the type of another, when both are but types of the same third thing. But the divines of James the First's reign and of his son's were to the reformers exactly what the so-called fathers were to the apostles: the very same tendencies, growing up even in Elizabeth's reign, becoming strengthened under the Stuart kings, and fully developed in the non-jurors, which distinguish the divines of the seventeenth century from those of the sixteenth, distinguish also the church system from the gospel. There are many who readily acknowledge this difference in the English church, while they would deny it in the case of the ancient church. Indeed, it is not yet deemed prudent to avow openly that they prefer the so-called fathers to the apostles, and therefore they try to persuade themselves that both speak the same language. And doubtless, if the Scriptures are to be interpreted according to the rule of the writers of the third, and fourth, and fifth centuries, the thing can easily be effected; as, by a similar process, the Articles of the Church of England, if interpreted according to the rule of the non-jurors and their successors, might be made to speak the very sentiments which their authors designed to condemn.

the institution and purpose of the communion, and especially the remarkable words which our Lord used in instituting it. They show what infinite importance he attached to that truth which he expressed both in symbolical words and action under the same figure, of eating His body and drinking His blood. But to suppose that that truth can only be realized by one particular ritual action, so that the one great work of a Christian is to receive the Lord's Supper,—which it must be, if our Lord's words in the sixth chapter of St. John refer to the communion,—is so contrary to the whole character of our Lord's teaching, and not least so in the very words so misinterpreted, that to maintain such a doctrine, leading as it does, to such manifold superstitions, is actually to preach another Gospel than Christ's—to bring in a mystical religion instead of a spiritual one,—to do worse than to Judaize.

III. TRADITION.

"*Some persons wish to magnify the uncertainties of the Scripture, in order to recommend more plausibly the guidance of some supposed authoritative interpreter of it.*"—"The high church party," we have been lately told, "take holy Scripture for their guide, and, in the interpretation of it, defer to the authority of primitive antiquity: the low church party contend for the sufficiency of private judgment." It is become of the greatest importance to see clearly, not what one party, or another, may contend for, but what is the real truth, and what accordingly, is the duty of every Christian man to do in this matter. Scripture is not hopelessly obscure or ambiguous; but it may not be inexpedient here to consider a little, what are the objections to the principle of the high church party; to clear away certain difficulties which are supposed to beset the opposite principle; and to state, if possible, what the truth of the whole question is.

I. The objections to the principle of the high church party are these:—Its extreme vagueness. What is primitive antiquity? and where is its authority to be found? Does "primitive antiquity" mean the first three centuries? or the first two? or the first five? or the first seven? Does it include any of the general councils? or one of them? or four? or six? Are Irenæus and Tertullian the latest writers of "primitive antiquity?" or does it end with Augustine? or does it comprehend the venerable Bede? One writer has lately told us, that our Reformers wished the people to be taught, "that, for almost seven hundred years, the church was most pure." Are we, then, to hold that primitive antiquity" embraces a period of nearly seven centuries? Seven

centuries are considerably more than a third part of the whole duration of the church, from its foundation to this hour: can the third part of a nation's history be called its primitive antiquity? Is a tenet, or a practice taught when Christianity had been more than six hundred years in the world, to be called primitive? We know not, then in the first place, what length of time is signified by "primitive antiquity."

But let it signify any length of time we choose, I ask, next, where is its authority to be found? In the decisions of the general councils? But if we call the first four centuries "primitive antiquity," we find in this period only two general councils; if we include the fifth century, we get four; if we take in the sixth and seventh centuries, we have then, in all, six general councils. Will the decisions of any, or all of these six councils furnish us with an authoritative interpretation of Scripture? They give us the Nicene and the Constantinopolitan creeds; they condemn various notions with respect to the person of our Lord, and to some other points of belief; and they contain a variety of regulations for the discipline and order of the church: but, with the exception of some particular passages, there is no authority in the creeds, or canons, or anathemas of these councils, for the interpretation of Scripture; they leave its difficulties just where they were before. It is but little, then, which the first six general councils will do towards providing the student of Scripture with an infallible standard of interpretation.

Where, however, except in the councils, can we find any thing claiming to be the voice of the church? Neither individual writers, nor yet all the writers of the first seven centuries together, can properly be called the church. They form, even altogether, but a limited number of individuals who, in different countries, and at different periods, expressed, in writing, their own sentiments, but without any public authority. Origen, one of the ablest and most learned of them all, was anathematized by the second council of Constantinople; Tertullian was heretical during a part of his life; Lactantius was taxed with heterodoxy. How are we to know who are sound? And if sound generally, that is to say, if they stand charged with no heretical error, yet it does not follow that a man is infallible because he is not heretical; and none of these writers have been distinguished like the five great Roman lawyers whom the edict of Theodosius* selected from the mass, and gave to their decisions a legal authority. Or, again, if it be

* Cod. Theodos. lib. i. tit. iv. The edict is issued in the name of the emperors Theodosius the younger, and Valentinian the younger, in the year A.D. 426.

said that the agreement of the great majority of them is to be regarded as decisive, we answer, that as no individual amongst them is in himself an authority, legally, so neither can any number of them be so; and if a moral authority only be meant, such as we naturally ascribe to the concurring judgment of many eminent men, then this is a totally different question, and is open to inquiry in every separate case; for as on the one hand, no one denies that such a concurring judgment is *an* authority, yet, on the other hand, it may be outweighed, either by the worth of the few who differ from the judgment, or by the reason of the case itself; and the concurring judgment of the majority may show no more than the force of a general prejudice, which only a very few individuals were sensible enough to resist.

In fact, it would greatly help to clear this question if we understand what we mean by allowing, or denying, the authority of the so-called fathers. The term *authority* is ambiguous, and according to the sense in which I use it, I should either acknowledge it or deny it.—The writers of the first four, or of the first seven centuries, have *an* authority, just as the scholiasts and ancient commentators have: some of them, and in some points, are of weight singly; the agreement of many of them has much weight; the agreement of almost all of them would have great weight. In this sense, I acknowledge their authority and it would be against all sound principles of criticism to deny it. But if, by authority, is meant a *decisive* authority, a judgment which may not be questioned, then the claim of authority in such a case, for any man, or set of men, is either a folly or a revelation. Such an authority is not human, but divine: if any man pretends to possess it, let him show God's clear warrant for his pretension, or he must be regarded as a deceiver or a madman.

But it may be said, that an authority not to be questioned was conferred, by the Roman law, on the opinions of a certain number of great lawyers: if a judge believed that their interpretation of the law was erroneous, he yet was not at liberty to follow his own private judgment in departing from it. Why may not the same thing be allowed in the church? and why may not the interpretations of Cyprian, or Athanasius, or Augustine, or Chrysostom, be as decisive, with respect to the true sense of the Scriptures, as those of Gaius, Paulus, Modestinus, Ulpian, and Papinian, were acknowledged to be with respect to the sense of the Roman law?

The answer is, that the emperor's edict could absolve the judge from following his own convictions about the sense of the law, because it gave to the authorized interpretation the force of law. The text, as the judge interpreted it, was a law repealed; the comment of the great

lawyers was now the law in its room. As a mere literary composition, he might interpret it rightly, and Gaius, or Papinian, might be wrong; but if his interpretation was ever so right, grammatically or critically, yet, legally, it was nothing to the purpose ;—Gaius's interpretation had superseded it, and was now the law which he was bound to obey. But, in the church, the only point to be aimed at is the discovery of the true meaning of the text of the divine law: no human power can invest the comment with equal authority. The emperor said, and might say, to his judges, "You need not consider what was the meaning of the decemvirs, when they wrote the twelve tables, or, of Aquillius, when he drew up the Aquillian law. The law for you is not what the decemvirs may have meant, but what their interpreters meant: the decemvirs' meaning, if it was their meaning, is no longer the law of Rome." But who can dare to say to a Christian, "You need not consider what was the meaning of our Lord and his apostles; the law for you now is the meaning of Cyprian, or Ambrose, or Chrysostom ;—that meaning has superseded the meaning of Christ." A Christian must find out Christ's meaning, and believe that he has found it, or else he must still seek for it. It is a matter, not of outward submission, but of inward faith; and if in our inward mind we are persuaded that the interpreter has mistaken our Lord's meaning, how can we by possibility adopt that interpretation in faith?

Here we come to a grave consideration—that this doctrine of an infallible rule of interpretation may suit ignorance or scepticism: it is death to a sincere and reasonable and earnest faith. It is not hard for a sceptical mind to deceive itself by saying, that it receives whatever the church declares to be true: it may receive any number of doctrines, but it will not really believe them. We may restrain our tongues from disputing them, we may watch every restless thought that would question them, and instantly, by main force, as it were, put it down; but all this time our minds do not assimilate to them; they do not take them up into their own nature, so as to make them a part of themselves, freshening and supplying the life-blood of their very being. Truth must be believed by the mind's own act; our souls must be drawn towards it with a reasonable love: some affinity there must be between it and them, or else they can never really comprehend it. The sceptic may desperately become a fanatic also, but he is not become, therefore, a believer.

Authority cannot compel belief; the sceptic who knows not what it is to grasp any thing with the firm grasp of faith, may mistake his acquiescence in a doctrine for belief in it; the ignorant and careless, who believe only what their senses tell them, may lay up the words of divine

truth in their memory, may repeat them loudly, and be vehement against all who question them. But minds to which faith is a necessity, which cannot be contented to stand by the side of truth, but must become altogether one with it,—minds which know full well the difference between opinion and conviction, between not questioning and believing,—they, when their own action is superseded by an authority foreign to themselves, are in a condition which they find intolerable. Told to believe what they cannot believe; told that they ought not to believe what they feel most disposed to believe; they retire altogether from the region of divine truth, as from a spot tainted with moral death, and devote themselves to other subjects; to physical science, it may be, or to political; where the inherent craving of their nature may yet be gratified, where, however insignificant the truth may be, they may yet find some truth to believe. This has been the condition of too many great men in the church of Rome; and it accounts for that bitterness of feeling with which Machiavelli, and others like him, appear to have regarded the whole subject of Christianity.

The system, then, of deferring to the authority of what is called the ancient church in the interpretation of Scripture, is impracticable, inasmuch as, with regard to the greatest part of the Scripture, the church, properly speaking, has said nothing at all; and if it were practicable, it would be untenable, because neither the old councils, nor individual writers, could give any sign that they had a divine gift of interpretation; and if such a gift had been given to them, it would have been equivalent to a new revelation, the sense of the comment being thus preferred to what we could not but believe to be the sense of the text. Above all, the system is destructive of faith, having a tendency to substitute passive acquiescence for real conviction; and therefore I should not say that the excess of it was popery, but that it had once and actually those characters of evil which we sometimes express by the term popery, but which may be better signified by the term idolatry; a reverence for that which ought not to be reverenced, leading to a want of faith in that which is really deserving of all adoration and love.

II. But it is said that the system of relying on private judgment is beset by no less evils: that it is in itself inconsistent, and leads to Socinianism and Rationalism, and, in the end, to utter unbelief; so that, the choice being only between two evils, men may choose the system of church authority as being the less evil of the two. If this were so, I see not how faith could be attained at all, or what place would be left for Christian truth. But the system of the Church of England* is, I

* Much has been lately written to show that the Church of England allows the authority of the ancient councils and writers, and does not allow the right of private

am persuaded, fully consistent, and has no tendency either to Socinianism or Rationalism. Let us see what that system is.

It is invidiously described as maintaining "the sufficiency of private judgment." Now we maintain the sufficiency of private judgment in interpreting the Scriptures in no other sense than that in which every

judgment. But it is perfectly clear, from the 21st Article, that it does not allow the authority of councils; that is to say, it holds that a council's exposition of doctrine may be false, and that such an exposition is of no force "unless it may be declared that it be taken out of Holy Scripture." Who, then, is to declare this? for to suppose that the declaration of the council itself is meant is absurd: the answer, I imagine, would be, according to the mind of the Reformers, "Every particular or national church," and especially the king as the head of the church. They would not have allowed private judgment, because they conceived that a private person had nothing to do but to obey the government; and it was for the government to determine what the truth of Scripture was. The Church of England, then, expressly disclaims the authority of councils, and, in its official instruments, it neither allows nor condemns private judgment: but the opinions of the Reformers, and the constitution of the church in the 16th century, were certainly against private judgment: their authority for the interpretation of Scripture was undoubtedly the supreme government of the church, not the bishops, but the king and parliament. But then this had respect not to the power of discerning truth, but to the right of publishing it, which is a wholly different question. That an individual was not bound in *foro conscientiæ* to admit the truth of any interpretation of Scripture which did not approve itself to his own mind, was no less the judgment of the Church of England than that if he publicly disputed the interpretation of the church, he might be punished as unruly, and a despiser of government. But then it should ever be remembered that the church, with the Reformers, was not the clergy. And now that the right of publication is conceded by the church, it is quite just to say that the Church of England allows private judgment; and if that judgment differ from her own, she condemns not the act of judging at all, but the having come to a false conclusion.

It is urged that the act of 1 Elizabeth, c. 1, allows that to be heresy which the four first councils determined to be so. This is true; but it also adjudges to be heresy whatever shall be hereafter declared to be so by "the high court of parliament, with the assent of the clergy in their convocation." The Church of England undoubtedly allowed the decisions of the first four councils, in matters of doctrine, to be valid, as it allowed the three creeds, because it decided that they were agreeable to Scripture; but the binding authority was that of the English parliament, not of the councils of Nicæa or Constantinople.

As to the canon of 1571, which allows preachers to teach nothing as religious truth but what is agreeable to the Scriptures, "*and* which the catholic fathers and ancient bishops have collected from that very doctrine of Scripture," it will be observed that it is merely negative, and does not sanction the teaching of the "catholic fathers and ancient bishops" generally, or say that men shall teach what they taught; but that they shall not teach as matter of religious faith, a new deduction from Scripture of their own making, but such truths as had been actually deduced from Scripture before, namely, the great articles of the Christian faith. Farther, the canons of 1571 are of no authority, not having received the royal assent.—*Strype's Life of Parker*, p. 322.

sane man maintains its sufficiency, in interpreting Thucydides or Aristotle; we mean, that, instead of deferring always to some one interpreter, as an idle boy follows implicitly the Latin version of his Greek lesson, the true method is to consult all* accessible authorities, and to avail ourselves of the assistance of all. And we contend, that, by this process, as we discover, for the most part, the true meaning of Thucydides and Aristotle with undoubted certainty, so we may also discover, not, indeed, in every particular part or passage, but generally, the true meaning of the Holy Scriptures with no less certainty.

But if another man maintains that a different meaning is the true one, how are we to silence him, and how are we justified in calling him a heretic? If by the term heretic we are to imply moral guilt, I am not justified in applying it to any Christian, unless his doctrines are positively sinful, or there is something wicked, either in the way of dishonesty or bitterness, in his manner of maintaining them. The guilt of any given religious error, in any particular case, belongs only to the judgment of him who reads the heart. But if we mean by heresy "a grave error in matters of the Christian faith, overthrowing or corrupting some fundamental article of it," then we are as fully justified in calling a gross misinterpretation of Scripture "heresy," as we should be justified in calling a gross misinterpretation of a profane Greek or Latin author, ignorance or want of scholarship. There is no infallible authority in points of grammar and criticism, yet men do speak confidently, notwithstanding, as to learning and ignorance; Porson and Herman are known to have understood their business, and a writer who were to set their decisions at defiance, and to indulge in mere extravagances of interpretation, would be set down as one who knew nothing about the matter. So we judge daily in all points of literature and science; nay, we in the same manner venture to call some persons mad, and on the strength of our conviction we deprive them of their property, and shut them up in a madhouse: yet if madmen were to insist that they were sane, and that we were mad, I know not to what infallible authority we could appeal; and, after all, what are we to do with those who deny that authority to be infallible? we must then go to another infallible authority to guarantee the infallibility of the first, and this process will run on for ever.

But, in truth, there is more in the matter than the being justified or

* Of course no reasonable man can doubt the importance of studying the early Christian writers, as illustrating not only the history of their own times, but the New Testament also. For the Old Testament, indeed, they do little or nothing, and for the New they are of much less assistance than might have been expected; but still there is no doubt that they are often useful.

not justified in calling our neighbour a heretic. The real point of anxiety, I imagine, with many good and thinking men is this; whether a reasonable belief can be fairly carried through; whether the notion of the all-sufficiency of Scripture is not liable to objections no less than the system of church authority; whether, in short, our Christian faith can be consistently maintained without a mortal leap at some part or other of the process; nay, whether, in fact, if it were otherwise, our faith would not seem to stand rather on the wisdom of man than on the power of God.

I use these words, because these and other such passages of the Scripture are often quoted as I have now quoted them, and produce a great effect on those who do not observe that they are quoted inapplicably; for the question is not between man's wisdom and God's power, but simply whether we have reason to believe that God's power has been here manifested; or rather, to see whether we cannot give a reason for the faith which is in us, such faith resting upon God's power and wisdom as manifested in Christ Jesus; for if no reason can be rendered for our faith, then our minds, so far as they are concerned, are believing a lie; they are believing in spite of those laws by which God has determined their nature and condition.

Yet, however we believe, blindly or reasonably, (for some men, by God's mercy, are accidentally, as it were, in possession of the truth, the falsehood of their own minds in holding it not being, it is to be hoped, imputed to them as a sin;) however we believe, I never mean to say that our faith is not God's gift, to be sought for and retained by constant prayer and watchfulness, and to be forfeited by carelessness or sin. That is no true faith in which reason does not accord; yet neither can reason alone and without God ever become perfected into faith. For although intellectually, the grounds of belief may be made out satisfactorily, yet we are not able to follow our pure reason by ourselves; and no work on the evidences of Christianity can by itself give us faith; and much less can amid the manifold conflicts of life maintain it. That faith is thus the gift of God, and not our own work, I would desire to feel as keenly and continually, as with the fullest conviction I acknowledge it.

Now, to resume the consideration of that which, as I said, is the real point of anxiety with many. The doubt whether the course of a reasonable belief can be held to the end without interruptions: they say that the received notions of the inspiration, and consequently of the complete truth, of the Scriptures cannot reasonably be maintained; that he who does maintain them does so by a happy inconsistency;—he is to be congratulated for not following up his own principles; but

why should he then find fault with others who do that avowedly and consistently to which he is driven against his professions by the clear necessity of the case ?

This argument was pressed by Mr. Newman, some time since, in one of the Tracts for the Times ; and it was conducted, as may be supposed, with great ingenuity, but with a recklessness of consequences, or an ignorance of mankind, truly astonishing ; for he brought forward all the difficulties and differences which can be found in the Scripture narratives, displayed them in their most glaring form, and merely observed, that as those with whom he was arguing could not solve these difficulties, but yet believed the Scriptures no less in spite of them, so the apparent unreasonableness of his doctrine about the priesthood was no ground why it should be rejected—a method of argument most blamable in any Christian to adopt towards his brethren ; for what if their faith, being thus vehemently strained, were to give way under the experiment ? and if, being convinced that the Scriptures were not more reasonable than Mr. Newman's system, they were to end with believing, not both, but neither ?

Therefore the question is one of no small anxiety and interest ; and it is not idly nor wantonly that we must speak the truth upon it, even if that truth may to some seem startling ; for by God's blessing, if we do go boldly forward wherever truth shall lead us, our course needs not be interrupted, neither shall a single hair of our faith perish.

The same laws of criticism which teach us to distinguish between various degrees of testimony, authorise us to assign the very highest rank to the evidences of the writings of St. John and St. Paul. If belief is to be given to any human compositions, it is due to these ; yet if we believe these merely as human compositions, and without assuming anything as to their divine inspiration, our Christian faith, as it seems to me, is reasonable ;—not merely the facts of our Lord's miracles and resurrection ; but Christian faith, in all its fulness—the whole dispensation of the Spirit, the revelation of the redemption of man and of the Divine Persons who are its authors—of all that Christian faith, and hope, and love can need. And this is so true, that even without reckoning the Epistle to the Hebrews amongst St. Paul's writings,—nay, even if we choose to reject the three pastoral epistles*—yet taking only what neither has been nor can be doubted—the epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, and Thes-

* I say this, not as having the slightest doubt myself of the genuineness of any one of the three, but merely to show how much is left that has not been questioned at all, even unreasonably.

salonians, we have in these, together with St. John's Gospel and First Epistle,—giving up, if we choose, the other two,—a ground on which our faith may stand for ever, according to the strictest rules of the understanding, according to the clearest intuitions of reason.

I take the works of St. John and St. Paul as our foundation, because, in the first place, we find in them the historical basis of Christianity; that is to say, we find the facts of our Lord's miracles, and especially of his resurrection, and the miraculous powers afterwards continued to the church, established by the highest possible evidence. However pure and truly divine the principles taught in the gospel may be, yet we crave to know not only that we were in need of redemption, but that a Redeemer has actually appeared; not only that a resurrection to eternal life is probable, but that such a resurrection has actually taken place. This basis of historical fact, which is one of the great peculiarities of Christianity, is strictly within the cognizance of the understanding; and in the writings of St. John and St. Paul we have that full and perfect evidence of it which the strictest laws of the understanding require.

But the historical truth being once warranted by the understanding, other faculties of our nature now come in to enjoy it, and develop it; the highest reason and the moral and spiritual affections find respectively their proper field and objects, which, whenever presented to them in vision or in theory, they must instinctively cling to, but to which they now abandon themselves without fear of disappointment, because the understanding has assured them of their reality. We must suppose, on any system, the existence of reason and spiritual affections as indispensable to the understanding of the Scriptures; external authority can do nothing for us without these, any more than the mere faculties of the common understanding. But with these we apprehend the view which St. John and St. Paul afford to us; it opens before us one truth after another, one glory after another. St. John evidently supposes that his readers were familiar with another account of our Lord's life and teaching; and we find accordingly, another account existing in the writings of the three other evangelists. One and the same account is manifestly the substance of their three narratives, to which they thus bear a triple testimony, because none of the three has merely transcribed the others, and none of them apparently was the original author of it. Thus having now the full record of our Lord's teaching, we find that he everywhere refers to the Old Testament as to the word of God, and the record of God's earlier manifestations of himself to man. He has cleared up those especial points in it which might have most perplexed us, as I shall notice more fully hereafter, and he repre-

sents himself as the perpetual subject of its prophecies. We thus receive the Old Testament, as it were, from his hand, and learn while sitting at his feet to understand the lessons of the law and the prophets.

Thus we make Christ the centre of both Testaments, and by so doing, we cannot be blind to the divinity pervading both. For the amazing fact that God should come into the world and be in the world cannot by possibility stand alone; it hallows, as it were, the whole period of the world's existence, from the beginning to the end, placing all time and every place in relation to God; it disposes us at once to receive the fact of the special call of the people of Israel;—it gives, I had almost said, an *à priori* reason why there must have been in earlier times some shadows, at least, or images to represent dimly to former generations that great thing which they were not actually to witness; it leads us to believe that there must have been some prophetic voices to announce the future coming of the Lord, or else "The very stones must have cried out."

But those writings of St. John and St. Paul which were our first lessons in Christianity, and those other accounts of our Lord's life and teaching to which they introduced us,—can we conceive it possible, that the real meaning of all these shall be hopelessly obscure and uncertain; that if we seek it ever so diligently, we shall not find it? With an humble mind ready to learn, with a heart fully impressed with the sense of God's presence, so as to be morally and spiritually in a condition to receive God's truth, can we believe, then, that the use of those intellectual means, which open to us certainly the sense of human writers, shall be applied in vain to those writers who were commissioned to be the very heralds of a divine message, whose especial business it was to make known what they had themselves heard? Surely if a sufficient certainty of interpretation be attainable in common literature, the revelation of God cannot be the solitary exception.

But we may be mistaken: we may *believe* that we interpret truly, but we cannot be *infallibly sure* of it; we want an authority which shall give us this assurance. This is no doubt the natural craving of our weakness; but it is no wiser a craving than if we were to long for the heaven to be opened, and for a daily sight of our Lord standing at the right hand of God. To live by faith is our appointed condition, and faith excludes an infallible assurance. We must earnestly believe that we have the truth, and die for our belief, if necessary, but we cannot *know* it. No device which the human mind can practise can exclude the possibility of doubt. If we would find an armour which should cover us at every point from this subtle enemy, it would be an

armour that would close up the pores of the skin, and stop our breath; our fancied security would kill us. Is it really possible that, with our knowledge of man's nature, our belief in any human authority can really be more free from doubt than our belief in the conclusions of our own reason? There must ever be the liability to uncertainty; we can put no moral truth so surely as that our minds shall always feel it to be absolutely certain. Where is the infallible authority that can assure us even of the existence of God? And will the scepticism that can believe its own conclusions in nothing else rest satisfied with one conclusion only—that the writers of the first four centuries cannot err? Surely to regard this as the most certain proposition that can be submitted to the human mind, is no better than insanity.

But we will consent to trust, it may be said, with God's help, to our own deliberate convictions that we have interpreted Scripture truly; but you tell us that the Scripture itself is not inspired in every part; you tell us that there are in it chronological and historical difficulties, if not errors; that there are possibly some interpolations; that even the apostles may have been in some things mistaken, as in their belief that the end of the world was at hand. Where shall we find a rest for our feet, if you first take away from us our infallible interpreter, and now tell us, that even if we can ourselves interpret it aright, yet that we cannot be sure that the very Scripture itself is infallibly true?

It is very true that our position with respect to the Scriptures is not in all points the same as our fathers'. For sixteen hundred years nearly, while physical science, and history, and chronology and criticism, were all in a state of torpor, the questions which now present themselves to our minds could not from the nature of the case arise. When they did arise, they came forward into notice gradually: first the discoveries in astronomy excited uneasiness: then as men began to read more critically, differences in the several Scripture narratives of the same thing awakened attention; more lately, the greater knowledge which has been gained of history, and of language, and in all respects the more careful inquiry to which all ancient records have been submitted, have brought other difficulties to light, and some sort of answer must be given to them. Mr. Newman, as we have seen, has made use of these difficulties much as the Romanists have used the doctrine of the Trinity when arguing with Trinitarians* in defence

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of transubstantiation. The Romanists said,—"Here are all these inexplicable difficulties in the doctrine of the Trinity, and yet you believe it." So Mr. Newman argues with those who hold the plenary inspiration of Scripture, that if they believe that, in spite of all the difficulties which beset it, they may as well believe his doctrine of the priesthood; and many, if I mistake not, alarmed by this representation, have actually embraced his opinions.

It has unfortunately happened that the difficulties of the Scriptures have been generally treated as objections to the truth of Christianity; as such they have been pressed by adversaries, and as such Christian writers have replied to them. But then they become of such tremendous interest, that it is scarcely possible to examine them fairly. If my faith in God and my hope of eternal life is to depend on the accuracy of a date or of some minute historical particular, who can wonder that I should listen to any sophistry that may be used in defence of them, or that I should force my mind to do any sort of violence to itself, when life and death seem to hang on the issue of its decision?

Yet what conceivable connexion is there between the date of Cyrenius's government, or the question whether our Lord healed a blind man as he was going into Jericho or as he was leaving it; or whether Judas bought himself the field of blood, or it was bought by the high priests: what connexion can there be between such questions, and the truth of God's love to man in the redemption, and of the resurrection of our Lord? Do we give to any narrative in the world, to any statement, verbal or written, no other alternative than that it must be either infallible or unworthy of belief? Is not such an alternative so extravagant as to be a complete reductio ad absurdum? And yet such is the alternative which men seem generally to have admitted in considering the Scripture narratives: if a single error can be discovered, it is supposed to be fatal to the credibility of the whole.

This has arisen from an unwarranted interpretation of the word "inspiration," and by a still more unwarranted inference. An inspired work is supposed to mean a work to which God has communicated his own perfections; so that the slightest error or defect of any

about old and new popery: but if this be the way of representing new popery, by exposing the common articles of faith, it will set the minds of all good Christians farther from it that ever. For upon the very same grounds we may expect another parallel between the belief of a God and transubstantiation, the effect of which will be the exposing of all religion. This is a very destructive and mischievous method of proceeding; but our comfort is that it is very unreasonable, as I hope hath fully appeared by this discourse."—*Doctrine of the Trinity and Transubstantiation compared.*

kind in it is inconceivable, and that which is other than perfect in all points cannot be inspired. This is the unwarranted interpretation of the word "inspiration." But then follows the still more unwarranted inference,—"If all the Scripture is not inspired, Christianity cannot be true," an inference which is absolutely entitled to no other consideration than what it may seem to derive from the number of those who have either openly or tacitly maintained it.

Most truly do I believe the Scriptures to be inspired; the proofs of their inspiration rise continually with the study of them. The scriptural narratives are not only about divine things, but are themselves divinely framed and superintended. I cannot conceive my conviction of this truth being otherwise than sure. Yet I must acknowledge that the Scriptural narratives do not claim this inspiration for themselves; so that if I should be obliged to resign my belief in it, which seems to me impossible, I yet should have no right to tax the Scriptures with having advanced a pretension proved to be unfounded; their whole credibility as a most authentic history of the most important facts would remain untouched; the gospel of St. John would still be a narrative as unimpeachable as that of Thucydides, which no sane man has ever disbelieved.

So much for the unwarranted inference, that if the Scripture histories are not inspired, the great facts of the Christian revelation cannot be maintained. But it is no less an unwarranted interpretation of the term "inspiration," to suppose that it is equivalent to a communication of the Divine perfections. Surely, many of our words and many of our actions are spoken and done by the inspiration of God's Spirit, without whom we can do nothing acceptable to God. Yet does the Holy Spirit so inspire us as to communicate to us His own perfections? Are our best words or works utterly free from error or from sin? All inspiration does not then destroy the human and fallible part in the nature which it inspires; it does not change man into God.

In one man, indeed, it was otherwise; but He was both God and man. To Him the Spirit was given without measure; and as his life was without sin, so his words were without error. But to all others the Spirit has been given by measure; in almost infinitely different measure it is true: the difference between the inspiration of the common and perhaps unworthy Christian who merely said that "Jesus was the Lord," and that of Moses, or St. Paul, and St. John, is almost to our eyes beyond measuring. Still the position remains, that the highest degree of inspiration given to man has still suffered to exist along with it a portion of human fallibility and corruption.

Now, then, consider the epistles of the blessed Apostle St. Paul,

who had the Spirit of God so abundantly, that never we may suppose did any merely human being enjoy a larger share of it. Endowed with the Spirit of a Christian, and daily receiving grace more largely, as he became more and more ripe for glory; endowed with the Spirit's extraordinary gifts most eminently; favoured also with an abundance of revelations, disclosing to him things ineffable and inconceivable,—are not his writings to be most truly called inspired? Can we doubt that, in what he has told us of things not seen, or not seen as yet,—of Him who pre-existed in the form of God before he was manifested in the form of man,—of that great day, when we shall arise incorruptible, and meet our Lord in the air, and be joined to him forever,—can any reasonable mind doubt, that in speaking of these things he spoke what he had heard from God; that to refuse to believe his testimony is really to disbelieve God?

Yet this great Apostle expected that the world would come to an end in the generation then existing. When he wrote to the Thessalonians some years before his first imprisonment at Rome, he warned them, no doubt, against expecting the end immediately: but he appears still to have supposed that it would come in the lifetime of men then living. At a later period, when writing to the Corinthians, his dissuasion of marriage seems to rest mainly upon this impression; it is good not to marry, "on account of the distress which is close at hand;" *διὰ τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν ἀνάγκην*; compare 2 Thess. ii. 2, *ὡς ὅτι ἐνέστηκεν ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ Κυρίου*. "The time is short," he adds; "the fashion of this world is passing away." And again, when speaking of the resurrection, he says emphatically "the dead shall rise incorruptible, and *we* shall be changed;" where the pronoun being expressed in the original *ἡμεῖς ἀλλαγησόμεθα*, shows that by the term, "*we*," he does not mean the dead, but those who were to be alive at Christ's coming. So again, still later, when writing from Rome to the Philippians, he tells them "the Lord is at hand;" and later still, even in his first Epistle to Timothy, he charges Timothy "to keep his commandment without spot, unrebukable, until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ." These and other passages cannot without violence be interpreted even singly in any other sense; but taking them together, their meaning seems absolutely certain. Shall we say, then, that St. Paul entertained and expressed a belief which the event did not verify; We may say so, safely and reverently, in this instance; for here he was most certainly speaking as a man, and not by revelation; as it has been providentially ordered that our Lord's express words on this point have been recorded—"Of that day and hour knoweth no man; no, not the angels in heaven." Or again, shall we say, that St. Paul

advised the Corinthians not to marry, chiefly on this ground; and that this throws a suspicion over his directions in other points; But again it has been ordered, that in this very place, and no where else in all his writings, St. Paul has expressly said that he was only giving his judgment as a Christian, and not speaking with divine authority;—the concluding words of the chapter, δοκῶ δὲ κἀγὼ πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἔχειν, do not signify, as our Version renders them, "And I think also that I have the Spirit of God," as if he were confirming his own judgment by an assertion of his inspiration in a sense beyond that of common Christians; but the words say, "And I think that I too have the Spirit of God,"—"I too as well as others whom you might consult, so that my judgment is no less worthy of attention than theirs. But it is his Christian judgment only that he is giving, as he expressly declares, and not his apostolical command or revelation; a distinction which he never makes elsewhere, and which is in itself so striking, that we seem to recognise in it God's especial mercy to us, that our faith in St. Paul's general declarations of divine truth might not be shaken, because in one particular point he was permitted to speak as a man, giving express notice at the same time that he was doing so.

Now it is at least remarkable, that in the only two instances in which the existence of any absence of divine authority is to be discerned in St. Paul's epistles, provision is actually made by God's goodness to prevent them from prejudicing our faith in St. Paul's divine authority generally. And so in whatever points any error may be discoverable in Scripture, we shall find either that the errors are of a kind wholly unconnected with the revelation of what God has done to us, and of what we are to do towards Him; and therefore are perfectly consistent with the inspiration of the writer, unless we take that unwarranted notion of inspiration which considers it as equivalent to a communication of God's attributes perfectly; and of this kind are any errors that may exist either in points of physical science, or of chronology, or history; or if there be anything else which appears inconsistent with inspiration, in the sense in which we really may and do apply it to the Scriptures, namely, that they are a perfect guide and rule in all matters concerning our relations with God, then we shall find that God has made some special provision for the case, to remove what it otherwise might have had of real difficulty.

This merciful care is above all to be recognised with regard to one point, which otherwise would, I think, have been a difficulty actually insuperable: I mean the manifestly imperfect moral standard, which in some cases is displayed in the characters of good men in the Old Testament. Put the gospel by the side of the law and history of the Is-

raelites; observe what the law permitted, and public opinon under the law did not condemn; observe the actions recorded of persons who are declared to have been eminently good, and to have received God's especial blessing; and it is manifest that had not our Lord himself vouchsafed his help, one of two things must have happened—either that we must have followed the old heresy of rejecting the Old Testament altogether, or else that our respect for the Old Testament must have impeded the growth of the more perfect law of Christ. The true solution I do not think that we could have discovered, or ventured to admit on less authority than our Lord's. But his express declaration, that some things in the law itself were permitted, because nothing higher could then have been borne, and his stating in detail that in several points what was accounted good or allowable in the former dispensation was not so really, while at the same time he constantly refers to the Old Testament as divine, and confirms its language of blessing with respect to its most eminent characters, has completely cleared to us the whole question, and enables us to recognise the divinity of the Old Testament and the holiness of its characters, without lying against our consciences and our more perfect revelation, by justifying the actions of those characters as right, essentially and abstractedly, although they were excusable, or in some cases actually virtuous, according to the standard of right and wrong which prevailed under the law.

After observing God's gracious care for us in this instance, as well as in those which I have noticed before, I cannot but feel that we may safely trust Him for every other similar case, if any such there be, and that he will not permit our faith either in Him or in his holy word to be shaken, because we do not attempt to close our eyes against truth, nor seek to support our faith by sophistry and falsehood. Feeling what the Scriptures are, I would not give unnecessary pain to any one by an enumeration of those points in which the literal historical statement of an inspired writer has been vainly defended. Some instances will probably occur to most readers; others are perhaps not known, and never will be known to many, nor is it at all needful or desirable that they should know them. But if ever they are brought before them, let them not try to put them aside unfairly, from a fear that they will injure our faith. Let us not do evil that evil may be escaped from; and it is an evil, and the fruitful parent of evils innumerable, to do violence to our understanding or to our reason in their own appointed fields; to maintain falsehood in their despite, and reject the truth which they sanction. If writers of Mr. Newman's school will persist in displaying the difficulties of the Scripture before the eyes of those who had

not been before aware of them, let those who are so cruelly tempted be conjured not to be dismayed; to refuse utterly to surrender up their sense of truth,—to persist in rejecting the unchristian falsehoods which they are called upon to worship; sure that after all that can be said, that system will remain false to the end; and their Christian faith, if they do not faithlessly attempt to strengthen it by unlawful means, will stand no less unshaken.

In conclusion, Christian faith rests upon Scripture; and as it is in itself agreeable to the highest reason, so the authenticity of the Scriptures on which it rests is assured to us by the deliberate conclusions of the understanding; nor is any "mortal leap" necessary at any part of the process; nor any rejection of one truth, in order to retain our hold on another. And if it should happen, as in all probability it will, that we shall be called upon to correct in some respects our notions as to the Scriptures, and so far to hold views different from those of our fathers, we should consider that our fathers did not, and could not stand in our circumstances; that the knowledge which may call upon us to relinquish some of their opinions, was a knowledge which they had not. Till this knowledge comes to us, let us hold our fathers' opinions as they held them; but when it does come, it will come by God's will, and to do his work: and that work will, assuredly, not be our separation from our fathers' faith; but if we follow God's guidance humbly and cheerfully, clinging to God the while in personal devotion and obedience, we may be made aware of what to them would have been an inexplicable difficulty, and which was, therefore, hidden from their knowledge; and yet, "through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, we believe that we shall be saved even as they."

THE

DIVISIONS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS

OF

KNOWLEDGE.

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In an institution such as this, the lectures delivered embrace a great variety of subjects, and they are given without any order or mutual connexion. Different views of the great world of knowledge are thus presented to us: but all are necessarily partial, nor do they tell us how they are to be joined to one another, in order to convey a just notion of the whole. Even an imperfect attempt therefore to show the connexion or relation between them, seemed to me to be desirable; that we may understand what is the value of the several branches of knowledge, as helping to make up the great sum of human wisdom; and may also see, which is a point of no small importance, what sort of knowledge it is which particularly entitles its possessor to be called a well educated man.

Now this slight statement of the object of this lecture shows that we are going to venture on an inquiry of a very high order, inasmuch as it embraces not the subjects of any one or more of the sciences, but the nature and merits of those very sciences themselves. This sovereign investigation, in which the mind may be said to exert the very fulness of its power, examining at once the world of outward things and its own faculties and operations, standing apart as it were from all things visible and invisible, and as if by a mere abstract power of observation, looking at once above and below, around and within itself, this it is which is properly called philosophy.

First then, with a subject before us so extensive and so various, it will be necessary to break it up into certain divisions, that our minds may be able to comprehend it. This process of philosophical division admits of very considerable variety. We are not to suppose that there are only a certain number of divisions in any subject, and that unless we follow these, we shall divide it wrongly and unsuccessfully: on the

contrary every subject is as it were all joints, it will divide wherever we choose to strike it, and therefore according to our particular object at different times we shall see fit to divide it very differently. For instance, let us suppose that our subject be the vegetable creation; we shall see that this subject is divided differently, according to our different objects in studying it. If we consider vegetables only with reference to the uses which man can derive from them, we should divide them first into such as are useful to him directly, and such as are not: and the former again we should divide into such as are useful for food, such as are useful for clothing, and such as minister to our various wants in other ways. But in this division we should class some vegetables together which on another view of the subject we should find it necessary to separate, and separate others which on another view of the subject we should be obliged to class together. For instance, on the view of the subject already noticed, we should class wheat, and the potato, and the grape, and fig, under one division, that of vegetables useful for man's food; and should of course separate them from such plants as are incapable of being applied to the same purpose. But if we consider vegetables without any reference to man, and merely according to the differences or resemblances in their own structure, in other words if we consider them botanically, the wheat, the potato, the grape, and the fig, notwithstanding their common usefulness, are immediately separated from one another; the wheat is classed along with the grasses which feed our cattle, the potato and the vine are ranked with the nightshade and the henbane, and the fig is placed in the same division as the ash tree.

Bearing this in mind, we shall see that the various branches of human knowledge are capable of the most different arrangements according to the light in which we wish to regard them. Bacon, for instance, makes a three-fold division of them, which he derives from a similar division of the powers or operations of the human mind, into the memory, the imagination, and the reason. Accordingly he divides all knowledge into history, poetry, and science or philosophy; the first belonging to the memory, the second to the imagination, and the third to the reason. Another division has been adopted in a work still in the course of publication, the Encyclopædia Metropolitana; a division of which the author was, I believe, the late Mr. Coleridge. He first divides all science into pure and mixed. By pure science he means such as is conversant merely with the acts of the mind in itself, by mixed science that which considers these acts in connexion with the outward world. The pure sciences again he divides into formal and real; under the first of which he places grammar, logic, arithmetic,

and geometry; under the second are ranged metaphysics, morals, and theology. I am aware that this brief statement must be obscure; but my object in making it is to illustrate the truth, that human knowledge may be divided variously according to the purpose of the divider; and I wished to draw attention to the division into formal and real science, for I shall have occasion to make use of these terms hereafter, and shall then attempt to explain them.

For my present object, which is to give such a division as may be most readily and generally understood, I know not that I could adopt a better method than to divide our knowledge into such as relates to man, and such as relates to other objects of what kind soever, animate or inanimate. But when I speak of man, I mean that part of him which is peculiar to himself, namely, his intellectual and moral nature. For the study of his mere bodily frame, or of the phenomena of his physical life, is but a small part of one great whole, of which by far the greatest part relates to objects distinct from himself, and therefore the study may generally be classed more properly with those which relate to external things. Thus the knowledge which relates to man would naturally include every thing relating to his double nature, as a being having an understanding, and a moral part which we may call for convenience a spirit. Thus it would in the first place embrace the study of his mind; the analysis of its faculties and ideas, which is metaphysics; the analysis of the processes of his reason, which is logic; and the analysis of language, the instrument which he necessarily employs in these processes, which is grammar. Secondly, it would embrace the study of his moral nature; the analysis of his feelings and affections; which like that of the faculties of his understanding may be classed under metaphysics; and the analysis of his duties. This last, so long as his duties towards God are not understood, is the part of ethics or morals: but as soon as we are acquainted with God, and with our relations to Him, all our duties, whether towards God or man, are properly to be classed under one name, that of religion; because it is manifest that all our duties to other men are duties to God, and that whatever we ought to do is our duty for this very reason, because it is the will of God that we should do it.

Besides the study of man's nature in general, knowledge relating to man would also embrace a knowledge of the actions, characters, and fortunes of particular parts of mankind, whether larger or smaller. Under this head are to be ranked History, with all its subdivisions and Biography.

Then turning to the other great division of human knowledge, the knowledge that relates to all other objects besides ourselves; here too

the one vast whole thus presented to our imaginations may be broken up into various parts. It will include Natural History in its widest sense, including not only the animal and vegetable kingdoms, but the mineral also, and even the earth itself. But when we speak of the history of animals and plants, we must remember that here history is wholly distinct from biography. Amongst creatures without reason, whether animate or inanimate, one individual is like another; history with them regards only the species. Nor is chronology much more connected with them than biography; for the oak and lion of the present day are the same, so far as we can discover, as the oak and the lion of the first year of the world's existence. Time has only wrought changes in some few cases, through the agency of man, as in the change affected in particular vegetables by cultivation, and perhaps in one or two instances in animals also, by the attention bestowed on improving the breed. With the history of the earth, on the contrary, chronology is everything. Here there are constant changes working, altering the limits of land and water, and in some instances, where volcanic agency is busy, or where particular phenomena of wind and soil are combined, actually altering the character of the land, as well as lessening or increasing its limits. But still in all history there is this common point, that its principal business is to describe facts as they are or have been, rather than to enter into causes or general principles. And thus the natural historian looks as it were but on the outward edifice of nature: it belongs to other branches of knowledge to penetrate within the sanctuary.

It will be obvious that what is most needed for Natural History is careful observation. If we want to know more of an animal than we can collect from one simple view of it, we must examine it more carefully, and watch its habits for a considerable time together. Thus the very amusing account which Huber has given us of bees, was the result of constantly watching them; so that he made himself as it were an eye-witness of the whole life of the animal. So again in Geography which is the history of the surface of the earth. All that is wanted in order to draw a map of a country, is to bestow sufficient pains on surveying it; it is a long book which takes a great deal of time to read, but still all the information is to be found in the book, if we have but patience to read it through. But we want to do more than this with nature, we want not only to see what she is, but to understand how and why she is so, that we may be able ourselves to form her or reform her for our own purposes. Water, and air, and light, are things which the most ignorant of us enjoy, but not all understand them. The

sky with its hosts of stars must strike every one as beautiful, but to how few is there more of order apparent in that bright multitude, or regularity in their movements, than in the wild dance of a swarm of fireflies. Thus on every side above us and around us, there are materials not for observation only but for thought and reasoning; we may not only mark and learn the visible result produced by God's working, but observe the laws by which He works, that here too we may after our most imperfect measure learn to work like Him.

In ascending then from Natural History to Natural Philosophy, the first laws that would be inquired into would be those of a most obvious as well as most extensive class of phenomena, the phenomena of Motion. I use this term in its widest sense, as embracing the motions of the heavenly bodies no less than of earthly, as including the motion of fluids, such as air and water, as well as of solids. With regard to the heavenly bodies, their movements were indeed almost the only point in which human science could study them. The laws which preside over these movements formed the greatest part of the inquiries of Astronomy; as the laws which direct the movements of earthly bodies were, in the case of solids, the subject of Mechanics; and in the case of fluids, the subject of Hydrostatics, Pneumatics, and Optics. In all these instances there is this point in common: that we are considering those laws which act upon bodies from without, and produce in them a change of place only, and not of quality. We are therefore still, if I may so speak, at the outside of things, examining their movement only, and not their composition. It is possible, however, to go farther than this, and to examine another class of phenomena, those namely in which bodies are found to change not their place only but their quality, a change evidently of a deeper kind, and belonging to causes of a different character. And here we come to those studies in which such great progress has been made in our own generation; Electricity, with its kindred subjects Magnetism, and Galvanism, and Chemistry. How little progress had been made till a very recent period in the examination of the nature of bodies as opposed to their movement, may be well understood from this fact, that in the popular works on science which were in circulation in our own childhood, fire, air, earth and water, were still represented as the four elements of the universe. To what point the inquiry into these subjects may be carried hereafter, it seems impossible to anticipate; the doctrine of atoms appears indeed to be bringing us to the very elements of physical existence; while the study of the phenomena of Electricity, of Magnetism, and above all of what is called Animal Magnetism, seems to promise that in the course of years, or it

may be of centuries, we may arrive at some glimpses of a yet higher mystery, the relations of physical and moral existence towards each other, and the principle of animate life.

The study of external nature then, that is, of all things existing except ourselves, seems to divide itself first of all into two great divisions, History and Science: by the first of which I mean a mere record or description of facts or existing phenomena in the natural world, whether animate or inanimate; while by the second, I understand an inquiry into the laws or causes by which these phenomena are regulated. But Science again admits of a double division, inasmuch as its inquiries may either regard the movements of bodies, or their component parts and qualities; that is, to speak generally, it may consider them as affected mechanically or chemically. So then the divisions of all our knowledge of nature may be said to be three, Natural History, Mechanical Science, and Chemical Science, using all these terms for convenience sake in a sense rather wider than that which they bear in common language.

It would seem then that the range of natural knowledge is sufficiently extensive, and its subjects sufficiently sublime. To soar to the utmost limits of visible space, to measure the movements of the host of heaven, and on the other side to penetrate into the subtlest laws of being, and to analyse matter up to its very original elements, might surely be enough to vindicate the dignity of the study of nature. But the Greek philosophers exalted it yet further, by making it ascend not only to the purest forms of physical existence, but higher still, to the nature of God Himself. And undoubtedly, according to that grand division of all knowledge which I have adopted, the knowledge of man on the one hand, and of all other objects except man on the other, the knowledge of God might seem to take its place fitly as the last ascent of natural philosophy, and so the study of nature might infinitely transcend in dignity the study of man. But I would request your attention to this point, as it will be the foundation of all I have to say on the remaining part of my subject, the relations namely of the different divisions of our knowledge to one another. I request attention to this great truth, that God considered in this point of view, as the summit of the scale of existence, as the most exalted of all beings, and therefore in Himself the noblest object of knowledge, that God regarded in this manner is wholly beyond our reach, unapproachable and incomprehensible. No doubt He is the head as well as the author of all being; the fit completion of the pyramid of the knowledge of the universe is that it should end in that point of perfection of unity, the One Great Cause of all. But this pyramid is like that unfinished tower of Babel; its top never

can reach to God. It stands for ever manifestly incomplete, yet incapable of being completed; for the power which reared all the rest of the fabric can neither find nor lay in its place that last and crowning stone. God thus hiding Himself altogether from the sight of natural knowledge, reveals Himself only as a part, if I may so speak, of our knowledge of man; first as the fountain of all our duties, and so the perfection not of our natural knowledge but of our moral; and secondly in that great truth of the Christian Revelation, that as man alone he is to be known, or is in any way comprehensible.

We thus remove the centre of all our system from the division of natural knowledge to that of moral; and thus our view of the relations of the different branches to one another becomes greatly modified. That is, we get to regard all science, whether natural or moral, as a matter of duty rather than of simple knowledge: the knowledge being in all cases referable to a farther end, that is, our duty in compliance with God's will. For as on the one hand it is possible to regard all moral questions as a matter of simple science, inquiring into the actions and fortunes of man, and analysing his passions and faculties and duties purely for the sake of speculative truth, as if we were the inhabitants of another planet; so it is no less possible to regard all physical knowledge as a matter of practice; studying the phenomena, and inquiring into the laws of irrational and inanimate bodies not for the mere intellectual pleasure of discovering truth, but because the discovery of truth is more or less our duty according to the nature of our calling, for the benefit of others directly, or indirectly, or for the improvement of our own powers of mind, that so we may act our part in life more efficiently.

And thus while we see that no knowledge whatever is to be despised, and while we rejoice in the cultivation of all science of whatever kind, we yet cannot but perceive also, that thus looking upon all nature as ministering in a manner to man, and the knowledge of it as valuable because it ministers to his happiness, if other knowledge ministers to his happiness more, and more universally, then that knowledge must be deemed as yet more valuable than the knowledge of nature, and the possession of it must be considered essential to perfect education.

This is universally understood with regard to what is called religious knowledge, which every one allows to be beyond dispute the most valuable of all. It will be my object here to show that it is true also of those studies to which Coleridge gives the name of the pure sciences, and which he divides as I have said before, into those which he calls formal and real.

The pure sciences are all engaged either with mind, or with the

operations, or with the ideas and abstractions of the mind; none of them have to do with real material nature. Now the human mind may fitly be called that great and universal machine by which we operate upon all things. We all know the fame which was so deservedly obtained by the late Mr. James Watt, for his great improvements in the steam engine. The value of the steam engine consists not only in the magnitude of its powers, but in the generality of their application. It is useful not for one purpose only, but for hundreds. How different are the callings of the cotton manufacturer, the brewer, and the packet-master or coach proprietor; yet steam serves the purposes of them all. Now if the steam engine be so general an instrument, the human mind is yet more so. Nothing absolutely can be done without it, and who can set bounds to what may be done with it? In improving then this universal engine we are conferring a service on mankind, something the same in kind with the improvement of the steam engine, but in degree and extent of usefulness beyond all comparison greater.

Unhappily, however, there has either been no James Watt to perfect this mightier engine; or his directions have been despised or neglected; or mind being less manageable than iron and steam, the engine has refused to be moulded according to the model proposed for its improvement. For it is notorious that minds of equal natural power are most unequal in their practical efficiency, and that many persons with considerable talents and favourable opportunities are unable to avail themselves of either to any good purpose, because the cultivation of their mind has been wholly neglected. Now the mind is a universal instrument through its reasoning powers, its judgment, and its power of rapid and extensive combination. By the reasoning powers, I understand the faculty of coming to a true conclusion from premises or data which are undisputed; the power of making the most of our materials of knowledge. As a familiar and most admirable example of this I may refer to the Elements of Euclid: all that we set out with in this case are three simple postulates, or things required to be granted; and from these three are drawn by the strictest process of reasoning all that variety of truths respecting the properties of triangles, circles, &c., which fill a whole volume. Now all these truths are really contained in the postulates, axioms, and definitions of the two first pages; yet how few persons would have been able to discover and to prove them. This has been done by the power of reasoning; the power, that is, of finding out all the truths which lie hidden in any facts or principles presented to us, and of avoiding false conclusions; that is, the supposing certain truths to be contained in our principles which really do not exist in them. A good reasoner then is he who draws from the

data, or premises, or evidence before him, all that may justly be drawn from them, and nothing which may not.

Now as the human mind is eager to gain fresh knowledge, positive faults in reasoning have been quite as common as negative; that is, men have come to wrong conclusions quite as often as they have failed to discover all the right ones. This evil, of positively bad reasoning, of concluding what cannot be justly concluded, arises from a want of a due acquaintance with the instrument necessarily used in every process of reasoning, namely, language. And hence appears the importance of those two studies which teach us to analyse language, logic and grammar. Language is indeed a wonderful instrument, but the very facility of using it with a certain degree of effect, for we all talk and occasionally argue, is apt to conceal from us the difficulty of acquiring a perfect command of it. We constantly find persons both speaking and writing vaguely: using words in different senses, or in no well defined sense at all, without being aware of it; and as never having analysed the process of correct reasoning, arguing in a manner at random, and supposing that to be a proof, or an answer to an objection, which in reality is not so. These are faults for which the study of grammar and of logic is the appropriate remedy. In both we take language to pieces, examine its structure, and learn to appreciate and recognise those defects to which it is most liable. In logic especially, we learn what may be called the skeleton of reasoning, that simple form which however concealed under the more ornamental form of our common style of talking or writing, as the actual skeleton is concealed by our flesh, can never be really departed from without involving a fallacy. Knowing this skeleton accurately, we can in an instant feel, even through the covering, the flesh, so to speak, of our ordinary language, whether all the bones are in their right places, nay, we know where to suspect disorder, and by passing our probe at once to the suspected part, we can see whether or no all is sound. These suspicious parts in reasoning, to speak generally, are first what may be called the joint of the argument, the point of connexion between the premises and the conclusion, and secondly, any abstract terms which are found to occur often in the reasoning. For men's notions about such terms being often indistinct, it happens that they do not always use them in the same sense, and thus may deceive both others and themselves, by a word's imperceptibly shifting its meaning in the course of their argument, and a thing in reality different being thus passed off as the same.

Logic and Grammar then, as putting us on our guard against the fallacies of language, are the great means of cultivating our reasoning powers. And they are called formal sciences, as opposed to real be-

cause they treat not of any particular thing or matter, but of those forms of speech and of reasoning which apply equally to all matter; they are moulds into which we may put any material that we will, but without which none whatever can be shaped properly.

Such are the studies which the mind requires to perfect its reasoning powers by which it unfolds truth already acquired and recognised. All reasoning must set out from some fixed point supposed to be true; and its business is to see what other hidden truths may be developed from the truth so granted or assumed. Unhappily, however, the mind is not only liable to error in this process, but the supposed truth itself, which is the foundation of our reasoning, may have been assumed unjustly; we may be wrong in the stating of the sum as well as in the working of it. But here no formal science will be sufficient for us: for though there is one common form for all reasoning, yet things themselves are so infinitely various, and their truth is collected in so many different ways, that no one rule can be applicable to all. The judgment therefore, that power of the mind by which we take cognizance of truth, and transmit it, having stamped upon it our sanction, to our reasoning powers to coin as it were into other truths, can only be probably guided, not infallibly secured from error. But how is this guidance to be given it? How is this task, which most peculiarly deserves the name of education, to be accomplished? What is that great preparation which can dispose the mind, amidst the delusions with which we are surrounded, to fix on truth with a sure instinct, and to avoid error.

Error, according to Bacon's comparison, may originate in ourselves or without us; outward objects may not communicate a faithful image to us, or our own minds like a broken or uneven mirror may distort the image presented to them. Truth may not be to be found, or we may be in no fit condition to receive it.

What then are the hindrances in our own minds to receiving truth? Bacon divides them into three principal classes, which he calls the spectres or phantoms of the race, of the den, and of the market place. The fancifulness of these names is characteristic of the man: but their meaning is not the less admirable. The phantoms of the race are those prejudices or tendencies to error which are common to the whole race of mankind; the phantoms of the den are those which grow out of the peculiar weakness of each man's individual mind: and those of the market place are such as arise from our communication with other men, from the vagueness and ambiguities of language.

With the last kind we have no concern, as they have been noticed before. The other two demand the greatest attention, but my limits

will not allow me to do more than just to point out their importance. Among the common errors of our race may be noticed, 1st, that bondage of our minds to our senses, by which the visible and the present always prevails over the invisible and the absent; that great moral corruption which the Scripture calls unbelief: 2nd, that craving after general truths or principles, which makes us form theories hastily, upon insufficient evidence, and without noticing what makes against them: and 3rd, the abuse of a principle most true in itself, that truth and goodness are identical; a principle which becomes the fruitful parent of error, when setting up blindly and imperfectly our own standard of goodness, we will allow nothing to be true which seems to us to contradict it. These three, the spirit of unbelief, the spirit of impatience, and the spirit of bigotry, are common to all mankind, and we are all more or less affected by them.

Not less important to notice are the phantoms of the den, the tendencies of each man's individual constitution of mind. For example, how great are the differences between men, according as imagination or observation has most power over them. This difference separates the man of feeling and sentiment from the man of fact and reality; the poet from the man of science; the idealist school of philosophy from the sensualist; the admirer of names and associations from the lover of positive rights; the frantic from the sceptic. How apt are these two classes to sneer at and rail against one another; to tax each other with folly, and with hardness, and low-mindedness! How earnestly should we labour, if our imagination and feelings be predominent, to steady and sober them with the love of fact, and reason, and justice; or if observation and reasoning be our natural tendency, how heartily should we strive to soften and ennoble them by admiration and love of the beautiful, and faith in the invisible.

These instances, for I can but just allude to them, will show the discipline which our own minds require, to clear them from the common erroneous tendencies of our nature, as well as from those which infest ourselves individually. But whilst thus making the mirror of our own minds even and pure to receive the image of truth when presented to us; there is a further difficulty still, in extricating that form entire and unsoiled from the mass of confusion and error in which it so often lies buried. There is in the first place the difficulty of getting at the truth of facts; and then at the truth of opinions: and again there is the great question whether the truth of any opinion be eternal or only temporary; for it may be that a doctrine may be very true as applied to one time or place, which would be very false as applied to another. Thirdly there is the comparison of truths, which in practice is every

thing ; when two statements of principle are alike true in themselves, but are not both practically true with regard to us ; because the less of two good things becomes a positive evil if we follow it to the neglect of the better ; as for instance, a doctrine may be perfectly true as far as regards political economy, but not true as regards the happiness of a people speaking morally and religiously. Here then comes in the comparison of truths: for the economical truth becomes a practical falsehood if we follow it to the neglect of the moral truth. Let us observe then how many things are required for the perfecting of this great faculty of the mind, the judgment of truth, with which we are now concerned. To ascertain the truth of facts requires a knowledge of the laws of evidence ; what makes a testimony credible, and what makes it suspicious. To estimate the value of opinions requires, over and above our knowledge of human nature in general, a particular knowledge of the effect which circumstances have upon men's opinions, circumstances whether of time or country. For instance it has often been made a question whether the opinions of ancient or modern times are entitled to most respect; now this question, setting aside its ridiculous vagueness, might even, if asked with regard to any two definite periods, require a different answer according to the different opinions about which the dispute turned ; for it is very possible that the opinion of one age might be most valuable on one point, and that of another upon another. Again, to know whether an opinion is true generally or partially, requires in itself no slight acquaintance both with the distinguishing characteristics of eternal and partial truth, and with the circumstances of different times and countries, and the bearings of those circumstances upon the truth in question ; for a truth may be only local or temporary, and yet may apply to two countries or to two periods differing in many respects from one another, but not in those particular respects which affect the application of the truth to their case. Further the comparison of truth, renders it necessary that our standard of duty and of good should be clearly settled ; that knowing what is the highest truth, and what the subordinate and inferior, we may never follow that lower good which, when opposed to the higher, becomes evil.

Besides the reasoning powers and the judgment, I spoke of the power of rapid and extensive combination, as one of the things which enabled the mind to be an universal instrument. Perhaps, strictly speaking, I ought not to give it a distinct place, for it is in many cases essential towards forming a sound judgment: but its great importance may justify me in bestowing some separate notice upon it. We live in a world so varied, that without this power of combination

our views must be exceedingly narrow, or exceedingly confused. They must be narrow, if confining ourselves to one class of subjects and of relations, we understand them indeed in themselves thoroughly, so far as they can be understood thoroughly, without considering them as acting or acted on by other things, but are wholly ignorant of all others; they must be confused, if studying variously, and receiving ideas from many different sources, we let them lie confusedly upon one another, without arranging them into one great whole. The power of combination may be said to consist in a quick perception of likeness: in two different subjects we discern some one point bearing a resemblance to a common third: we group them together, and then notice their disagreements as well as their agreements. And this goes on continually with a multiplied power; for the more ideas we have thus grouped together in our minds, the more points are offered to which some new idea may attach itself; as in a child's card sheep-fold, the more cards you add, the more you multiply points on which to join fresh cards still. This power of combination is most essential to the profitable reading of history, for unless we combine the lessons afforded by the story of one age or country with those afforded by that of others, our recollection of one will confuse that of the others, they will probably be all imperfectly remembered, and most certainly all will be imperfectly understood.

If any of my hearers be surprised at the great number of elements thus required to perfect the human mind as an instrument (for all that I have been saying has borne on this point only; I have spoken nothing of any particular knowledge as useful to ourselves or others, except as far as regards its bearings on the powers of the mind;) let them learn to think more highly than men commonly do think of the full meaning of the term education, and let them not over-estimate the value of the attempts that are now making in various ways to give information to the people, including such institutions as this of ours. Simple knowledge of any the humblest trade may enable us to be useful to others, to maintain our families, and if it be followed as our appointed line of duty, to glorify God. But considered as instruction, as information, as in short an intellectual acquisition, the value of the knowledge communicated, be it of chemistry, be it of astronomy, be it of geography, be it of history, depends on the powers and on the education of the receiving mind. Knowledge is the material for the mind to work upon; but if the instrument be blunt or out of order, what avails the fineness of the material! it continues stuff unwrought and useless. Further, we shall have seen that education in the proper sense of the word cannot be given equally to a great number of persons. You may teach them the formal sciences indeed equally, so

that their reasoning powers may be cultivated alike; but you cannot do the same with their judgment or their power of combination. For the judgment depending greatly on a knowledge of men, and the power of combination increasing with the number of ideas presented to it, they who by circumstances are confined to a limited sphere, who see little variety, who have never associated with many highly cultivated minds, and above all with minds cultivated under different circumstances of rank, profession, and country, must labour under disadvantages which no mere book instruction can remove. But at the same time it is important to see how much mere book instruction can do, if it be applied wisely. If we read the works of great men, philosophers, or orators, poets, historians, or divines, the works of great men, whose own views are large and profound, whose minds have combined actively a great variety of ideas, and beautifully expressed them; and if we read them with our minds alive and awake to catch and to understand, we are not only, as has been often remarked, in a better society than is easily to be found amongst living men, but we gain a far wider and truer experience of men, and of things than is gained often times by a whole life of active intercourse with what is called the world. And not to speak of foreign writers, what a treasure of wisdom and of experience is to be gained from the works of Bacon, his Essays and his Advancement of Learning; from the conversation of Johnson as recorded by Boswell, far more indeed than from his writings; from the Aids to Reflection, and the Literary remains of Coleridge, from the Sermons of Butler; from the Poetry of Milton and of Shakspeare. Only let us read with a mind attentive and inquiring; let us for instance always acquaint ourselves with the age in which the writer lived, with something of the circumstances of his life and the peculiarities of his character. And when I speak of the age in which he lived, I do not speak of a knowledge of a mere date, which is good for nothing; as for instance that Bacon was born in 1560, and died in 1626; but an idea of what that period was, what events Bacon saw, and with what men he held intercourse, how remote from, or how like to our own. An inquiring spirit is not a presumptuous one, but the very contrary: He whose whole recorded life was intended to be our perfect example, is described as gaining instruction in the Temple by hearing and asking questions: the one is almost useless without the other. We should ask qnestions of our book and of ourselves; what is its purpose; by what means it proceeds to effect that purpose: whether we fully understand the one, whether we go along with the other. Do the arguments satisfy us, do the descriptions convey lively and distinct images to us; do we understand all the allusions to per-

sons or things? in short does our mind act over again from the writer's guidance what his acted before; do we reason as he reasoned, conceive as he conceived, think and feel as he thought and felt; or if not, can we discern where and how far we do not, and can we tell why we do not?

And now in conclusion, if the mind be thus cultivated and exercised, we stand as it were on the edge of the great garden of knowledge, free to turn on which path we choose, with an instrument of surpassing power to make any portion of it yield its fruits for our nourishment and enjoyment. Happily indeed the choice is fixed for most of us, our calling in life decides for us the particular branch of knowledge, whether physical or moral, which we are most required to study. And inclination or accidental circumstances may farther suggest such branches as we may choose to study besides, in such hours of leisure as we can command. Only it is clear that in whatever it is our duty to act, those matters also it is our duty to study; there are many things of which we must all be ignorant, many of which we may be ignorant because there are other studies which we prefer to follow: but there are two things of which, unless we wholly go out of the world, we may not be ignorant without great blame, our duties as men and as citizens. And thus the very matters which concern us most nearly, are exactly those on which the rules of this and other similar institutions forbid us to enter. I do not dispute the expediency of these rules, or to speak more correctly, their necessity, in the present state of party feeling, both religious and political: but so long as they are observed, it is idle to call Mechanics' Institutes places of adult education. Physical science alone can never make a man educated; even the formal sciences, invaluable as they are with respect to the discipline of the reasoning powers cannot instruct the judgment; it is only moral and religious knowledge which can accomplish this. And if habitually removing such knowledge from the course of our studies, we exercise our thoughts and understanding exclusively on lower matters, what will be the result, but that when we come to act upon these higher points, in our relations as citizens and as men, we shall act merely upon ignorance, prejudice, and passion? For notions of moral good and evil of some sort or other we must have; and so also in this country we can hardly help having some notions about political good and evil; but if we take no pains that these notions shall be true and good, what will our lives be but a heap of folly and of sin? This should be borne in mind carefully; and if these merely scientific or literary institutions appear to us to be sufficient for our instruction, if having learnt all that they can teach us, the knowledge so gained shall

hide from us our moral ignorance, and make us look upon ourselves as educated men, then they will be more than inefficient, or incomplete; they will have been to us positively mischievous. But if we are well aware of their deficiencies, and take them only at their real value, they may furnish us with some knowledge that may be of use to us in our several callings, and they may undoubtedly give us some innocent and wholesome recreation. They may do more than this, however, if they encourage in us habits of unimpassioned inquiry; if they make us hold commune with our minds, and teach us to feel the difference between understanding a subject and not understanding it. In this manner they may prepare us for the study of those higher matters on which they themselves do not enter; they may make us feel our ignorance where we are ignorant, and the vagueness of our notions where they are vague: they may thus preserve us from presumption on the one hand, and yet, by stimulating the desire of knowledge, may save us from an idolatrous leaning upon human authority on the other; so helping to cherish a state of mind at once docile and inquiring, which best becomes us both as men and as Christians.

THE

SOCIAL PROGRESS OF STATES.

This disquisition is the First Appendix to Thucydides, Volume I.

Thucyd. I. 13. *Τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων· πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ γήτοις γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι.*

THE change described in these words is so important, and bears so much on the right understanding of the history, not only of Greece, but of all other nations, that I have thought it deserving of a fuller consideration than it could receive in a note. Its importance consists in this, that it is a natural period in history, marking the transition of every country from what I may call a state of childhood to manhood. Now states, like individuals, go through certain changes in a certain order, and are subject at different stages of their course to certain peculiar disorders. But they differ from individuals in this, that though the order of the periods is regular, their duration is not so; and their features are more liable to be mistaken, as they can only be distinguished by the presence of their characteristic phenomena. One state may have existed a thousand years, and its history may be full of striking events, and yet it may be still in its childhood: another may not be a century old, and its history may contain nothing remarkable to a careless reader, and yet it may be verging to old age. The knowledge of these periods furnishes us with a clue to the study of history, which the continuous succession of events related in chronological order seems particularly to require. For instance, in our own history we are apt to take certain artificial divisions, such as the accession of the different lines of kings, or an event like the restoration, which is rather a subdivision of one particular period, than the beginning or termination of a period in itself. And in this manner we get no distinct notions of the beginning, middle, and end of the history of a people, and often appeal to examples which are nothing to the purpose, because they are taken from a different stage of a nation's existence from that to which they are applied.

I take then the words which I have quoted at the beginning of this essay, and shall proceed to notice the critical period described in them, the period, namely, when wealth begins to possess the ascendancy formerly enjoyed by nobility; and the contending parties in the state assume the form of rich and poor, the few and the many, instead of the old distinction of nobles and commons, of a conquering race and a conquered.

This ascendancy, enjoyed in the earliest state of society by noble birth, has been traced in various countries, and its phenomena most successfully investigated by Giovanni Battista Vico* in his *Principi di Scienza nuova;* a work disfigured indeed by some strange extravagancies, but in its substance so profound and so striking, that the little celebrity which it has obtained out of Italy is one of the most remarkable facts in literary history. Vico's work was published in 1725, yet I scarcely remember ever to have seen it noticed by any subsequent writers who have touched upon the same subject even down to our own times.

The statement of Thucydides with respect to Greece, contains, it may be seen, no mention of any period of aristocratical government; but describes the transition as taking place from limited hereditary monarchies to tyrannies: it may appear therefore to a superficial observer that nobility enjoyed no such ascendancy as I have imagined, and that the very first case to which I apply my theorem disproves its truth. But the old Homeric monarchies were in fact an instance of power depending on blood, and therefore of the ascendancy of nobility. They were like the feudal monarchies of modern Europe, essentially aristocracies, in which the separation of all the chiefs or nobles from the inferior people was far more strongly marked than the elevation of the king above his nobles. Nay, if we consider Greece as a whole, and remember the small space included within the limits of the several kingdoms in the heroic ages, the kings, as they are called, resemble the feudal vassals of France and Germany, each supreme over a dominion as extensive as the Greek kingdoms, and forming together a body widely separated from the commons, and whose members were felt to belong to the same class, and to be on a level with each other in purity of blood, however great might have been the differences between them in power and connexions. It was virtually then the ascen-

* I mention Vico because his work is not generally known. My obligations to the great writers of Germany, to Niebuhr, Müller, Wachsmuth, &c., it is almost unnecessary to mention; as, since the publication of their works, it would imply strange presumption or strange ignorance to write upon ancient history without having studied them.

dancy of nobility, when all power and distinction were confined to the class of nobles, whether there was one individual elevated above the rest of his class with still higher power and distinction, or whether all the members of it exercised the sovereignty jointly and alternately. So in other countries the same state of society has varied more or less in its subordinate relations, and yet, if carefully examined, will be found everywhere to retain its essential character, and to mark the first period, or youth, of political existence. Some of these varieties it may not be uninstructive to notice, and to trace the causes which have led to them. The simplest and probably the earliest form was that in which the offices of the chief and priest were united in the same persons, as in the heroic times in Greece, and in the well known instance of Melchisedek, king of Salem, at a far more remote period. This is the first transition from domestic or patriarchal to something like civil society; and if the several sons of a patriarch established themselves in separate habitations, they would each become the chiefs and priests of their immediate followers. But in the course of a few generations, if the united body of these little societies happened to settle in another country, and the dangers of their new situation forced them to choose some one chief for their common leader, yet still the other chiefs would remain as widely distinguished as before from the mass of the people, and would still retain their sacred and sovereign character, although its exercise was limited to their own particular tribe, and somewhat obscured by the greater elevation of the king of the whole nation. Nay, even when the posterity of these original nobles was so multiplied that many of them were necessarily excluded from an active share in the government, still they did not lose the distinction of their birth: they were naturally eligible to public offices, to priesthoods, and to commands in war, if they did not actually enjoy them; and their equality was maintained by their right of meeting in a general assembly, to control, if need were, those of their body to whom the executive authority had been delegated, and by being exempt from any judicial sentence of the greater chiefs, or kings, unless the free voices of their own equals, or peers, had first declared them guilty. This first form of aristocracy, in which civil and military command were united with the office of priest, existed, besides the instances already noticed, in Rome and in Etruria; in the former along with the habitual appointment of a king; in the latter, the purely aristocratic form generally prevailed, and a king, or chief of the whole nation, was only chosen in seasons of peculiar difficulty.

Another and later form of the ancient aristocracies was that in which the offices of priest and chief were distinct from one another, as in In-

dia, in Persia, in Egypt, in ancient Gaul, and in the feudal kingdoms of modern Europe. The origin of this separation of powers, was probably various. In some instances it may have been produced by the invasion of a ruder people, who while they took to themselves the possession of the land and the civil and military government, yet learned to respect the superior knowledge of the old inhabitants, and left to their chiefs the dignity and influence of the priesthood, while they deprived them of their actual power as rulers and leaders in war. This was the case in the foundation of the modern feudal kingdoms: the Gaulish or Roman clergy* preserved and increased their rank and influence under the Frank invaders, while the property of the soil, the sceptre, and the sword, were transferred almost entirely to the conquerors. Thus also the Median magi continued to enjoy their religious preeminence and immunities under the Persian kings, while all other classes of the Median nation were shorn of their supremacy, and held an inferior rank under the Persians. In other cases the separation of the two powers arose from the character of the national religion. In a rude people, religion, unless supported by the art of its ministers, holds but a low place in public estimation: he who was chief and priest would value himself upon the former character much more than upon the latter: his priestly duties would be in time devolved upon persons of an inferior class†, to spare himself the trouble of performing them; or, if retained, would be used as mere engines of state craft for the maintenance of his own civil superiority. Thus among the ancient Scythians we read of no priests at all; that is, the chiefs either performed the sacrifices themselves, or devolved them, as a menial duty, upon their servants: among the Anglo-Saxons there were priests, but as they formed no order in the state, as they were not allowed to carry arms, or to ride but on a mare, it should seem that they were only an inferior class, the mere ministers at the sacrifices, on whom the chiefs had thrown the performance of a duty which they disdained to execute themselves. The existence of prophets among both the Scythians and Saxons, as of certain prophetic families among the ancient Greeks, must not be mistaken for a priesthood. The priestly and prophetic character were not necessarily connected with one another; and the latter was not like the former held to be communicable only by decent. Besides, that impatience to penetrate into futurity,

* See Hallam, Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 146, ed. 8vo. Thierry, Conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands, tome i p. 32, &c.

† As in the story of the Potitii of Rome, whose family was supposed to have become extinct as a punishment for their profaneness in devolving their hereditary priesthood upon public slaves. Livy, i. 7.

which has in every age and country encouraged pretensions to prophecy, is quite distinct from those feelings of reverence and devotion which are the salt of religion even in its worst corruptions. Prophets or fortune-tellers might exist among a people too brutish to have any conceptions of religion, as they have peculiarly marked the lowest tribes of negroes, and the degraded race of the gypsies. In these instances, then, the separation of the offices of priest and chief would arise from the rudeness of the people, and the want of any external or internal recommendations in the religion itself. But the more common form of separation arose from the very opposite cause. In proportion as religion was valued; as its ceremonies were more imposing; as the necessity of fixing the period of its festivals led to the study of astronomy; and as men's minds, thus saved from sinking into barbarism, retained the traditions of older times, and preserved in their devotions something more worthy of Him who is the true object of all worship; so would the priest-chiefs of the people esteem their priesthood above their civil and military authority, and would especially prefer their peaceful and sacred duties to the exercises and combats of arms. Hence, whilst they ministered at the temples of the gods, presided at festivals, and perhaps awarded punishments and settled differences between man and man, as the representatives of the gods, they appointed persons less distinguished and less sacred to lead out the people to battle*, and sometimes would fix upon some warlike stranger, whose adventures in arms had spread his renown, and who, living by his sword, was ready to offer his services to any who could hold out a worthy recompense. Military command thus conferred was sure to become ere long political sovereignty; but the king thus raised could not venture to invade the old privileges, or diminish the ancient dignity of the priestly order; the priests still remained the highest class in the state†,

* It appears that one of the principal reasons which made the Israelites change their earlier government into a monarchy, was a wish that the leader of their armies should be the first man in the state, and not, as had been hitherto the case, subordinate to the religious authorities. For although Samuel was not a priest, yet still in his government the religious character predominated over the civil and military, as was naturally the case where the religion was so pure and elevated in its principles as amongst the Israelites.

† As in India, Egypt, Gaul, and Attica. The military caste in Egypt held their lands from the sovereign. (Compare Herodot. ii. 168, and Genesis xlvii. 20—22.) In Attica the Eupatridæ and Geomori corresponded to the priests and military class of Egypt; whereas in the colonies which were founded when society was more advanced, and when the distinctions of blood had yielded to those of property, the Geomori, or military landowners, formed the first and most aristocratical class. Compare Herodot. vii. 155. Thucyd. viii. 21.

and the military leaders and soldiers, who received for their services grants of land from the sovereign, on the tenure of joining his standard whenever he should summon them, and who thus became the founders of a new nobility, inseparably connected with territorial property, held notwithstanding only the second rank. Still, however, so general was the aristocratical spirit in early times, the territorial nobility adopted the feelings and institutions of the earlier priest-nobles in their earnestness to preserve their blood pure from any mixture with the classes below them; intermarriages were forbidden, and the mass of the community were as carefully excluded by the military nobles from all civil and military power, as they were by the priesthood from all religious authority, and from the knowledge of which the priestly order were then the sole possessors.

A third form of aristocracy, later perhaps than either of the two already noticed, retained some of their features, while in other points it resembled the most recent form of all, the aristocracy of colonies. The third form then I may call, by way of distinction, the aristocracy of conquest. An invading people occupies the country of a people of a different race: the old inhabitants either seek a refuge elsewhere, or are reduced to a state of vassalage; nor does even their religion survive the common wreck. The conquerors introduce their own institutions, differing in their internal relations according to the circumstances of their previous condition, but establishing always one and the same relation between them and their subjects, the relation of nobility and commonalty.* Inferior leaders, or even common soldiers of distinguished bravery, in the conquering army, acquired lands, and became territorial nobles with respect to the conquered people; while, on the other hand, the common interest and common dangers of the invaders drew them all more closely together, and diminished or destroyed those distinctions of rank which might have existed between them in their former country. A nobility of race succeeds to that of family; and is guarded from corruption by the same restrictions upon intermarriage with persons not noble, that is to say, not of the conquering people. It will be observed that in all these cases the ascendancy of blood is still the prevailing principle, insomuch that even when partially interrupted, in one case by the admission of a military leader and his followers to share the sovereignty of the priest nobles, and in the other by the cir-

* This was the case with the Dorians in Peloponnesus after the conquest, as also with the Normans in England. "Les valets de l'homme d'armes Normand, son écuyer, son porte-lance, furent gentilshommes; ils furent des hommes nobles et considerables auprès du Saxon autrefois riche, autrefois noble lui-même, maintenant courbé sous l'epée de l'étranger," &c. Thierry, tome i. p. 343.

cumstances of the conquest naturally impairing all artificial distinctions between the conquerors themselves, still it soon recovered its force, and proved only to have formed for itself a new channel, in which it continued to flow with even an increase of strength and rapidity. In fact, nobility having taken property not so much into its alliance as into its service, strengthening itself with the real power of wealth, yet making noble descent a necessary qualification, without which political power was unattainable, established itself on a firmer basis, and opposed a barrier to the advance of popular principles which long delayed their triumph, and rendered it in the end incomplete.

The ascendancy thus enjoyed by noble blood was not merely the fruit of the natural respect which men feel for the sons, and even for the descendants, of those who have been illustrious in their generation. Two other powerful causes contributed to it; the one, a real superiority of military prowess or wisdom, such as at this day distinguishes the European from the Hottentots or the natives of New South Wales, and which has ever accompanied certain races of mankind as compared with others; the other may be found in the doctrines of a false religion, which, having first made to itself gods of men, taught as a consequence of this doctrine, that the posterity of the men thus deified were themselves of a higher order than the bulk of mankind, and were more valued and loved by the god who in his mortal state had been their progenitor. Of these two causes, the one was wholly founded on falsehood; the other rested on what was true once, but it was a truth not eternal and necessary, but temporary and contingent; a truth the term of whose existence it became those who profited by it to do their best to abridge. Differences of race have not yet been proved indestructible, and the probability is that they might be removed or infinitely lessened, if the members of the superior race showed half as much eagerness in elevating and enlightening the inferior, as they have generally done in degrading them. But the guilt of all aristocracies has consisted not so much in their original acquisition of power, as in their perseverance in retaining it; so that what was innocent or even reasonable at the beginning, has become in later times atrocious injustice; as if a parent in his dotage should claim the same authority over his son in the vigour of manhood, which formerly in the maturity of his own faculties he had exercised naturally and profitably over the infancy of his child.

The principle then of the ascendancy of noble blood necessarily marks the infancy of mankind; and wherever it has long continued to exist, it marks a state of infancy unnaturally prolonged by the selfish policy or criminal neglect of those who ought rather to have gradually

trained it up to the independence of manhood. I now proceed to examine the course of circumstances by which this aristocratical dominion has been overthrown; by what untoward causes the critical periods of this overthrow have in many instances only led to a worse and more hopeless disorder; and how, in other cases, the purposes of God for the progress of the human race have been better answered, and the moral and political constitution, when recovered from the shock of its crisis, has gone on healthfully towards the full perfection of its being. For this purpose then it will be necessary to trace the origin and progress of the estate of the COMMONS, noticing particularly those causes which influenced its condition, and which served in some cases to ensure and complete its victory, or in others impeded its natural growth, and have kept it in a state of perpetual insignificance.

The earliest form of the existence of the commons appears to be that in which they were no other than the slaves of the chiefs or nobles. This form appears in the numerous households of the heads of the pastoral tribes, almost before anything deserving the name of a state was to be met with. At a much later period it prevailed in Parthia,* and has been one of the characteristics of the Sclavonic nations in modern Europe. It naturally marks the infancy of society when the inferior occupations of life and all common trades were followed exclusively by slaves or by foreigners;† and by the former probably somewhat earlier than by the latter. The chiefs of a tribe, whether they were one or many, fixed their dwelling on the tops of isolated hills, or where a high table land terminated abruptly in precipitous cliffs; here they made their followers construct walls for their defence, and within this fortified precinct they lived with their families and their personal attendants, and here also they made a place of worship for the gods of their fathers. Below, at the foot of the hill, rose the dwellings of the rest of their dependents, the keepers of their flocks and herds, or the cultivators of their lands, who for their own security were glad to live under the protection of the castle of their chief. If several of these little tribes united to form one people, they would sometimes occupy a spot where several eminences were to be found, near to each other, yet distinct; and each of these would form a separate κώμη or village, appropriated to a separate tribe, while all together composed the city of the united people. Sparta‡ was an instance of a city thus formed out of a cluster of distinct villages; and, according to some opinions Rome was another. But in general the original city consisted properly of one

* Justin. xli. 2.

† Παρ' ἐνίοις ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ ξενικόν. Aristotle, Politics, iii. 2.

‡ See Thucyd. i. 10, and the note.

fortified enclosure, on commanding ground, which contained the habitations of the chiefs and their immediate dependents, with the temples of their hereditary gods; while the dwellings of the rest of their dependents were built without the walls,* either at the foot of the hill, or scattered over the surrounding country. And these men, not living in the town but around about it, not citizens but dependents, were the original *περίοικοι* of Grecian History. Their numbers in process of time increased, and their own condition improved. Their numbers increased by the number of strangers, who, in a rude and unsettled state of society, were constantly driven from their homes to seek a refuge elsewhere; the slaves or followers of another chief, who hoped to find an easier service; adventurers attracted by the military fame of the tribe to which they desired to join themselves; and men with blood on their hands, flying from the vengeance of the family of him whom they had slain. Persons of the last class, as being often of noble blood in their own tribe or country, were received as citizens in their new home;† but fugitives of the other two descriptions swelled the number of the *περίοικοι*, or commons. Sometimes also a whole people expelled from their own country, or led by some other cause to seek a new abode, solicited an asylum amongst the inhabitants of another city. They were admitted to dwell with them, *σύνοικοι ἐγένοντο*, like the Israelites of Egypt, and the Pelasgians in Attica;‡ and had a distinct quarter assigned for their residence. But neither were these considered as citizens, and either continued a distinct race, and were subjected to the dominion of the citizens till they were either driven or became enabled to emigrate once more: or, if they blended with the old inhabitants of the land, it was with the commons, not with the citizens; and they swelled the mass of that already mixed population which was grown up around the city of the chiefs, and which made it now a citadel in the midst of a city, rather than the principal part of the city itself. Meantime, while

* This on a larger scale seems to have been the plan of some of the great eastern capitals. What was properly called the city of Ecbatana consisted of seven concentric fortified enclosures, the external circle being about the size of Athens; but all these were only the residence of the king, and apparently of the higher castes, the magi and principal warriors: the mass of the population lived without the walls. See Herodot. i. 98, 99. So in Babylon, the great external walls enclosed a district rather than a city, but within these were two smaller fortified enclosures, the tower of Belus, and the royal quarter or precinct of the court, which as far as we can judge from the existing remains of it, extended along the Euphrates for about two miles. [See Mr. Rich's Memoir, in which the Mujelibe seems to answer to the *βασιλήιον* of Herodotus, i. 181.]

† See the story of Phœnix, Homer, Iliad, ix. 479, &c., and of Epeigeus, Iliad, xvi. 570. Compare also the famous story of Atys and Adrastus in Herodotus, i. 34, &c.

‡ Compare Herodotus, ii. 51, vi. 137. Thucyd. ii. 17, note.

the numbers of the commons thus increased, their condition improved also. In the middle ages the emancipation of the serfs of the nobility was largely effected by the influence of Christianity; nor was the church slow in urging in this instance a full compliance with the spirit of the gospel. But the gospel addresses itself in vain in our days to the proprietors of slaves; and this difference neither arises from any moral superiority in the noble over the planter, nor altogether from the diminished zeal of the Church. It springs out of the different relation in which the slaves stood to their masters. The dependents of a feudal noble were the instruments of his pride and power rather than of his wealth: their numbers swelled his state, their swords maintained his quarrels; but if they were changed from serfs to tenants, their services in these respects would be nearly the same; so that it was no extraordinary sacrifice of selfishness to emancipate them. Thus also the followers of the nobles of a much more remote period were employed in war or agriculture much more than in household offices. Slaves of this latter description were extremely few;* they were bred up with the children of the family, and little distinction was made in the treatment of the one and the other. Meantime the agricultural vassals were suffered to make the most of their own industry, and portions of land† were sometimes granted them by their lords, in which they acquired in a few generations a sort of property: while those who lived nearer to the towns acquired wealth by following various branches of trade or handicraft employments. In this manner they grew comparatively rich and powerful; and when a change of circumstances took place, and the chiefs began to feel that wealth was an important means of power, it was too late then to reduce their vassals to the condition of our colonial slaves, and to make a profit of their labour, when they were on the point of asserting their complete equality with their lords.

But before this change was effected, all but the chiefs, that is, all who were not of noble blood, whether they were born dependents on the nobles, or whether they were strangers who had been induced to settle amongst them, were alike comprised under the denomination of "commons," δῆμος, and were not considered members of the state, or πολῖται. The widely different feeling which existed towards them, and towards the citizens or members of the state, is best shown by the different language in which Homer makes Ulysses address them. (Iliad, book II.) They could neither command in war nor in peace: they

* Herodot. vi. 137, viii. 137. Juvenal, xiv. 168.
† Festus in "Patres."

could not minister at the altars of the gods; nor were their voices admitted in the decision of state affairs. They were, in short, in the heroic times, what the slaves and resident foreigners were in the historic age, that is, inhabitants of the country, but not citizens. They could not possess land nor intermarry with the citizen nobility of the commonwealth: and if they were free from personal slavery, yet both politically and in private life they were liable to constant oppression; for the "limited prerogatives" of the kings of ancient Greece are to be understood only with respect to their nobles; over the commons both the kings and nobles were absolute. Still, as we have seen, if they could acquire any property, either in war or by commerce, it remained fully their own; they thus obtained consideration, and learned to feel their own power and rights; and were already sufficiently important to be courted as auxiliaries in the civil contests of the aristocracy, before they were strong enough to assert their claims in their own name, and enter as principals into the quarrel in their own cause.

The outline here given, as far as relates to the ancient world, can be made out only from a careful comparison of various scattered passages in ancient authors; nor perhaps can every portion of it be supported by direct testimony, although in the main I have no doubt that all who have studied ancient history attentively will admit its correctness. But for the analogous period of society in modern times we have evidence full and direct; and a slight sketch of the Constitution of Augsburg* will at once illustrate and confirm what I have given as a picture of the origin of the commons generally under similar circumstances. On the conquest of Swabia by the Franks, a certain number of persons, free by birth, (Ingenui,) and enjoying in consequence of their birth the privileges of an aristocracy, such as the exclusive right of serving in war, of administering justice, and of discharging the offices of religion, settled with their dependents in the town of Augsburg. In process of time there grew up around them a large population, chiefly formed out of the class of freedmen, that is, of the vassals or dependents of the free citizens who had been emancipated by their lords; and this population was settled not within the precincts of the city, but outside the walls in suburbs surrounded by a palisade, whence they were denominated "Pfalburger," or "citizens of the palisade," the Greek *περίοικοι*, to distinguish them from the genuine citizens who lived within the walls. But the free or noble inhabitants of the inner town were alone called simply "citizens," (burger;) a "decree of the citizens of Augsburg"

* The whole of this account of the constitution of Augsburg is taken from Paul von Stetten's "Geschichte der adelichen Geschlechter in Augsburg." ("History of the Noble Families of Augsburg.") Augsburg, 1762.

was synonomous with a "decree of the great council of the inhabitants of free blood," and by no means comprehended the Pfalburger, although these last formed the most numerous part of the population. The "citizens" of Augsburg, although living in a town, and not on their lands in the country, were yet in all respects accounted the equals of the Milites Agrarii, or country nobility, throughout Germany; they used all the distinctions of nobility, banners and armorial bearings, and they intermarried with the nobles, as belonging to the same class in society. They had their two Stadt-Pfleger, or burgomasters, their ordinary council of twelve citizens, annually chosen by the council of the preceding year; and their great council, (the Comitia Curiata of the early Roman constitution,) composed of the whole body of citizens. But about the beginning of the 14th century the commons found themselves sufficiently advanced in wealth and power to lay claim to their share of the rights of citizenship. They seem first to have been admitted into the great council, as the plebeians at Rome voted in the comitia before they were admitted into the senate, or eligible to the consulship: then the ordinary council was increased from twelve to four and twenty, the additional members being apparently chosen from the commons; but the twelve patrician counsellors still formed a separate tribunal, to which cases were brought in the last resort, although on other occasions they formed one body with the counsellors of the commons. Still faithfully representing the same course of events which had marked the downfall of the old aristocracies of Greece and Rome, Augsburg had her noble family of popular principles, whose members, whether from ambition or true patriotism, asserted the rights of the commons, and exposed themselves to the persecutions of their own body; and Sibot Stolzhirsch and his kinsmen acted the part of Clisthenes and the Alcmæonidæ at Athens, of the Valerii and Manlius Capitolinus at Rome. Finally, in the year 1368, the companies of trades, or, in other words, the commons of Augsburg, succeeded without a struggle in gaining for themselves not only an equality of rights with the nobles, but an absolute ascendancy; and in the first moment of their triumph they proposed to destroy the political existence of the nobility altogether, and to oblige every citizen under the old constitution to become a commoner and a member of some* one of the companies. They listened however to the entreaties of the nobles, and allowed them to remain a separate

* This was done from time to time at Florence as a reward of the liberal principles of particular nobles; for the nobility being disqualified from holding public offices, could only be rendered eligible to them by being made commoners. On the other hand, unpopular commoners were sometimes ennobled, in order to disfranchise them. Hallam, Middle Ages, chap. III. part ii., p. 435.

order; they gave them also their share in the government, ordering that fifteen nobles should be chosen into the common council of the companies, and that one of these should be always burgomaster along with the burgomaster of the commons.

This story of the gradual emancipation of the commons of Augsburg is particularly deserving of attention, because it exhibits a rare instance of society advancing in its natural course without the interference of any disturbing causes; and the example therefore is well fitted to show what are to be considered as the general laws of a nation's progress, if left to itself, and what are merely accidental and forcible interruptions of them. For instance, the subsequent revolution in Augsburg in 1548, by which the aristocracy regained almost all their former ascendancy, was not produced by any internal and natural causes, but by foreign violence; the emperor Charles the Fifth, in his hatred of all free and just government, forcibly dispossessing the commons of their power. But even where the disturbing cause is certain in its interference, as in mechanics the resistance of the air always prevents a body from obeying the natural laws of motion, still the general principles of the science are universally held to be essential to the attainment of a true knowledge of it. Much more does this hold good in political science, where disturbing causes need not of necessity come into action, and what is true in principle may sometimes, as at Augsburg up to the year 1548, be no less true in practice.

The history of Augsburg down to the overthrow of its liberty by Charles the Fifth, shows the manner in which the aristocracy of blood is naturally overthrown by the ordinary progress of a people in wealth and civilization; it shows too with how little difficulty and danger this change may be effected, where no disturbing causes exist, and where the effort of the political constitution is neither hurried forwards, nor violently checked, external circumstances combining also to favour it. Spring is ever a critical period, and the fairest promise of blossom on the healthiest tree may be cut off by one of the sudden frosts or storms so incident to that changeful season. In the political spring also there are peculiar dangers internal and external, which in too large a proportion of instances have never allowed the blossom to ripen. These may be stated principally as three; 1st, The union of property, under peculiar local circumstances, with nobility; 2nd, The increasing influence of wealth leading to absolute monarchy instead of a free government; 3rd, an unfavourable state of foreign relations. I proceed to speak of these in their order.

1. The union of property, under peculiar local circumstances, with nobility. This is a check upon the growth of liberty which peculiarly

belongs to what I have called aristocracies of conquest: for in these cases the first settlement of the conquering people renders the distribution of property fearfully unequal, and the hostile relation long maintained between the conquerors and the conquered leads to fruitless insurrections, and subsequent confiscations, or to laws directly restraining the acquisition of property by the conquered people. But where the distinction between nobles and commons is not founded on conquest, the emancipation of the latter is checked by the local circumstances of the country, or the moral and physical constitution of the race of its inhabitants. Distance from the sea, the want of great rivers, the existence of large forests and deserts, the interposition of numerous chains of mountains or impracticable hills, any thing, in short, that impedes communication, and thus shuts out foreign commerce, necessarily tends to prevent the creation of any wealth but that arising from land, and the land is already monopolized by the aristocracy. Now where the land, as in Judea, is divided in the beginning amidst the whole people, the absence of foreign commerce, although incompatible with any high advancement in knowledge and general cultivation of mind, is not incompatible with a large amount of national virtue and happiness: but an agricultural country in the hands of an aristocracy is a state at once of physical, intellectual, and moral degradation, and which tends to exclude all opportunities of amendment. Again, the moral and physical constitution of different races of mankind produces results worth noticing. The lively and social temper of the Greeks and Italians led them to desire frequent intercourse with one another, and could scarcely exist without the excitement of the theatre and the forum. Thus the chiefs resided in the towns, even while their main property was derived from the country; and they were far more accessible to the influence or power of the commons than if, like the territorial nobility of Germany, they had resided on their estates in castles, which were so many strongholds of their dominion. On the other hand, the strong passion for field sports which distinguished the Teutonic nations, and their little aptitude for social and intellectual enjoyments, made them in general abandon the towns to their vassals, and continue to keep themselves and their immediate dependents out of the reach of the humanizing influences of general society, as well as of the direct force of popular power. Under these circumstances, then, property is united with nobility in keeping down the progress of the nation; either because the commons are prevented from acquiring commercial wealth, by which alone they can hope to balance the territorial wealth of the aristocracy; or because the nobles find in the very situation of their property an advantageous

military position, enabling them to escape the influence of the commons before an actual collision takes place, and to enter into the contest when it does come with superior means of resistance.

2. But the most fatal danger which threatens the political constitution, arises out of the very crisis of its state of transition from the ascendancy of blood to that of property, when monarchical despotism is the result instead of general liberty. Sometimes this despotism has been itself only transient, and after having been the instrument of good in plucking up by the roots the old aristocracy, has yielded in its turn to a free and liberal government ; but in other cases it has realized the fable of the horse and the stag, and has established a worse and more enduring tyranny over the people than that which it supplanted. Of the first class were the despotisms noticed by Thucydides as springing up almost everywhere on the first overthrow of the old aristocratical monarchies : of the second, the history of modern Europe affords but too many examples. But in both, the evil arose from the imperfect distribution of wealth ; commerce was confined to a few hands, and produced a rate of profit, proportionably large ; and the increased attention paid to agriculture added to the wealth of a few only, because the land was engrossed by only a small portion of the community. In Greece a man who could purchase the services of a small body of mercenary soldiers seized the citadel, and made himself tyrant. In modern Europe a king who was rich enough to substitute a small standing army for the feudal array of an earlier period, became at once independent of the support of his nobles, and powerful enough to crush them if they offered any opposition to his plans. In the famous revolution of 1660 in Denmark, the commons surrendered their liberties to the crown in order to purchase thus dearly the subversion of the aristocracy. And wherever a king has existed in modern Europe, the overthrow of the aristocracy has generally been effected by his means. Happy the people who have not suffered their liberties to be merely transferred from one spoiler to another, but have asserted their right to share in the victory of the crown. But in modern Europe, the size of the kingdoms, and the much more strongly monarchical spirit of the people, allowed the kings to consolidate their work ; while in ancient Greece the tyrant of a single town was far more readily overthrown. It has been an aggravation to the evil in modern times, that the king, after he had once established his power, seemed to make common cause with the aristocracy against the people, and lent his support to maintain them in their many exemptions and prerogatives. At the same time, the means by which he has maintained his own despotism, a mercenary standing army, has rendered finance a most important sub-

ject of attention, and has marked that second stage in society, in which money rather than birth confers the ascendancy.

3. But if we look a little further we shall trace this unfavourable aspect of the great crisis in the progress of society to one cause above all others, to an unfavorable state of foreign relations, or, in other words, to foreign wars. Well has Thucydides, with his accustomed wisdom, denounced war as the great aggravation of the factions of Greece ; it was this which hardened their hearts, and blinded their reason, till they were ready for the perpetration of any folly and any crime. And to the exemption from this curse, which Great Britain enjoyed during the latter half of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, the favourable termination of our political crisis is mainly to be attributed. In no country had it commenced with symptoms more alarming: the aristocracy were exhausted by the wars of the Roses ; the clergy changed from an independent estate of the realm to the veriest slaves of the king's pleasure ; the commons were daily advancing, it is true, in wealth and intelligence, but their strength was not yet matured, and was wholly incompetent to resist a vigorous military despotism. But providently was it ordered that the prudence and parsimony of Elizabeth, and the unwarlike temper of her successor, saved us from engaging deeply in the great continental wars. Most thankful should we be that their foreign policy was not more vigorous, their commanders not more wisely selected, their military operations not more fortunate. Leicester and Buckingham by their incapacity were far more useful to their country under the circumstances of that time than if they had possessed the genius of Marlborough or Wellington. Had the military spirit of the nation been more ably directed, had there been formed in the wars of Holland or the Palatinate such a band of disciplined soldiers as those whose unrivalled exploits* in Flanders in 1658 were the admiration of their French allies, and the terror of Spain, the triumph of the crown in the civil war of 1642 must have been speedy and decisive, and before even the talents of Cromwell could have organized the parliament's armies, their total defeat, and the utter extinction of the national liberties, would have been inevitably consummated.

What England thus happily escaped, delayed for nearly two centuries the deliverance of France. The long contest with Spain and Austria produced effects infinitely more disastrous than the defeats of Pavia and St. Quentin. For these ample atonement was made at Ro-

* There is a most entertaining account of the exploits of this invincible army in one of the volumes of the Harleian Miscellany, written by major-general Morgan, who was its actual commander, although Lockhart was nominally the general.

croi and Fribourg; but what could remedy the prevalence of a military spirit, created by so many years of warfare; the distraction of the public mind from all schemes of internal improvement; and the absolute power acquired and secured by the crown? And within our own memory, when nature, recovered from her long check, made a second and happier effort to attain to maturity, the curse of war again interposed to mar the work, and the aggressions of the imperial armies provoked a reaction, by the consequences of which the deliverance achieved by the Constituent Assembly was again for a time placed in jeopardy.

Nor, while noticing the evils arising to the political constitution from an unfavourable state of its foreign relations, must we forget that abuse of the principle of hereditary succession which has placed the crowns of remote and uncongenial nations on the head of the same individual. This accumulation of dominion has been often regarded with jealousy by foreign nations, as threatening their own independence; but its dangers are still greater to the people* thus unnaturally subjected to the same master. In this ill-omened union, each member of it is to the other like the dead corpse fastened by the tyrant of old to the living man; the strength and resources of each are employed in crushing the other's independence. So Charles the Fifth trampled upon the liberties of the Netherlands with the help of his Spanish soldiers, and upon Italy with the military force both of Spain and Germany.

Such are the dangers besetting that critical period of a nation's existence, when it is emerging from the dominion of its old aristocracy. If it escapes these, either originally or finally, it enters upon its state of manhood, and is exposed to a somewhat different succession of struggles. The contest then is between property and numbers, and wherever it has come to a crisis, I know not that it has in any instance terminated favourably. Such was the state of Greece in the time of Thucydides; of Rome during the last century of the commonwealth;

* What is here said applies, be it remembered, to the period when the commons are in the natural course of things ripe for a political emancipation, and are strong enough to excite the jealousy of the aristocracy. But at an earlier period, while they are still entirely subservient to the nobility, the union of several crowns in the person of one sovereign, has been advantageous to the general liberty, because his great foreign power and resources have led the nobles to conciliate the regard of the commons for their own defence against the king; and a happy union of interests and feelings has been thus produced, whose effects in after-times are most beneficial. Such was the case in England, owing to the extensive continental dominion of the first Plantagenet monarchs; the Anglo-Norman barons became English in feeling, and favoured the liberties of the commons, because they were afraid of being ejected from their possessions by the Poitevins and other continental subjects of Henry the Third, as their ancestors had dispossessed the Anglo-Saxons.

and such has been the state of England since the revolution of 1688. Comparisons drawn from the preceding period are inapplicable to this; while, on the other hand, as the phenomena of the second period arise out of causes connected with the earlier state of things, they cannot be clearly understood unless that former state be fully known to us. Thus to argue that the Romans were less bloody than the Greeks from a comparison between the factions of the Peloponnesian war and the struggles of the Roman commons against the Patricians, is to compare the two nations under very different circumstances; it is instituting a parallel between the intensity of our passions in manhood and in childhood. The bloody factions of Corcyra and Megara are analogous to the civil wars of Marius and Sylla, of Cæsar and Pompey, of Brutus and Cassius against the triumvirs: the harmless contests between the commons and patricians can only be compared to those which prevailed in Greece before the Persian invasion, when the party of the coast at Athens was disputing the exclusive ascendancy so long enjoyed by the eupatridæ or party of the plain. And the true conclusion is, that the second contest, between property and numbers, is far more inevitably accompanied by atrocious crimes than that earlier quarrel in which property and numbers were united against property and birth.

The causes of this difference are worth noticing. The distinction between the nobility and the commons was originally a real one; that is, it was grounded upon a real superiority either physical or moral. But every successive generation tended to make it more and more imaginary; till, at the moment of the final struggle between the two orders, it had no real existence at all. The commons were then become as well qualified as the nobles, both physically and morally, to conduct the affairs of peace and war; and thus the exclusive ascendancy of the nobility being become unnatural and absurd, now that it existed along with a real equality of the two parties in merit and in wealth, was resigned for very shame, and was in fact but the sacrifice of a shadow. Whereas in the contest between property and numbers, the course of things is exactly the opposite. The final struggle here only takes place when the real differences between the contending parties have reached the widest point of separation; when the intermediate gradations of society are absorbed in one or other of the two extremes, and the state is divided only between the two irreconcilable opposites of luxury and beggary. This is no contest between men really equal, to do away with a fictitious distinction: it is a struggle between utter contraries; between parties who have absolutely no point in common, no knowledge of each other's feelings, no sympathy in each other's pursuits;

and who are contending for a prize which one cannot gain without a proportional loss to the other. And in confirmation of this view of the subject, wherever difference of blood and race is so strong as even after the lapse of ages to constitute a real distinction, as in the case of white men and negroes, there the perfect amalgamation of the political body becomes exceedingly difficult, if not utterly hopeless; and the daily increasing negro population of the United States, a population excluded by a feeling of natural diversity from an enjoyment of the rights of citizenship, is perhaps one of the most alarming points in the future prospects of that great and growing people.*

On the other hand, the position of parties in the latter contest must be traced to the causes connected with that one which preceded it. The enormous inequality of property at Rome, against which the Agrarian laws were particularly directed, arose out of the exclusive claim to the rights of citizenship formerly asserted by the patricians. They who were not citizens could have no title to a share of the national lands; and in early times none were citizens except the patricians. The principle that the land of the state should be equally† divided amongst all the citizens in the original settlement of the country, and that an admission of new citizens implied that they should share

* "The hostility existing between the free blacks and the whites in the United States is even more inveterate than that of slaves towards their masters; and in some of the states, Virginia especially, it has been thought necessary to enact laws, by which all manumitted slaves are compelled to quit the commonwealth." *Ward's Mexico*, vol. i. p. 38. In Mexico, on the contrary, where there is scarcely any thing of a pure negro population, so much more strongly distinguished than the native American race from the physical character of Europeans, the different castes have blended freely together, and the common feeling of hatred to the old Spaniards of Europe has drawn together all the natives of Mexico, whether of Spanish or of Indian extraction; and has even led the former, descended as they are from the first conquerors of Mexico, to identify themselves with the aborigines, and to speak of the atrocities of their own ancestors as committed by Spain against their countrymen. *Ib.* p. 34.

† This appears from what we know of the first settlement of particular nations in the territory which they afterwards occupied; as, for instance, of the Israelites in Canaan, and the Dorians in Peloponnesus. It appears also from the practice observed in the planting of colonies, both among the Greeks and Romans, where equal shares of land were distributed to the several colonists. Hence when a number of new citizens were admitted, there was generally a demand for a re-division of the land, on the principle that it was a common stock, which ought to be equally shared among all the citizens. The philosophers also, in their proposed models of a commonwealth, proceed on the same notion; certain portions of the land are to be set apart for religious purposes, and the rest to be divided in lots amongst the citizens. See Plutarch, Lycurgus 8. Thucydid. V. 4. Dionysius Halicarn. II. 6, 7. Herodot. IV. 159. Aristot. Politic. VI. 4, VII. 10.

for the future in all public land not yet divided, was generally recognized by the nations of antiquity. But the Roman patricians, whilst they allowed the first part of this principle, objected to the second; and refused to admit the commons to any division of the unappropriated public land. So again in modern times, how much of the actual situation of our aristocracy of property is derived from our old aristocracy of conquest: the enormous landed estates of many of our nobility,—the great political influence conferred by land above all other kinds of property,—the law of primogeniture and the law of entails. Above all, the existence of an order of nobility communicated by descent, with separate powers, and peculiar privileges, gives to the aristocracy of modern Europe much more of the character of the older aristocracy of blood than was retained after the corresponding revolution in Greece and Rome. In fact, if hereditary monarchy was to be retained, public liberty could scarcely have been achieved or preserved without a co-existent hereditary aristocracy.

The view that has been here taken of the progress of society offers an explanation of many points, which without it have been sometimes misunderstood. It shows how the popular party of an earlier period becomes the antipopular party of a later; because the tendency of society is to become more and more liberal, and as the ascendancy of wealth is a more popular principle than the ascendancy of nobility, so it is less popular than the ascendancy of numbers. Thus the comitia centuriata of Servius Tullius, which in the times of Marius and Cæsar would have been an institution entirely aristocratical, were in their first creation a most liberal and popular measure, by admitting wealth to that supremacy which had before been monopolized by noble birth. Thus the house of commons, which was the popular part of our constitution so long as the struggle was between the nation and the crown, has been regarded since the accession of George the Third as a body predominantly aristocratical, because the parties in the state have resolved themselves into the advocates of property on one side, and of general intelligence and numbers on the other.

We may learn also a more sensible division of history than that which is commonly adopted of ancient and modern. We shall see that there is in fact an ancient and a modern period in the history of every people; the ancient differing, and the modern in many essential points agreeing with that in which we now live. Thus the largest portion of that history which we commonly call ancient is practically modern, as it describes society in a stage analogous to that in which it now is; while, on the other hand, much of what is called modern history is practically ancient, as it relates to a state of things which has passed away.

Thucydides and Xenophon, the orators of Athens, and the philosophers, speak a wisdom more applicable to us politically than the wisdom even of our own countrymen who lived in the middle ages; and their position, both intellectual and political, more nearly resembled our own. We may learn also by the experience of other societies in an analogous state to ours, that having happily overlived the critical season of the transition from youth to manhood, what we should now most dread are accidents, or constitutional disease produced by external violence: that is, that the great enemy of society in its present stage is war: if this calamity be avoided, the progress of improvement is sure; but attempts to advance the cause of freedom by the sword are incalculably perilous. War is a state of such fatal intoxication, that it makes men careless of improving, and sometimes even of repairing their internal institutions; and thus the course of national happiness may be cut short, not only by foreign conquest, but by a state of war poisoning the blood, destroying the healthy tone of the system, and setting up a feverish excitement, till the disorder terminates in despotism.

Extending our view still more widely, and observing that in some parts of the world society seems never to have reached its natural manhood, but has either gone on in protracted infancy, or has received a shock at the moment of its transition, which has condemned it to a long living death; that either the old aristocracies have still existed, or have only been exchanged for despotism in its worst, and, humanly speaking, most hopeless form; we shall draw near with reverence to those higher causes, which proceeding directly from the inscrutable will of our Maker, seem designed to humble the presumption of fancying ourselves the arbiters of our own destiny. It is vain to deny that differences of national character apparently constitutional, and belonging to distinct families of the human race, have immensely influenced the greatness and happiness of each: it is equally clear, that the physical geography of the several parts of the earth has advanced or prevented the moral and intellectual progress of their respective inhabitants. The boundless and unmanageable mass of earth presented by the continents of Asia and Africa has caused those parts of the world, which started the earliest in the race of civilization, to remain almost at the point from whence they set out; while Europe and America, penetrated by so many seas, and communicating with them by so many rivers, have been subdued to the uses of civilization, and have ministered with an ever-growing power to their children's greatness. Well indeed might the policy of the old priest nobles of Egypt and India endeavour to divert their people from becoming familiar with the sea, and represent the occupation of a seaman as incompatible with the purity of the highest

castes. The sea deserved to be hated by the old aristocracies, inasmuch as it has been the mightiest instrument in the civilization of mankind. In the depth of winter, when the sky is covered with clouds, and the land presents one cold, blank, and lifeless surface of snow, how refreshing is it to the spirits to walk upon the shore, and to enjoy the eternal freshness and liveliness of ocean. Even so in the deepest winter of the human race, when the earth was but one chilling expanse of inactivity, life was stirring in the waters. There began that spirit whose genial influence has now reached to the land, has broken the chains of winter, and covered the face of the earth with beauty.

But these distinctions between race and race, like those between individuals, involve a duty which men have been unhappily very unwilling to practise. They who are most favoured by nature owe their best assistance to those whose lot is most unpromising; they who have advanced the furthest in civilization, are bound to enlighten others whose progress has been less rapid. But here that feeling of pride and selfishness interposes, which, under the name of patriotism, has so long tried to pass itself off for a virtue. As men in proportion to their moral advancement learn to enlarge the circle of their regards; as an exclusive affection for our relations, our clan, or our country, is a sure mark of an unimproved mind, so is that narrow and unchristian feeling to be condemned, which regards with jealousy the progress of foreign nations, and cares for no portion of the human race but that to which itself belongs. The detestable encouragement so long given to national enmities, the low gratification felt by every people in extolling themselves above their neighbours, should not be overlooked amongst the causes which have mainly obstructed the improvement of mankind. Exclusive patriotism should be cast off, together with the exclusive ascendancy of birth, as belonging to the follies and selfishness of our uncultivated nature. Yet, strange to say, the former at least is sometimes upheld by men who not only call themselves Christians, but are apt to use the charge of irreligion as the readiest weapon against those who differ from them. So little have they learned of the spirit of that revelation, which taught emphatically the abolition of an exclusively national religion and a local worship, that so men, being all born of the same blood, might make their sympathies coextensive with their bond of universal brotherhood.

PREFACE

TO THE

THIRD VOLUME OF ARNOLD'S THUCYDIDES.

Two or three points offer a tempting field for investigation. They are not exclusively connected with Thucydides, but as bearing generally upon Greek philology and history, I have thought that the mention of them would not be impertinent.

I. Even after all the labours of the Prussian scholars, much remains to be done towards obtaining a complete knowledge of the number, and still more the value of the Greek MSS. now existing in Europe. It is not easy to know how many MSS. of any given writer are extant, where they are to be found, and, above all, whether from their age and character they are worth the trouble of an exact collation. A labour of this kind cannot be accomplished by individuals; but the present spirit of liberal cooperation which seems to influence literary as well as scientific men throughout Europe, renders its accomplishment by the combined exertions of the scholars of different countries by no means impracticable. It would be exceedingly convenient to possess an alphabetical list of all the extant Greek and Latin writers, with a catalogue raisonnée of the MSS. of each: and if such a work were attempted, there is little doubt, I imagine, that in point of number a very large addition would be made to the stock of MSS. already known. What the result might be in point of value is another question; still it is desirable to know what we have to trust to; and when we have obtained a right estimate of our existing resources in manuscripts, we shall then be better able to judge what modern criticism will have to do from its own means towards bringing the text of the ancient writers to the greatest possible state of perfection.

II. We seem now to have reached that point in our knowledge of the Greek language, at which other languages of the same family must be more largely studied before we can make a fresh step in advance. The practice of Greek, if I may allowed the expression, seems tolerably well understood; the usage of the best writers, not only in points of construction, but even of orthography, has been carefully examined. We are now anxious to explain some few words or ex-

pressions of less frequent occurrence, or to understand the principle of others whose meaning we have sufficiently learned from experience. I had intended, for instance, to inquire into the difference between the two conjunctions εἰ and ἤν; and there is much in the use of the particle ἄν, which has not yet been explained satisfactorily. I went far enough to ascertain the different uses of εἰ and ἤν, in Thucydides, as a matter of fact; but my ignorance of the etymology of the two words made me unable to ascend higher, and to explain the principle of this difference. It is easy enough to guess at etymologies, but this has been done more than enough in times past: and an etymology built on guesses is as worthless as one founded on real knowledge is instructive. It is possible that a more enlarged study of the different languages and dialects of the great Indo-Germanic family, both in their ancient and actual forms, may enable us to acquire such a knowledge; and we shall thus obtain perhaps a more clear understanding of some of those particles which even now are involved in much uncertainty. So far, I think, we may hope to advance not unreasonably; but further progress seems scarcely possible. The origin of language in itself partakes of the same obscurity which surounds the origin of society: there is a point with both beyond which we cannot penetrate. Attempts to explain the phenomena of language *à priori* seem to me unwise. We cannot conceive the inventing of a language, because we cannot conceive the human mind acting without language. From a certain point we can readily trace the nature of the process: we can understand how simple terms expressive of outward objects were transferred to express by metaphor the operations of the mind; but how these simple terms were themselves arrived at, it seems impossible to discover, or even reasonably to imagine. Wherever the result is obtained by combination of existing elements, the method is intelligible; but invention, strictly speaking, appears to belong to a higher power than ours. As it has been well observed, that, supposing the first men to have been savages, we cannot understand how, without some divine interference, the human race could ever have arrived at civilization, so, if we suppose men to have been in such a state as to have had to invent or contrive a language, we cannot conceive how mankind, any more than other animals, should ever have been able to speak at all.

III. Passing from the language in Thucydides to the matter contained in his History, the introduction in the first book naturally leads us to consider the question, how far the pretended early history of Greece is really historical or mythical. And here I confess that further consideration has induced me to accede to many of those notions of Niebuhr

and Müller which I formerly regarded as unreasonably sceptical. I had not deferred sufficiently to the tact which is gained in these matters by great natural ability aided by long experience. Niebuhr's comparison is most true, that "if any one, on going into Benvenuto's prison when his eyes had for months been accustomed to see the objects around him, had asserted that Benvenuto, like himself, could not distinguish any thing in darkness, surely he would have been somewhat presumptuous." Yet still the character of the early Grecian history does not seem to have been completely analysed. Niebuhr has shewn that in the Roman history passages wholly legendary occur in the midst of a narration substantially historical; thus the account of the taking of Veii is legendary, while the earlier events of the siege are as clearly historical. This is important, because it prepares us for the same intermixture in the early history of Greece also; and shews us that portions of real history may exist before the beginning of the merely historical period: towards the frontiers of fable and history patches or fragments of each are often to be found completely insulated within the territories of the other. And to distinguish one from the other, we must be guided by internal evidence; the ancient writers may have offered both indiscriminately as history, and may have erred in doing so; but is it not to imitate their error, if we represent both indiscriminately to be mythical, because we cannot rely on their discernment, and because they have in some instances related as history what has no pretensions to the name?

But with respect to Thucydides himself, it is a question how far he is to be taxed with such want of discernment, and whether he has himself regarded any thing as historical in the traditions of ancient Greece, which was in fact no better than mythical. This question is one which his editor seems naturally called upon to examine: and it may incidentally perhaps throw some light on the question of mythical narratives in general, on which as a whole I do not feel myself competent to enter fully.

There is no doubt that the ablest men may entertain erroneous opinions on points which nothing has led them particularly to examine. If therefore Thucydides had never been led to question the real existence of the chiefs or patriarchs who were said to have given their name to their respective people, his mention of Hellen and Minos as historical persons would afford no proof that they were so. And it is well observed by a most able writer, that the power of distinguishing between history and mythical stories "depends upon a survey of a vast field, of which but a small part was open to the view" of the early

Greek historians. *We* suspect the real existence of Hellen and his sons, because we observe a practice widely spread amongst different nations, of deriving the name of a people from a supposed king or leader of it; and not only do we find the lives and actions of these pretended heroes to be for the most part of an unhistorical character, but our more extended knowledge of languages enables us in many instances to discover the real origin of a national name, and thus to prove the falsehood of its reputed derivation. And thus a general suspicion being thrown upon such stories, any single one of the number, although containing nothing improbable in itself, must yet be regarded as unhistorical, unless there be some peculiar circumstances connected with it, giving it some distinct and particular ground of credibility.

So far then I am willing to allow that Deucalion and Hellen Pelops, and Eumolpus, and any other heroes whom Thucydides may have named in his History, cannot be safely maintained to be real persons from his having mentioned them as such, without expressing any doubt as to their reality. Nor can it be thought to prove the existence of an individual Homer, the author of the Iliad, Odyssey, and Homerick Hymns, that both Thucydides and Herodotus appear to have been of this opinion, and to have entertained no doubt of its truth. Literary criticism was in their days so much in its infancy, and that experience of the erroneousness of popular traditions which in our times has awakened criticism was then so wanting, that the ablest men may be forgiven for having embraced the common notions on such matters just as they found them, without making any inquiry into their truth. But with regard to the early history of Greece, Thucydides was well aware of its uncertainty, and of the mythic character of some of those accounts which had passed for history. It is with a full consciousness of these facts that he professes to give us notwithstanding a credible outline of the principal revolutions which Greece had undergone, and carries his notices back to a period earlier than the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus, or even than the war of Troy. His account of the Pelopid kings is professedly drawn from the statements of those "who had received from their fathers the clearest information as to the affairs of the Peloponnesians." Herodotus when speaking of the Dorian invasion of Peloponnesus, expressly says that the account given of it by the Lacedæmonians themselves, differed from all the stories of the poets. Is it impossible that there should have existed, along with the poetical version of the early Greek history, another version of a simpler and truer character; and that long before written narratives were known, a faithful tradition may have been handed down in some particular fami-

lies, which the memory could have retained as readily, when once applied to the task, as it is known to have retained the verses of the rhapsodists? And if this be so, the fabulous actions ascribed to any hero in the poetical version of its exploits are no more a reason for our rejecting the historical traditions respecting him, and for supposing him to be altogether an imaginary personage, than the romances about Charlemagne should make us disbelieve the biography of Eginhard.

Undoubtedly it may be said that these apparently historical traditions ave no real foundation; and are no more than the clumsy attempts of Palæphatus to make fable pass for truth by merely divesting it of its impossibilities. And in this manner, according to Niebuhr, the annalist Piso pruned and mangled the poetical legends of Rome, and thought by so doing to convert them into history. It may be so certainly, but it does not follow that it must be so; and with respect to Greece, the judgment of Thucydides is no inconsiderable argument to prove that it was not so. And if any writer as able and as inquiring as Thucydides, and as fully aware of the existence and real character of the poetical legends, had arisen at Rome in the age of the Scipios, or even of Cicero; and after stating in express terms the general uncertainty of the early Roman history, had given a brief outline of its principal events, collected from sources which he conceived to be trustworthy, such a sketch would in all probability have rendered the immortal work of Niebuhr in great measure superfluous.

It is indeed natural that revolutions which effect a change in the inhabitants of a country should tend to interrupt the traditions of the conquered people, or to corrupt them; and thus the Dorian conquest was likely to obscure the recollections of the Achaian princes of Sparta and Mycenæ. Yet it should be remembered that the Achaians were neither extirpated nor enslaved; that they may have retained their own traditions, as the Welsh and Irish have done under circumstances somewhat similar; and that in one part even of Peloponnesus itself the descendants of the Pelopid princes had established themselves as conquerors, amid the general disasters of their race; so that in Achaia the old Achaian traditions may have been preserved as easily as the Dorian traditions in Laconia and Argolis. With respect to the Dorians themselves, if their whole early history since their establishment in Peloponnesus had in the time of Thucydides become utterly lost, if the very race of their kings had been falsified, so that they pretended to be Achaians and Heraclidæ, whilst in reality they were Dorians like the rest of their people, such a phenomenon would call for some inquiry into its causes, as it has no antecedent probability to induce us to be-

lieve it. It is not probable that a people far removed from the condition of savages, and established within historical memory in the country which they were actually occupying; a people who since that period had undergone no great revolutions, whose social and political relations, whose religion, and whose customs had suffered no change, should nevertheless have wholly lost the memory of their ancestors' fortunes, and should have had none but a poetical history, though their traditions were notoriously at variance with the stories of every known poet. But most incredible of all is it that they could have been mistaken as to the race of their kings, to which their existing institutions bore a living witness. A man's race in ancient times was marked by the peculiar religious worship of his family; thus Herodotus, in order to throw light on the extraction of Isagoras, observes, that the members of his *gens* sacrificed to the Carian Jupiter: and owing to this circumstance, the member of any distinguished person's origin was preserved in as effectual a manner as it could be by a series of contemporary documents. Now the constant voice of tradition as to the Achaian extraction of the Spartan kings must have been confirmed by their peculiar religious ceremonies, such as they existed in the historical age of Greece; and there is no likelihood that these should have undergone any change since the period of the Dorian conquest. But if they were then Achaian, and not Dorian, the period of the alleged expulsion of the Heraclidæ from Peloponnesus was at that time within memory, and a thing so tenaciously remembered as the peculiar ancestry or race of a people would not be forgotten in the course of a hundred years. Besides every tradition of the Spartans attested that the kings were of a different race from their people; the royalty of the one, and the independent allodial property of the other, were derived from a supposed original contract, by which the two parties united for their common benefit; the Heraclidæ recovering the thrones which belonged to their race, whilst the Dorians, to whose aid their restoration was owing, took care to assert their own independent condition, very distinct from that of a mere δῆμος in those early times under its own natural hero chiefs. It seems to me the wildest of fancies to suppose that all these traditions, which were not poetical, as well as the known religious rites of the kings, were the mere fruits of state policy, which artfully represented the Dorian chiefs as being of Achaian extraction, in order to give a sort of colour of right to their occupation of the Peloponnesus. As if barbarian conquerors needed such a pretext, or were in the habit of inventing it; as if the Norman chiefs would have forsworn their own real ancestry, to represent themselves as descended from the race of the conquered Saxons. And where is the improba-

bility of the common story, which represents the Heraclidæ as exiled from Peloponnesus, and then becoming the chiefs of the people who gave them an asylum? The very same thing happened with the Norman nobles who took refuge in Scotland: they became chiefs of Keltic clans, to which they gave their name without altering the national character of their clansmen; and in little more than two centuries after their flight into Scotland, two of these Norman families, those of Bruce and Balliol, were seated on the Scottish throne. Without pretending then to assert the historical character of the stories told of the individual founders of the Spartan royalty, yet that the Spartan kings were of Achaian and not of Dorian extraction seems to me to admit of no reasonable doubt; being precisely one of those points on which tradition may best be trusted; being proved by what in ancient times was a positive evidence, supplying the place of history, namely, the peculiar character of the religious rites of different races; and being in itself quite consistent with probability, yet had it not been true, most unlikely to have been invented.

IV.* There is another point not peculiarly connected with Thucydides, except so far as he may be considered as the representative of all Grecian history, which appears to me deserving of notice; that state of imperfect citizenship so common in Greece under the various names of *μέτοικοι*, *περίοικοι*, *σύνοικοι*, &c. This is a matter of importance, as bearing upon some of the great and eternal principles of political science, and thus applying more or less to the history of every age and nation.

It seems to be assumed in modern times, that the being born of free parents within the territory of any particular state, and the paying towards the support of its government, conveys a natural claim to the rights of citizenship. In the ancient world, on the contrary, citizenship, unless specially conferred as a favour by some definite law or charter, was derivable only from race. The descendants of a foreigner remained foreigners to the end of time; the circumstance of their being born and bred in the country was held to make no change in their con-

* What follows, on the subject of citizenship, has been controverted since the appearance of the first edition of this work, by those whose arguments and authority are alike entitled to the greatest respect. I hope to have an opportunity ere long of returning to the subject, and attempting to meet the objections brought against the theory here maintained. In the meanwhile, I did not think it desirable to carry on such an argument at length in the preface to an edition of Thucydides; so that I have contented myself with reprinting the preface in its original form, reserving a fuller exposition and defence of the positions maintained in it for another occasion.—Note to the second Edition of Thucyd., 1841. The allusion is to the Appendix to the Inaugural Lecture on Modern History.

dition; community of place could no more convert aliens into citizens than it could change domestic animals into men. Nor did the paying of taxes confer citizenship; taxation was the price paid by a stranger for the liberty of residing in a country not his own, and for the protection afforded by its laws to his person and property; but it was thought to have no necessary connexion with the franchise of a citizen, far less with the right of legislating for the commonwealth.

Citizenship was derived from race; but distinctions of race were not of that odious and fantastic character which they have borne in modern times; they implied real differences often of the most important kind, religious and moral. Particular races worshipped particular gods, and in a particular manner. But different gods had different attributes, and the moral image thus presented to the continual contemplation and veneration of the people could not but produce some effect on the national character. According to the attributes of the god was the nature of the hymns in which he was celebrated; even the music varied; and this alone to a people of such lively sensibilities as the Greeks, was held to be a powerful moral engine; whilst the accompanying ceremonies of the worship enforced with still greater effect the impression produced by the hymns and music. Again, particular races had particular customs which affected the relations of domestic life and of public. Amongst some polygamy was allowed, amongst others forbidden; some held infanticide to be an atrocious crime, others in certain cases ordained it by law. Practices and professions regarded as infamous by some, were freely tolerated or honoured amongst others: the laws of property and of inheritance were completely various. It is not then to be wondered at that Thucydides, when speaking of a city founded jointly by Ionians and Dorians, should have thought it right to add "that the prevailing institutions of the place were the Ionian;" for according as they were derived from one or the other of the two races, the whole character of the people would be different. And therefore the mixture of persons of different race in the same commonwealth, unless one race had a complete ascendancy, tended to confuse all the relations of life, and all men's notions of right and wrong; or by compelling men to tolerate in so near a relation as that of fellow citizens differences upon the main points of human life, led to a general carelessness and scepticism, and encouraged the notion that right and wrong have no real existence, but are the mere creatures of human opinion.

But the interests of ambition and avarice are ever impatient of moral barriers. When a conquering prince or people had formed a vast dominion out of a number of different nations, the several customs and

religions of each were either to be extirpated, or melted into one mass, in which each learned to tolerate those of its neighbours, and to despise its own. And the same blending of races, and consequent confusion and degeneracy of manners, was favoured by commercial policy; which, regarding men solely in the relation of buyers and sellers, considered other points as comparatively unimportant, and in order to win customers would readily sacrifice or endanger the purity of moral and religious institutions. So that in the ancient world civilization which grew chiefly out of conquest or commerce, went almost hand in hand with demoralization.

Now to those who think that political society was ordained for higher purposes than those of mere police or of traffic, the principle of the ancient commonwealths in making agreement in religion and morals the test of citizenship cannot but appear wise and good. And yet the mixture of races is essential to the improvement of mankind, and an exclusive attachment to national customs is incompatible with true liberality. How then was the problem to be solved; how could civilization be attained without moral degeneracy, how could a narrow minded bigotry be escaped without falling into the worst evil of Epicurean indifference? Christianity has answered these questions most satisfactorily, by making religious and moral agreement independent of race or national customs; by furnishing us with a sure criterion to distinguish between what is essential and eternal, and what is indifferent, and temporal or local; allowing, nay commanding, us to be with regard to every thing of this latter kind in the highest degree tolerant, liberal, and comprehensive; while it gives to the former that only sanction to which implicit reverence may safely and usefully be paid, not the fond sanction of custom, or national prejudice, or human authority of any kind whatever, but the sanction of the truth of God.

That bond and test of citizenship then which the ancient legislatures were compelled to seek in sameness of race, because thus only could they avoid the worst of evils, a confusion and consequent indifference in men's notions of right and wrong, is now furnished to us in the profession of Christianity. He who is a Christian, let his race be what it will, let his national customs be ever so different from ours, is fitted to become our fellow citizen: for his being a Christian implies that he retains such of his national customs only as are morally indifferent; and for all such we ought to feel the most perfect toleration. He who is not a Christian, though his family may have lived for generations on the same soil with us, though they may have bought and sold with us, though they have have been protected by our laws, and paid taxes in

return for that protection,* is yet essentially not a citizen but a sojourner; and to admit such a person to the rights of citizenship tends in principle to the confusion of right and wrong, and lowers the objects of political society to such as are merely physical and external.

In conclusion I must beg to repeat what I have said before, that the period to which the work of Thucydides refers belongs properly to modern † and not to ancient history; and it is this circumstance, over and above the great ability of the historian himself, which makes it so peculiarly deserving of our study. The state of Greece from Pericles to Alexander, fully described to us as it is in the works of the great contemporary historians, poets, orators, and philosophers, affords a political lesson perhaps more applicable to our own times, if taken all together than any other portion of history which can be named anterior to the eighteenth century. Where Thucydides, in his reflections on the bloody dissensions at Corcyra, notices the decay and extinction of the simplicity of old times, he marks the great transition from ancient history to modern, the transition from an age of feeling to one of reflection, from a period of ignorance and credulity to one of inquiry and scepticism. Now such a transition took place in part in the sixteenth century; the period of the Reformation, when compared with the ages preceding it, was undoubtedly one of inquiry and reflection. But still it was an age of strong feeling and of intense belief; the human mind cleared a space for itself vigorously within a certain circle; but except in individual cases, and even those scarcely avowed, there were still acknowledged limits of authority, which inquiry had not yet ventured to question. The period of Roman civilization from the times of the Gracchi to those of the Antonines was in this respect far more completely modern; and accordingly this is one of the periods of history which we should do well to study most carefully. But unfortu-

* It is considered in our days that those who are possessed of property in a country ought to be citizens in it: the ancient maxim was, that those who were citizens ought to be possessed of property. The difference involved in these two different views is most remarkable.

† It is curious to observe how readily men mistake accidental distinctions for such as are really essential. A lively writer, the author of the "Bubbles from the Brunnens of Nassau," ridicules the study of what is called ancient history; and as an instance of its uselessness, asks what lessons in the art of war can be derived from the insignificant contests which took place *before the invention of gunpowder*. Now it so happens that one who well knew what military lessons were instructive, the emperor Napoleon, has selected out of the whole range of history the campaigns of seven generals only, as important to be studied by an officer professionally in all their details; and of these seven three belong to the times of Greece and Rome, namely, Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar. See Napoleon's "Melanges Historiques," tome II. p. 10.

nately our information respecting it is much scantier than in the case of the corresponding portion of Greek History; the writers, generally speaking, are greatly inferior; and in freedom of inquiry no greater range was or could be taken than that which the mind of Greece had reached already. And in point of political experience, we are even at this hour scarcely on a level with the statesmen of the age of Alexander. Mere lapse of years confers here no increase of knowledge; four thousand years have furnished the Asiatic with scarcely anything that deserves the name of political experience; two thousand years since the fall of Carthage have furnished the African with absolutely nothing. Even in Europe and in America it would not be easy now to collect such a treasure of experience as the constitutions of 153 commonwealths along the various coasts of the Mediterranean offered to Aristotle. There he might study the institutions of various races derived from various sources: every possible variety of external position, of national character, of positive law; agricultural states and commercial, military powers and maritime, wealthy countries and poor ones, monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, with every imaginable form and combination of each and all; states overpeopled and underpeopled, old and new, and in every circumstance of advance, maturity, and decline. So rich was the experience which Aristotle enjoyed, but which to us is only attainable mediately and imperfectly through his other writings; his own record of all these commonwealths, as well as all other information concerning the greatest part of them, having unhappily perished. Nor was the moral experience of the age of Greek civilization less complete. By moral experience I mean an acquaintance with the whole compass of those questions which relate to the metaphysical analysis of man's nature and faculties, and to the practical object of his being. This was derived from the strong critical and inquiring spirit of the Greek sophists and philosophers, and from the unbounded freedom which they enjoyed. In mere metaphysical research the schoolmen were indefatigable and bold, but in moral questions there was an authority which restrained them: among Christians the notions of duty and of virtue must be assumed as beyond dispute. But not the wildest extravagance of atheistic wickedness in modern times can go further than the sophists of Greece went before them; whatever audacity can dare and subtilty contrive to make the words "good" and "evil" change their meaning, has been already tried in the days of Plato, and by his eloquence, and wisdom, and faith unshaken, has been put to shame. Thus it is that while the advance of civilization destroys much that is noble, and throws over the mass of human society an atmosphere somewhat dull and hard; yet it is

only by its peculiar trials, no less than by its positive advantages, that the utmost virtue of human nature can be matured. And those who vainly lament that progress of earthly things which, whether good or evil, is certainly inevitable, may be consoled by the thought that its sure tendency is to confirm and purify the virtue of the good: and that to us, holding in our hands not the wisdom of Plato only, but also a treasure of wisdom and of comfort which to Plato was denied, the utmost activity of the human mind may be viewed without apprehension, in the confidence that we possess a charm to deprive it of its evil, and to make it minister for ourselves certainly, and through us, if we use it rightly, for the world in general, to the more perfect triumph of good.

I linger round a subject which nothing could tempt me to quit but the consciousness of treating it too unworthily. What is miscalled ancient history, the really modern history of the civilization of Greece and Rome, has for years interested me so deeply, that it is painful to feel myself after all so unable to paint it fully. Of the manifold imperfections of this edition of Thucydides none can be more aware than I am; but in the present state of knowledge these will be soon corrected and supplied by others: and I will at least hope that these volumes may encourage a spirit of research into history, and may in some measure assist in directing it; that they may contribute to the conviction that history is to be studied as a whole, and according to its philosohhical divisions, not such as are merely geographical and chronological; that the history of Greece and of Rome is not an idle inquiry about remote ages and forgotten institutions, but a living picture of things present, fitted not so much for the curiosity of the scholar, as for the instruction of the statesman and the citizen.

RUGBY SCHOOL.—USE OF THE CLASSICS.

This Narrative is extracted from the Quarterly Journal of Education for 1834.

THIS school was originally a simple grammar school, designed for the benefit of the town of Rugby and its neighbourhood. Any person who has resided for the space of two years in the town of Rugby, or at any place in the county of Warwick within ten miles of it, or even in the adjacent counties of Leicester and Northampton to the distance of five miles from it, may send his sons to be educated at the school without paying any thing whatever for their instruction. But if a parent lives out of the town of Rugby, his son must then lodge at one of the regular boarding-houses of the school; in which case the expenses of his board are the same as those incurred by a boy not on the foundation.

Boys placed at the school in this manner are called foundationers, and their number is not limited. In addition to these, there are 260 boys, not on the foundation; and this number is not allowed to be exceeded.

The number of masters is ten, consisting of a head-master and nine assistants. The boys are divided into nine, or practically into ten classes, succeeding each other in the following order, beginning from the lowest: first form, second form, third form, lower remove; fourth form, upper remove, lower fifth, fifth, and sixth. It should be observed, to account for the anomalies of this nomenclature, that the name of sixth form has been long associated with the idea of the highest class in all the great public schools of England; and, therefore, when more than six forms are wanted they are designated by other names, in order to secure the magic name of sixth to the highest form in the school. In this the practice of our schools is not without a very famous precedent: for the Roman augurs, we are told, would not allow Tarquinius Priscus to exceed the ancient and sacred number of three, in the centuries of Equites; but there was no objection made to his doubling the number of them in each century, and making in each an upper and a lower division, which were practically as distinct as two centuries. There is no more wisdom in disturbing an old association for no real benefit,

than in sparing it when it stands in the way of any substantial advantage.

Into these ten classes the boys are distributed in a three-fold division, according to their proficiency in classical literature, in arithmetic and mathematics, and in French. There is an exception made, however, in favour of the sixth form, which consists in all the three divisions of exactly the same individuals. All the rest of the boys are classed in each of the divisions without any reference to their rank in the other two: and thus it sometimes happens that a boy is in the fifth form in the mathematical division, while he is only in the third or fourth in the classical; or, on the other hand, that he is in a very low form in the French division, while he is in a high one in the classical and mathematical. During the two first lessons on Wednesday, the school is arranged according to its classes in French; and on Saturday, according to its classes in arithmetic and mathematics.

The masters also have different forms in the three different divisions. The masters of the higher classical forms may teach the lower forms in mathematics or French; and the masters of the higher forms in either of those two departments may have the care of the lower forms in the classical arrangement.

The general school hours throughout the week are as follows:—

Monday.—First lesson, seven to eight. Second lesson, quarter-past nine to eleven. Third and fourth lessons, quarter-past two to five.

Tuesday.—First and second lessons, as on Monday. Eleven to one, composition. Half-holiday.

Wednesday.—As on Monday.

Thursday.—As on Tuesday.

Friday.—As on Monday.

Saturday.—As on Tuesday and Thursday, except that there is no composition from eleven to one.

There are various other lessons at additional hours for different classes, but it is needless to trouble our readers with such minute details.

Each half year is divided into two equal periods, called language time and history time. The books read in these two periods vary in several instances,—the poets and orators being read principally during the language time, and history and geography being chiefly studied during the history time. This will be more clearly seen from the following Table of the general work of the school for a whole year.

	Classical Division.			Mathematical Division.	French Division.
	Language Time.	Scriptural Instruction, &c.	History Time.		
First Form	Latin Grammar, and Latin Delectus.	Church Catechism and Abridgment of New Testament History.	Markham's England, Vol. I.	Tables, Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division, simple and compound Reduction.	Hamel's Exercises up to the Auxiliary Verb.
Second Form	Latin Grammar and Latin Delectus. Eutropius.	St. Luke. Genesis.	Markham's England, Vol. II.	The work done in the first form repeated; Rule of Three, Practice.	Hamel's Exercises, Auxiliary Verbs, regular Conjugations, and some of the irregular. Gaultier's Geography.
Third Form	Greek Grammar (Matthiæ Abridgment.) Valpy's Greek Exercises. Valpy's Greek Delectus. Florilegium. Translations into Latin.	Exodus, Numbers, Judges, I. and II. Samuel, St. Matthew.	Eutropius. Physical Geography, U.K.S.	Rule of Three. Practice. Vulgar Fractions. Interest.	Hamel's Exercises, first part continued, Irregular Verbs. Elizabeth, ou Les Exilés en Sibérie.

	Classical Division.			Mathematical Division.	French Division.
	Language Time.	Scriptural Instruction, &c.	History Time.		
Lower Remove	Greek Grammar, and Valpy's Exercises. Rules of the Greek Iambics. Easy Parts of the Iambics of the Greek Tragedians. Virgil's Eclogues. Cicero de Senectute.	St. Matthew in Greek Testament. Acts in the English Bible.	Parts of Justin. Parts of Xenophon's Anabasis. Markham's France to Philip of Valois.	Vulgar Fractions. Interest. Decimal Fractions. Square Root.	Hamel continued and repeated. Jussieu's Jardin des Plantes.
Fourth Form	Æschylus Prometh. Virgil, Æn. II. and III. Cicero de Amicitiâ.	Acts in the Greek Testament. St. John in the English Bible. Old Testament. History.	Part of Xenophon's Hellenics. Florus, from III. 21. to IV. 11. History of Greece, U.K.S. Markham's France, from Philip of Valois. Detailed Geography of Italy and Germany.	Decimals, Involution and Evolution, Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division of Algebra. Binomial Theorem. Euclid, Book I., Propos. I. to XV.	Hamel's 2nd Part, chiefly Syntax of the Pronouns. La Fontaine's Fables.
Upper Remove	Sophocles' Philoct. Æschyl. Eumenid. Homer's Iliad, I. II. Virgil Æn., IV. V. Parts of Horace, Odes I. II. III. Parts of Cicero's Epistles.	St. John in Greek Testament. Deuteronomy and Ep. of St. Peter. Selections from the Psalms.	Parts of Arrian. Parts of Paterculus, Book II. Sir J. Macintosh's England.	Equation of Payments, Discount, Simple Equations. Euclid, Book I. from XV. to end.	Translations from English into French. La Fontaine's Fables.

	Classical Division.			Mathematical Division.	French Division.
	Language Time.	Scriptural Instruction, &c.	History Time.		
Lower Fifth	Æschyl. Sept. contra Thebas. Sophocl. Œd. Tyr. Homer's Iliad, III. IV. Virgil's Æn., VI. VII. Extracts from Cicero's Epistles. Parts of Horace.	St. John. Epistles to Timothy and Titus. Bible History, from 1 Kings to Nehemiah, inclusive.	Parts of Arrian. Herodotus III., 1, 38, 61, 67, 88, 116. Livy, Parts of, II. and III., Hallam's Middle Ages, France, Spain, Greeks, and Saracens. Physical and Political Geography of all Europe.	Exchange, Alligation, Simple Equations, with two unknown Quantities and Problems. Euclid, Book III.	Syntax and Idioms. A Play of Molière, to construe and then turn again from English into French.
Fifth Form	Æschyl. Agamemn. Homer's Iliad, V. VI. Odyssey, IX. Demosthenes' Leptines in Aphobum. I. Virgil's Æn., VIII. Parts of Horace. Cicero in Verrem.	Epistles to the Corinthians. Paley's Horæ Paulinæ.	Parts of Herodotus and Thucydides. Parts of Livy. Hallam's Middle Ages. State of Society.	Quadratic Equations. Trigonometry. Euclid, to the end of Book VI.	Pensées de Pascal. Translations from English into French.
Sixth Form	Various parts of Virgil and Homer. Some one or more of the Greek Tragedies. One or more of the private orations of Demosthenes. Cicero against Verres. Part of Aristotle's Ethics.	One of the Prophets in the Septuagint Version. Different Parts of the New Testament.	Parts of Thucydides, and Arrian. Parts of Tacitus. Parts of Russell's Modern Europe.	Euclid, III.—VI. Simple and Quadratic Equations, Plane Trigonometry, Conic Sections.	Parts of Guizot's Histoire de la Révolut. de l'Angleterre, and Mignet's Histoire de la Révolut. Franç.

Every year, immediately before the Christmas holidays, there is a general examination of the whole school in the work that has been done during the preceding half year. A class-paper is printed containing the names of those boys who distinguish themselves; and in order to gain a high place on this paper, it is usual for the boys to read some book in one or more of their several branches of study, in addition to what they have read with the masters in school. In this manner they have an opportunity of reading any work to which their peculiar taste may lead them, and of rendering it available to their distinction in the school.

There are exercises in composition, in Greek and Latin prose, Greek and Latin verse, and English prose, as in other large classical schools. In the subjects given for original composition in the higher forms, there is a considerable variety. Historical descriptions of any remarkable events, geographical descriptions of countries, imaginary speeches and letters, supposed to be spoken or written on some great question or under some memorable circumstances; etymological accounts of words in different languages, and criticisms on different books, are found to offer an advantageous variety to the essays on moral subjects to which boys' prose composition has sometimes been confined.

Three exhibitioners are elected every year by the trustees of the school, on the report of two examiners appointed respectively by the vice-chancellors of Oxford and Cambridge. These exhibitions are of the value of £60 a year, and may be held for seven years at any college at either university, provided the exhibitioner continues to reside at college so long; for they are vacated immediately by non-residence.

One scholar is also elected every year by the masters, after an examination held by themselves. The scholarship is of the value of £25 a year, and is confined to boys under fourteen and a half at the time of their election. It is tenable for six years, if the boy who holds it remains so long at Rugby. But as the funds for these scholarships arise only from the subscriptions of individuals, they are not to be considered as forming necessarily a permanent part of the school foundation.

In any statement of the business of a school, such as has been given above, there will be an unintentional exaggeration, unless the reader makes due allowance for the difference between the theory of any institution and its practical working. But on the other hand, a reader unacquainted with the real nature of a classical education, will be in danger of undervaluing it, when he sees that so large a portion of time at so important a period of human life is devoted to the study of a few ancient writers, whose works seem to have no direct bearing on the

studies and duties of our own generation. For instance, although some provision is undoubtedly made at Rugby for acquiring a knowledge of modern history, yet the History of Greece and Rome is more studied than that of France and England; and Homer and Virgil are certainly much more attended to than Shakspeare and Milton. This appears to many persons a great absurdity; while others who are so far swayed by authority as to believe the system to be right, are yet unable to understand how it can be so.

It may freely be confessed that the first origin of classical education affords in itself no reasons for its being continued now. When Latin and Greek were almost the only written languages of civilized man, it is manifest that they must have furnished the subjects of all liberal education. The question therefore is wholly changed, since the growth of a complete literature in other languages; since France, and Italy, and Germany, and England, have each produced their philosophers, their poets, and their historians, worthy to be placed on the same level with those of Greece and Rome.

But although there is not the *same* reason now which existed three or four centuries ago for the study of Greek and Roman literature, yet there is another no less substantial. Expel Greek and Latin from your schools, and you confine the views of the existing generation to themselves and their immediate predecessors: you will cut off so many centuries of the world's experience, and place us in the same state as if the human race had first come into existence in the year 1500. For it is nothing to say that a few learned individuals might still study classical literature; the effect produced on the public mind would be no greater than that which has resulted from the labours of our oriental scholars; it would not spread beyond themselves, and men in general after a few generations would know as little of Greece and Rome, as they do actually of China and Hindostan. But such an ignorance would be incalculably more to be regretted. With the Asiatic mind, we have no nearer connexion or sympathy than that which is derived from our common humanity. But the mind of the Greek and of the Roman is in all the essential points of its constitution our own; and not only so, but it is our own mind developed to an extraordinary degree of perfection. Wide as is the difference between us with respect to those physical instruments which minister to our uses or our pleasures; although the Greeks and Romans had no steam-engines, no printing-presses, no mariner's compass, no telescopes, no microscopes, no gunpowder; yet in our moral and political views, in those matters which most determine human character, there is a perfect resemblance in these respects. Aristotle, and Plato, and Thucydides, and Cicero,

and Tacitus, are most untruly called ancient writers; they are virtually our own countrymen and contemporaries, but have the advantage which is enjoyed by intelligent travellers, that their observation has been exercised in a field out of the reach of common men; and that having thus seen in a manner with our eyes what we cannot see for ourselves, their conclusions are such as bear upon our own circumstances, while their information has all the charm of novelty, and all the value of a mass of new and pertinent facts, illustrative of the great science of the nature of civilized man.

Now when it is said, that men in manhood so often throw their Greek and Latin aside, and that this very fact shows the uselessness of their early studies, it is much more true to say that it shows how completely the literature of Greece and Rome would be forgotten, if our system of education did not keep up the knowledge of it. But it by no means shows that system to be useless, unless it followed that when a man laid aside his Greek and Latin books, he forgot also all that he had ever gained from them. This, however, is so far from being the case, that even where the results of a classical education are least tangible, and least appreciated even by the individual himself, still the mind often retains much of the effect of its early studies in the general liberality of its tastes and comparative comprehensiveness of its views and notions.

All this supposes, indeed, that classical instruction should be sensibly conducted; it requires that a classical teacher should be fully acquainted with modern history and modern literature, no less than with those of Greece and Rome. What is, or perhaps what used to be, called a mere scholar, cannot possibly communicate to his pupils the main advantages of a classical education. The knowledge of the past is valuable, because without it our knowledge of the present and of the future must be scanty; but if the knowledge of the past be confined wholly to itself, if, instead of being made to bear upon things around us, it be totally isolated from them, and so disguised by vagueness and misapprehension as to appear incapable of illustrating them, then indeed it becomes little better than laborious trifling, and they who declaim against it may be fully forgiven.

To select one instance of this perversion, what can be more absurd than the practice of what is called constructing Greek and Latin, continued as it often is even with pupils of an advanced age? The study of Greek and Latin, considered as mere languages, is of importance mainly as it enables us to understand and employ well that language in which we commonly think, and speak, and write. It does this because Greek and Latin are specimens of language at once highly per-

fect and incapable of being understood without long and minute attention: the study of them, therefore, naturally involves that of the general principles of grammar; while their peculiar excellences illustrate the points which render language clear, and forcible, and beautiful. But our *application* of this general knowledge must naturally be to our own language; to show us what are its peculiarities, what its beauties, what its defects; to teach us by the patterns or the analogies offered by other languages, how the effect which we admire in them may be produced with a somewhat different instrument. Every lesson in Greek or Latin may and ought to be made a lesson in English; the translation of every sentence in Demosthenes or Tacitus is properly an exercise in extemporaneous English composition; a problem how to express with equal brevity, clearness and force, in our own language, the thought which the original author has so admirably expressed in his. But the system of construing, far from assisting, is positively injurious to our knowledge and use of English; it accustoms us to a tame and involved arrangement of our words, and to the substitution of foreign idioms in the place of such as are national; it obliges us to caricature every sentence that we render, by turning what is, in its original dress, beautiful and natural, into something which is neither Greek nor English, stiff, obscure and flat, exemplifying all the faults incident to language, and excluding every excellence.

The exercise of translation, on the other hand, meaning, by translation, the expressing of *an entire sentence* of a foreign language by an entire sentence from our own, as opposed to the rendering separately into English either every separate word, or at most only *parts of the sentence*, whether larger or smaller, the exercise of translation is capable of furnishing improvements to students of every age, according to the measure of their abilities and knowledge. The late Dr. Gabell, than whom in these matters there can be no higher authority, when he was the under-master of Winchester College never allowed even the lowest forms to *construe;* they always were taught, according to his expression, to *read into English.* From this habit even the youngest boys derived several advantages; the meaning of the sentence was more clearly seen when it was read all at once in English, than when every clause or word of English was interrupted by the intermixture of patches of Latin; and any absurdity in the translation was more apparent. Again, there was the habit gained of constructing English sentences upon any given subject, readily and correctly. Thirdly, with respect to Latin itself, the practice was highly useful. By being accustomed to translate idiomatically, a boy, when turning his own thoughts into Latin, was enabled to render his own natural English

into the appropriate expressions in Latin. Having been always accustomed, for instance, to translate "quum venisset" by the participle "having come," he naturally, when he wishes to translate "having come" into Latin, remembers what expression in Latin is equivalent to it. Whereas, if he has been taught to construe literally "when he had come," he never has occasion to use the English participle in his translations from Latin; and when, in his own Latin compositions, he wishes to express it he is at a loss how to do it, and not unfrequently, from the construing notion that a participle in one language must be a participle in another, renders it by the Latin participle passive; a fault which all who have had any experience in boys' compositions must have frequently noticed.

But as a boy advances in scholarship, he ascends from the idiomatic translation of particular expressions to a similar rendering of an entire sentence. He may be taught that the order of the words in the original is to be preserved as nearly as possible in the translation; and the problem is, how to effect this without violating the idiom of his own language. There are simple sentences, such as "Ardeam Rutuli habebant," in which nothing more is required than to change the Latin accusative into the English nominative, and the active verb into one passive or neuter: "Ardea belonged to the Rutulians." And in the same way the other objective cases, the genitive and the dative, when they occur at the beginning of a sentence, may be often translated by the nominative in English, making a corresponding change in the voice of the verb following. But in many instances also the nominative expresses so completely the principal subject of the sentence, that it is unnatural to put it into any other case than the nominative in the translation. "Omnium primum, avidum novæ libertatis populum, ne postmodum flecti precibus aut donis regiis posset, jurejurando adegit [Brutus] neminem Roma passuros regnare." It will not do here to translate "adegit" by a passive verb, and to make Brutus the ablative case, because Brutus is the principal subject of this and the sentences preceding and following it; the historian is engaged in relating his measures. To preserve, therefore, the order of the words, the clause "avidum novæ libertatis populum" must be translated as a subordinate sentence, by inserting a conjunction and verb. "First of all, while the people were set so keenly on their new liberty, to prevent the possibility of their ever being moved from it hereafter by the entreaties or bribes of the royal house, Brutus bound them by an oath, that they would never suffer any man to be king at Rome." Other passages are still more complicated, and require greater taste and command of language

to express them properly; and such will often offer no uninteresting trial of skill, not to the pupil only, but even to his instructor.

Another point may be mentioned, in which the translation of the Greek and Roman writers is most useful in improving a boy's knowledge of his own language. In the choice of his words, and in the style of his sentences, he should be taught to follow the analogy required by the age and character of the writer whom he is translating. For instance, in translating Homer, hardly any words should be employed except Saxon, and the oldest and simplest of those which are of French origin; and the language should consist of a series of simple propositions connected with one another only by the most inartificial conjunctions. In translating the tragedians, the words should be principally Saxon, but mixed with many of French or foreign origin, like the language of Shakspeare, and the other dramatists of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. The term "words of French origin" is used purposely to denote that large portion of our language which, although of Latin derivation, came to us immediately from the French of our Norman conquerors, and thus became a part of the natural spoken language of that mixed people, which grew out of the melting of the Saxon and Norman races into one another. But these are carefully to be distinguished from another class of words equally of Latin derivation, but which have been introduced by learned men at a much later period, directly from Latin books, and have never, properly speaking, formed any part of the genuine national language. These truly foreign words which Johnson used so largely, are carefully to be shunned in the translation of poetry, as being unnatural, and associated only with the most unpoetical period of our literature, the middle of the eighteenth century.

So also, in translating the prose writers of Greece and Rome, Herodotus should be rendered in the style and language of the chroniclers; Thucydides in that of Bacon or Hooker, while Demosthenes, Cicero, Cæsar and Tacitus, require a style completely modern—the perfection of the English language, such as we now speak and write it, varied only to suit the individual differences of the different writers, but in its range of words, and in its idioms, substantially the same.

Thus much has been said on the subject of translation, because the practice of construing has naturally tended to bring the exercise into disrepute: and in the contests for academical honours at both Universities, less and less importance, we have heard, is constantly being attached to the power of *vivâ voce* translation. We do not wonder at any contempt that is shown towards *construing*, the practice being a

mere folly; but it is of some consequence that the value of *translating* should be better understood, and the exercise more carefully attended to. It is a mere chimera to suppose, as many do, that what they call free translation is a convenient cover for inaccurate scholarship. It can only be so through the incompetence or carelessness of the teacher. If the force of every part of the sentence be not fully given, the translation is so far faulty; but idiomatic translation, much more than literal, is an evidence that the translator does see the force of his original; and it should be remembered that the very object of so translating is to preserve the spirit of an author, where it would be lost or weakened by translating literally; but where a literal translation happens to be faithful to the spirit, there of course it should be adopted; and any omission or misrepresentation of any part of the meaning of the original does not preserve its spirit, but, as far as it goes, sacrifices it, and is not to be called "free translation," but rather "imperfect," "blundering," or, in a word, "bad translation."

In the statement of the business of Rugby School which has been given above, one part of it will be found to consist of works of modern history. An undue importance is attached by some persons to this circumstance, and those who would care little to have their sons familiar with the history of the Peloponnesian war are delighted that they should study the Campaigns of Frederic the Great or of Napoleon. Information about modern events is more useful, they think, than that which relates to antiquity; and such information they wish to be given to their children.

This favourite notion of filling boys with useful information is likely, we think, to be productive of some mischief. It is a caricature of the principles of inductive philosophy, which, while it taught the importance of a knowledge of facts, never imagined that this knowledge was of itself equivalent to wisdom. Now it is not so much our object to give boys "useful information," as to facilitate their gaining it hereafter for themselves, and to enable them to turn it to account when gained. The first is to be effected by supplying them on any subject with a skeleton which they may fill up hereafter. For instance, a real knowledge of history in after life is highly desirable; let us see how education can best facilitate the gaining of it. It should begin by impressing on a boy's mind the names of the greatest men of different periods, and by giving him a notion of their order in point of time, and the part of the earth on which they lived. This is best done by a set of pictures bound up together in a volume, such, for instance, as those which illustrated Mrs. Trimmer's little histories, and to which the writer of this

article is glad to acknowledge his own early obligations. Nor could better service be rendered to the cause of historical instruction than by publishing a volume of prints of universal history, accompanied with a very short description of each. Correctness of costume in such prints, or good taste in the drawing, however desirable if they can be easily obtained, are of very subordinate importance: the great matter is that the print should be striking, and full enough to excite and to gratify curiosity. By these means a lasting association is obtained with the greatest names in history, and the most remarkable actions of their lives: while their chronological arrangement is learnt at the same time from the order of the pictures; a boy's memory being very apt to recollect the place which a favourite print holds in a volume, whether it comes towards the beginning, middle, or end, what picture comes before it, and what follows it. Such pictures should contain as much as possible the poetry of history: the most striking characters, the most heroic actions, whether of doing or of suffering; but they should not embarrass themselves with its philosophy, with the causes of revolutions, the progress of society, or the merits of great political questions. Their use is of another kind, to make some great name, and great action of every period, familiar to the mind; that so in taking up any more detailed history or biography, (and education should never forget the importance of preparing a boy to derive benefit from his accidental reading,) he may have some association with the subject of it, and may not feel himself to be on ground wholly unknown to him. He may thus be led to open volumes into which he would otherwise have never thought of looking: he need not read them through—indeed it is sad folly to require either man or boy to read through every book they look at, but he will see what is said about such and such persons or actions; and then he will learn by the way something about other persons and other actions; and will have his stock of associations increased, so as to render more and more information acceptable to him.

After this foundation, the object still being rather to create an appetite for knowledge than to satisfy it, it would be desirable to furnish a boy with histories of one or two particular countries, Greece, Rome, and England, for instance, written at no great length, and these also written poetically much more than philosophically, with much liveliness of style, and force of painting, so as to excite an interest about the persons and things spoken of. The absence of all instruction in politics or political economy, nay even an absolute erroneousness of judgment on such matters, provided always that it involves no wrong principle in morality, are comparatively of slight importance. Let the boy gain, if

possible, a strong appetite for knowledge to begin with; it is a later part of education which should enable him to pursue it sensibly, and to make it, when obtained, wisdom.

But should his education, as is often the case, be cut short by circumstances, so that he never receives its finishing lessons, will he not feel the want of more direct information and instruction in its earlier stages? The answer is, that every thing has its proper season, and if summer be cut out of the year, it is vain to suppose that the work of summer can be forestalled in spring. Undoubtedly, much is lost by this abridgment of the term of education, and it is well to insist strongly upon the evil, as it might, in many instances, be easily avoided. But if it is unavoidable, the evil consequences arising from it cannot be prevented. Fulness of knowledge and sagacity of judgment are fruits not to be looked for in early youth; and he who endeavours to force them does but interfere with the natural growth of the plant, and prematurely exhaust its vigour.

In the common course of things, however, where a young person's education is not interrupted, the later process is one of exceeding importance and interest. Supposing a boy to possess that outline of general history which his prints and his abridgments will have given him, with his associations, so far as they go, strong and lively, and his desire of increased knowledge keen, the next thing to be done is to set him to read some first rate historian, whose mind was formed in, and bears the stamp of, some period of advanced civilization, analogous to that in which we now live. In other words, he should read Thucydides or Tacitus, or any writer equal to them, if such can be found, belonging to the third period of full civilization, that of modern Europe since the middle ages. The particular subject of the history is of little moment, so long as it be taken neither from the barbarian, nor from the romantic, but from the philosophical or civilized stage of human society; and so long as the writer be a man of commanding mind, who has fully imbibed the influences of his age, yet without bearing its exclusive impress. And the study of such a work under an intelligent teacher becomes indeed the key of knowledge and of wisdom: first it affords an example of good historical evidence, and hence the pupil may be taught to notice from time to time the various criteria of a credible narrative, and by the rule of contraries to observe what are the indications of a testimony questionable, suspicious, or worthless. Undue scepticism may be repressed by showing how generally truth has been attained when it has been honestly and judiciously sought; while credulity may be checked by pointing out, on the other hand, how manifold are the errors into which those are betrayed whose intellect or

whose principles have been found wanting. Now too the time is come when the pupil may be introduced to that high philosophy which unfolds "the causes of things." The history with which he is engaged presents a view of society in its most advanced state, when the human mind is highly developed, and the various crises which affect the growth of the political fabric are all overpast. Let him be taught to analyze the subject thus presented to him; to trace back institutions, civil and religious, to their origin; to explore the elements of the national character, as now exhibited in maturity, in the vicissitudes of the nation's fortune, and the moral and physical qualities of its race; to observe how the morals and the mind of the people have been subject to a succession of influences, some accidental, others regular; to see and remember what critical seasons of improvement have been neglected, what besetting evils have been wantonly aggravated by wickedness or folly. In short, the pupil may be furnished as it were with certain formulæ, which shall enable him to read all history beneficially; which shall teach him what to look for in it, how to judge of it, and how to apply it.

Education will thus fulfil its great business, as far as regards the intellect, to inspire it with a desire of knowledge, and to furnish it with power to obtain and to profit by what it seeks for. And a man thus educated, even though he knows no history in detail but that which is called ancient, will be far better fitted to enter on public life than he who could tell the circumstances and the date of every battle and every debate throughout the last century; whose information in the common sense of the term, about modern history, might be twenty times more minute. The fault of systems of classical education in some instances has been, not that they did not teach modern history, but that they did not prepare and dispose their pupils to acquaint themselves with it afterwards; not that they did not attempt to raise an impossible superstructure, but that they did not prepare the ground for the foundation, and put the materials within reach of the builder.

That impatience, which is one of the diseases of the age, is in great danger of possessing the public mind on the subject of education; an unhealthy restlessness may succeed to lethargy. Men are not contented with sowing the seed unless they can also reap the fruit; forgetting how often it is the law of our condition, that "one soweth and another reapeth." It is no wisdom to make boys prodigies of information; but it is our wisdom and our duty to cultivate their faculties each in its season, first the memory and imagination, and then the judgment; to furnish them with the means, and to excite the desire of improving themselves, and to wait with confidence for God's blessing on the result.

THE

DISCIPLINE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

This article appeared in the Quarterly journal of Education of 1835, as a reply to a previous censure in that Miscellany of the "*Flogging* and Fagging" as practised at Winchester School.

LIBERAL principles and popular principles are by no means necessarily the same: and it is of importance to be aware of the difference between them. Popular principles are opposed simply to restraint—liberal principles to unjust restraint. Popular principles sympathize with all who are subject to authority, and regard with suspicion all punishments—liberal principles sympathize, on the other hand, with authority, whenever the evil tendencies of human nature are more likely to be shown in disregarding it than in abusing it. Popular principles seem to have but one object—the deliverance of the many from the control of the few. Liberal principles, while generally favourable to this same object, yet pursue it as a means, not as an end; and therefore they support the subjection of the many to the few under certain circumstances, when the great end, which they steadily keep in view, is more likely to be promoted by subjection than by independence. For the great end of liberal principles is indeed "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," if we understand that the happiness of man consists more in his intellectual well-doing than in his physical; and yet more in his moral and religious excellence than in his intellectual.

It must be allowed, however, that the fault of popular principles, as distinguished from liberal, has been greatly provoked by the long-continued prevalence of principles of authority which are no less illiberal. Power has been so constantly perverted that it has come to be generally suspected. Liberty has been so constantly unjustly restrained, that it has been thought impossible that it should ever be indulged too freely. Popular feeling is not quick in observing the change of times and circumstances: it is with difficulty brought to act against a long-standing evil; but, being once set in motion, it is apt to overshoot its

mark, and to continue to cry out against an evil long after it has disappeared, and the opposite evil is become most to be dreaded. Something of this excessive recoil of feeling may be observed, I think, in the continued cry against the severity of the penal code, as distinguished from its other defects; and the same disposition is shown in the popular clamour against military flogging, and in the complaints which are often made against the existing system of discipline in our schools.

The points which are attacked in this system are two—flogging and fagging; and we will first consider the question of flogging. We have nothing to do with arguments against the excessive or indiscriminate use of such a punishment: it is but idle to attack what no one defends, and what has at present hardly any real existence. The notion of a schoolmaster being a cruel tyrant, ruling only by the terror of the rod, is about as real as the no less terrific image of Bluebeard. The fault of the old system of flogging at Winchester, alluded to in your last Number, was not its cruelty, but its inefficiency; the punishment was so frequent and so slight as to inspire very little either of terror or of shame. In other schools, eighty or a hundred years ago, there may have been a system of cruel severity, but scarcely, I should imagine, within the memory of any one now alive. But the argument against *all* corporal punishment applies undoubtedly to an existing state of things; and this argument, therefore, I shall proceed to consider.

"Corporal punishment," it is said, "is degrading." I well know of what feeling this is the expression; it originates in that proud notion of personal independence which is neither reasonable nor Christian, but essentially barbarian. It visited Europe in former times with all the curses of the age of chivalry, and is threatening us now with those of Jacobinism. For so it is, that the evils of ultra-aristocracy and ultra-popular principles spring precisely from the same source—namely, from selfish pride—from an idolatry of personal honour and dignity in the aristocratical form of the disease—of personal independence in its modern and popular form. It is simply impatience of inferiority and submission—a feeling which must be more frequently wrong or right, in proportion to the relative situation and worthiness of him who entertains it, but which cannot be always or generally right except in beings infinitely more perfect than man. Impatience of inferiority felt by a child towards his parents, or by a pupil towards his instructors, is merely wrong, because it is at variance with the truth: there exists a real inferiority in the relation, and it is an error, a fault, a corruption of nature, not to acknowledge it.

Punishment, then, inflicted by a parent or a master for the purposes of correction, is in no true sense of the word degrading; nor is it the

more degrading for being corporal. To say that corporal punishment is an appeal to personal fear is a mere abuse of terms. In this sense all bodily pain or inconvenience is an appeal to personal fear; and a man should be ashamed to take any pains to avoid the tooth-ache or the gout. Pain is an evil; and the fear of pain, like all other natural feelings, is of a mixed character, sometimes useful and becoming, sometimes wrong and mischievous. I believe that we should not do well to extirpate any of these feelings, but to regulate and check them by cherishing and strengthening such as are purely good. To destroy the fear of pain altogether, even if practicable, would be but a doubtful good, until the better elements of our nature were so perfected as wholly to supersede its use. Perfect love of good is the only thing which can profitably cast out all fear. In the meanwhile, what is the course of true wisdom? Not to make a boy insensible to bodily pain, but to make him dread moral evil more; so that fear will do its proper and appointed work, without so going beyond it as to become cowardice. It is cowardice to fear pain or danger more than neglect of duty, or than the commission of evil; but it is useful to fear them, when they are but the accompaniments or the consequences of folly and of faults.

It is very true that the fear of punishment generally (for surely it makes no difference whether it be the fear of the personal pain of flogging, or of the personal inconvenience of what have been proposed as its substitutes, confinement, and a reduced allowance of food,) is not the highest motive of action; and therefore, the course actually followed in education is most agreeable to nature and reason, that the fear of punishment should be appealed to less and less as the moral principle becomes stronger with advancing age. If any one really supposes that young men in the higher forms of public schools are governed by fear, and not by moral motives; that the appeal is not habitually made to the highest and noblest principles and feelings of their nature, he is too little aware of the actual state of those institutions to be properly qualified to speak or write about them.

With regard to the highest forms, indeed, it is well known that corporal punishment is as totally out of the question in the practice of our schools as it is at the universities; and I believe that there could nowhere be found a set of young men amongst whom punishment of any kind was less frequent, or by whom it was less required. The real point to be considered is merely, whether corporal punishment is in all cases unfit to be inflicted on boys under fifteen, or on those who, being older in years, are not proportionably advanced in understanding or in character, who must be ranked in the lower part of the school, and who are little alive to the feeling of self-respect, and little capable of being

influenced by moral motives. Now, with regard to young boys, it appears to me positively mischievous to accustom them to consider themselves insulted or degraded by personal correction. The fruits of such a system were well shown in an incident which occurred in Paris during the three days of the revolution of 1830. A boy of twelve years old, who had been forward in insulting the soldiers, was noticed by one of the officers; and though the action was then raging, the officer, considering the age of the boy, merely struck him with the flat part of his sword, as the fit chastisement for boyish impertinence. But the boy had been taught to consider his person sacred, and that a blow was a deadly insult; he therefore followed the officer, and having watched his opportunity, took deliberate aim at him with a pistol, and murdered him. This was the true spirit of the savage, exactly like that of Callum Beg in Waverley, who, when a "decent gentleman" was going to chastise him with his cane for throwing a quoit at his shins, instantly drew a pistol to vindicate the dignity of his shoulders. We laugh at such a trait in the work of the great novelist, because, according to our notions, the absurdity of Callum Beg's resentment is even more striking than its atrocity. But I doubt whether to the French readers of Waverley it has appeared either laughable or disgusting; at least the similar action of the real Callum in the streets of Paris was noticed at the time as something entitled to our admiration. And yet what can be more mischievous than thus to anticipate in boyhood those feelings which even in manhood are of a most questionable nature, but which, at an earlier period, are wholly and clearly evil? At an age when it is almost impossible to find a true, manly sense of the degradation of guilt or faults, where is the wisdom of encouraging a fantastic sense of the degradation of personal correction? What can be more false, or more adverse to the simplicity, sobriety, and humbleness of mind which are the best ornament of youth, and offer the best promise of a noble manhood? There is an essential inferiority in a boy as compared with a man, which makes an assumption of equality on his part at once ridiculous and wrong; and where there is no equality, the exercise of superiority implied in personal chastisement cannot in itself be an insult or a degradation.

The total abandonment, then, of corporal punishment for the faults of young boys appears to me not only uncalled for, but absolutely to be deprecated. It is of course most desirable that all punishment should be superseded by the force of moral motives; and up to a certain point this is practicable. All endeavours so to dispense with flogging are the wisdom and the duty of a schoolmaster; and by these means the amount of corporal punishment inflicted may be, and in fact has been,

in more than one instance, reduced to something very inconsiderable. But it is one thing to get rid of punishment by lessening the amount of faults, and another to say, that even if the faults are committed, the punishment ought not to be inflicted. Now it is folly to expect that faults will never occur; and it is very essential towards impressing on a boy's mind the natural imperfectness and subordination of his condition, that his faults and the state of his character being different from what they are in after life, so the nature of his punishment should be different also, lest by any means he should unite the pride and self-importance of manhood with a boy's moral carelessness and low notions of moral responsibility.

The beau-ideal of school discipline with regard to young boys would appear to be this—that whilst corporal punishment was retained on principle as fitly answering to, and marking the naturally inferior state of, boyhood, morally and intellectually, and therefore as conveying no peculiar degradation to persons in such a state, we should cherish and encourage to the utmost all attempts made by the several boys as individuals to escape from the natural punishment of their age by rising above its naturally low tone of principle. While we told them that, as being boys, they were not degraded by being punished as boys, we should tell them also, that in proportion as we saw them trying to anticipate their age morally, so we should delight to anticipate it also in our treatment of them personally—that every approach to the steadiness of principle shown in manhood should be considered as giving a claim to the respectability of manhood—that we should be delighted to forget the inferiority of their age, as they laboured to lessen their moral and intellectual inferiority. This would be a discipline truly generous and wise, in one word, truly Christian—making an increase of dignity the certain consequence of increased virtuous effort, but giving no countenance to that barbarian pride which claims the treatment of a freeman and an equal, while it cherishes all the carelessness, the folly, and the low and selfish principle of a slave.

With regard to older boys, indeed, who yet have not attained that rank in the school which exempts them from corporal punishment, the question is one of greater difficulty. In this case the obvious objections to such a punishment are serious; and the truth is, that if a boy above fifteen is of such a character as to require flogging, the essentially trifling nature of school correction is inadequate to the offence. But in fact boys, after a certain age, who cannot keep their proper rank in a school, ought not to be retained at it; and if they do stay, the question becomes only a choice of evils. For the standard of attainment at a large school being necessarily adapted for no more than

the average rate of capacity, a boy who, after fifteen, continues to fall below it, is either intellectually incapable of deriving benefit from the system of the place, or morally indisposed to do so, and in either case he ought to be removed from it. And as the growth of the body is often exceedingly vigorous where that of the mind is slow, such boys are at once apt for many kinds of evil, and hard to be governed by moral motives, while they have outgrown the fear of school correction. These are fit subjects for private tuition, where the moral and domestic influences may be exercised upon them more constantly and personally than is compatible with the numbers of a large school. Meanwhile such boys, in fact, often continue to be kept at school by their parents, who would regard it as an inconvenience to be required to withdraw them. Now it is superfluous to say, that in these cases corporal punishment should be avoided wherever it is possible; and perhaps it would be best, if for such grave offences as would fitly call for it in younger boys, older boys whose rank in the school renders them equally subject to it, were at once to be punished by expulsion. As it is, the long-continued use of personal correction as a proper school punishment renders it possible to offer the alternative of flogging to an older boy, without subjecting him to any excessive degradation, and his submission to it marks appropriately the greatness and disgraceful character of his offence, while it establishes, at the same time, the important principle, that as long as a boy remains at school, the respectability and immunities of manhood must be earned by manly conduct and a manly sense of duty.

It seems to me, then, that the complaints commonly brought against our system of school discipline are wrong either in their principle or as to the truth of the fact. The complaint against *all* corporal punishment, as degrading and improper, goes, I think, upon a false and mischievous principle: the complaint against governing boys by fear, and mere authority, without any appeal to their moral feelings, is perfectly just in the abstract, but perfectly inapplicable to the actual state of schools in England. I now proceed to make a few remarks upon another part of the system of public schools, which is even less understood than the subject already considered,—I mean the power of fagging.

Now by "the power of fagging," I understand a power given by the supreme authorities of a school to the boys of the highest class or classes in it, to be exercised by them over the lower boys for the sake of securing the advantages of regular government amongst the boys themselves, and avoiding the evils of anarchy,—in other words, of the lawless tyranny of physical strength. This is the simple statement

of the nature and ends of public school fagging—an institution which, like all other government, has been often abused, and requires to be carefully watched, but which is as indispensable to a multitude of boys living together, as government, in like circumstances, is indispensable to a multitude of men.

I have said that fagging is necessary for a multitude of boys when *living together;* for this will show how the system may be required in the public schools of England, and yet be wholly needless in those of Scotland. The great Scotch schools are day-schools—those of England are boarding-schools. Now the difference between these two systems is enormous. In the Scotch schools the boys *live* at their own homes, and are under the government of their own relations; they only meet at school for a certain definite object during a certain portion of the day. But in England the boys, for nearly nine months of the year, live with one another in a distinct society; their school life occupies the whole of their existence; at their studies and at their amusements, by day and by night, they are members of one and the same society, and in closer local neighbourhood with one another than is the case with the ordinary society of grown men. At all those times then, when Scotch boys are living at home with their respective families, English boys are living together amongst themselves alone; and for this their habitual living they require a government. It is idle to say that the masters form, or can form, this government; it is impossible to have a sufficient number of masters for the purpose; for, in order to obtain the advantages of home government, the boys should be as much divided as they are at their respective homes. There should be no greater number of schoolfellows living under one master than of brothers commonly living under one parent; nay, the number should be less, inasmuch as there is wanting that bond of natural affection which so greatly facilitates domestic government, and gives it its peculiar virtue. Even a father with thirty sons, all below the age of manhood, and above childhood, would find it no easy matter to govern them effectually—how much less can a master govern thirty boys, with no natural bond to attach them either to him or to one another? He may indeed superintend their government of one another; he may govern them through their own governors; but to govern them immediately, and at the same time effectively, is, I believe, impossible. And hence, if you have a large *boarding*-school, you cannot have it adequately governed without a system of fagging.

Now, a government among the boys themselves being necessary, the actual constitution of public schools places it in the best possible hands. Those to whom the power is committed, are not simply the

strongest boys, nor the oldest, nor yet the cleverest; they are those who have risen to the highest form in the school—that is to say, they will be probably at once the oldest, and the strongest; and the cleverest; and further, if the school be well ordered, they will be the most respectable in application and general character—those who have made the best use of the opportunities which the school affords, and are most capable of entering into its objects. In short they constitute a real aristocracy, a government of the most worthy, their rank itself being an argument of their deserving. And their business is to keep order amongst the boys; to put a stop to improprieties of conduct, especially to prevent that oppression and ill-usage of the weaker boys by the stronger which is so often ignorantly confounded with a system of fagging. For all these purposes a general authority over the rest of the school is given them; and in some schools they have the power, like the masters, of enforcing this authority by impositions, that is, by setting tasks to be written out or learnt by heart for any misbehaviour. And this authority is exercised over all those boys who are legally subject to it, that is, over all below a certain place in the school, whatever be their age or physical strength; so that many boys who, if there were no regular fagging, would by mere physical force be exercising power over their schoolfellows, although from their idleness, ignorance, and low principle they might be most unfit to do so, are now not only hindered from tyrannizing over others, but are themselves subject to authority—a most wholesome example, and one particularly needed at school, that mere physical strength, even amongst boys, is not to enjoy an ascendancy. Meanwhile this governing part of the school, thus invested with great responsibility, treated by the masters with great confidence and consideration, and being constantly in direct communication with the head-master, and receiving their instruction almost exclusively from him, learn to feel a corresponding self-respect in the best sense of the term; they look upon themselves as answerable for the character of the school, and by the natural effect of their position acquire a manliness of mind and habits of conduct infinitely superior, generally speaking, to those of young men of the same age who have not enjoyed the same advantages.

What becomes then of those terrible stories of cruelty which inspire so many parents with horror at the very name of fagging; or what shall we say of that very representation of the fagging at Winchester, which appeared in the last Number of your Journal? It is confessed, indeed, in a subsequent page of that Number, that your correspondent's representation is not applicable to the present state of Winchester. Would it not then have been fairer to have inserted in

the running title of the article, "Flogging and Fagging at Winchester," the words "as formerly practised?" But, indeed, even as describing a past state of things, there is surely some confusion in the statement. It is important to distinguish such acts of oppression as belong properly to the system of fagging, from such as arise merely from superior physical force, and consequently exist as much, I believe, a thousand times more, in those schools where there is no legal fagging. For instance, your correspondent complains of the tyranny practised at Winchester at bed-time, "tossing in the blanket, tying toes, bolstering, &c." These, indeed, are most odious practices, but what have they to do with fagging? I have known them to exist at private schools, where there was no fagging, to a degree of intolerable cruelty. In college, at Winchester, where there were two or three præfects in every chamber, I scarcely remember them to have been practised at all during the period of which I can speak from my own experience. And this is natural; for the boys who delight in this petty tyranny are very rarely to be found amongst the oldest in a school, and still less amongst those who have raised themselves to the highest rank in it: they are either middle-aged boys, from fourteen to sixteen, or such older boys as never distinguish themselves for any good, and who, never rising high in the school, are by a system of fagging, and by that only, restrained from abusing their size and strength in tyranny. Other abuses which your correspondent mentions, such as toasting, lighting fires, &c., arise so far from a system of fagging, that this system, when ill-regulated, allows a certain well-defined class of boys to exact services which otherwise would be exacted merely by the strongest. But I said, what every one must be aware of, that the government of boys, like every other government, requires to be watched, or it will surely be guilty of abuses. Those menial offices which were exacted from the juniors at Winchester were only required of them because the attendance of servants was so exceedingly insufficient, and the accommodations of the boys in many particulars so greatly neglected. If you do not provide servants to clean the boys' shoes, to provide them with water of a morning, or to wait on them at their meals, undoubtedly the more powerful among them, whether the power be natural or artificial, will get these things done for them by the weaker; but supply the proper attendance, and all this ceases immediately. There will remain many miscellaneous services, such as watching for balls at cricket or fives, carrying messages, &c., which servants undoubtedly cannot be expected always to perform, and which yet belong to that general authority vested in the boys of the highest form. They belong to that general authority, and are

therefore now claimed as rightfully due; but if there were no such authority, they would be claimed by the stronger from the weaker. For I assume it as a certain fact, that if you have two or three hundred boys living with one another as a distinct society, there will be some to command, as in all other societies, and others to obey: the only difference is, that the present system first of all puts the power into the best hands; and, secondly, by recognizing it as legal, is far better able to limit its exercise and to prevent its abuses, than it could be if the whole were a mere irregular dominion of the stronger over the weaker.

There is another thing, which to those who are acquainted with schools, will seem of no small importance. Leave a number of boys together as legally equal, and the irregular tyranny exercised under these circumstances by every stronger boy over every weaker one, has so far the sanction of the public opinion of the school, that any individual sufferer would be utterly afraid to complain of his ill-usage to the master. But give one class a legal superiority over the rest, and an abuse of power on their part is no longer received with sympathy; and the boy who were to complain of it to the master, instead of being hated as an informer, would rather be regarded by the mass of his companions as an asserter of their common liberties. Now to those who consider the difficulty of getting boys to complain of ill-usage where public opinion condemns the complaining, it will appear an immense security against oppression, that it may be denounced without incurring general odium; and such I fear is the Jacobinical spirit of human nature, that this can never be the case unless the oppression proceed from one invested with *legal* authority.

For my own part, however, I am not one of those who think it an evil that younger or less manly boys should be subject legally to those more advanced in age and in character. Such subjection is not degrading, for it is rendered not to an arbitrary, but to a real superiority; it is shown to a power exercised in the main not for its own good, but for that of the society as a whole. Neither do I regard it as oppressive; for the degree and kind of obedience enforced under a well-regulated system of fagging is beneficial to those who pay it. A strict system is not therefore a cruel one; and the discipline to which boys are thus subjected, and the quickness, handiness, thoughtfulness, and punctuality, which they learn from some of the services required of them, are no despicable part of education. Many a man who went from Winchester to serve in the Peninsula in the course of the last war must have found his school experience and habits no bad preparation for the activity and hardships of a campaign; not only in the mere power of

endurance, but in the helpfulness and independence which his training as a junior had given him. When your correspondent talks of the servility encouraged by the system of fagging, and gravely imputes to this cause what he calls the characteristic servility of English gentlemen, the cause appears to me as wrongly assigned as I think the supposed result imaginary.

The real servility which exists in England, whether amongst men or boys, is not an excessive deference for legal authority, but a surrender of individual judgment and conscience to the tyranny of public opinion. This tyranny exists in schools to a fatal degree; but it is not exercised chiefly by those who have the power of fagging, and far less in virtue of that power; on the contrary, the boys of the highest form are the only corrective of it, and so far as they contribute to it, it is not owing to the power which distinguishes them from the other boys, but to that imperfection of age and judgment which, to a certain degree, they share in common with them. Great, indeed, is this evil; but it is one arising almost inevitably from the circumstances of a *boarding*-school, namely, that it is a society wholly composed of persons whose state, morally and intellectually, is, by reason of their age, exceedingly imperfect.

It is this which renders it so difficult to make a large school a place of Christian education. For while, on the one hand, the boys stand to their masters in the relation of pupils to a teacher, they form, on the other hand, a complete society amongst themselves; and the individual boys, while influenced by him in the one relation, are unhappily in the other more influenced by that whole of which they are members, and which affects them in a much larger portion of their lives. And how can this influence be of a Christian character, when the perfect impression of Christianity cannot possibly be received by any society which is not in the highest state of advancement? by all others it is either taken incorrectly, or repelled altogether: they can but exhibit that mixture of superstition and profaneness which characterized the semi-barbarous societies of the middle ages; a mixture as unfavourable to the development of man's highest excellence, as Christianity purely imbibed is favourable to it, and indispensable.

The stress of this remark, however, applies to a *society* in a low moral state, and not to an individual. Boys in their own families, as the members of the natural and wholesome society of their father's household, may receive its lessons, and catch its spirit, and learn at a very early age to estimate right and wrong truly. But a society formed exclusively of boys, that is, of elements each separately weak and imperfect, becomes more than an aggregate of their several defects: the amount of evil in the mass is more than the sum of the evil in the indi-

viduals; it is aggravated in its character, while the amount of good, on the contrary, is less in the mass than in the individuals, and its effect greatly weakened.

Now this being the case, and the very fact of a *boarding*-school involving the existence of such an unfavourable state of society, he who wishes really to improve public education would do well to direct his attention to this point; and to consider how there can be infused into a society of boys such elements as, without being too dissimilar to coalesce thoroughly with the rest, shall yet be so superior as to raise the character of the whole. It would be absurd to say that any school has as yet fully solved this problem. I am convinced, however, that in the peculiar relation of the highest form to the rest of the boys, such as it exists in our great public schools, there is to be found the best means of answering it. This relation requires in many respects to be improved in its character; some of its features should be softened, others elevated: but here and here only is the engine which can effect the end desired; and if *boarding*-schools are to be cleared of their most besetting faults and raised in all that is excellent, it must be done by a judicious improvement; but most assuredly not by the abolition of the system of authorized fagging.

POETRY OF COMMON LIFE.

This Essay is the Preface to Mr. Platt's Collection of Poems, entitled, "The Poetry of Common Life."

There is a ridiculous character in one of Molière's French plays, who is represented as going to school in his old age to acquaint himself with the very first rudiments of learning. He is particularly struck with the explanations given him of the words "Verse" and "Prose," and cannot enough express his astonishment that he should have been talking "Prose" all his life, without ever being aware of it.

This feeling, caricatured as it may seem, is exactly what many persons entertain with regard to poetry. They look upon it as a thing quite remote from common life and common people, and would be utterly surprised to hear that they themselves have most certainly been many times in a state of mind completely poetical; and, in all probability have often, like Molière's *Monsieur Jourdain*, spoken in poetical language without being aware of it, just as he had been talking prose.

Much mischief has arisen from this false impression. The most natural thing in the world has been regarded as the most artificial; and one of the most ennobling pleasures of the human mind, and at the same time, one most within the reach of every one, has been thought to belong almost exclusively to the rich, like the luxuries of the table, or the splendour of a great establishment. Nor is this merely owing to aristocratical pride in the richer classes, or to their wish to keep a monopoly of enjoyment to themselves. It arises out of a real honest ignorance of the nature of poetry, and of the almost universal capacity of taking delight in it; for there is no doubt that Mr. Cobbett would go along with the highest aristocrat in laughing at the notion of the poor reading poetry; not because he would think them not fit to enjoy it, but because he would consider it as not fit to be studied by them: he would regard it as a mere rich man's toy, which none but the idle, or the silly, would hold it worth their while to study.

No error has ever arisen without something to make it less absurd than we might at first sight suppose it. In the present case it has

accidentally happened that the language of poetry for many years in this country *was* quite unnatural, and the subjects to which it was confined were not capable of exciting general interest. And not in this country only, but in many others, as the rich had most means of rewarding the writers of poetry, so it was naturally made suitable to their tastes; and the subjects chosen, and the style in which they were treated, were both adapted to the turn of mind of the richer classes; and for that very reason—such has been the unhappy separation between the different parts of society—they have been less agreeable and less intelligible to the mass of the community.

But this does not make it less true that poetry, in itself, may be one of the most universal pleasures of mankind. By *poetry* we mean certain feelings expressed in certain language. *Poetical feelings* are merely, in other words, all the highest and purest feelings of our nature,—feelings, therefore, which, considering what we generally are, cannot but be of rare occurrence. It has been truly said, that

> "Our better mind,
> Is like a Sunday's garment, then put on
> When we have nought to do,—but at our work
> We wear a worse for thrift."

Our common temper, therefore, which is but too generally cold, and selfish, and worldly, is altogether unpoetical; but let any thing occur to put us above ourselves, any thing to awaken our devotion, our admiration, or our love—any danger to call forth our courage, any distress to awaken our pity, any great emergency to demand the sacrifice of our own comfort, or interest, or credit, for the sake of others, then we experience for the time a *poetical temper*, and *poetical feelings*; for the very essence of poetry is, that it exalts and ennobles us, and puts us into a higher state of mind than that which we are commonly living in.

Such, then, being *poetical feelings*, we shall soon see what is meant by *poetical language*. Our words, our style, nay our very tone of voice, naturally vary according to the temper of our minds. When we are feeling any strong passion it instantly alters our manner of speaking from that which we practise on common occasions. It clears away all that is mean and vulgar, all that is dull and tiresome in our language; and renders it at once spirited, noble, and pithy. The mind being highly excited, becomes more than usually active; it catches with great quickness every impression given by surrounding objects; it seizes rapidly every point in which they may seem to express sympathy with its own feelings. Hence its language is full of images

and comparisons; it is unusually rich and beautiful, that is, it crowds together a number of ideas in a short space, and expresses them in the most lively manner, because its conception of them is keen and vivid. The very tone of the voice is altered, it becomes more rapid and animated, and the flow of our words is less broken, and more measured and musical, than in common unexcited conversation. This will be understood in a moment by just turning to the poetical parts of the Bible: for instance, let any one observe the difference between the two first chapters of the Book of Job, which contain the mere story, and those which immediately follow them. He will find his tone and manner of reading, if he be reading aloud, change instantly in going from the second chapter to the third. *Poetical language* is in truth the language of excited feeling; and this is what was meant by saying that as every man has been in a poetical state of mind at some time or other of his life, so almost every man must, in some degree, however imperfect, have expressed himself on such occasions in poetical language.

This is what may be called the natural history of poetry, showing the elements in nature out of which it arose. Here, as in all other cases, art came to imitate nature; the pleasure of excitement is notorious to every one; and poetry in the common sense of the word, is an artificial means of producing this pleasure, by presenting us with exciting feelings expressed in exciting language. Hence arose the invention of verse, partly in imitation of that flowing and harmonious language which is natural to us when speaking under the influence of strong feeling; partly to create an additional excitement by the effect of an harmonious arrangement of sounds. But the oldest known poetry, which is that contained in the Old Testament, was not written in any regular metre or verse; nor is verse essential to the nature of poetry, although the almost universal practice of later times has made us think it so.

It is manifest, from what has been said, how the various sorts and styles of poetry have arisen. For, though all men have the same feelings, yet at different times, and in different classes of society, some feelings will be predominant over others: nor will the same feelings always be excited exactly in the same way. For instance a very rude people will be most delighted by the poetry which tells of the warlike actions of their fathers; a religious people will be most fond of devotional poetry; a people in a very high state of refinement will enjoy a poetry which goes deeply into the workings of our minds and affections, and awakens feelings absolutely unintelligible to men in a less advanced condition. But although all persons may thus be unable to

enjoy the same poetry, yet every one would enjoy poetry of some kind or other, if he could meet with any of the kind suitable to his own case—that is, if it was addressed to those feelings which are most alive within his own breast, and expressed in language which he could understand.

The more extensive our knowledge of men and things, and the greater the activity of our minds and the liveliness of our feelings, so much the more universal will be our pleasure in poetry; inasmuch as we shall be able to enter into the notions, and to sympathize with a greater number of poets of different descriptions, ages, and countries. For to like only one sort of excellence is the sure mark of an imperfectly educated mind; it likes one sort only, because it only knows and understands one sort.

Meanwhile, the object of the present collection is at once to gratify the taste of a large class of readers, and to improve it. The poetry here presented to them speaks to those universal feelings which we all have in common, as men and as Englishmen. None can find it too hard for them; while at the same time, the poems here selected are the productions of minds at once so vigorous and so cultivated, that every reader will find in them something to strengthen his understanding, and to enrich it—something whose beauty will rise on his contemplation of it, at once exciting greater efforts of mind on his part and rewarding them.

The works of great poets require to be approached at the outset with a full faith in their excellence: the reader must be convinced that if he does not fully admire them, it is his fault, and not theirs. This is no more than a just tribute to their reputation; in other words, it is the proper modesty of an individual thinking his own unpractised judgment more likely to be mistaken than the concurring voice of the public. It is the property of the greatest works of genius in other departments also, that a first view of them is generally disappointing; and if a man were foolish enough to go away trusting more to his own hasty impressions than to the deliberate judgment of the world, he would remain continually as blind and ignorant as he was at the beginning. The cartoons of Raphael, at Hampton Court Palace—the frescoes of the same great painter in the galleries of the Vatican at Rome—the famous statues of the Laocoon and the Apollo Belvidere—and the Church of St. Peter at Rome, the most magnificent building perhaps in the world—all alike are generally found to disappoint a person on his first view of them. But let him be sure that they are excellent, and that he only wants the knowledge and the taste to appreciate them properly, and every succeeding sight of them will open his eyes

more and more, till he learns to admire them, not indeed as much as they deserve, but so much as greatly to enrich and enlarge his own mind, by becoming acquainted with such perfect beauty. So it is with great poets: they must be read often and studied reverently, before an unpractised mind can gain any thing like an adequate notion of their excellence. Meanwhile, the process is in itself most useful: it is a good thing to doubt our own wisdom, it is a good thing to believe, it is a good thing to admire. By continually looking upwards, our minds will themselves grow upwards; and as a man, by indulging in habits of scorn and contempt for others, is sure to descend to the level of what he despises, so the opposite habits of admiration and enthusiastic reverence for excellence impart to ourselves a portion of the qualities which we admire; and here, as in every thing else, humility is the surest path to exaltation.

EDUCATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES.

This Essay includes two letters published in the Sheffield Courant, 1832.

We all are aware of the growing power of the middling classes of society, and we know that the Reform Bill will increase and consolidate it. But power, like every other gift bestowed upon us by God's Providence, is not a mere gratuity, but a trust. It is given us to do good with it; and, therefore, it is far better both for ourselves and others that we should not possess it at all, than that we should not know how to use it.

There is one party in the country who wish the mass of the people to be shut out from political power, and who maintain, their belief agreeing with their wish, that the people will never be fit to exercise it. Another party triumphs in the prospect of the increased power of the mass of the community, without seeming to care whether it be fitted to discharge so important a trust or no. Now I am earnestly desirous that the people should grow jointly in power and true knowledge; but at the same time I should regard their power as the worst of evils, if true knowledge were not to accompany it.

It seems to me, then, that the education of the middling classes at this time, is a question of the greatest national importance. I wish exceedingly to draw public attention to it; and to impress most strongly on those engaged in conducting it, the difficulty of their task, as well as its vast importance; how loudly it calls for their very best exertions, and how nobly those exertions, wisely directed, may hope to be rewarded.

The schools for the richer classes are almost universally conducted by the clergy; and the clergy have the superintendence of the parochial schools for the poorer classes. But between these two extremes there is a great multitude of what are called English, or commercial schools, at which a large porportion of the sons of farmers and of tradesmen receive their education. In some instances these are foundation schools, and the master is appointed by, and answerable to, the trustees of the charity; but more commonly they are private undertakings, entered upon by individuals as a means of providing for themselves and their families. There is now no restriction upon the exer-

cise of the business of a schoolmaster, and no enquiry made as to his qualifications. The old provision which rendered it unlawful for any man to teach without obtaining a license from the bishop of the diocese, has naturally and necessarily fallen into disuse; and as the government for the last century has thought it right to leave the moral and religious interests of the people nearly to themselves, an impracticable restriction was suffered to become obsolete; but nothing was done to substitute in its place one that should be at once practicable and beneficial.

Now, in schools conducted by the clergy, the parents have this security, that the man to whom they commit their children has been at least regularly educated, and generally speaking, that he must be a man of decent life. And if I mistake not, it is merely the prevalence of the feeling that this is so, which has in point of fact given to the clergy nearly the whole education of the richer classes. A man who was not in orders might open a school for the sons of rich parents, but he would find it very difficult to get pupils. This state of things has been converted into an accusation against the clergy, by some pretended liberal writers; but it is evidently a most honourable tribute to that union of intellectual and moral qualifications which, in spite of individual exceptions, still distinguishes the clergy as a body. A layman, who had obtained academical distinctions, would have the same testimony to his intellectual fitness, that a clergyman could boast of, but these distinctions prove nothing as to a man's moral character; whereas, it is felt justly, that the profession of a clergyman affords to a great extent an evidence of moral fitness also: not certainly as implying any high pitch of positive virtue, but insuring at least, in common cases, the absence of gross vice; as affording a presumption in short that a man is disposed to be good, and that his faults will be rather those of deficient practice than of habitual carelessness of principle.

But the masters of our English or commercial schools labour under this double disadvantage, that not only their moral but their intellectual fitness must be taken upon trust. I do not mean that this is at all their fault; still less do I say, that they are not fit actually for the discharge of their important duties: but it is a disadvantage to them that their fitness can only be known after trial,—they have no evidence of it to offer beforehand. They feel this inconvenience themselves, and their pupils feel it also; opportunities for making known their proficiency are wanting alike to both. It has long been the reproach of our law, that it has no efficient *secondary punishments*: it is no less true, that we have no regular system of *secondary education*. The classical schools throughout the country have Universities to look to. Distinc-

tion at school prepares the way for distinction at college ; and distinction at college is again the road to distinction and emolument as a teacher. It is a passport with which a young man enters life with advantage, either as a tutor or as a schoolmaster. But any thing like local Universities,—any so much as local distinction or advancement in life held out to encourage exertion at a commercial school, it is as yet vain to look for. Thus the business of education is degraded : for a schoolmaster of a commercial school having no means of acquiring a general celebrity, is rendered dependent on the inhabitants of his own immediate neighbourhood ; if he offends them, he is ruined. This greatly interferes with the maintenance of discipline ; the boys are well aware of their parents' power, and complain to them against the exercise of their master's authority ;—nor is it always that the parents themselves can resist the temptation of showing their own importance, and giving the master to understand that he must be careful how he ventures to displease them.

It is manifest that this disadvantage cannot be overcome by the mere efforts of those on whom it presses : the remedy required must be on a larger scale. That the evil occasioned by it is considerable, I can assert with confidence. Submission and diligence are so naturally unwelcome to a boy, that they whose business it is to enforce them have need of a vantage ground to stand upon. They should command the respect of their scholars, not only by their personal qualities but by their position in society. They should be able to encourage diligence, by pointing out some distinct and desirable reward to which it may attain. For this the interference of Government seems to me indispensable, in order to create a national and systematic course of proceeding, instead of the mere feeble efforts of individuals ; to provide for the middling classes something analogous to the advantages afforded to the richer classes by our great public schools and Universities. Meanwhile it may not be amiss to consider what is the course of education actually followed in the generality of commercial schools, and what are the improvements of which it is susceptible.

I believe it often happens, that boys in the lowest form of a commercial school require absolutely to be taught to read. They have been neglected at home in their earliest years, till when they come to eleven or twelve years of age, their friends find themselves obliged to send them to school ; forgetting however, that owing to their own neglect, what ought to be the work of seven or eight years has now to be completed as it can within three or four. But supposing a boy able to read and write, his education, properly so called, then commences. He receives instruction in arithmetic, history, and geography ; in English

grammar, and in composition. The rudiments of physical science, carried on to a greater or less degree of advancement, are also taught him; and with a view to his particular business in life, he learns land surveying, if he is to be brought up to agricultural pursuits; or book-keeping, if he is intended for trade. His religious instruction varies probably more than any thing else, according to the personal character of his instructor, the line of study here being much less clearly marked out, except to a man who is himself in earnest as to its importance. Sometimes the boys are required to analyse grammatically any sentence in an English book, and to give the derivations of the several words in it, just as boys at classical schools are called upon to do in Greek and Latin. And doubtless there may be many commercial schools, especially in the manufacturing districts, where the course of study far surpasses what is here given, and where the instruction on scientific subjects, in chemistry, and in mechanics, is carried to a high degree of proficiency.

But I confess that this is not the point upon which I feel much anxiety. I have little doubt that boys will be sufficiently taught all that they require for their particular calling: and scientific knowledge is so generally valued, and confers a power so immediately felt, that I think its diffusion may safely be reckoned on. This, however, has nothing to do with the knowledge which the Reform Bill calls for. A man may be ever so good a chemist, or ever so good a mechanic, or ever so good an engineer, and yet not at all the fitter to enjoy the elective franchise. And if we call a people educated who possess only scientific or physical knowledge, we practically misapply the term: for though such knowledge be a very good education, as far as a man's trade or livelihood is concerned, yet, in a political sense, and as a qualification for the exercise of political power, it is no education at all. The distinction requires to be stated more fully.

Every man, from the highest to the lowest, has two businesses; the one his own particular profession or calling, be it what it will, whether that of soldier, seaman, farmer, lawyer, mechanic, labourer, &c.—the other his general calling, which he has in common with all his neighbours, namely, the calling of a citizen and a man. The education which fits him for the first of these two businesses, is called professional; that which fits him for the second, is called liberal. But because every man must do this second business, whether he does it well or ill, so people are accustomed to think that it is learnt more easily. A man who has learnt it indifferently seems, notwithstanding, to get through life with tolerable comfort; he may be thought not to be very wise or very agreeable, yet he manages to get married, and to bring

up a family, and to mix in society with his friends and neighbours. Whereas, a man who has learnt his other business indifferently, I mean, his particular trade or calling, is in some danger of starving outright. People will not employ an indifferent workman when good ones are to be had in plenty; and, therefore, if he has learnt his particular business badly, it is likely that he will not be able to practise it at all.

Thus it is that while ignorance of a man's special business is instantly detected, ignorance of his great business as a man and a citizen is scarcely noticed, because there are so many who share in it. Thus we see every one ready to give an opinion about politics, or about religion, or about morals, because it is said these are every man's business. And so they are; and if people would learn them as they do their own particular business, all would do well: but never was the proverb more fulfilled which says, that every man's business is no man's. It is worse indeed than if it were no man's; for now it is every man's business to meddle in, but no man's to learn. This general ignorance does not make itself felt directly,—if it did, it were more likely to be remedied: but the process is long and round about; false notions are entertained and acted upon; prejudices and passions multiply; abuses become manifold; difficulty and distress at last press on the whole community; whilst the same ignorance which produced the mischief now helps to confirm it or to aggravate it, because it hinders them from seeing where the root of the whole evil lay, and sets them upon some vain attempt to correct the consequences, while they never think of curing, because they do not suspect the cause.

I believe it is generally the case, at least in the agricultural districts, that a boy is taken away from school at fourteen. He is taken away, less than half educated, because his friends want him to enter upon his business in life without any longer delay. That is, the interests of his great business as a man are sacrificed to the interest of his particular business as a farmer or a tradesman. And yet very likely the man who cares so little about political knowledge, is very earnest about political power, and thinks that it is most unjust if he has no share in the election of members of the legislature. I do not blame any one for taking his son from school at an early age when he is actually obliged to do so, but I fear that in too many instances there is no sense entertained of the value of education, beyond its fitting a boy for his own immediate business in life: and until this be altered for the better, I do not see that we are likely to grow much wiser, or that though political power may pass into different hands, that it will be exercised more purely or sensibly than it has been.

"But the newspapers—they are cheap and ready instructors in po-

litical knowledge, from whom all may, and all are willing to learn." A newspaper writer, addressing a newspaper editor, must not speak disrespectfully of that with which they are themselves concerned; but *we* know, and every honest man connected with a newspaper would confess also, that our instruction is often worse than useless to him who has never had any other. We suppose that our readers have some knowledge and some principles of their own; and adapt our language to them accordingly. I am afraid that we in many cases suppose this untruly; and the wicked amongst our fraternity make their profit out of their readers' ignorance, by telling them that they are wise. Instruction must be regular and systematic; whereas a newspaper must give the facts of the day or the week,—and if it were to overload these with connected essays upon general principles, it would not be read. Assuredly he who does honestly want to gain knowledge, will not go to a newspaper to look for it.

Real knowledge, like every thing else of the highest value, is not to be obtained so easily. It must be worked for,—studied for,—thought for,—and *more than all*, it must be prayed for. That is education which lays the foundation of such habits, and as far as a boy's early age will allow, gives them their proper exercise.

EARLY ROMAN HISTORY.

This Disquisition was first published in the London Quarterly Review, for June, 1825—as a critique on "NIEBUHR'S "*History of Rome;*" WACHSMUTH'S "*Inquiry into the early History of the Roman State,*" and CREUZER'S "*Sketch of Roman Antiquities.*"

WE have a great deal to learn respecting the literature of Germany; and there is a great deal in it which is well worth our learning. Of the works whose titles we have prefixed to this article, the first has been published more than twelve years, and the second nearly six; all of them are written with great ability and extraordinary learning; and the history of Niebuhr, in particular, has thrown new light upon our knowledge of Roman affairs, to a degree, of which those who are unacquainted with it, can scarcely form an adequate notion.

Niebuhr, whose name stands at the head of our paper, is a son of the celebrated traveller, whose merits are well known in this country. In the two volumes which he has hitherto published, he has carried the History of Rome no farther than to the dictatorship of Q. Publilius Philo, in the year of Rome 416. When he had thus far completed his task, he heard of the discovery of Cicero's Treatise de Republicâ, in the library of the Vatican; and he suspended the prosecution of his labours, in the full expectation that the work of such a writer upon such a subject, would furnish him with new and valuable information, more than sufficient to reward him for waiting for it. He had been previously appointed minister for the court of Berlin at Rome; and being thus on the spot while the newly discovered treatise was preparing for publication, he rendered considerable assistance to its editor, by giving him several conjectural corrections of the text and drawing up an index to the work. But he found out too late, that his hopes of deriving from it any new lights on the history of the Roman constitution had been completely delusive; and we learn, from a pamphlet which he published in *1823, that he was then intending to resume his labours

* Uber die Nachrich tvon den Comitien der Centurien im zweyten Buch Ciceros de Republicâ. Bonn, 1823.

without delay, so that we hope ere long to welcome the appearance of another volume.

The two volumes, however, which are already before the world, produced a strong sensation in Germany upon their first publication. Those who had been in the habit of studying the history of Rome, were surprised to find how much had hitherto escaped their researches, and still more, to see the materials which had been long at their disposal, employed for the first time in the construction of an edifice, whose different parts were in harmony with each other, and combined to form one consistent whole. Yet it was almost impossible that any man, however splendid his genius, should at once open a new path in ancient literature, and pursue it so thoroughly and so unerringly as to leave nothing to be done by those who should come after him. Thus, fully sharing in the general admiration excited by Niebuhr's history, the author of the second of the works before us, perceived that his own inquiries in the same field were not altogether superseded. In following the footsteps of his predecessor, he has in many points corrected his errors, while to the soundness of his views in general he has borne most weighty and honourable testimony. We have joined Creuzer's Sketch of Roman Antiquities to the Histories of Niebuhr and Wachsmuth, as it is by far the most valuable work within our knowledge on the subject of which it treats, and confirms their statements with a sanction rendered valuable by the great and deserved reputation of its author.

"An account of the ancient Romans," says Dr. Johnson,* "as it cannot nearly interest any present reader, and must be drawn from writings that have been long known, can owe its value only to the language in which it is delivered, and the reflections with which it is accompanied." Johnson, like many other men who delight in laying down general positions, and in exerting their reasoning powers in the deduction of inferences from them, was impatient of the slow process of historical induction, and devoted his mind to the study of human nature in the characters of individuals, in which some general and practical principle was attainable with far less labour. What he disliked, he neglected; and so limited are the greatest human faculties, that of that which we neglect, we must be contented to be ignorant. In Johnson's eyes, Goldsmith was a good historian; and as Livy and Plutarch had long been known to the world, he supposed that we were already in possession of all the facts of Roman history. But with regard to the earlier parts of that history, men who were accustomed to examine

* In his Review of Blackwell's Memoirs of the Court of Augustus, published in the second volume of his works, p. 375. 8vo edit. 1806.

evidence had already expressed their scepticism before his time. M. Beaufort had asserted the total uncertainty of the common accounts of the early ages of Rome; and Hooke, in attempting to answer him, had only furnished additional proof of his own unfitness for the office of an historian. In our own times, and in our own country, the number of those who agree with Beaufort has, no doubt, considerably increased; but while they treat the common narrative of Livy and Dionysius with deserved contempt, nothing has been attempted to be substituted in its room; and the mass of readers, not liking to leave so large a blank in their course of historical study, have continued to read, and to quote, and to believe, the story which has been handed down to them. In this state of things, the unbelieving party has shown itself, as usual, just as indolent, and just as unphilosophical, as the credulous. Niebuhr, however, saw what was the duty of an historian, and set himself resolutely and ably to perform it. He examined every ancient author in whose works anything was to be found illustrative of the antiquities of Rome; the writings of Festus, Nonius, and the other grammarians, are full of fragments of those early Roman historians who flourished in the sixth and the beginning of the seventh century of Rome; and in whose days many memorials of the ancient state of the different people of Italy were yet in existence, which were subsequently lost amidst the devastation of the Social War, and of its bloodier continuation, the contest between Sylla and the Marian faction.* These same early writers are often also quoted by name by Dionysius, and sometimes by Livy and Plutarch; and the fragments of respectable testimony which may be thus collected, are the first materials which we must use in forming what may really deserve the name of a history of the period in question. Next to these in value, are the great historians and philosophers of the golden age of Grecian literature: Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, and above all, Aristotle. None of these writers, indeed, have ever mentioned the name of Rome; and no one, therefore, before Niebuhr, had ever thought of looking to them for information with respect to Roman history. But they describe with perfect knowledge a state of society similar in many respects to that which existed in Italy before the Romans had conquered the whole peninsula, and which had entirely passed away long before the time of Augustus. The nature of the confederacies between a powerful state

* The principal of these are M. Cato, the Censor, who died at an advanced age, A. U. C. 604; L. Cincius Alimentus, who flourished during the second Punic war, and was once a prisoner in Hannibal's camp; and L. Cælius Antipater, a contemporary of the Gracchi. Ennius may be added in respect of his Annals, who was born A. U. C. 515, and died A. U. C. 584.

and a number of smaller ones, which was so marked a feature in the political relations of antiquity, is displayed most clearly and fully by Thucydides and Xenophon; while all the ancient principles of government, the varieties of aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy; the favourite maxims and policy of each, their invariable connection with the particular kind of military force predominant in each different country, and the course of revolutions to which they were severally most liable, are recorded with matchless diligence and sagacity in the Politics of Aristotle. No man ever understood more thoroughly the use of induction in the discovery of truth than the great author of the doctrine of Syllogisms. His mind was as patient and well-disciplined as it was acúte and original; and his opinions and reasonings on laws, constitutions, and political economy, were founded not on fanciful speculations, but on an immense collection of the antiquities and forms of government of one hundred and fifty-eight commonwealths, which he had himself previously made and digested. It is true, that of this part of his labors much has been lost; and certainly in the wreck of ancient literature, nothing more valuable has been lost; yet the accounts of the Athenian constitution, which are to be found in Julius Pollux and other writers of the same description, have been mostly borrowed from this great work, and enough remains to us in those books of it which are still extant, to give us a very tolerable knowledge of the nature of ancient governments and the views of the oldest lawgivers. With the helps thus derived from the literature of Greece, in addition to the fragments of the earliest Roman historians, we may proceed to study, with advantage, the narratives of Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch. We shall find their total want of judgment, their carelessness, and their ignorance sufficiently provoking, but if we persevere with patience, we shall discover a large portion of truth in their accounts, though strangely disguised and mixed up with falsehoods; our previous study of more valuable authorities will enable us to discern, or at least to form a probable conjecture, where they have drawn from a trustworthy source, and where they have followed some writer or some tradition of later times, whose correctness is as little to be relied on as their own. Where national or family vanity, or carelessness or ignorance, have corrupted the history, the narrative will either be found inconsistent with itself, or with some facts, institutions, or customs, which have been reported to us, and established beyond reasonable doubt by competent witnesses; where, on the contrary, the story is genuine, it will be in harmony with all these, and will often carry with it its own confirmation, by the incidental mention of particulars which the writers themselves did not understand,

but which, when explained by a fuller knowledge, throw light and consistence on the whole narrative, and become important evidences of its genuineness and truth. A more direct way of correcting the false traditions of the ordinary story is also often to be found in an extensive investigation of ancient literature. The fable of the defeat of the Gauls by Camillus, which originated in the vanity of the Furian family, is detected by the positive testimony of Polybius, Strabo, and Diodorus, and by a passage in Suetonius, in which the rival vanity of the Claudian family has tended to discover the truth; and the real issue of the war between Porsena and the Romans was first proved by Beaufort from a passage in Pliny, which quotes the terms of the treaty dictated by the Tuscan king; and has been since confirmed by Niebuhr, from a fact incidentally mentioned by Livy himself; the diminution of the number of the Roman tribes from thirty to twenty, in consequence of the large cession of territory by which the Romans were obliged to purchase peace.

There is yet another branch of study most important to a full understanding of the Roman history, which has been of late years cultivated in Germany with great success, and of which both Niebuhr and Wachsmuth have largely availed themselves: we mean the study of the Roman law. In this country even professed scholars know in general very little of the works of the Roman lawyers; in proof of which we may remark, that the recent discovery of the Institutes of Gaius has been scarcely noticed, and not half a dozen copies sold in England; while an entire edition has been disposed of on the continent, and the work either is, or was a very short time since, out of print. But in Germany, more especially, every point connected with the Roman laws and constitution has been examined with that critical and sensible spirit which distinguishes the really learned men of that country; and the writings of Haubold, Hugo, and Savigny, have thrown light upon many questions, which had before been full of confusion and difficulty. The history of no country can be written as it ought to be without a competent knowledge of its laws; and on this point as on so many others, Niebuhr has had the merit of first perceiving and then acquiring the qualifications requisite to the due fulfilment of his task, and has tended, we hope, to raise the standard by which the merits of future historians are to be tried.

Upon principles such as these Niebuhr has proceeded, and in so doing has adopted the only method by which a real knowledge of Roman history can ever be obtained. In the execution of his work there are naturally faults to be pointed out, but the merit of the design remains the same, and men of very inferior minds, by following the path which

he has first traced, may arrive perhaps at a perfection which he himself has missed. This is the true character of original genius, and for this will the names of Mitford and Niebuhr be honourably distinguished, as the first modern discoverers in Grecian and Roman history. Both these writers have left much to be done by their successors; both are rather too fond of paradox; both are often erroneous in their judgments on particular points; and both are deficient in simplicity and animation of style. But they are the giants who first cut through the rocks and penetrated the tangled thickets of the forest; and they may well be pardoned if they do not always stop to make the road perfectly smooth, or if they sometimes, in the very pride of their strength, carry it needlessly over some steep and difficult ground instead of choosing the easier and simpler course over the plain. Already, as we have stated, Niebuhr's paradoxes and fanciful hypotheses have been corrected and sobered down by his able successor, Wachsmuth, who, deriving the full benefit of Niebuhr's genius, has had leisure to apply his own powers to the improving the work which his predecessor has so well begun; and although much less remains to be done by those who may come hereafter, yet we cannot doubt but that there will still be those who will carry their labours even to a higher degree of excellence.

It will not be expected that we should follow the authors before us, step by step, through all the points embraced by their histories, or that we should detain our readers with an examination of controversies more suited to a classical or antiquarian journal than to one of general literature. But the Agrarian Laws are so connected with subjects of universal interest, they occupy so prominent a part in Roman history, they have been so little understood by former writers, and have been explained and illustrated by Niebuhr with such singular ability and learning, that we shall but render justice to his work, and perhaps most satisfy our readers, by dwelling at some length on this most remarkable part of the institutions of Rome; only premising, that although we have generally followed Niebuhr, he is yet not to be considered responsible for all the facts and opinions which we are about to offer.

In almost all countries the legal property of the land has been originally vested in the sovereign, whether we are to understand under that name a single chief, a particular portion of the nation, or the people at large. In the same manner the property of all land in a conquered country was, in ancient times, held to be transferred to the sovereign power in the conquering state. Whether the right thus acquired was exercised in its utmost rigour depended upon circumstances; it was so exercised in some instances by the total expulsion of the old inhabitants,

and the settlement of a new population in their room; sometimes the former proprietors were left in the occupation of their lands, but only on the footing of tenants, obliged to pay a rent to a number of individuals of the conquering nation, among whom the property of the conquered country was divided; and, sometimes, when the victors behaved most mildly, they merely imposed a land-tax on their new subjects, and reserved to themselves the tithe of the produce of the soil, as an acknowledgment of their right of property over it. Now as the Romans acquired the greatest part of Italy by conquest, the Roman people were the lords of the soil in almost every part of the peninsula. In many, or in most instances, the former owners were left in undisturbed occupation; but there were also very extensive tracts of land which the Romans took into their own hands, and which were more peculiarly called Ager publicus, the lands of the commonwealth. *These were the joint property of all the citizens;* nor till a regular division of them took place, could any one individual claim the exclusive ownership of any part of them, though he, in common with his neighbours, had a right to the use and enjoyment of the whole. This community of possession was sufficiently natural and practicable in the earliest periods of society, when the land was occupied rather in feeding cattle than in tillage—a period, the dim remembrance of which was fondly cherished under the notion of a golden age of universal brotherhood. But in a more advanced stage of society to leave land in this state of common occupation was in effect to expose it to a sort of general scramble, in which it was soon found that the strong encroached upon the weak, and that the poor man could get none of the benefits of that common stock of which he was nominally one of the proprietors. Hence originated the practice of assigning to each individual a certain portion, and of marking out and securing its limits with the greatest solemnities of religion. Every thing was done under the direction and according to the rites of the augurs, who derived their art from the mysterious lore of the priests or sages of Etruria. The augur stood with his face turned towards the south, east, or the west; and drew across the whole space of land to be divided two main lines intersecting each other at right angles, the one from south to north called Cardo, from its being drawn towards the supposed pole of the heaven, and the other, from east to west, called Decumanus. These were made of a considerable width to serve as roads, and parallel to each of them were drawn a succession of other lines, till the whole ground was portioned out into a number of equal shares, according to the number of persons among whom it was to be divided. Each of these squares was further defined by a certain number of termini, or landmarks, which being once fixed

in this solemn manner it became the height of wickedness to remove. Every portion of land thus allotted to any Roman citizen became his freehold in the highest sense of the term; it paid no land tax or tithe; for the individual to whom it had been granted only received it as his fair dividend out of the common stock, and enjoyed with regard to it the same complete sovereignty, which the whole state had possessed over the whole of the conquered land while it remained undivided. It might be sold also by Mancipatio,—that is, with an unexceptionable and perfect title, as the owner held it free from every incumbrance and in absolute propriety, and could convey it away therefore on the same terms. But the great mass of the national demesnes, which had not been thus divided, were held by a very different tenure. We have said that they were considered as common property; but it appears that individuals were allowed to occupy and enclose certain portions of them, and that this possession or occupation, as it was called, though liable to be determined at any moment whenever the state thought proper to claim its rights, and to order a division of the land, was yet protected by the authority of the prætors from the forcible encroachment of any other private individual. By what means one person was entitled to this sort of possession in preference to another, does not seem to be clearly ascertained. Appian indeed is probably correct in his account of the general origin of the practice; the land thus occupied, he says, was mostly waste, and whilst it was undivided, the state permitted individuals to cultivate certain parts of it for themselves, on the payment of the tithe of the produce to the public revenue. But whether the censors, or any other magistrates, possessed the patronage of nominating the persons who were to enjoy so profitable a bargain, Appian either knew not, or was too careless to mention. From the imperfect notices in Festus* and Siculus† Flaccus, it would seem that the occupation was altogether arbitrary; and it is possible that the officers and soldiers of the conquering army may at the time of their conquest, have secured and marked out for themselves certain parts of that land from which they had just expelled the owners. Be this as it may, we know that in process of time the possession of this undivided land fell almost exclusively into the hands of the nobility. The ground, however, which any person thus enjoyed, was protected by none of those sacred termini which marked the limits of freehold property; it was guaranteed by no solemn and public act, ratified with the sanctions of the national religion, nor was it always secured, as in the regularly divided

* In voce, "Possessio."

† "De Conditionibus Agrorum," apud Scriptores Rei Agrariæ. Ed. Goesii.

lands, by the neighbourhood of many other similar properties, whose owners had a common interest in defending each other from oppression. A poor man's occupation-farm might be often in the midst of a large tract possessed by a wealthy patrician, and would be most commonly so remote from Rome as to render an appeal to the prætor's protection almost impracticable. Under these circumstances, the small occupiers were often forcibly expelled, often intimidated or oppressed into a sale of their lands, and still oftener found their possessions encroached upon, while they were absent on their duties as legionary soldiers, and the unconsecrated and irregularly marked boundary of their farm removed from its place by some more powerful neighbour.* Thus the greatest part of the national demesnes were productive of advantage only to a small class of the community; and the system of occupation which might have been tolerable so long as all ranks shared in its benefits, became a great injustice when it only enriched a few of the great nobility. To check this evil was the object of the famous Licinian law, which had nothing to do with private property as has been commonly supposed, but only limited the amount of undivided national land which might be occupied by any one individual. Meantime, as estates thus held by occupation were *legally* secure against any claims but those of the state, and as the passing an Agrarian law for the division of the national lands was always strenuously opposed by the whole weight of the aristocracy, this species of property was transferred by sale from one holder to another with almost as much confidence as if it were really freehold. Sold indeed by mancipation it could not be; for the state still continued to be its lawful owner, and it was still liable to the payment of tithe, or land-tax, which, according to the Roman law, were infallible signs that the property belonged to the sovereign. But the possession of it was bought and sold on the speculation that the right of the state would not be exercised—a speculation, be it remembered, which rested on no tacit agreement, but was founded merely on the strength of the aristocratical interest, and on the probability that it would be able to defeat any proposal for the regular division of the national lands, according to the forms of the Agrarian laws.

These much misunderstood laws were no violations, therefore, of the rights of property, nor were they fantastic attempts to interfere with the natural progress of wealth; but a strictly regular and legal way of disposing of the estates of the commonwealth, conducing no less to the general benefit than to that of the poorer citizens, who were thus more

* Conf. Appian. Bell. Civil. l. i. c. 7. Plutarch. T. Gracchus, c. 8. and the form of the Prætor's Interdict in Festus, in voc. Possessio.

immediately provided for. The severity of the ancient law of nations which allowed so free a use of the right of conquest, may indeed be justly condemned; yet it is at least as defensible as the pretensions of sovereignty so often advanced by modern nations over uncivilized countries, on no better ground than the accident of being the first Europeans to discover them. But laying out of view the loss sustained by the conquered people, and the encouragement given to a spirit of ambition on the part of the conquerors, the Agrarian laws appear to have been among the fairest means ever devised for obviating the necessity of poor laws, and providing for the wants of a redundant population. It will not be supposed that we are extending this praise to the military colonies of Sylla, of Cæsar, or of the second triumvirate; or that we are insensible to the abuses often attending the execution of the Agrarian laws of an earlier period, when the commissioners for dividing the national lands were invested with too ample authority, and were often induced, from party or personal motives, to select the new colonists out of the least deserving part of the poorer citizens. But the principle of portioning out the national property from time to time amongst the individual members of the nation, was certainly not contrary to justice; nor was the policy contemptible, of thus providing for the indigent, and strengthening the state at large by covering its frontiers with a line of colonies, depending on it for protection, and abundantly repaying it by keeping its conquests in obedience, and notwithstanding the first attacks of its enemies. The propriety indeed of selecting any particular district for the operation of an Agrarian law was to be determined by the peculiar circumstances of the case. When the national demesnes, as was the case in Campania,* were actually possessed by a number of small occupiers, who lived on their own farms, cultivated them well, and regularly paid their tithe to the government; and when the colonists by whom they would have been superseded were likely to be the mere refuse of a profligate populace, chosen by the proposer of the measure in reward of the turbulence which they had displayed in the internal disputes of the capital, the impolicy of an Agrarian law in this particular instance was evident. But when, on the contrary, the demesnes of the state had been engrossed to an illegal amount by two or three wealthy individuals; when these persons, according to their frequent practice, had expelled by violence or oppression the poorer occupiers who held their farms by the very same tenure of tolerated temporary possession; when they had covered the country with work-houses for their slaves, and em-

* See Cicero's Speeches against the Agrarian Law of P. Rullus.

ployed the labour of none but slaves in the cultivation of their lands, to the absolute extirpation of the free peasantry,—it was at once a measure of justice and wisdom on the part of the state, to turn off those tenants at will by whom its indulgence had been abused, and its property mismanaged; and to divide its lands regularly amongst its own free citizens, who were already the joint proprietors, rather than suffer them to lie profitless to itself, maintaining only one or two self-constituted tenants and a multitude of slaves. In its principle, therefore, the Agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus was just and wise; and his proposal to allow a compensation to the occupiers of national lands for the loss of possessions absolutely illegal in their extent, and held, even within the limits fixed by the Licinian law, only during the pleasure of the people, was a concession more liberal than they were strictly entitled to demand. It is another question how far it was politic to bring the measure forward, considering the actual strength of the aristocracy; the power of the nobility had so long suspended the execution of an Agrarian law in Italy, that they had derived advantage from their own wrong, and seemed to have gained the sanction of time for their encroachments, because they had for so many years prevented the people from questioning them. Under these circumstances many preparatory steps were needful before the evils of the existing system could be attacked with any hope of success; and as imprudence in a reformer is in itself a political crime, the memory of Gracchus is justly liable to blame, notwithstanding the purity of his motives, and the strict legality and beneficial nature of the reform which he vainly endeavoured to accomplish.

Some idea of the originality and value of Niebuhr's History may be formed from this specimen; not less excellent are his remarks on the original composition of the Roman army, and its connection with the political divisions of the commonwealth, as instituted by Servius Tullius; although we think that he has failed in tracing correctly the subsequent changes which took place in its tactics, up to the full development of the legionary system, such as it is described by Polybius. On this point also we shall venture upon some detail, as it will serve to illustrate the revolutions which the art of war has undergone under similar circumstances in different ages and countries, to bring ancient and modern history together, and make them each reflect light upon the other. We may hope that the folly is now gone by of studiously painting the manners, institutions and events of ancient times in colours most strongly contrasting with everything which we know from our own experience. The pictures thus produced were striking and beautiful indeed, but nothing practical could be learnt from them, since

they displayed a world as unreal as the fantastic creations of romance. Indeed if their brilliancy ever excited a wish to imitate them, the result was not only unprofitable, but mischievous, when attempts were made to force the characters and practice of modern nations from their proper growth and course, in the vain hope of making them resemble a pattern purely imaginary. Thus the lessons of what was called ancient history, impressed on the mind by its earliest associations, were a hindrance rather than a help to the politician and the statesman; whilst men of another description, whose knowledge was altogether practical, seeing what absurdities arose from an appeal to the pretended example of antiquity, were tempted to despise the study of the past, and to trust solely to their own natural understandings, and their acquaintance with men and things actually existing. But our conclusions must be suspicious, unless they rest on an experience as extensive in point of time as of space; and the rashness of the King of Siam, in disbelieving the existence of ice, has been often imitated by those, who forget that phenomena utterly at variance with all that we see around us, may be produced as easily by a difference of centuries, as by a difference of latitude.

In almost all rude societies the principal military force has consisted of cavalry or chariots. The superiority, which these possess over men on foot in the infancy of the military art, is obvious and overwhelming, and can only be counterbalanced by regular discipline, and a system of tactics far above the capacities of an ignorant people. Accordingly, not only in Asia, but in Greece, in Gaul, in Britain, and in Italy, the fate of every battle in the oldest times depended on that part of the army who fought on horseback or in chariots; and the infantry, if they deserved the name, were hardly better than a disorderly crowd, fit only to add to the prisoners or the slain when the enemy was put to flight. But the horsemen were necessarily the wealthier members of the community, who thus became also the most powerful; in fact, the system threw the chief political power into the hands of the king and of the richer citizens, who could afford to mount and bring into the field themselves and their own dependents. This was one reason why the earliest governments were either monarchies or aristocracies; and exactly in the same manner, when society was in its second infancy, in the middle ages, similar causes produced a similar result; the cavalry, or men at arms, then constituted so exclusively the strength of every army, that the term "milites," in the Latin of that time, is used to designate them alone; and the third estate or commons, was everywhere in a state of complete insignificance. But in process of time, wherever the people were enabled by fortunate circumstances to acquire wealth,

and to obtain some knowledge of the arts, the class of citizens who fought on foot naturally improved their arms and their discipline, and becoming thus of more importance as soldiers, gradually rose also in political consideration and weight. But all free citizens served at their own expense and provided their own arms, the men of moderate fortunes had a twofold advantage over the soldiers of the poorer classes. They could not only afford to clothe themselves from head to foot in armour, and to procure spears and swords of a higher temper, but they had leisure to practise themselves in military exercises, and thus to obtain that familiarity with the use of their arms, and that acquaintance with order and discipline, which gave them an infinite superiority over the ill-armed and untrained multitude. Hence the popular party in the earliest times has consisted always of those citizens who were rich without nobility, as opposed to those who possessed at once nobility, riches, and power; and the first steps towards liberty have been the result of a contest not between the rich and the mass of community, but between the rich and the noble. Hence also that which is a popular party in one stage of society becomes at a more advanced period an oligarchical one; and thus Aristotle observes, that what was anciently called a democracy, or popular government, was the very same which in his own time was known by the name of a timocracy, or moderate oligarchy; because originally no more extensive idea could be formed of the term "popular," than as denoting those who presumed to claim a share in the government without the long established qualification of noble blood.

It was in the reign of Servius Tullius that the exclusive aristocracy of the earliest times was first mitigated at Rome; and changes were introduced the natural tendency of which was to transfer the chief power in the state from the high nobility to the second and more numerous class of citizens, who possessed moderate wealth, and were of plebeian birth. The traditions respecting Servius himself are somewhat at variance with one another; but it is sufficiently clear that he was not a patrician, and that he owed the throne to his personal merits and his favour with the people. To the nobility he was an object of perpetual jealousy and hatred; it was natural, therefore, that he should strengthen himself against their enmity by increasing the political importance of the commons. This was the purpose of his famous census, which has been completely misunderstood, not only by later writers, but what is remarkable enough, even by Cicero himself. For when Cicero wrote, the exclusive ascendancy of birth had been overthrown for several centuries, and the contending parties in the commonwealth

were the same as in modern times—the rich and the multitude. Because, therefore, the institutions of Servius Tullius favoured the possessors of property rather than the numerical majority of the people, they were supposed to have been framed in aspirit adverse to the popular interest, and to have been designed to prevent the lower orders from acquiring any political weight: whereas the idea of such a democracy as existed in Cicero's time, could never have occurred to any one in the days of Servius Tullius; and it was then as liberal and as popular a principle to set property on a level with birth, as it was afterwards to confer a superiority on numbers over property. Accordingly the exclusive power of the patricians was as much weakened by the regulations of Servius Tullius, as that of the Eupatridæ of Athens by those of Solon. The richest class of plebeians was required to serve in war as cavalry; and twelve centuries of equites were thus added to the six which previously existed, and which had been formed out of the patricians alone. But the most important change consisted in the improvement of the infantry, which, as we have seen, was composed of plebeians alone. Both their tactics and weapons of offence as well as defence were adapted to enable them to withstand the charge of cavalry. The order of the phalanx was introduced instead of the loose array of older times; the richest class who were to fight in the first ranks, were required to furnish themselves with the complete panoply of a helmet, cuirass, and greaves, all made of brass, with a round shield of the same metal, (ασπις, or clypeus,) and with a long spear or pike. The second, third, and fourth classes, containing all those citizens whose property was under 100,000 asses, and above 12,500, were also called upon to serve in the phalanx, although accoutrements gradually less complete and less expensive were required of them. The fourth class indeed were armed only with the long spear and javelin; but the close array and solid mass of the phalanx rendered it less necessary for the soldiers of the rear ranks to be in complete armour; they were protected by the shields and bodies of those who stood before them, while they could add to the weight of a charge, and their spears being calculated to project even beyond the soldiers of the first line, added to the strength and closeness of that hedge of steel which the front of the phalanx presented to an enemy. By this system a class of citizens, who must otherwise have gone to battle ill-armed and comparatively impotent, were enabled to be of material service, and became at once of importance, by forming a part of that body which was now the main strength of the commonwealth. For the heavy-armed infantry of the middle classes immediately obtained its just superiority over the ca-

valry of the nobility. Exactly in the same manner, when trade or peculiar local circumstances had raised the condition of the commons in modern Europe, the long pike and the close order of battle were the arms and tactics first adopted by the infantry in order to sustain the charge of the feudal cavalry. The result also was the same as in Greece and ancient Italy: the chivalry of Burgundy were scattered by the Swiss infantry at Granson and Morat; and the bristling pikes and deep masses of the Spanish foot were long the terror of Europe, till the improved use of fire-arms, about the middle of the seventeenth century, produced another revolution in the art of war, to which ancient history can afford no parallel.

It would have been the natural effect of the institutions of Servius Tullius to change the aristocracy of the Roman constitution into that species of oligarchy, or rather of timocracy, which existed at Lacedæmon, at Corinth, and in most of the commonwealths of Greece, during the Peloponnessian war. But instead of this, we find the aristocratical principle of making noble birth a necessary qualification for all the great offices of state, prevailing for a hundred and fifty-eight years after this period; and the oldest contemporary writer who has left us an account of the Roman army, describes a system of tactics totally different from that which was in use among the Greeks, and which we have described Servius Tullius as introducing at Rome. In no part of his work has Livy more completely betrayed his incompetence to write the ancient history of his country than in the passage in which he notices and attempts to explain this remarkable fact:— "Clipeis antea Romani usi sunt; deinde, postquam stipendiarii facti sunt, scuta pro clipeis fecere; et quod antea phalanges similes Macedonicis, hoc postea manipulatim structa acies cœpit esse." Lib. viii. c. 8. Thus hastily does he pass over an alteration which affected most deeply the whole internal constitution of Rome, as well as its military power. And to mark yet more strongly his total want of accuracy and consistency, the passage which we have quoted, and the account of the census of Servius Tullius, lib. i. c. 43, are the only places in which he ever alludes to the existence of the order of the phalanx in the Roman armies; in all his descriptions of battles he writes as if the divisions and arms of the legion, such as Polybius describes them, had been adopted from the earliest ages of the commonwealth. In his omitting to mention the use of the Greek tactics as actually prevalent at one time, he has probably copied with correctness the chronicles of the older writers, from whom he has compiled his narrative. We believe that the tyranny of the second Tarquin deranged altogether the institutions of his predecessor; and that while he thinned the number

of patricians by arbitrary executions, he was equally careful to depress the wealthier plebeians, and to alter that military system which rendered them the chief strength of the national army. An instance is recorded in Grecian history,* in which the tyrant of a city found means to secure the arms of the heavy-armed infantry, and was thus enabled, by the aid of his guards, to keep the people securely in subjection; and Tarquin, who manifestly exercised a perfect despotism, whose person was protected by a body-guard at home, and who enjoyed also a commanding influence over several of the neighbouring states, had possibly in the early part of his reign, adopted with success some similar expedient. If this was the case, and if the plebeians were reduced by him to the helpless condition of light-armed infantry, the exclusive ascendancy of the aristocracy after his expulsion follows as a matter of course; nor is it less natural that the nobility, having thus regained their old supremacy, should do their utmost to preserve it, by relaxing the institutions of Servius Tullius, and not requiring even the richer plebeians to furnish themselves with the expensive armour demanded for the service of the phalanx. In times of severe distress, such as those which followed the first establishment of the consular government, individuals would gladly avail themselves of this indulgence, without reflecting that by so doing they were depriving themselves, as a body, of all their weight in the commonwealth. Thus the Roman infantry again became inferior in importance to the cavalry; and this state of things is marked in the accounts given of the battle at the Lake Regillus, A. U. C. 258. The stories of single combats between the generals, which make the descriptions of that action resemble the battles of Homer and Virgil, are not to be treated as mere poetical fictions, but really represent the state of the military at that period; when the cavalry forming the principal strength of the army, and being composed of all the nobility of the commonwealth, personal conflicts among the chiefs were mutually sought after, and the fall of a brave and active leader would powerfully influence the fate of the day. Again, the tradition of the three hundred and six Fabii marching out at the head of their clan to fight the Tuscans, seems to show that birth had regained that exclusive ascendancy of which Servius Tullius had tried to deprive it; for the common soldiers, or plebeians, of the clan were all light armed, and therefore are not even mentioned in those chronicles from which Livy copied his narrative; whilst the Fabii, as patricians, alone bore complete armour, without any intermixture even of the wealthier plebeians. It is manifest also, from the whole account of the secession to the Mons Sacer,

* See Thucyd. l. 6. c. 58.

and afterwards of the insurrection against the Decemviri, that nothing like a regular heavy-armed infantry, formed out of the four first classes of plebeians, could have existed during those periods; as in that case the principal power in the state must have been in their hands, and the institution of tribunes would have been needless. The Gauls appear to have served unintentionally the cause of liberty at Rome, by obliging the Roman generals to improve the arms of their infantry. Camillus is said* to have first introduced among them the use of iron or steel helmets, and to have required them to add a rim of brass to their shields, (scuta,) which were before made only of wood, to enable them to resist the blows of the Gaulish swords. The long spear also, which every man of the four first classes was directed by Servius Tullius to carry, had been completely laid aside, till Camillus restored the use of it, as the most effectual weapon with which to combat an undisciplined enemy. It was not, however, exactly the same with the spear of the phalanx, but might be thrown, as well as thrust, against an enemy, and was, indeed, generally, in after-times, employed in the former manner. This alteration in the arms of the infantry took place in the year of Rome 388; and it is, at least, a remarkable coincidence, that the Licinian and Sextian laws, which were the great triumph of the liberty of the Roman people, and which had been obstinately opposed by the aristocracy during the preceding nine years, were all carried immediately afterwards; as if the improvement in the military force of the plebeians at once ensured them their due share of political rights. It was then found that without forsaking the loose array to which they had been so long accustomed, the infantry might be rendered completely effective both in arms and discipline; so that there was no temptation to return to the order of the phalanx; and the experience of every successive war must have rendered the Romans more and more satisfied with the excellence of their own tactics, which had grown thus curiously and accidentally out of a system intended, and apparently well calculated, to depress the importance of the infantry, and so to keep the plebeians perpetually dependent on the aristocracy.

But we have dwelt, perhaps too long on the subject of the works before us, and we are anxious to say a few words, before we conclude, both on the writers themselves, and the modern literature of the great nation, which has produced them. The first characteristic which strikes us in both is great learning, and deep research; such as marked so honourably the scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We have discovered nothing like index hunting in any of the works

* Plutarch in Camillo, c. 40, 41.

which we are considering; no signs of a knowledge got up for a particular time and purpose—a knowledge barely sufficient to eke out its task, and the limits of which present themselves to the eye at every turn, betraying the poverty of the possessor. Like Gibbon, or even more than he, Niebuhr, and Wachsmuth, and Creuzer luxuriate in an abundance of learning seemingly inexhaustible; it is confined to no one subject, or age, or country, but appears almost equally familiar with all. The literature of our own country is so much studied in Germany, that we were not surprised to find Niebuhr quoting Blackstone, without a single word of explanation, as if every German were perfectly acquainted with his name and works. But when we consider the extreme difficulty of communication between England and the continent at the time when Niebuhr was writing his first volume, we do think it remarkable that he should refer in the same manner to the travels of Lord Valentia, (*Niebuhr*, vol. i. p. 336,) which were then very recently published, and which might well be supposed to have escaped the notice of a foreigner deeply engaged in studies of another description.

Equally general is the knowledge displayed by Creuzer and Wachsmuth; but the qualities which most distinguish the learning of the modern Germans from that of the eminent scholars of former times, are independence of thought, and discrimination of judgment. They do not merely retail the facts and opinions which they meet with in the course of their reading, without taking any pains to ascertain the truth of the one or the soundness of the other. They do not class the wisest and the most foolish reasonings under one general name of "ancient authorities," and quote them all with equal confidence and respect. On the contrary, every work which they have occasion to notice is subjected to a complete critical analysis; its accidental and its internal value are distinguished, and each carefully appreciated; the probable sources of the author's information are explored with the utmost diligence; and the product of knowledge, which is at last collected from him, is applied to illustrate the works of other writers; so that nothing is left to float vaguely in the mind of the reader or to encumber it with an ill-digested weight. This, indeed, is high, but not exaggerated praise; and we wish that the literature of which this may be said, were far more generally known and studied amongst us. In our literary intercouse with Germany we have hitherto been as passive traders as the Chinese; we have suffered our own productions to be exported, without any desire to import those of our neighbours in return; or if we have purchased any of their commodities, we have trafficked like savages, bartering things of real value for the mere glass beads, toys, and tawdry finery of those with whom we have traded. But the

taste for better things is rising, and the most valuable part of the most valuable literature in Europe will not long remain unknown to the inquiring and intelligent minds of Englishmen.

Whenever the time arrives that the historians, poets, and divines of Germany are as familiar to us as those of our own country already are to the Germans, we are far from thinking that we shall be the only gainers by it, or that our benefit will not in part consist in learning to avoid those faults of which the German literature affords some striking examples. With minds so active and so independent, the temptation to paradox is sometimes irresistible; where so much supine credulity and childish ignorance has been detected in the writers of past times, it is natural to be led away by self-complacency, and to fancy that the improving or correcting hand of modern wisdom is everywhere needed. Contrary, however, to the spirit of the French philosophers of the last century, it seems the fashion in Germany to speak most scornfully of the ages immediately preceding the present, and to retaliate for the excessive praises once lavished upon the eighteenth century, by treating that period with proportionate contempt. The greatest glory is of course to be won by the conquest of a conqueror; and it is the readiest path to distinction to assail that which stands supreme in public opinion. We have seen a similar attack carried on in our country against the literature of the eighteenth century, and grounded on the same fallacious principle: it was not thought enough to demand a due share of general admiration for our old writers; they, in their turn, were to be lifted up to an unnatural pre-eminence, and no author to be deemed worthy of respect who had had the misfortune to be born since the Restoration. Niebuhr's admiration, however, is bestowed on a much more remote antiquity, and he seems almost to believe in a gradual degeneracy of the human race from some high pitch of bodily and mental excellence, which he supposes it to have attained in the earliest stages of its existence.

By a most extraordinary misunderstanding of the passage which he quotes, Niebuhr brings forward the authority of Aristotle in support of the notion, that the state of society existed before the rude and solitary life of an individual; the whole subsisted, he says, before its part. He will not believe, therefore, that the aborigines of Italy were a mere horde of savages, and treats with contempt the opinion that mankind has gradually advanced from a condition of rudeness to civilization and knowledge. He is inclined to enlarge Linnæus's well-known division of the genus "Homo" into two species, Homo Vulgaris, or the common man, and Homo Sylvestris, or the man of the woods; and would rather divide it into a great number of species; some designed for a

greater, and others for a less degree of moral and intellectual excellence; forming, we suppose, a gradual scale from the most perfect breed of men, wherever we are to look for it, down to the negro, the hottentot, and the ape. Accordingly, he will by no means admit the descent of all mankind from one original pair: but supposes that different breeds of men were originally created in different countries; that as different parts of the globe have their characteristic vegetables and animals of the brute creation, so also they may be believed to produce each its peculiar species of man.

We have thought it right to give this specimen of that spirit of paradox, which now and then lamentably disfigures Niebuhr's work; reminding us of the observation which a German writer is said to have made upon his countrymen. "J. P. Richter a dit, que l'empire de la mer était aux Anglais, celui de la terre aux Français, et celui de l'air aux Allemands." We will add the beautiful comment on this text:—"En effet, on aurait besoin, en Allemagne, de donner un centre et des bornes à cette éminente faculté de penser qui s'élève, et se perd dans le vague, pénètre et disparoît dans la profondeur, s'anéantit à force d' impartialité, se confond à force d'analyse, enfin manque de certains défauts qui puissent servir de circonscription à ses qualités."—*Madame de Staël, de l'Allemagne*, tom. i. p. 19. A defect of this kind is easily turned into ridicule, and it may be made the foundation of a more serious and, perhaps, more reprehensible species of attack. There is, or at least there was, a class of persons in this country, who, on meeting with such opinions as that which we have quoted from Niebuhr's history, overwhelm the author at once with a sweeping charge of "German folly and infidelity." But "folly and infidelity," whether of English or German growth, have never been more unsuccessfully combated than by such opponents. "To make a man an offender for a word," is condemned by the highest authority; if there be any who are tempted to tax Niebuhr with deism or infidelity, because he does not believe the descent of all mankind from two first parents; we would recommend them to consider well the admirable passage in Johnson's Life of Sir Thomas Browne, in which he defends the subject of his Memoir from a similar imputation, and points out the want of wisdom as well as of charity in those who are willing on slight grounds "to enlarge the catalogue of infidels." We are, certainly, very far from agreeing with the opinions of Niebuhr; and we sincerely lament errors, which, in such a man, can only proceed from a want of duly weighing the grounds of belief, and studying the Scriptures in a teachable and humble spirit; but we think that a German may very possibly be a sincere believer in the Gospel, without having fully considered how

closely the truth of the Jewish revelation is connected with that of the Christian, and even without allowing the inspiration of Scripture in a sense so universal, as that in which we ourselves take it. There is naturally enough, something of a national character in the manner and degree of men's faith; and it has often been remarked that the German school of theology has a tendency to latitudinarianism: its divines are apt to explain away some of the most forcible scriptural expressions, and to introduce hypotheses of their own, without sufficiently reflecting on the consequences involved in the sacrifice of the plain statements of the Bible to the removal of some merely imaginary difficulty. Such men, however, and men who grow up at their feet, and imbibe their habits of thinking, are not to be *therefore* inconsiderately branded with want of Christian belief: the appellation of infidel belongs with far greater propriety to many writers on whom it has never been bestowed; to a whole multitude of dramatists, novelists, essayists, and others, who, while speaking respectfully of the doctrines of Christianity, have inculcated practical principles in direct opposition to the spirit of the gospel, when, indeed, another German writer* expresses his envy of the happiness of the ancient Greeks because they had never heard the name of Israel, and when we find him in the same volume speaking with triumphant delight of an act of assassination; such a man betrays the true character of unbelief, accompanied, as it always is, with moral depravity. But there are no principles in Niebuhr's work which afford grounds for any similar accusation against him. In fact, if we would hope to restrain that wildness of criticism on theological subjects which is too prevalent in Germany, we must learn to tolerate amongst ourselves a sober freedom of honest and humble inquiry; our censures, at present, lose some of their weight as proceeding from a national school too little accustomed to question old opinions to be able fairly to judge when they are questioned without reason. The scepticism of pride or ignorance or wickedness is sufficiently abundant; but this can never lead to truth. We believe that the inquiring spirit of the Germans is of a better kind; and while we sincerely wish to see it purified from its extravagances, we think that this may be most successfully effected, if we acknowledge, and endeavour to imitate its excellencies.

The deficiencies in the intellectual character of the Germans are owing, we think, to circumstances over which they had no control. To quote again the powerful work of Madame de Staël, "La séparation des classes nuit à quelques égards à l'esprit proprement dit. Les nobles y ont trop peu d'idées, et les gens de lettres trop peu d'habitude des

* Poppo, Prolegomena ad Thucydidem.

affaires." If we ask for the causes of this wide line of demarcation which exists in Germany, between the different classes of society, the geography and history of the country will furnish us with the answer. With the exception of that part of the frontier which is washed by the Baltic, the sea coast of Germany is limited to the narrow space comprised between the Elbe and the Ems: a space utterly out of proportion to the size of the country, and far too small to allow that free communication with foreign nations, which is as essential to the political welfare of a people, as a free circulation of air to the health of an individual. The sea opens to mankind a boundless field of action; and thus gives a practical direction to energies of the mind which, if denied their natural course, will run up into a luxuriant but unfruitful growth of speculation and theory. The continuance too of the original disunion between the different parts of Germany has contributed to the same results. In France, in Spain, and in the British islands, the petty kingdoms or provinces which seemed designed by nature to form one great body, were happily united before they had attained to that age when each would have become too stiff and hard to be moulded into a new form. But in Germany and Italy the separation has existed till the time for union has gone by: and in both countries the strength of the nation is frittered away in the multitude of principalities into which they are divided. This, however, is not the only nor the worst evil which results. With the original elements unblended together, were retained also their original institutions and forms of society. That most infallible mark of barbarism, a system of castes, continued to defy the full light of the eighteenth century, (we beg Niebuhr's pardon for the expression;) and even now, notwithstanding the progress lately made towards a better state, is far from being completely overthrown. With all these disadvantages of an almost total exclusion from the sea, a deficiency of national power, and an absence of municipal freedom, we cannot be surprised that the energies of the Germans have been turned more towards thinking than acting; and that their understandings are tinged with that fanciful idealism for which a practical acquaintance with mankind, and with the concerns of real life, seems to offer the only remedy.

With Great Britain, on the other hand, the case is totally different. Since the world began, no state of society has ever afforded such advantages for the attainment of the highest intellectual and moral excellence as that which we at this moment enjoy. With far more truth than when it was originally spoken, we may now say, that "we have made every land and every sea accessible to our enterprise;" yet our communication, extensive as it is, with foreign countries, is far surpassed

by that wonderful internal intercourse, by which the remotest corners of our own island, we trust that ere long we may say islands, are connected and bound together, one with another. We believe it is no exaggeration to say, that if any two gentlemen were to be thrown together by accident in a stage-coach in any part of the country, and would consent to enter freely into conversation, they would soon find some one person, if not many, with whom they were both acquainted, and would thus have something of a tie to prevent them from feeling towards each other as perfect strangers. This is one good produced by our locomotive habits, and by the practice of visiting watering-places in different parts of the kingdom; and it is one which, if duly considered, will be found of immense importance. It produces directly an amalgamation of the several classes of society; men differing widely in rank and profession associate with each other; and thus, from the mixture of their acquaintance, even where the circle of it be small, they lose that pedantry and ignorance which are the invariable consequences of living alone, or associating only with persons who view every thing in the same light with themselves. As far as the interests of literature are concerned, we believe that this vigorous and healthy circulation, reaching as it does, to the remotest corners of Great Britain, is even more beneficial than the perfect freedom enjoyed by the press; although doubtless that freedom, as well as the whole character of our political institutions, is favourable to the perfection of the understanding in a degree which can hardly be estimated too highly. For instance, with what advantages over the writers of other nations does an Englishman undertake to unravel the histories of Greece or Rome? Familiar, as we are from our childhood, with all the phenomena of political parties, their aptness to adhere with pertinacity to a name, when circumstances have totally changed the thing,—the slender thread which connects them, after a course of years, with their original principles, amidst many apparent deviations from them; the exaggeration of their language and feelings; their furious enmities, and convenient coalitions, and the audacity with which they identify themselves with the national good; we can easily interpret aright the language of historians concerning them, and accurately estimate their nature and their merits. If then we have not surpassed the literature of Germany, and still more if we have not equalled it, the fault is our own; and it can neither be ascribed to any external disadvantages, nor to any want of natural intelligence, but to some other cause which it most deeply concerns us to discover and remove.

We are so accustomed to dwell upon the extraordinary merits of a few of our great writers, that we are generally insensible to the mani-

fold deficiencies of our literature. Yet if we compare it with that of France or Germany, its poverty in works of laborious learning is truly remarkable. If a student in history ask where he can find an account of any of the great nations of the continent in the English language, we recollect nothing better to refer him to than the miserable compilation of Russell, or the heavy and unsatisfactory volumes of the Universal History. We are not forgetful of the works of Robertson, of Archdeacon Coxe, and of Mr. Hallam; but these embrace only particular periods, and still leave it undeniable, that we have no good history of any modern nation except our own. In ecclesiastical history we have a remarkable instance of our peculiar defect, a want of learning. Milner was a man of piety and of ability; but from the narrow limits of his knowledge, and the uncritical spirit with which he appears to have studied, his work is altogether unworthy of its subject. But our inferiority is still more striking and less excusable in every branch of study connected with the history, antiquities, and literature of Greece and Rome. We believe that there are many writers of those nations whose works have never been edited in England at all:—but it is more to the purpose to inquire in how many instances the editions of any of them generally received as the best, have been executed by Englishmen. If we except certain portions of the Greek dramatists and poets, we really cannot remember a single one; and if this be spoken too universally, as through forgetfulness it may be, we are sure at least that the exceptions will not be more than sufficient to prove the rule. In lexicography our list contains scarcely a name of high reputation; and the many defects and errors of the Greek grammar which is most commonly used in our schoools, may well excite a foreigner's astonishment.* If we turn to works written in illustration of ancient manners, arts, institutions, and laws, what names can we find amongst our own countrymen to oppose to those of Grævius and Gronovius, of Meursius, of Sigonius, of Petit, of Montfaucon, of Winckelman, of Godefroi, of Heineccius, and a multitude of others, without naming the great modern writers of Germany, Creuzer, Hugo, Haubold, and Savigny?

* It will be seen at once that we refer to the Eton Greek Grammar; by whom it was first written, or what character it deserved to bear in relation to the then existing state of knowledge, we know not—but it is decidedly behind the present age, and does not tend to give boys an accurate knowledge of the parts of speech, or the principles of syntax. We cannot but think that it might well become some of the members of the collegiate body, who have "all appliances and means," present leisure, past experience, sufficient learning in all, in some, as every one knows, a high degree of it, and an admirable library; to do something for its improvement. From the masters themselves it would be most unreasonable to expect any labour in addition to their present overwhelming occupations.

Nor can it be said that the attention of Englishmen is engrossed by other subjects, and that they have no leisure to bestow on classical studies. We know that the attention of our great schools is directed almost exclusively to these very points; that they hold a principal place in the system of education adopted by our universities; and that in no country can there be found more munificent institutions, expressly founded for the encouragement of liberal learning. We know also that in no country in Europe is something more than a merely superficial acquaintance with the classics of Greece and Rome so indispensable, we might almost say universal, an accomplishment of a gentleman; and we know by the specimens of a higher degree, which we can produce, what might, and what ought to be the boast of our universities. When we speak of Blomfield, the great Porson, Gaisford, and the lamented Elmsley, a man whom it is not too much, perhaps, to call the most purely Attic scholar of his age, we speak of men, whose characteristic qualities are soundness of judgment, accuracy of knowledge, and elegance of taste—of men who do but make it a more important question, to what cause we ought to ascribe our general deficiency in the field of classic literature and criticism. The conclusion of a long article is not the place to enter upon such an inquiry. One observation, however, we will make; many of our readers will remember the time when the number and indolence, "the prejudice and port" of resident fellows of colleges were the common topics of invective and ridicule. That clamour had its day, and has passed away; but its effect was in part most pernicious—we may attribute to it in no small degree the present custom of dispensing, as a matter of course, with the residence of all members of foundations who have taken the degree of master of arts. How little do we foresee the results of changes, which break in upon the rules laid down for us by our forefathers! this custom has defeated in great measure the object of the founders of our colleges; and the consequence of it has been the converting our universities into great schools; and the leaving in them scarcely any individuals who are simply occupied in the cultivation of literature. Fellowships are sought for as helping out the incomes of students in the active professions of life; and the residents in the universities are reduced to tutors and pupils. Far be it from us to insinuate that the duties of the former are not zealously and ably performed, we scarcely know a body of public servants more meritorious, or worse paid; but this we may be allowed to say without offence, that from the unvarying and unceasing nature of their occupations they are wholly unable to devote themselves to literature; and that commencing their career early in life, and often with the highest promise of excellence, their

minds become early jaded and worn out, their passion for study, and zeal in the pursuit of knowledge much abated, and that they often retire with intellects little, if at all, advanced by advancing years. Splendid exceptions may be and are found; but as a class of men it is obvious that these must not be looked to as likely to furnish many competitors in industry, knowledge, or in patient self-devotion to the cause of literature, with the indefatigable students of Germany.

THE SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE OPERATIVE CLASSES.

This article, now presented in a continuous form, originally appeared as "Letters" in the Sheffield Courant, in the year 1832.

I. I HAVE lately been travelling through the northern and midland counties of England;—and it was impossible not to be struck with the generally flourishing appearance of the country. But views of this kind affect me with almost as much pain as pleasure. One cannot enjoy the beauty which one sees, because we know how much of suffering and how much of discontent and all evil passions are lurking beneath it.

When I think on the moral and physical state of the English labourers, whether employed in agriculture, in manufactures, or in trade, I grow somewhat impatient of those long discussions upon the Reform Bill, which are engrossing the time of Parliament. And so widely are those discussions spread by the public press, that this same question engrosses the attention not of Parliament only but of the nation at large. It delays inquiry into other matters, and prevents those measures of precaution or of palliation, which it is dangerous, which it may be fatal, to postpone. What have we learnt from the experience of last autumn and winter? Nothing, I fear, in the way of preventing the recurrence of such scenes;—the wise and good, they who could and would better the present state of things, seem to have learnt nothing at all from it; but the authors and instruments of evil have learnt much. Upon them, if I am not greatly misinformed, the lesson has been anything but thrown away. At any rate this much is certain, that while nothing has been done within the last six months to enlighten and improve the poorer classes, much has been done and is daily doing to mislead and to excite them; clubs, unions, and associations, the eternal curse of society in every age and country that has witnessed them, are more active and more audacious than ever; and the foundations of all moral and social good are assailed with a vehe-

mence which, unhappily, is only to be equalled by the supineness or ignorance with which they are defended.

Meanwhile there is in action one instrument from which I hope much, and that is the Provincial Press. Most of the country newspapers which I have seen, seem to me to be really independent; to be free from aristocratical influence, and at the same time to be above pandering to the popular passions and follies, like too large a portion of the newspaper press of London. There is a soberness in their tone which is the thing most essential to the directors of public opinion. The people are just as much slaves, when they follow blindly the violence and faction of an unknown writer in a newspaper, as when they are bribed or overawed by property and political influence. I wish the people to be really independent;—that is, to think and to judge calmly for themselves; not to be agitated and to clamour without thinking, just as their favourite newspaper sets them on. I am a thorough friend to knowledge, and, therefore, I detest excitement and violence; for these utterly obscure the truth, and make a man ready to talk and act upon everything, while he knows nothing.

If you agree with me in these principles, you will, perhaps, be disposed to second my endeavours to put them in practice. I care not whether people agree with me or not in all my conclusions, if I can but persuade them really to think for themselves, and to consider freely and fairly those questions on which they are now no better than the veriest parrots and slaves. Far be it from me to fancy that I can see my way through all the difficulties of our social condition. But if I can only set an example of fair and calm inquiry, concealing nothing, palliating nothing, exaggerating nothing—if I can lead men to consider their grievances wisely, as well as to feel them keenly—to look into the causes of them, and so to dismiss that soreness and fierceness with which they now regard their supposed authors;—if, in short, I can but in any degree improve the temper and sober the judgment with which men now study political questions,—neither shall I have written in vain, nor will you repent of the space which you will have allowed me to occupy.

I begin then, with giving a sketch of the several causes which have brought about the present relations of the rich and poor towards one another, both with regard to their mutual feelings, and to their outward condition.

II. If it should please God that the Cholera should reach this country,—if it were to spread through our thickly peopled towns and parishes with its usual virulence,—if suffering and death were preying upon thousands of our population,—you can conceive, amidst all the panic that would undoubtedly prevail, how much we should witness

also of active and judicious inquiry, and of self-denying charity. But above all, great as would be the evil, it would not be embittered by angry and revengeful passions amongst ourselves. It would arise so clearly from causes utterly beyond human power to counteract, that the sufferers themselves could attribute their calamity to no other source than the inscrutable will of God:—it would be so great and manifest a scourge that all persons would use their best and most vigorous endeavours to get rid of it.

Such is the case with the visitations of sickness; such is the case also with the visitations of famine, when they arise clearly from unfavourable seasons. But unluckily it is far otherwise with the visitations of poverty. Here the sufferers attribute the evils which oppress them to the faults of other men; and as passion is blind, they are apt to try any means rather than those which can really effect their object, to deliver themselves from their burden. On the other hand, they who are exempt from the visitation, instead of regarding it as an evil calling aloud for palliation, if not for total cure, are tempted to view it too much as coming in the natural course of things,—as resembling the fevers of autumn, or the agues of marshy districts—inconveniences which have happened and will continue to happen—against which it is vain to struggle, and they who escape them have only to enjoy their good fortune, and congratulate themselves that *they* are not the victims.

The object, then, of every honest public writer should be to calm and to enlighten the poor; to interest and to arouse the rich. We are afflicted by a great evil, not certainly brought on solely by the hand of God—like the visitations of pestilence and famine,—yet brought on so far as men have been the authors of it, partly by a sort of chance medley, partly through ignorance, and partly from the mere indulgence of feelings so universal, and usually visited with so little blame, that no man has a right to impute them as a crime to his neighbour. On the other hand, the evil is so great, and ignorance and carelessness, however excusable at first, become so deeply blamable after warning given, that it will not do to regard the actual state of the poor as an unavoidable drawback upon national prosperity,—a drawback which *must* be paid, and which it is the best way to think of as little as possible.

If I do but state ever so briefly the various causes which have brought on our present distress, the number of matters thus crowded together will be almost enough to bewilder some readers. But if they can scarcely see their way through the subject when laid at once before them, how could others, while seeing only the unconnected parts of it, and without the aid of experience to enlighten them, be expected to

see beforehand to what their conduct was leading? Our present distress is owing—1. To the long war which raged through Europe for more than twenty years, everywhere deranging the state of society, and in England forcing suddenly the increase of our population and of our commerce and manufactures to an unusual, and therefore mischievous excess.

2. To the natural tendency of wealth to become richer, and of poverty to become poorer; by which trade carried on on a large scale has driven trade on a smaller scale out of the market; by which the rich have been enabled to buy property to a large extent, and often at a great advantage; while men of small fortunes have been led to sell, often at a great disadvantage: so that, while a larger portion of the community has been forced to depend wholly on their labour, that labour itself, owing to the effect of great wealth in encouraging human invention, and thus leading to the discovery and use of machinery, has become far less valuable.

3. To the effect of wealth in making men more alive to, and more able to procure, intellectual pleasures; while poverty renders the same pleasures at once undesired and unattainable; so that the different classes of society have been removed to a greater distance from one another, have sympathised with and understood each other less, and thus have become strangers to each other, too ready, I fear, to become enemies also.

4. To the Poor Laws, a beneficent institution,—harmless and even salutary—in a wholesome state of society; but fearfully aggravating its evils when once it becomes diseased, by encouraging a want of forethought and exertion in the poor, and accustoming them not to look higher than the bare necessaries of life; while, on the other hand, the rich are galled by a burden of a compulsory charity, their feelings are hardened, and, accustomed to look on their neighbours as on paupers supported at their expense, they lose towards them all sense of equality and brotherhood.

5. To the excess of aristocracy in our whole system, religious, political, and social; an evil arising from causes which run back to the earliest period of our history; and which have tended silently and unconsciously to separate the higher classes from the lower in almost every relation of life. For instance, it is an enormous evil, yet one for which no one is to blame, that the rich and poor in England have each what is almost a distinct language; the language of the rich, which is of course that of books also, being so full of French words derived from their Norman ancestors, while that of the poor still retains the pure Saxon character inherited from their Saxon forefathers.

Now, in this brief and compressed statement there is matter enough to think upon, for those who are able and willing to think instead of clamouring and indulging mere ignorant abuse. There are real and intelligible causes of the present distress; but because they do not serve the ends of agitators, they are passed over in silence, whilst the changes are wrung upon the vague words—"Corruption," "Misgovernment," "Tyranny," "Pampered oligarchy," "Boroughmongering faction," &c. Truly it is hard to decide whether they who use this language are more wicked or more ignorant; for though their tone and spirit abundantly show that truth is not their object, yet their excessive shallowness must wholly acquit them of having discovered it, and then wilfully suppressing it. But popular principles are too sacred to be abandoned in disgust because of the vileness of their advocates; and I hope to labour unceasingly in the great work of social reform, notwithstanding the baseness and the folly by which it is obstructed under pretence of advancing it.

III. In the month of November 1830, a paper was found one morning, affixed to the church in a small parish in one of the midland counties, which was at that time, and afterwards, perfectly free from any disturbance. The paper was of some length; and from some particular circumstances, as well as from internal evidence, it was known to be the genuine production of one of the labourers in the village. It was so striking, both in matter and manner, that the clergyman of the place read it aloud immediately to the farmers in the vestry-room, and carried it about afterwards, to shew it to several persons in the neighbourhood. Amongst the rest he shewed it to me, and I read it with very great interest and attention. It seemed to me to be clearly genuine—that is, it expressed the real grievances of the labourers of that neighbourhood, just as they were likely to feel them of themselves, without having been influenced and corrupted by the falsehoods of the Jacobin press. Its complaints, therefore, appeared to me to be well worth our serious attention, and they certainly confirmed the views which I had long been accustomed to entertain as to the real evils of the labourers' condition and their causes.

This paper said nothing about rents, or tithes, or taxes: it complained neither of the squire, nor of the parson, nor of the government: neither did it cry out against the aristocracy, nor speak of the rich as the enemies and oppressors of the poor. It set out with saying, that God had intended that there should be both rich and poor in the world, but not that the poor should be so wretched and degraded as they were at present. It complained that cottages had been pulled

down, and cottage gardens thrown together and ploughed up, to increase the size of the large farms. It dwelt particularly upon the distance which there now was between the farmers and the labourers: the farmers, it said, do not now call their labourers into their kitchen, and give them a draught of beer, but "take no more notice of them *than if they were dumb beasts*, and let them eat their crust by the ditch side, with nothing to drink with it but water." And it spoke of the fires which were then frequent in so many counties, as of great acts of wickedness; but that the farmers might certainly expect such a judgment on their hard-heartedness, if they still persisted in it. It concluded with praying for a blessing upon the clergyman of the parish, whom it described as the "good shepherd," who worked in the Church and out of the Church to do the people good.

Now we see, that in this paper the grand grievances of the labourer are described as twofold: his absolute want of comforts, in getting only the poorest food, and a crowded and miserable dwelling; and his degradation in society, in being left to eat his meal in the open air, as if he were a dumb beast. The latter of these seemed to have made quite as deep an impression on the writer's mind as the former, and very deservedly; for a want of kindness is as bad as a want of food, and to society at large it is far more mischievous; for it spreads mutual suspicion, and fear, and hatred, and makes men ascribe the evils of their outward condition to the faults of their neighbours, and thus to think themselves not unfortunate, but aggrieved. There is no saying how much mischief is thus created, and the consequences cannot be better shown than by what was said in the paper about the fires. The writer, it seems, would on no account have taken any part in them, yet he could not be altogether sorry if they were to break out in his parish; because those who suffered from them seemed to him to deserve punishment. Even a good man could go as far as this; and how many are likely to be found in every parish who would gladly go much farther?

I will go any lengths with any man in acknowledging the enormity of this evil, and the urgent necessity of correcting it. But still I know that it has not been brought about intentionally, and that it would not have been easy, unless they were far better than they are, to have avoided it. It is the consequence of the violent stimulus or spur given to the progress of society in our days, by various causes, some good and some bad:—by the long war in which we have been engaged, on the one hand; and by the increased activity of the human mind on the other. We have been living, as it were, the life of three hundred years in thirty. All things have made a prodigious start together,—or

rather all that could have done so, and those that could not have therefore been left at a long distance behind. When an army makes a forced march, every one knows how impossible it is to make all the parts of it advance equally.

The process in its details has been this. The war created a great demand for every thing; and the other countries of Europe, feeling the actual miseries and the distractions of war far more than we did, and being cut off by our great naval power and Bonaparte's decrees from foreign commerce,—left us to supply much more than our fair share of it. Large fortunes were made, and enormous sums of money brought into circulation; activity and extravagance were the order of the day. Every man in the richer and middling classes saw around him examples of greater enterprise in all sorts of ways, and of greater luxuries enjoyed in consequence, than he or his father had ever known. We know how contagious such examples are, and that in these matters no man likes to be left behind his neighbour. Accordingly, rents were raised, wastes were inclosed, farms thrown together, small properties bought up, new branches of trade opened, new manufactories set up, new machines invented, and every hand that could be found was pressed into the service of capital, either to make it, or to increase it. All was busy and all was thriving; and of the quantity of national wealth thus created, you and I, and all the higher and middling classes are tasting the benefits;—some with more or less of a drawback in their increased taxation, but still we are enjoying many more comforts or luxuries than were enjoyed by our fathers. Nor is it to be denied that the poor also are deriving some benefit from it. Earthenware has succeeded to wood or pewter; their wives and daughters can dress better and cheaper; and cheap publications are much more numerous. But from the poor it has taken away with one hand more than it has given with the other. It is a universal rule, whether in morals, in knowledge, or in money matters, that "*much will make more*," and that "*little is apt to become less.*" The small farmer was driven out of the market by the large farmer; the small tradesman by the great one; the small home manufacturer, who eked out the produce of his farm or of his labour in the fields, by the spinning, or straw platting, or lace making, of his wife and daughters in the winter evenings, could not stand against the united powers of capital and machinery. Deprived of the means of selling any thing else to advantage, they were forced to increase the class, already too large, of those who had nothing to sell but their labour. But here the market was becoming overstocked, for the war ended, and the demand for every thing lessened, and other nations were bestirring themselves to supply their own wants; so that

there was getting less to be done, with more hands, and those wholly without other means of support, vying with one another to do it. Of course labour fell, for who could expect a farmer to pay more for work when he could get it done for less? But what was even worse was this, while one half of society was moving forward, and the other half sinking backward, the distance between them in feelings and habits was continually becoming greater. I have often heard gentlemen speak with much indignation of the changed habits of farmers and tradesmen: the farmer, they say, keeps his hunters, and his wife and daughters dress as finely as ladies, and learn music instead of making pies and puddings, as formerly; and hence it is, they go on, that the labourers are turned out of doors to eat by the ditch side, and are treated like "*dumb beasts.*" I have never heard such language without feeling quite as much indignation as those who used it; but it was directed not against the farmers, but against themselves. What insolence is it, when we ourselves are so changed from the manners of our fathers, when we are so much better educated, and enjoy so many more comforts than they did, to complain of others for having made a similar advance. I rejoice most heartily in the changed habits of the farmers, —if the fact be true,—and I only wish that the habits of the labourer had been raised also. The high Aristocrat is but echoing the language of the worst Jacobin: except that the Jacobin is the more consistent of the two. Both would pull down the higher of two unequal classes, instead of raising the lower; but whilst the Jacobin would reduce all ranks to the lowest level, the high Aristocrat would reduce all but his own. To both is the doctrine of the good and the wise utterly opposed. Our business is to raise all, and to lower none. Equality is the dream of a madman, or the passion of a fiend. Extreme inequality, or high comfort and civilization in some, coexisting with deep misery and degradation in others, is no less also a folly and a sin. But an inequality where some have all the enjoyments of civilized life, and none are without its comforts,—where some have all the treasures of knowledge, and none are sunk in ignorance, that is a social system in harmony with the order of God's creation in the natural world,—and which can alone fulfil His purposes for man as a reasonable and a spiritual being, as capable of serving and glorifying his Maker here, and of enjoying with Him hereafter an eternal communion.

IV. This has brought me very nearly to the threshold of the grand difficulty which besets the whole matter of our inquiries; the difficulty of knowing *how things are to be mended.* There are mistakes enough afloat as to the causes of our present evils, and yet here we have actual facts to investigate; they may be tangled and confused, it is true, yet

we know that as the result is before our eyes, a careful tracing of things backwards will bring us at last to the true cause or causes of it. But in projecting remedies we are in a manner bridging chaos: we start from firm ground, but we instantly lose our footing, and all becomes uncertain; we may hope, we may suppose, fairly argue, and reasonably conclude; but with regard to the future we cannot *know*.

I wish that this view of the case were as vividly present to the minds of all political writers, as it must be to theirs who know the most and think the deepest. To read the arrogant language of many a journalist, one would suppose that they were the very wisest men of their species, whose clear sight could carry them with a firm step through intricacies where ordinary persons must grope on their way darkling. But the truth is, that they walk confidently only because they are so short-sighted as to see no obstacles in their path till they actually stumble over them.

Good sheer thorough ignorance is indeed apt to be presumptuous and violent, for its only chance of gaining credit is by preventing its readers from exercising their own reflection and judgment. Whereas, he who understands something of his subject, and is really anxious to know more, desires nothing so much as a fair and full examination of his statements. He knows that there is something at least in them worth attending to; he is aware also that there may be much that is mistaken; but truth being his object, he wants the question to be fairly worked out, and he cares very little whether himself or any one else be the lucky man who shall first discover the vein of the precious ore. If nine-tenths of all that I have said were to be entirely mistaken, I should yet be perfectly satisfied if its tone and manner had invited my readers to think for themselves, and so enabled them to correct my errors.

I may seem to be going a little out of the way, but it is bad economy of time in the end to set out on a journey unprepared. Every newspaper, every tract, every pamphlet, nay I dare say every active member of a club or an union, has got a remedy at hand for the evils of the times. There is Mr. Owen, formerly the proprietor of the cotton factory at New Lanark, who would begin with society from the very beginning, and make us all men of a different nature from what we are now. There is Mr. Carlile, of the Rotunda, who would make all things straight by merely persuading every man to get rid of his conscience, and labour, talk, write, and fight, if needful, to advance his own interest, and gratify his own passions; a doctrine, in short, which says in plain English, "every man for himself, and the devil for us all." Others talk only of attacking "the drones of society;" of making those

who live in idleness disgorge the wealth which they are daily sucking out of the poor man's labour: and especially of stripping parsons, pensioners, and stock-jobbers, by which last term Mr. Cobbett means, "*those who have got any money in the funds.*" Then again others of a different party cry out for war and a paper currency, to give employment to the poor: they sigh for fresh issues of country bank notes, for long credits, and high rents: they think, in short, that the process of getting drunk is far pleasanter than that of getting sober; so they want to apply again to the dram bottle.

It may perhaps be worth while, therefore, to show the groundlessness of those notions which are entertained by many rash and inconsiderate talkers.

I protest against the extravagant expectation of a remedy for all evils, which some entertain from parliamentary reform. Not that I would disparage the utility or the importance of improvements in our representative system; but it is absurd to expect that any *system* should of itself bring about beneficial changes. The most perfect plan of representation can only enable the people, to choose, if they *will*, the fittest persons to represent them; but if the electors are influenced by private and personal considerations, and not by public spirit,—if they elect with a view to individual interests, or the interests of their own particular class, in opposition to that of the country, a reformed parliament is likely to be as corrupt as an unreformed; and if the members of parliament show themselves selfish and unprincipled, they will in fact only be the fitter representatives of such electors. But supposing that members are elected on the purest principles, and prove worthy of the trust reposed in them, they can do much indeed, but they cannot do all that is desirable towards remedying many of the national evils. There is a great part of them which, though time and wisdom combined may gradually remove, will not admit of a sudden cure by any human skill; and there are, I fear, many objects contemplated by some, which no human means can ever possibly accomplish. No parliamentary wisdom, for instance, can at once sweep away the burden of the national debt. It is a debt contracted for money which was borrowed and *spent* in the course of a long and costly war. *The money is gone and lost for ever!* We might by wiping off the debt with a wet sponge, ruin the fundholders, and enrich the rest of the nation at their expense; but this would be no benefit to the community, because the fundholders are a part of the community; and it can be no benefit to any nation that one half of it should be robbed, and the other half robbers.

We may, however, by judicious frugality, gradually diminish the

debt; and we can resolve never to increase it by resorting to the ruinous practice of borrowing.

But in order *to avoid increasing the national debt, we must above all things endeavour to avoid war.* Those who honestly regard war as beneficial on account of its *furnishing employment*, are under the most mischievous of all delusions. Those whom war maintains and enriches, it enriches at the expense of the rest of the community, and at a far greater loss to the one party than gain to the other. And yet destructive as it is both of life and of capital, I am persuaded that its disordering and demoralizing effects are far the greatest part of the evils of war.

Let it not be supposed that it is in the power of any legislature, however enlightened and upright, and zealous to fulfil the expectations of many among the labouring classes, who seem to think that regulations might be established which should secure to every labourer—to all that now exist and shall hereafter come into existence, wages sufficient at all times to enable them to maintain their families comfortably. The founds for the support of labourers, whether greater or less, cannot in any country be infinite; and a law which professes to insure to *all* who demand it, whether they worked well or ill—whether they were few or many, a comfortable subsistence, would profess an impossibility. To compel a farmer to employ a certain *fixed number* of labourers at a certain rate of wages, whether it answered or not, would be only *unjust;* to compel him to maintain *all* that offered, would be impossible. I *ought* not to be made to part with all I have, I *cannot* be made to part with *more* than I have.

But a wise and active legislature may do much towards mitigating, and in time doing away the sufferings to which the labouring classes are, and long have been exposed in many parts of England.

The practice of making up wages out of the poor rates, which, in the southern parts of England especially, has for some time been very prevalent, is, in fact, under the mask of kindness to the poor, one of the most degrading systems of oppression. When men are paid, not according to their industry and skill, but according to their wants,—when for the same species of labour one man receives only half the weekly wages of the other, not because his work is worth less, but because he is a single man,—we are so far advanced towards a state of slavery. The slave, like one of the domestic animals, being his master's property, receives, whether the profits of his labour be small or great, as much, and *only as much* as is sufficient to support him in tolerable condition: his maintenance is proportioned to his need, not

to his exertions; and as a *necessary consequence* of this want of a stimulus, he is kept to work by the *fear of punishment.*

V. If I was right in attributing the evils of our social relations to various causes, it cannot be probable that the remedy is to be sought for in any single measure. I may have my own notions, like other men, as to the measure most especially called for in the first instance; but I am quite satisfied that any one by itself will be totally inefficient towards working any substantial improvement. Neither Reform in Parliament, nor emigration, nor lowering the interest of the debt, nor church reform, nor giving the poor allotments of land, nor spreading knowledge and a taste for intellectual pursuits among them, nor yet the abolition of the corn laws and of the tithes, for which many call so loudly,—none of all these things will do us any great or real good, unless. as the waters of bitterness have flowed in by so many different channels we set vigorously to work at stopping up *all* the inlets of mischief, on one great system, clearly and comprehensively devised, and steadily and perseveringly executed.

For, to refer to my former statement of the causes of our distress,—the increase of our population and of our manufactures to an unnatural excess, which I have put at the head of these causes, might perhaps be relieved by emigration, or by home colonies, as they are called, or as some think by the abolition of tithes and corn laws; but how will these things affect the moral evils of our condition? how are they to raise the moral and intellectual character of the poor, to bring them and the rich nearer to one another; or how will they prevent the return of the same evils, or of others even still worse, in the course of a few years, if circumstances should again favour their revival? Capital and machinery have, in the way I have stated, and when combined with other causes, helped to depress the condition of the labourer; and it may be thought that to fix a maximum of property or a minimum of wages, or to destroy steam engines and machines of all other descriptions, might at least cure this evil. But here we should be further still from our object; for though I believe that capital and machinery have, *under actual circumstances*, done much harm, yet the fault is not in them, but in those unfavourable circumstances which have drawn evil out of what is in itself good. And thus, to destroy what is good in itself, and yet not to meddle with the circumstances which alone have made it in part injurious, would only leave us in a worse state than we are in now. So the ignorance of the poor might be removed by education: but how can you really educate a man, unless he and his equals in society go along with you, and appreciate the good which you would give them? And who can be expected to desire general knowledge and intellectual

pleasures, whilst his more bodily wants are ill satisfied? Yet again—the Poor Laws are and have been injurious, *owing to other unfavourable circumstances*. Should we mend the matter by striking off the Poor Laws at one sweep? Or would not this be an act as wicked as it is utterly impracticable, and should not we by so doing deserve all the horrors of that general convulsion, for which we should ourselves have given the signal? For the evils produced by a spirit of ultra-aristocracy prevailing throughout our social system, many, I fear, think that, for this at least, they know a short and effectual remedy. To overthrow the peerage and the church, to divide great properties, or, in short to do away with such a thing as a gentleman altogether, would strike home, they would say, to the root of this mischief, once and for ever. It is waste of time to talk of wickedness to a Jacobin, for it is the very essence of his nature. But setting aside the guilt of such a scheme, and granting its practicability, I say boldly that on the lowest notions of utilitarian morality *it would not answer*. It might if we had as much elbow room as in America, *and a population of slaves to do all our hardest and most irksome work for us*. But conceive our population of fifteen millions pent up in the narrow limits of this Island, with society in an utter chaos, all its former landmarks gone, all hitherto respected principles of order utterly rooted out, all property submitted to a scramble, and the best restraints of our ferocious passions snapped into a thousand pieces. No living man can tell, and God forbid that we should have any real cause to speculate, when such a sea of troubled waters would ever grow calm, in what direction a volcano so fraught with all elements of destruction might discharge its fury. Whether foreign war with all its evils might come as a welcome relief to the utter miseries of domestic anarchy,—whether England might renew the career of Napoleon, and after spreading the curse of its conquests over Europe, might provoke, as he did, a bitter revolution on her own head; or whether, from very weariness, after civil war, want of employment, and their consequences, famine and pestilence, had effectually reduced the superfluous population, the people might fly for relief to despotism: this much is certain, that the moral and physical condition of the poor, (and who would then be other than poor?) would be ten times more miserable and degraded than it is now.

All these considerations show the enormous difficulty of the subject, and should teach us that a great deal of knowledge, and of good judgment, and very comprehensive views, and good principles and good temper, all are required in the public men who would help us out of our present evils. For instance, to take only one question out of many, that of our population, how many various opinions exist about it: first

as to the fact whether it be excessive or no; and then as to the remedies, whether emigration or home colonies are preferable, or whether some mere political changes would effect all that is wanted. On some of these points, I doubt whether any one is sufficiently well informed; and happy should I be if I could direct the attention of some of your readers, to the importance of gaining and communicating information upon them. I know how much I have to learn about them myself, and I see that some writers of great name and much pretension are exactly in my own situation, although they do not appear to be aware of it. My remarks on population, therefore, will be very like an honest map of an imperfectly surveyed country; it will exhibit great blanks by the side of spots laid down in full detail; but how much better is this than to do like some of the old geographers, who filled up from imagination the parts for which they had no real authorities; and thus as far as in them lay, perpetuated to posterity the ignorance of their own generation.

VI.—It is more than two thousand years ago that a Greek philosopher, Phaleas of Chalcedon, impatient, like Mr. Owen in the present day, of the existing evils of society, proposed to remedy them by an equalization of property and of education. Upon the first of these remedies Aristotle remarks, that a limit set to property is inefficient, unless you also set a limit to population. Otherwise, says he, your system in the first place cannot last, and besides you will, in the course of a few years have as much poverty as ever. Within our own memory, Mr. Godwin, better known perhaps as the author of "Caleb Williams" than from his work on "Political Justice," repeated the complaint of Phaleas, and maintained that the evils of society arose from misgovernment, and especially from the unequal distribution of property. Mr. Malthus replied to him as Aristotle more than two thousand years before had replied to Phaleas. He said that there was another cause at work, quite independent of political misgovernment, and as powerful in producing evil;—namely, *the tendency of population to outgrow the means of subsistence.* So that, to use Aristotle's words, a limitation of property is nothing, unless you can also limit within proper bounds the increase of population.

Here you have in a few words what is called the Malthusian theory of population; but which, in fact, was known to Aristotle and to the philosophers of ancient Greece, quite as well as to Mr. Malthus. The doctrine, however, had long been forgotten in modern Europe, because since the days of the Roman Empire, Europe had never been fully peopled, and therefore the advantages of a large population were much more an object of desire, than its inconveniences were matter of alarm.

It had become a habit with literary men to retail the complaints of the Roman writers upon the decay of the true strength of a state, a free and hardy population, and the growth of overgrown luxury among the rich in its stead. And in them this complaint was reasonable ; for partly owing to long and bloody civil wars, partly to the general buying up of small properties by the rich, and the employment of slave labour instead of that of freemen, and partly to an unequalled profligacy of manners, the free population in Italy, even as early as the Christian era, was exceedingly scanty, and every encouragement was given to the rearing of a family, both to increase the number of citizens, and by opening a field for the domestic affections, to bring back a more wholesome state of public morals.

I have stated thus much to account for the alleged novelty of Mr. Malthus's theory when he first published it ; although it had been well known in Greece two thousand years earlier. People are not apt to think of the evils of one extreme, when they themselves are actually suffering from those of the other ; and therefore while Europe was under-peopled, and labour was sure to find a good market, because there was constant demand for it, no one was inclined to anticipate the time when the tide would turn, and when, instead of wanting men to do the work, work would be often sought for in vain to employ the men.

But though our fathers may well be excused for not anticipating an evil which they did not feel, I cannot extend the same indulgence to those who would persuade themselves that the evil which they do feel is not an evil because their fathers never complained of it. There are generally, it seems, two periods in the history of a nation, at which its population is found to press too hardly upon its means of subsistence. The first takes place when its most obvious and first-found resources become insufficient ; when the slovenly farming and careless enjoyment of the earliest stage of a nation's existence are exchanged for a harder industry, a more careful search after other and more hidden sources of wealth, and the calling in of science to quicken the somewhat enfeebled powers of nature. This period occurred in England towards the middle of the sixteenth century ; when landlords began to understand the value of their land, and to employ it in the manner which would return them the greatest profit ; when commerce began to be followed up with unaccustomed vigour, and when, as the sure mark of a great change working in the state of society, the distress and numbers of the poor increased beyond all further example, and rendered the hazardous experiment of the Poor Laws welcome and necessary, as they deemed it, to the statesmen of that generation. Then be-

gins a second period—the period of systematical improvement, so far as the physical resources of a nation are concerned, but unhappily, by no means of equal improvement in the higher points of national wisdom and national virtue. And therefore, a crisis is hastened which otherwise might never have arrived. National wealth is enormously increased; but because great moral ignorance generally prevails, national poverty increases also. The population thus goes on increasing too rapidly; because, whilst the high state of commercial activity on the one hand offers it constant encouragement, the poor, as no pains are taken to elevate them, become less and less thoughtful, and less and less desirous of a high state of comfort, and therefore ready to marry and to raise a family, if they have a prospect of the bare necessaries of life. Thus, however skilfully and vigorously a nation's whole resources may be called into action; however much its agriculture may be improved, its commerce extended, its manufactures multiplied; still the population is increasing too fast, because there is a large portion of the community whose habits belong rather to the first state of society than the second, who marry and have families as if the earth were still yielding its first luxuriant abundance for its handful of original settlers, instead of being come to that point, when civilization being necessary to call forth its powers, men are ill fitted for the state in which they are living if they are content to multiply as savages.

To this second period we are come, and to the time when its crisis is most threatening. The great point on which I would insist is this; —that let railways be multiplied as they will, or new markets opened for our manufactures, or still further improvements introduced into agriculture, still our population will continue to be excessive so long as the wages of labour are low, and the bulk of the people depend solely on their labour. And this will continue to be the case, until the habits and tastes of the poor can be raised, and they can be taught to look for better prospects for their children than merely keeping them from starving. I come to the conclusion, therefore, that our population requires to be lessened: and now propose to consider the different means of effecting this great object thoroughly and permanently.

VII.—The storm, I trust, has blown over, and has spent its violence upon Nottingham and Derby. Your townsmen of Sheffield, I am glad to see, have kept up their usual character for good sense and a regard to justice in abstaining from such disgraceful outrages as have been perpetrated in the neighbouring counties. Disgraceful and atrocious outrages indeed they are, and almost more disgraceful to that portion of the public press which excited them first and then tried to palliate their guilt, than to the miserable ruffians who perpetrated them. If

the friends of liberty and the people would save their cause from utter disgrace, they should not gently regret such crimes and half excuse them, but denounce them with disgust and abhorrence, and try to bring the actors and abettors of them to condign punishment.

Meantime, what additional interest is thrown by all these disgraceful scenes upon the subject on which I am addressing you? What can more plainly show how insufficient any one remedy would be to bring things to a better state? An increase of work or a rise in wages would do nothing for those Derby and Nottingham rioters in the way of making them better members of society: so long as they continue in their present state of ignorance and demoralization, they would but eat and drink the more for the time, without doing any thing to raise their condition permanently. And yet, whilst they continue in their present poverty, how are they to be enlightened and humanized?

I have just read a very able pamphlet by Mr. Richardson, of Haydon, in Norfolk, on the general question of the poor laws and the employment of the agricultural population. Mr. Richardson thinks that there is no excess of population in the agricultural districts; but that many more hands might be profitably employed. He proposes that every county should constitute one entire parish, thus making the market of labour perfectly free within the bounds of each county: he would simplify the laws of settlements, and make them settlements on counties, not on parishes: he would provide for the employment of the principal part of the labourers by allotting a certain number to every rate payer, according to his assessment, giving him, however, the choice of his men: and for the employment of the remainder he would provide by what he calls district farms, to be hired by the county; and which he supposes would cover their own expenses by the sale of their produce.

It seems to me that there is much good in these suggestions, and particularly in the plan for doing away with parish settlements, at present a frightful source of misery. Mr. Richardson is a practical man, and his opinions are recommended by a large experience. I should be very glad to see his reforms adopted, but the mischief lies deeper than his plan alone would reach. For granting that more hands than are now employed might be set to work with advantage, yet the evil is not only that many men are now out of employment, but that those who do work are under-paid; and no man can imagine, when he takes into the account the population, not of the agricultural districts only, but of the manufacturing, and above all of Ireland, that the wages of labour can materially rise while there is so great a competition at hand to keep it down.

The evil lies deeper; and it is this. Freedom and property are things so essentially united, that to have a large free population *wholly* dependent on their labour, when that labour is of a sort which every man can perform, is of itself a state of things fraught with mischief. Perhaps some may not be aware that this state is one of rare occurrence in the history of the world; because, generally speaking, either the great mass of labourers have been slaves, or else their numbers have been much below the resources of the country, and their market has been so good that industry has enabled them to acquire property. When the labourers were slaves, their welfare as little entered into the consideration of statesmen as that of the brute creation; the happiness of the *nation* was never thought to be affected because its *slaves* were oppressed and miserable. In truth, this was the readiest way of solving the problem, how to insure the happiness of civil society—shut out from society those whom it is most difficult to render happy, and you can then effect your object easily.

Slavery is justly looked upon with abhorrence; but it would have been well if, when priding ourselves upon its extinction, we had considered the new and most difficult duties which then devolved upon us. It is very easy to say, "we will not tolerate slavery," but it is a very different matter to know how to untie that knot which the system of slavery cut in twain summarily.—Society, if it deserve the name, must provide for the welfare of all whom it receives into its pale; and we have truly learnt from Christianity that it should receive every human being. We cannot and we ought not to go back, but neither can we remain as we are; for our poor at this moment have the name and rights of freemen, while their outward condition is that of slaves. And this is the case, because we have transferred to our free population the notions which were entertained of a population of slaves: because labourers, when slaves, had and could have no property, we have thought it no evil that labourers when citizens should be equally destitute.

It is on this view of the case that I call our present population excessive. I do not doubt that a much larger population could be maintained in a state of slavery; but the question is, whether our present numbers are not so great as to make it impossible for the labourer to acquire property by his labour,—in other words, whether they are not so great as to hinder the labourer from becoming what a freeman ought to be. I may be told that they are not too great, if the property be fairly divided: but to this I answer that a division of property is no more a just proposal on the part of the poor, than it would be just on the part of the rich to bring back the poor to their original state of

slavery. Either of these measures would, no doubt, remove the particular inconsistencies of our present state, but it would be only by introducing far greater injustice and greater misery in the room of it.

By the law of the land as it now is, every poor man may claim from society the maintenance of a slave: he has a right to be kept from starving, as a slave would be kept; and in return society may justly claim his work, as it would the work of a slave. But according to my notions, society should do more than this; it should put the poor man, being a freeman, into a situation where he may live as a freeman ought to live: and I see not how this can be done, except in one or two ways, either by what are called home colonies, or by emigration. This was the course regularly pursued in ancient times, when our present difficulty presented itself. When a large population who had formerly been slaves or conquered in war, grew up to the condition of freemen and citizens, they were provided for by being settled on the unappropriated lands of the state, or when none of those were to be found, they were sent out to be settled in a colony. This was the only way of avoiding one of two evils, each of which was then considered intolerable; the existence on the one hand of a free population in beggary; and on the other, a total overthrow of society, by dividing the property of the old citizens, in order to satisfy these new partners in the political firm, who wanted to come into a share of its profits for nothing.

VIII. When I spoke of the evil of having the bulk of our population dependent wholly upon labour, when that labour was of a sort which every man could perform, I said that in our present circumstances I could see no other remedy for this evil except in what are called Home Colonies, or in emigration. I am willing, however, to take the expression "Home Colonies," in the widest possible sense, and extend it to every measure for giving the labourer an interest in the soil, whether as a tenant or as a proprietor. I do believe that if these and emigration, accompanied with other measures, were fairly tried, there is nothing in our present condition which forbids our entertaining lively hopes for the restored and much improved welfare of our country.

But I am told that the people cannot bear to hear that our population is excessive; they say, that before any are turned out for the general good, the resources of the country should first be more equally divided; that it is only because some have too much that others have too little. No one talks of *turning out* any body. I never heard any man dream of *forcing people to migrate*, which would be in plain English to *transport them*; neither is it doubtful that if all persons fared alike, and

we could persuade one half of the community peaceably to share their property with the other, that there is food enough in the island to maintain us all till next summer. But it is one thing to encourage the poor to migrate, and another to force them to do it—it is one thing not to be overpeopled if an utterly impossible change in society were to take place, and another not to be overpeopled as society now exists. No doubt human beings might be packed much closer in Great Britain than they are now: but the real question is, whether such a crowding is practicable under actual circumstances, and whether also it is desirable; whether, in short, England *could* make itself like Judea in the time of Solomon; and whether, if it could, this would be the best means of mending our actual condition.

I am at a loss to understand how it can be unjust or inhuman to say to a man who is here barely able to keep himself from starving, that we will assist him to go to another country, where he may live in comfort, and provide sufficiently for himself and his family. I know that such a proposal made to persons in the richer classes is not thought a hardship or an insult, but a great favour; that fathers are glad to get situations for their sons in India, even though they part with them for such a number of years, that they cannot expect to live till they return. No doubt a parent would rather be able to provide for his son comfortably at home than send him to India; but he would much rather send him to India than see him live in beggary at home; and it does not occur to him to ask his neighbour to give him a piece of his estate, rather than that he should have to bear the pain of parting. Or if any particular trade be overstocked in any town, the man who finds himself best able to support himself by capital previously acquired, does not think himself injured if he be advised to go and look for an opening in his trade elsewhere.—It is, indeed, a shocking thing that poor men should be persuaded to migrate without knowing anything of the country to which they are going, and without having any one to advise them when they get there. This ignorance, I am inclined to think, is one of the greatest obstacles to emigration. No man likes to take a leap in the dark; and emigration is nothing better than a leap in the dark, when a man has never before been ten miles from his own village, when he has no notion of distances, and knows not a single particular about the climate, productions, customs, and manner of living in foreign countries. A mere elementary knowledge of geography would instantly dispel the vague fears which many of the poor now feel unreasonably. Migration would thus lose its terrors, and their knowledge would not only make them cease to fear it, but would teach them how to derive the full benefit of it.

Here the importance of increasing the knowledge of the poor forces itself upon us most strongly. Ignorance, indeed, meets us at every turn, as one of the greatest difficulties which we have to encounter; and what I am next going to notice is one proof of the mischiefs of ignorance. Nothing is more common than to hear people talk of the millions of unproductive acres which are to be found in this island, on which they tell us our whole labouring population might be advantageously settled. It is impossible that persons who talk thus can know much about these unproductive acres. There are enough of them, doubtless, in point of extent between Cornwall and Northumberland. I have sometimes thought that the Railways hereafter may do a great deal for your moors, by enabling you to get lime and manure in sufficient quantities to make a completely new soil in such parts as may be brought into cultivation. In this way the inclosure of Hounslow Heath, and the other wastes within ten miles of London has been found to answer tolerably well. But the moors offer three obstacles which I do not believe all the Railways in the world would ever effectually overcome; great extent, an impracticable soil, and a bad climate. Some people fancy that because a great many new enclosures have taken place within the last fifty years, therefore the waste lands still remaining may also be inclosed with advantage. They forget that what has been left was naturally the most impracticable part of the whole country; and I speak upon a general knowledge of every extensive tract of waste now remaining in England, when I say that almost all of them present difficulties either of soil or climate, or both, such as to render their cultivation on a large scale in our present state of science a matter practically hopeless.

This is quite a sufficient answer to the mere idle talk about our millions of uninclosed acres, which some indulge in who ought to know better. At the same time I do not doubt that much may be done on a small scale in different parts of the country, by allotting portions of reclaimable waste to the poor of particular parishes and districts. And I should like to know whether there does not often exist great abuse as to the employment of what is called the *poor's plot;* that is, the ground which was awarded to the poor of the parish at the time of an inclosure, in compensation for the loss of their rights of common. I am afraid that in some instances this land is let by the parish officers to a farmer, and even the rent of it, instead of being given to the poor, goes partly to eke out the poor rates.

Besides the inclosure of wastes, there is another way of giving property to the labourer, by allotting him a portion of land for a garden. This is a measure of which every one seems to approve; which I

know in practice to be a source of great benefit to the poor, and of great comfort; and which I heartily hope will spread over the whole country.

But, what is to be done meanwhile for the manufacturer? He cannot be set to inclose wastes,—and where, in the midst of a crowded town, can he get the pleasure and the profit of a garden? How can he be put in a condition to acquire property,—or how can life be rendered to him something more benefiting a man and a Christian than it too often is at present? This is a question, I doubt not, which has frequently occurred to your mind as well as to mine; and what is more to the purpose, it is become perfectly familiar to the manufacturers themselves; and if a good and fair answer be not given to it by others, they are but too likely to answer it themselves in a manner ruinous and disgraceful alike to them and to their neighbours.

It cannot be answered, however, without touching upon various points, both moral and political, in which the evil is plain enough, but the remedy seems beyond the power of any legal enactment, and to rest mainly with the people themselves. But the urgency of the crisis may make men listen to a statement which would have found them deafer than the deaf adder, if uttered in the season of apparent prosperity.

IX.—It has often been said that there are some prophecies which tend to insure their own fulfilment; and the language which I see and hear used every day by persons perfectly well-intentioned, seems likely to furnish another instance of the truth of this. People talk as if they were arrived at a period when every thing is to be thrown, as it were, into the crucible, and come out again in a new form. Not only the details of Government, but the very principles on which society is held together, are spoken of as likely to be questioned; not only the mere external constitution of the Church Establishment, but the foundations of our duty to God and man are considered as on the point of being subjected to a rude inquiry. Now, if men accustom themselves to hold this language, they are assuredly helping to bring about the very thing which they fear. There never have been, and never will be wanting some few wretches, or madmen, who, in their folly or their wickedness, would be glad to get rid of every law and every principle. There are always some to be found who have strong personal reasons for thinking gaols a nuisance, and who would be glad to make converts to their opinions. But are honest men really to stand and discuss such questions as this?—or would it not be the greatest possible encouragement to pickpockets and thieves, if we were gravely and mournfully to regret the prospect of having soon to examine the right of enacting laws

against them, and to dread the possibility of the speedy repeal of all such restrictions, after they had been fully subjected to the scrutiny of public opinion?

I proposed to speak of the state of the manufacturer; and great need there is of speaking plainly about it. It is in the manufacturing towns that we are told to look for the seeds of all these wonderful changes—in the increased knowledge and improved organization of the working classes. I am heartily glad to think that their knowledge is increased; and if it were increased more, I should think their improved organization a great blessing also. But will any man in his senses tell me that the working classes in any town in Britain have acquired knowledge enough to put us all at sea again as to the very main principles of social, nay even of human life? Mr. Loudon tells us that the intelligence of the Birmingham workman is particularly remarkable. This, he says, is owing partly to the peculiar skill which their manufacture requires, and partly to the prevalence of school education in that neighbourhood. The former cause, no doubt, makes them remarkably intelligent in matters connected with their own manufactures, and gives them a great facility of turning their hand from one sort of work to another, as the state of the market may require; and it is owing to this that the distress in Birmingham has never equalled that which has been felt occasionally in the cotton districts in Cheshire and Lancashire. It gives them an intelligence in matters connected with their own business, which I have noticed with high admiration. But skill in the working of metals will not give an acquaintance with the far more difficult working of society: and as to their school education, Mr. Loudon knows that neither the nature of the instruction given at what are called English schools, nor the time that any workman can spend at them, are such as to give him much moral and political knowledge. Or are they to get this knowledge in after-life from newspapers? Do newspapers pretend, or is it their business, to give a general view of the principles of any science? To tell us of past times, or of the state of foreign countries? It is true, they give us an account of passing events in other countries, but they cannot do more, and how little is this towards giving us an accurate knowledge of what is really thought and done in them! Supposing that newspapers could teach a great deal more than they either do or can,—what are the working man's opportunities for reading it calmly, and for thinking it over, and properly digesting it in his own mind? And what previous cultivation has his mind received to enable it to turn any fresh information to the best account? When, therefore, I hear so much said of the intelligence of the working classes, and of the enlightened state of public opinion, I

feel very much as I should do if any ill judging friends were to overwhelm a clever and intelligent child with compliments, and make him think himself as wise as his teachers. I should say that these friends were taking the very way to hinder him from ever being as wise as his teachers,—by teaching him to think so too soon, and thus to slacken his efforts, or to misdirect them. I am, indeed, indignant at the insolent language in which some persons depreciate both the capacities and the knowledge of the working classes, and treat them as if they knew nothing and were unable to think for themselves. I have known quite enough of the working classes to make me justly impatient of such foolish and impertinent language as this. But it is one thing to speak of them as ignorant and incapable of judging about politics, and another to suppose them capable of disproving principles established by the general consent of the best and wisest of men, or to say that they can possibly judge as well upon subjects which they have not fully studied, as those who have a hundred times greater knowledge and experience. Assuredly we may learn a great deal, even on political subjects from the working classes. I never talked with an intelligent man amongst them, I never read any of their speeches at public meetings, or of their writings, without deriving some instruction from them. But take even Mr. Cobbett, with all his extraordinary natural abilities, and the great advantages which he has had in later life; and who can only be put on the same grounds with the working classes as far as regards his original defects of education. We all know how cleverly Mr. Cobbett writes; but to talk of him as an oracle of political or moral wisdom would be ludicrous. And he is so violent, and, I fear, so little scrupulous, that some may attribute many of his most absurd assertions,—such for instance, as that England was formerly more populous than it is now,—to a wilful intention to deceive. But in truth I do believe that it is sheer ignorance; not indeed honest or excusable ignorance, for no man ought to write about a question without learning the facts of it,—but yet a very natural ignorance in a clever man who has been ill educated;—who has read little, and has never been taught how to digest and appreciate properly what he has read.

I do not know whether the mechanics of Sheffield are likely to do me the honour of reading this letter. I wish they may, for I am sure that they will have the sense to allow the truth of my statement, and I am not afraid of their suspecting me of any aristocratical pride in saying it. God knows that I have not a particle of any such feeling,—and that my most earnest wish is to see the working classes raised in every thing, that there may be one hearty feeling of brotherhood between us all. But to flatter them is to insult them, and we seem now to be in

some danger of overvaluing their knowledge and judgment, just as for a long time they were undervalued. As long as they listen readily to any one who appeals to their passions, and turn away from him who addresses their reason, so long must they necessarily remain half instructed; for truth can only be attained by overcoming prejudice, just as virtue can only be attained by the conquest of our selfish passions.

I have been led on by my subject, for it is an important one which falls directly in my way. It will not do to be run down by the cry of ignorant men, merely because they have a numerous body of hearers and disciples. And as to mere physical force, I have no more fear of its triumphing over truth and justice, than I have of the brute creation rising in rebellion against mankind, and trying the force of horns and hoofs against reason and the laws of God's creation!

X.—I wrote in the full confidence that the truth spoken in sincerity would not generally offend. Had any covert object lurked behind the language which I used, had I secretly desired to uphold or palliate existing abuses, or to keep the working classes in their present degraded state, I should have been ashamed to have written it. But as it is, I should be ashamed of nothing more heartily than of speaking the truth on one side only: a practice quite as common amongst the professed friends of the people as amongst their supposed enemies.

If any principle or general statement be founded on truth, the course of events will serve continually to bear witness to it. I have stated "that the different classes of society have been removed to a great distance from each other—have sympathized with and understood each other less, and thus have become strangers to each other, too ready, I fear, to become enemies also." How dreadfully has this fear been verified by the riots at Bristol, how boldly has the fact been affirmed by Mr. Dyer, at the Cripplegate Ward meeting, when he said there could be no union between the employer and the employed; and by another person at the same meeting, who asserted "that it was as impossible to effect a union between the high and the low classes of society, as to mix oil and water; *there was no reciprocity of feeling between them.*" If this be true, if it is "impossible to effect a union between the higher and the lower classes," then indeed the Reform Bill is too late—all the efforts of individuals and of public bodies are alike too late, and a sort of Jacqueline war throughout the country is the only thing to be looked for.

But I utterly deny that it is impossible to effect a union between the rich and the poor. Wretches whose only hope of distinction consists in preventing such a union, may well wish to make us believe it impossible, and the less hateful wretches who carried on the work of plunder

and burning at Bristol, would no doubt also be happy to have it believed. But good and honest men, of whatever rank or fortune, from the richest peer to the poorest mechanic, will feel that it is a doctrine as false as it is wicked.

Yet even Mr. Dyer, whoever he may be, tells us something from which we may take a lesson. "There can be no union," he says, "between the employer and the employed." Why not? "*Because*," he goes on, "*it is the interest of every employer to get as much work as he can done for the smallest sum possible.*" Truly this is a text on which there might well be preached an awakening sermon.

Where is the Church most hated? Where is the aristocracy most hated? Where is the alienation of the poor from the rich most complete? The answer will always be, wherever the relation between them has been most exclusively that of employer and employed: in other words, where the relation has been most purely mercenary, I do not say, like that of master and slave, but actually worse.

I say "actually worse than that of master and slave," and I say it advisedly. West Indian slavery is the relation of employer and employed: the use of the slaves is merely to make them work in the plantations, and they may be sold like the hoes with which they work. But the old system of English slavery called villainage, was absolutely a far kinder relation. There the villain was a fixture on the land, and could not be sold away from it. Belonging to his lord, from his cradle to his grave, he was thought of not only as a living and moving tool, but as a human being. Affection often subsisted between him and his master,—of which there is this decided proof, that the system of villainage chiefly wore out by the master's voluntarily giving his villains freedom. This never would have happened, had the relation between them been only one of profit and loss:—of employer and employed.

Or look to agricultural parishes, and to private families. A farming labourer and a domestic servant, were once considered members of the household; they lived in the same family for years, and a mutual attachment subsisted between them and their masters. But how is it now? The relation of employer and employed has come into full action; farmers will not keep their labourers, masters sometimes will not and sometimes cannot keep their servants; they are afraid of letting them get a settlement in the parish, if they stay over the year, and so completely is this understood in some places, that a servant leaves his situation naturally at the end of a twelvemonth, unless something be expressly said about his remaining longer.

Now, our great manufacturing towns have risen solely with a view to this relation of employer and employed. The very name shows this.

that they are places where men have assembled together, not for the purposes of social life, but to make calicoes, or hardware, or broad cloths. A man sets up a factory, and *wants hands*. Observe the very expressions that are used, for they are all significant. What he wants of his fellow creatures is the loan of *their hands*;—of their heads and hearts he thinks nothing. These *hands* are attached to certain mouths and bodies which must be fed and lodged: but this must be done as cheaply as possible;—and accordingly, up starts a miserable row of houses, built where ground is cheapest, that is, where it is least generally desirable to get it;—built as close as possible, to have the more of them on a given space, and for the same reason without any sort of garden or outlet attached to them, because the comfort and enjoyment of the human being is quite independent of the serviceableness of his *hands*. But these *hands* are not only attached to mouths and bodies, but to reasonable minds and immortal souls. The mouths and bodies must be provided for, however miserably, because without them the hands cannot work; but the minds and souls go utterly unregarded. Is this any other than a national crime, a crime in the civil government, a crime in the church, a crime in all the wealthy and intelligent part of the English people, that while *hands* have been multiplying so enormously during the last forty years in every corner of the kingdom, no greater efforts have been made to provide for the welfare of the human beings who have multiplied with them; beings born not for time only but for eternity.

Hear the cry with which the bishops in particular are now assailed in every part of the kingdom, and most loudly in the great manufacturing districts. Whence comes the especial bitterness with which they, above all the other anti reforming peers, are everywhere attacked? Whence the hatred with which the whole order of the clergy is sometimes pursued? Is it not because the people have never been made to feel the full amount of the good which an Established Church may and ought to effect, and therefore are the more ready to complain of its endowments? Is it not because in our large manufacturing towns the National Church has allowed thousands and tens of thousands of its members to grow up in misery and in ignorance; and that a step-mother's neglect is naturally requited by something of a step-mother's unpopularity?

I am not blaming individuals,—nor have I in my mind a single personal allusion to any one either dead or living. The reproach attaches itself to the body. What worse than folly was it to talk of delicacies, and difficulties, and the danger of Parliamentary interference, and the mischief of interfering with Church property, when the very end for

which the establishment existed was left unattained? Was it fit to wait for money enough to build an expensive church, rather than license the first room, or the first court-yard that could be found, wherever the inhabitants of the parish became too numerous or too remote to attend the parish church? Was it even decent to leave many thousand persons to the instruction and care of one minister, rather than apply to Parliament for power to make a new allotment of the Church property, such as the new state of things required?

But these things were neglected; neglected by the Church, neglected by the government, neglected by the master manufacturer, and by the rich generally. Thousands of men grew up devoid alike of physical comforts, and of intellectual and moral culture; and now we are reaping the fruits of it. Having no property of their own they hate property,—having no means of intellectual enjoyment, they are driven to seek the pleasures which we have in common with brutes,—having never been made Christians, their undisciplined natures are incapable of valuing Christianity, and their evil passions teach them to hate it.

Still it is not too late now to remedy the evil; it is not too late *now*, —*but in five years it will be.* Enough of individual kindness still exists, enough of individual goodness, to ensure the success of measures carried into effect by well combined exertions of men co-operating with each other. Mr. Dyer, and men like him, may yet be silenced; and the two orders of society may be brought together, each feeling too deeply their own faults to dare to reproach those of the other. Meantime let me congratulate you on the honourable contrast which Sheffield has long presented, to so many other manufacturing towns.

XI.—If my previous view was likely to give offence to some of the working classes, my last, I suspect, would be received with as little favour by those who call themselves the Conservative party—but who, if we may name them from the tendencies of their conduct rather than from their intentions, may be well called ultra-revolutionists. I have however been always of opinion, that the whole truth, when not spoken in malice, can never be inflammatory—that all the mischief is done either by giving half the truth, or by throwing round the whole truth a violent, and therefore an unfair expression.

Take the facts, and place them by the side of each other. On the part of the working classes, there is a mass of imperfect and ill-digested knowledge, which has just succeeded to deep and general ignorance. On the part of the rich, there is a mass of half informed and half awakened attention to the poor, newly risen, after a long continuance of great neglect. Surely, here are the elements of a most happy state of things, if this imperfect knowledge on one hand, and par-

tial attention on the other, are by all means brought to assist in improving each other—if the past, instead of being for ever appealed to to inflame angry passions, be forgotten as if by common consent, like an evil dream, from which we are most thankful to have been awakened. But if the poor, instead of looking to be helped on by the rich, think to get on faster by plundering and pulling them down—or if the rich, instead of increasing their efforts a hundred fold, and in a wiser spirit, now stand aloof in fear or in disgust, the consequence will be that both rich and poor will suffer, or rather that all good men will suffer, whether rich or poor; while they who profit by the general ruin will be the dregs of either party, perhaps of both; the treacherous, lawless, greedy, profligate, and cruel; that class of wretches who, whether they have called themselves aristocrats or democrats, have been always alike in their tyranny, alike in their contempt of every law of God and man, and in their exclusive love of themselves, and their own interests and passions.

It has been a great evil that the relations between the rich and the poor have been so much confined to the single one of employer and employed. But is not this a very natural state of progress between the time when they stood to one another as master and slave, and that when they will stand to one another as citizen to citizen? The matter is now to hasten forwards as quickly as possible to this last state; and in order to do this, we must make efficient those great means of blessing whose inefficiency has been the cause of so much evil, but whose destruction would render the matter utterly hopeless.

I say plainly—that those great means of blessing are the *Aristocracy* and the *Christian Church*. No man alive is more aware than I am of the evils of an Aristocracy, or of an Established Church, when there is nothing to balance them; no man is more aware than I am of the quantity of good which they have left undone. But I should not blame them for their neglect, if it was not that their active exertions are capable of rendering us such enormous services. No man wishes more earnestly to see them reformed; and I hesitate not to say, that no man would more deeply grieve to see them destroyed. When I have been travelling in your beautiful neighbourhood, Sheffield, and looking over the magnificent domain of Lord Fitzwilliam, I have often heard my companions exclaim against the steam engine chimneys which in various parts of the view were sending up into the air their columns of smoke; but I have always said in answer; "Those unsightly chimneys, and that disfiguring smoke, are a most wholesome balance to the palace, and the gardens, and the woods of Wentworth. Were it not for them, England would be no better than Russia or Poland,—we

should be the mere serfs of a territorial aristocracy." And what if a companion of another sort were to exclaim against the aristocratical pride of Wentworth House, and against the useless costliness of keeping up the Churches of Ecclesfield and Rotherham? I should say to him as heartily and truly,—"That park and mansion, and those churches, are a most wholesome balance to the chimneys of the iron furnaces. Were it not for them, we should be without two of the greatest means of elevating and purifying mankind, nobility, and religion;—we should be in danger of becoming what the French sometimes falsely call us, a nation of buyers and sellers. But as it is, let all work together, and all do their duty, and we have the means of arriving at the happiest and highest state of society that the world has ever yet witnessed."

The perfection of Parliamentary Reform would be one which so raised the working classes, as to oblige the aristocracy to treat them more liberally, without throwing in their hands an exorbitant power before they are instructed, and softened enough to use it wisely. I wish the aristocracy in every place to come forward manfully, to join the political unions, or any other lawful and honest societies of the working classes, to state fairly the amount of their past neglect, and their hearty wish to make up for it. They may then meet the mere agitators boldly face to face, and indignantly deny their outrageous and shameless falsehoods. While confessing their great and most blameable neglect, that they have too long suffered their poorer brethren to live in a state of suffering and ignorance, they may most truly say that from wilful oppression and injustice, generally speaking, they are clear. The laws hitherto, by carrying to excess the principle of non-interference with a man's private concerns, have allowed him unintentionally to cause great public mischief. As it is the business of civil society to defend property, so it is no less its duty to limit the exorbitant exercise of its power. The famous Thellusson Act has already decided the principle, that a man may not do all that he will with his own:—he may use it, but not capriciously abuse it. Undoubtedly it is a matter of public concern that our great towns be not injured at the discretion of every individual speculator, who runs out street after street, and row after row of houses, till the working man in the heart of the town can neither breathe fresh air, nor find any open ground within his reach on which he can venture without being guilty of a trespass. It would be no slight benefit, if public walks and gardens, and still more public places of exercise, so laid out as to be ornamental as well as useful and agreeable, were of necessity attached to every great town in the empire. And it might be fairly imperative on every man who

builds a certain number of houses, to annex to them a certain portion of ground which might never be built upon, and which should serve in various ways for the recreation of the inhabitants.

I know it is said that the poorer people have no respect for works of art, nor for public property: that if indiscriminately admitted to museums, libraries, churches, or gardens, their greatest pleasure would be to do mischief. True it is, that the poor do not respect these things in England as much as they do abroad: and why? because they have never been thought capable of enjoying them, and therefore have been carefully denied access to them. Certain it is, that they never will respect them, till they are allowed to have an interest in them; but I should think it well worth while to risk the injury or destruction of a great many works of art, that the people might at last, as they surely would, become fond of those things, and feel that it was indeed a public injury to misuse them. And as a step to this, I have thought that advantage might in the first instance be taken of any societies actually formed amongst the working classes, such as benefit clubs, self-supporting dispensaries, political unions, or the like: and that it would be well worth the while of benevolent individuals to assist in the formation of libraries, or museums, or if possible in renting ground to serve for a public garden and place of amusement, not to be open at first to all the working classes, but to be placed under the management of one or more of these societies for the benefit of their own members. I say "placed under the management of these societies," perhaps with the addition of one or two honorary members of the richer classes, who might advise without being able to control their poorer associates; for it is most important to put the poor in authority, to intrust them with the care of property, and with the making and enforcing of regulations for its protection and improvement. The true and only way to make civil society really deserving of its name, is to give its members an active and not merely a passive part in the management of its concerns.

It will be said that all this is easy to talk of, but not so easy to execute. True it is that no single individual can execute it,—but a number of individuals may do a great deal towards it themselves, and still more may be done if plans of this sort are pressed forward on the public attention, till from being at first only noticed and discussed, they end with being generally adopted. Nor does it signify if any one particular plan be objectionable; the principle of raising the working classes in their bodily, in their intellectual, and in their spiritual condition, is the great thing that should for ever be inculcated on every man possessed of any influence in society.

CHRISTIAN POLITICS.

These "Essays on Church and State" were written in 1827, 1833, and 1840.

I. A PLAN OF A WORK ON "CHRISTIAN POLITICS;" 1827.

Of the end of man's existence.
Of the end of political society.
How far these ends have been hitherto answered.
Of Christianity as the means of effecting these ends, and of the grounds of its authority.
Of the manner in which the end of individual existence modifies the end of political existence.
How political happiness is best promoted by not being the principal end of man in society.
How political happiness is to be effected.
- § 1. Of physical or external happiness.
- § 2. Of Moral or internal happiness.

1. Physical happiness, affected by—
   - § 1. The state of personal liberty and safety.
   - § 2. The amount and distribution of national wealth.
2. Moral happiness, affected by—
   - § 1. The state of political liberty.
   - § 2. The amount of intellectual improvement.
   - § 3. The amount of spiritual improvement.

Of education as the means of obtaining moral happiness.
- § 1. Of political education.
- § 2. Of intellectual education.
- § 3. Of spiritual education.

This was the sketch of a work alluded to in Sermons, vol. i, p. 88, and in two letters in 1827.

"What say you to a work on πολιτικὴ, in the old Greek sense of the

word, in which I should try to apply the principles of the Gospel to the legislation and administration of a state. It would begin with a simple statement of the τέλος of man according to Christianity, and then would go on to show how the knowledge of this τέλος would effect all our views of national wealth, and the whole question of political economy; and also our practice with regard to wars, oaths, and various other relics of the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου."

"I have long had in my mind a work on Christian Politics, or the application of the Gospel to the state of man as a citizen, in which the whole question of a religious establishment and of the education proper for Christian members of a Christian commonwealth would naturally find a place. It would embrace also an historical sketch of the pretended conversion of the kingdoms of the world to the kingdom of Christ in the fourth and fifth centuries, which I look upon as one of the greatest *tours d'adresse* that Satan ever played, except his invention of Popery. I mean that by inducing kings and nations to conform nominally to Christianity, and thus to get into their hands the direction of Christian society, he has in a great measure succeeded in keeping out the peculiar principles of that society from any extended sphere of operation, and in ensuring the ascendancy of his own. One real conversion there seems to have been, that of the Anglo-Saxons; but that he soon succeeded in corrupting; and at the Norman Conquest we had little I suppose to lose even from the more direct introduction of Popery and worldly religion which came in with the Conqueror."—*Life and Correspondence.*

This work was never carried out, and would, in some points, have differed from the later fragments on the same subject. In illustration of the point of view from which the question was here approached, is given the following extract from an unpublished Preface to a volume of Sermons in 1829.

"Whether in any case the union, as it is called, of Church and State was desirable is another question; but wherever that union does exist, then the Gospel is directly brought into contact with political institutions and measures, and is required to apply its purifying influence to the conduct of governments no less than to that of private individuals. Of direct precepts indeed, addressed by Christ and His Apostles to kings and statesmen, there must necessarily be none; but of principles eminently applicable to the government of nations, of the spirit which should influence all public measures, he must be greatly ignorant of the Gospel who cannot find innumerable instances. Under other circumstances, the Christian minister may perhaps be allowed to confine himself to the care of the poor and ignorant: but the clergy

of a national church are directly called upon to Christianize the nation: not only to inculcate the private virtues of the Gospel,—but its pure and holy principles in their full extent; those divine laws, of which it may indeed be said, that their 'voice is the harmony of the world.' And this duty the Church of England has eminently neglected; and to the servility of its political principles alone, the neglect is chargeable. Did it become a Christian Church to make no other official declaration of its sentiments concerning war, than by saying that Christian men might lawfully engage in it; to say nothing of capital punishments with the bloody executions of Henry the Eighth's reign, so fresh in memory, but that they might be lawfully inflicted on Christian men for heinous and grievous offences? Or, because the Anabaptists, as the Waldenses had done before them, had gone so far as to refuse to take an oath at all, did it become a Christian Church to confine the principle of our Lord's prohibition to 'vain and rash swearing' only, and to leave the practice of legal oaths, not as a relic of an unchristian state of society, which we to our shame were not sufficiently advanced in the Gospel to renounce, but as a thing absolutely good now, as formerly under the dispensation of the Jews? Will it be asked what evil has arisen from this neglect of duty? I answer, that the evil is to be seen in the unchristian principles and practice of our rulers, and of all public men considered as such from the Reformation down to this very hour. Or was it vain to expect that any exertions of the Church could have made this kingdom in reality, as well as in name, a kingdom of Christ? Vain, perhaps, it would be to expect a result so glorious; yet, surely much was practicable, and it has been noted as a mark of folly for more than two thousand years, not to know 'how much the half is more valuable than the whole.' Nay experience itself has shown, what can be done even with far inferior means, when there is an active and Christian zeal at work. What is the present feeling in this country with regard to the Slave Trade, and how far must we look back to trace it to its origin? Its very birth is almost within the recollection of men now living; its strength and universality falls within my own. And has the Church of England as a body been forward in exciting this feeling; most of all is it to the High Church divines that we are indebted for it? The moving spring must be sought elsewhere, and the comparatively powerless sect of the Quakers has done more to imbue the nation with a Christian sense of the wickedness of stealing men to sell them as slaves, than was ever attempted by the vast influence of the Established Church:—because the Church of England is so dependent on the State, (more by the feelings of its members than by its legal constitution,) that instead of striving to grow

up into a true branch of Christ's glorious Church, perfect even after the infinite perfection of its Head, its notions of excellence have been lowered by the actual constitution in Church and State, by idle language about the doctrines of the Reformers, and the excellence of the British constitution. As if the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, scarcely waking as they were from the accumulated moral ignorance and insensibility of thirty generations, could offer any thing to satisfy our aspirations after Christian excellence; as if the consummated work of the Spirit of God were to be found in the dregs of the Papal and Feudal institutions!

"This great neglect of its highest duties is not peculiar, certainly, to the Church of England; it is the besetting sin of every church establishment, from the nominal conversion of the Roman emperors, down to this very hour. No doubt the influence of Christianity has made itself felt in all those countries which have professed it; but ought not its effects to have been far more perceptible than they are, now that nearly eighteen hundred years have elapsed since the kingdom of God was first proclaimed? Is it, in fact, the kingdom of God in which we are living? Are we at this hour living under the law, or under grace? I may be told that it is chimerical to expect such a state of things as the Apostles, in their earlier Epistles at least seem to have anticipated; that the splendid pictures of older prophecy must not be interpreted too literally; that when the Angels welcomed the birth of the Prince of Peace, with announcing peace on earth, they but alluded to the fact of the comparative tranquillity of the Roman world at that time, and augured nothing of the future state of the world. There are some prophecies which fulfil themselves, and some opinions, also, which insure their own perpetual truth; and amongst these, none is more memorable than that favourite tenet of public and practical men, as they call themselves, that mankind will always be much the same as they now are, and that to hope for any great improvement among them is visionary; and suiting to these low and unbelieving principles a practice consistently unworthy, they have kept the world in its present state of badness. They talk of experience, but it is all against them; for all the good that has been done in the world, has been done by acting in direct opposition to their theory; while all the evil that exists is its own proper and natural fruit. Superstition has been called in to aid this corrupt doctrine; and men have been so blinded by their reverence for antiquity, as to substitute the primitive Church, such as it actually existed, in the place of that perfect Church which never has yet existed, but which Christ designed as our standard of excellence, and the object of all our endeavours to accomplish; and by a cunning mixture of truth

with falsehood, and assuming a language apparently full of reverence for the Scriptures, and indignant at what it calls a profane disrespect to them, they have laboured to make us rest contented with our present state, by saying that nothing new can now be discovered in Christianity, and that we have nothing to do but to follow those primitive ages, which as being nearer in time to the Apostles must have been better acquainted with their doctrines than we can pretend to be. There is enough of truth in this language, and enough semblance of piety, to make it more extensively mischievous. The tenets which it is designed to combat have been carried, certainly, to a length no less injurious; and ordinary and unfair minds cannot be expected, perhaps, to separate truth from error when they are mixed together in the opinions of their adversaries. What causes produced the unchristian doctrines of many of the divines of modern Germany, Mr. Pusey's excellent work on that subject has sufficiently shown us; and they are such as well deserve the notice of our High Church divines. When the orthodox theologians, as they were called, had lost sight of the very purpose for which the Gospel was given,—the restoration of our moral nature from its state of corrupt principles and practice, and the raising it into a capacity of enjoying everlasting communion with God,—they, of all men, ought to have judged lightly of the error of the Rationalists in discarding what their own representations had already deprived of all its value. For so long as the great doctrines of Christianity are used as the Scripture uses them,—for the purpose of giving us particular motives and particular feelings,—so long they are, indeed, the very bread of life, and he who eateth of that bread shall live for ever. But when dissevered from their moral influence, when represented as awful mysteries, as objects of knowledge or of historical faith, they become like the manna of old; when no longer used as God designed them to be used, they are of all things the most worthless.

"The error then of the German Rationalists was great, but less mischievous than that of the orthodox divines who had preceded them. I say less mischievous,—because their attack on the form of Christianity created at once a general alarm, and is at this moment producing a most beneficial reaction; whereas the deadening of the spirit of the Gospel was an evil which went on surely and secretly, awakening no suspicion, and spreading every year a more deep and deadly slumber. Our divines are certainly far from meriting the censure which must be passed on those of the orthodox school in Germany: yet in their fondness for ecclesiastical rather than scriptural terms; in looking at the scripture through the unworthy medium of the Fathers and the Reformers, instead of applying the added experience of each successive age to

develope its riches in their full perfection, they have helped to stunt the growth of Christ's Church, and have caused Christians in general still to linger round those elements of Gospel truth which the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews expected Christians even in this day to have left behind them in their progress. For though it be most true, that there is no new fact in Christianity to be learnt, and nothing to be discovered which does not really follow from those principles contained in the writings of the Apostles; yet it is not true that those principles have been even yet fully developed, or made to yield all that abundance of Divine wisdom which is actually to be drawn from them. The promise of the Spirit of Truth to abide for ever with his Church, implies surely that clearer views of truth should be continually vouchsafed to us; and if the work were indeed fully complete when the Apostles entered into their rest, what need was there for the Spirit of Wisdom, as well as of Love, to be ever present even unto the end of the world. They, however, must think very strangely of this Eternal Comforter and Guide, who imagine His influence to be communicated without any outward means, as an inspiration to vouchsafed to a passive and often a careless recipient. 'He shall glorify me,' said Christ, 'for He shall take of mine and shall show it unto you.' It is by the study of the great principles of all goodness and all wisdom contained in the Christian Scriptures, that we are fashioned after our imperfect measure to goodness and wisdom also. But for this study to be profitable in the highest possible degree, we see in practice that large experience, that a spirit rising above the influence of its age, and a pure love of excellence, combined with a clear and manly understanding, are all necessary. How is it conceivable that the innocence of pious frauds could have been so long maintained by sincere Christians in the earliest ages, and the duty of religious persecution so strenuously insisted on at a later period, if something more than the mere possession, or even than the mere devout reading of the Scriptures were not necessary in order to extract from them their full virtue. It is not only for the critical knowledge of the New Testament that study and some intellectual exertion are requisite; but much more must the understanding work vigorously and freely, and be unfettered by the corrupt notions of the world, before it can develope the moral excellence of the Gospel. We are shocked at those persons who cannot perceive that the whole spirit and principles of Christianity are a sufficient condemnation of suicide, although there be no express words which say, 'Thou shalt not kill thyself.' Yet, it is something of the same blindness which has made them declare that the New Testament does not condemn the existing civil institutions of mankind, when most

of those institutions are founded on principles wholly inconsistent with Christian purity, and lead in practice to various forms of corruption, error, and injustice. It is the work of the Spirit of wisdom, so to enlighten the sincere lover of goodness as to enable him gradually to rise in his views of perfection: to forget those things which are behind, and to press forward to those which are before: to follow up the principles of the Scripture to all their conclusions, which the ignorant or the dishonest reader has never arrived at; to strive for himself individually, and for that Christian nation to which he belongs, that they shall stir up the gift given unto them, abounding more and more in knowledge and in all judgment: till every relic of our evil nature be destroyed in principle, at least, if not in practice, and every thought and word be brought into the obedience of Christ, even if our deeds should still revolt from Him.

"The ordinary answer to all this, if answer it may be called, consists in mere random charges of enthusiasm and impracticability; such doctrines sound well in theory, but will not do, we are told, in practice. But to what is it that all the improvements in the world are to be ascribed, but to these high and aspiring principles; to what is every corruption, every folly, every existing wickedness imputable, but to the low notions of those who call themselves practical, and who, forming their models from their own practice, and that of others like them, ensure the perpetual grovelling of themselves, and all who listen to them in the degradation of their actual vileness? That blessed Gospel, which these practical men pretend to reverence, is full of what they must consider the wildest theories; and the heights to which it strives to raise us, and from which we are ever shrinking backwards, from a love of our native depths, are indeed unattainable to all who resolve to think them so. But read the Prophets, read the Apostles, read the words of the Lord of both Prophets and Apostles, and say if there is any limit to that perfection in virtue and in happiness which they call upon the Church of God to thirst after. Let St. Paul speak for all the rest." . . . . .

The MS. is here broken off. The passage on which the author was about to dwell, seems to have been Eph. iv. 11—13, to which, with that quoted from Heb. vi., he used frequently to refer in illustration of the views here set forth. "What is the progress spoken of?" he used to say. "It is in the application of Christianity to human things —the progress in this is as endless as the progress from our imperfection to perfection can be."

II. PLAN OF A WORK ON "CHRISTIAN POLITICS." 1833.

This Sketch was drawn up in pursuance of an intention then expressed, of attempting a "*Christian Aristotle's Politics*," to unfold his views on Church and State.

EVILS OF DISSENT :—

Politically, as dividing the people into parties.

Morally, as dividing and weakening the efforts of good men to improve the moral state of society.

CAUSES OF DISSENT :—

General causes; The varieties of the human mind, and the inveterate mistaking of the nature of Christian union.

Particular causes in England : The imperfect constitution of the Established Church, and political differences.

PROPOSED REMEDIES :—

The abolition of a Church Establishment altogether.

The giving all civil rights to Dissenters, and confirming and increasing their separation from the Establishment.

THE TRUE REMEDY :—

An enlarged constitution of the Christian Church of England, which is the State of England.

OBJECTIONS TO THIS REMEDY :—

Popular and utilitarian : That the State as such has nothing to do with religion.

Superstitious and fanatical : That the Church is distinct from the State and independent of it, having a divinely appointed government of its own.

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED :—

The State in a Christian country is the Church, and therefore has much to do with religion.

The Church, as such, has no divinely appointed government.

The true view of Church and State obviates many evils which have arisen from the confused notion of them ; evils—on the one hand of laxity and on the other of persecution.

Confused notions about excommunication and spiritual power.

Confused notions of Christian unity and faith.

PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS :—

The actual feelings of the Church party and of the Dissenters.

GENERAL BEARING OF SUCH A TRUE CHURCH OF ENGLAND ON THE NATIONAL WELFARE :—

On national education; on the condition of the poorer classes in manufacturing districts; on the morals and knowledge of all classes of the community.

THE ENDS OF THE CHURCH.

I. No good man can doubt, when he looks at the actual condition of this country, that the principal evils which actually oppress it, and which threaten it for the future in a still greater degree, are neither physical nor political, in the common sense of the word, but moral evils. Wide as may be the differences of opinion with respect to the remedy for these evils, or even their cause, yet their amount, and the probability of their increase, will hardly be disputed. In fact, the physical and political evils which exist are owing chiefly to the moral evils; and would be removed, not wholly, perhaps, but in great part, if the state of the country were improved morally. Those who fear the growing power of the poorer classes, fear it because they think that these classes are morally ignorant, and therefore are not fit to exercise power; those who dread the ascendancy of the aristocracy, and the consequent maintenance of all abuses, believe that the richer classes are morally ignorant also, and disposed to turn their advantages to their own benefit, and not to that of the whole community. The very distress of the poor is attributed by some to their own improvidence and carelessness; by others, to the neglect and selfishness of the rich. In short, whatever evil is most apprehended by any party, is generally ascribed to some moral defect in the opposite party; and if this defect could be abated, the danger, to say the least, would be felt to be greatly diminished.

But the benefits which might arise from the general acknowledgment of the real evil of our condition are generally frustrated by the belief that the evil is incurable. For physical and political evils men are prompt enough in devising remedies: they understand, also, that where individual efforts would be powerless to remove them, combination and the mechanism of society may undertake the task with success. But moral evil is left hopelessly to itself, or, at most, to the attacks of individual zeal. And yet there is no doubt that here, even more than

with political grievances, the combined exertions of many would do far more than the utmost energy of isolated virtue. Nor is such an association merely visionary; on the contrary there has existed one for eighteen hundred years; it has spread itself over all the countries of Europe; England, amongst the rest, is well acquainted with its name: almost every Englishman within the four seas professes to belong to it. This great society, for the putting down of moral evil, is no other than the Church of Christ.

Now I would wish every reader to ask himself whether this idea of the Church of Christ appears strange to him or natural? If the former, then let him consider whether it ought to seem strange to him: whether, if he consults the Scriptures, he will not find this notion of Christianity everywhere prominent; whether the most peculiar ordinances of the Christian religion are not grounded upon it and imply it. And let him think again, whether it is not likely, if the true nature of the Church be so different from what he has imagined it to be, that its practical results may possibly be of a kind which he has never as yet anticipated; may he not suspect, in short, that all his views of what is called religion have been injured by this original misapprehension? Or again, if the reader is prepared to admit that Christ's Church is a society for the putting down of moral evil, let him ask himself whether he has well considered the legitimate consequences of such a definition of it; whether, in fact, it is not practically forgotten; and whether that comparative failure of Christianity as to its effects upon the world, which all Christians acknowledge and lament, may not possibly be owing to this constant practical misunderstanding of its true character?

It will be found, I think, that neither in their use of the word "Religion," nor in speaking of "the Church," do men in general form any idea of the social character of Christianity. With "Religion" this is manifest: for, indeed, the term properly expresses nothing more than certain relations of man towards God, without intimating that these are necessarily involved with a peculiar relation of men to each other. "The Church" is spoken of in various senses, and with great vagueness; still it may be safely affirmed that it is not commonly understood to mean "the Society of Christians," but rather a distinct institution for the benefit of that society in one particular way, namely, their religious benefit: so that it is either taken as synonymous with "the Clergy," or with "a provision for the religious instruction of a people by public teaching and ceremonies." Both these meanings, it will be seen, are very different from that of "a Society for the putting down of moral evil," and the points of difference are the exact measure of the

inferiority of these false notions of "the Church of Christ" to the true one.

For if "the Church" be "the society of Christians," then every Christian is a member of the Church, a member of a society, whose objects are his objects, its interests are his interests, and in whose concerns he is therefore called upon to take an active part, and not merely a passive one. And, again, if the object of the Church be called "religious instruction," then a great portion of human life is taken away from its regard: its business is made particular, and not general; it is one amongst many of the institutions which society needs, instead of being society itself, in its most exalted relation, engaged in the perfecting of our moral nature. It is, therefore, of some importance, to ascertain whether these great weakenings of the efficacy and limitations of the range of the Church of Christ be according to the purpose for which it was founded.

That the Church of Christ was intended to be a society of which all Christians were to be members, and all active and useful towards the great object of the society, appears, to quote one passage out of a great number, from the twelfth chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians. The Church is there compared to the human body, which consists indeed of various members, but all active: if any were merely passive, and acted upon by other parts of the body, the healthy constitution of the whole would be impaired. The members indeed have different offices, but none may despise the rest, or can do without them. And lest this comparison might, in one respect, lead to error, because, in the human body, according to popular notions, there resides such a sovereignty and superiority in the brain or head, that in respect of its great activity, some of the other members may be called passive; therefore, the functions of the head in the Christian Church are assigned exclusively* to Christ himself, and all Christians are said to be mem-

* It is this point—that Christ is the Head of the Church—which will greatly help us to understand what is meant by the Church. For as Christ is not upon earth, nor exercises any visible government, nor is present in one place more than another, and yet is truly the Head and Governor of His Church, so we see at once that His Church is not to be thought of as a society or government in the common meaning of the words; but in that other sense in which we speak of civil society and of God's moral government, to the first of which all men who are not savages belong, while to the other all men whatsoever are subject. And as all civilized men belong to civilized society, and acknowledge in many respects a common law—although, in another sense, they belong to a great many different societies, and have very different laws—so it is with Christian men and with religious society. In that sense in which the Church has Christ for its Head, and is the Temple of the Holy Ghost, all Christians belong to it and all acknowledge one common law; while in another sense Christians

bers one of another, forming jointly that body, of which as at once connected with it, yet essentially superior and sovereign over it, Christ alone is fitted to be the Head.

Christ's Church, then, was to be a society, all whose members were to be active in promoting the society's objects. And this object was to be the putting down of moral evil, both within the Church and without it. It was to be the leaven to leaven the world, clearly, that is, to change its moral character; and, with respect to its operations upon itself, how magnificently is it described as working by the grace of its divine Head through the instrumentality of every joint and member performing its own portion of the work, to its own growth in truth and in love, in intellectual and moral perfection, according to no less a standard than the perfection of nature of Christ himself, the All-wise and the Most Holy. For this, the members each separately, and the body all together, are to labour together with their Lord, that the

belong to a great many different churches, and those churches have a great many different laws.

"But it is in its first and highest sense that the Church of Christ is the Communion of all living Christians—that it is Christ's mystical body, holy and beloved—the Heir of the promises, the Israel of God, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail. To the end of the world as there will be civilized society on earth, so will there be Christian society. Men will not all be savages, nor all strangers to God; there will be those who shall love one another for Christ's sake, who shall own one Spirit and one Lord and one God; who shall be striving against one and the same spiritual enemy, and walking together in one and the same hope of life eternal."—*Extract from a MS. Sermon on All Saints' Day*, 1835.

To the same effect are some remarks in a letter to Dr. Hawkins, November, 1830. "Have you ever clearly defined to yourself what you mean by 'one society,' as applied to the whole Christian Church upon earth? It seems to me that most of what I consider the errors about 'the Church,' turn upon an imperfect understanding of this point. In one sense, and that a very important one, all Christians belong to one society; but then it is more like Cicero's sense of 'societas,' than what we mean by a society. There is a 'societas generis humani,' and a 'societas hominum Christianorum;' but there is not one 'respublica' or 'civitas' of either, but a great many. The Roman Catholics say there is but one 'respublica,' and therefore, with perfect consistency, they say that there must be one central government; our Article, if I mistake not its sense, says, and with great truth, that the Christian Respublica depends on the political Respublica; that is, that there may be at least as many Christian societies as there are political societies, and that there may be, and in our own kingdom are, even more. If there be one Christian society, in the common sense of the word, there must be one government; whereas, in point of fact, the Scotch Church, the English Church, and the French Church, have all separate and perfectly independent governments; and consequently can only be in an unusual and peculiar sense 'one society:' that is, spiritually one, as having the same objects, and the same principles, and the same supports, and the same enemies."—*Life and Correspondence.*

Church, this great society, may become fully glorious; "not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing, but holy and without blemish."

There is, then, a society in existence, for the putting down of all moral evil, by the combined exertions of all its members. This society is the Church of Christ, and every Christian in England is a member of it. How is it that we have not rightly appreciated our relations and duties as such? How is it that the Church amongst us retains so faint a resemblance to a society, and works with such insufficient efficacy, nay, apparently with so inadequate a conception of its true object? The explanation of the fact is humiliating indeed, but it ought to be most instructive.

2. Before, however, we proceed to the explanation of the fact, it will be proper to develope and expose more fully to the observation of the reader the actual features of the fact itself. That is, having seen what is the true notion of the Church of Christ, "a society for the putting down of moral evil," or "for the moral improvement of mankind," let us examine how far the existing state of the Church amongst us is agreeable to this definition of it.

First of all, instead of one Church or society of Christians, we find a multitude. I do not mean that there are a number of particular congregations locally distinct, and therefore distinct also in their administration and municipal government. This might be the case without the slightest breach of Christian unity; and all these, in one sense, distinct societies would yet, in the true Christian sense, belong to one and the same. But we find not only distinction and municipal independence, but moral alienation. The different Christian societies amongst us are not distinct for the sake of local convenience, or a more satisfactory administration of their respective concerns; but because they disapprove of each other religiously; because each thinks that the others have injured the perfection of Christianity by some improper addition or omission; that, in short, they could not satisfactorily worship God together; and therefore there is something in their mutual feelings which goes beyond distinctness; there exists, to say the very least, something of alienation; they feel in some degree opposed to one another. The prosperity of any one of them is not a matter of unmixed rejoicing to the rest, nor its decline a matter of unmixed regret.

Now it is manifest that such feelings existing between several societies must so far hinder them from acting in common; so far as men disapprove of one another religiously, they will be backward in acting together in religious matters. So that here we have the Church of Christ truly divided, because it is divided morally; because men are

less inclined to work together for the objects of that Church. And as division in the sense of disagreement is weakness, even to a proverb, so the Church of Christ is weakened in its actual existence amongst us, because it has ceased morally to be one society.

Again, take the several societies of Christians amongst us, and consider how far their avowed object seems to be the putting down of moral evil. Are they not rather societies formed for what is called religious edification? *i. e.* for instructing their members in religious truth? or for the joint indulgence and expression of their devotional feelings? or for supplying their members with the comforts and consolations of religion as purely as possible? Doubtless these are amongst the objects for which the Church was formed; or, to speak more properly, these are the necessary means for the accomplishing of its object. Religious instruction, the exercises of prayer and praise, the participation in the sacraments, are amongst the prescribed and most necessary means for our growth in goodness. Still it is most essential that they should always be clearly seen to be means, and not in themselves an end; that their bearing is upon human life and character; that they belong to the Church of Christ as its instruments, and that the Church was founded, not merely for the perfecting these instruments, but for their application after being perfected; that its members should worship together, in order to live together; and that their combined efforts are wanted, not only for sowing the seed, but for cherishing the plant and reaping the harvest; that the Church, in short is more for the week-days than for the Sunday; more for the house, the street, or the field, than for that particular building which, by an unfortunate ambiguity of language, has appropriated to itself its name.

Further, not only is the object of the Christian Church unduly narrowed, but its character has been almost forgotten. When we speak of the actual Church, at least of the Established Church, as a society, we give it a title which the reality will scarcely warrant. The social character has been lost sight of, because the ministry has been corrupted into a priesthood, and has thus almost monopolized the active functions of the whole body. The term "society" is inapplicable to a despotism, or to an anarchy; it matters not whether those in authority have a tyrannical power, or an inefficient one, if they alone are active, and no regular means are provided by which the other members of the body may support them, encourage them, direct them, or control them; if, in short, the whole business of the body, be it much or little, is delegated to them exclusively, then the excellences and uses of a society are forfeited; we lose not only its freedom, but its energy; we have no longer the combined action of many, contributing their varied pow-

ers and their joint interest to the promotion of the common good,—but the isolated power of a few, acting sometimes violently, but always imperfectly, upon a mass in itself inert and neutral.

The existing Church, then, falls short of the definition of the pure Christian Church, that it is a "society for the putting down of moral evil," from two causes: first, because it has substituted for its true object another, less extensive, and much more liable to be perverted; and secondly, because it has in a great measure abandoned its social character, and become an order rather than a society. In other words, it has unduly limited, and otherwise unduly corrupted its notions of Christian doctrine, and has well nigh destroyed the efficacy of its Church government; and therefore, as a means of acting upon mankind in the mass, it has greatly failed; failed not absolutely, but in comparison with what it might have effected had it properly availed itself of its divine powers. It has not put down evil, for evil in the course of this world is still predominant; it has but softened some of its worst features, so far as regards mankind as a whole; while the fulness of its blessings has been tasted only by individuals: that is to say, that the good done has been wrought by Christianity; the good not done has been lost by the imperfections of the Christian Church.

3. In saying that "the Church has unduly limited and unduly extended its notions of Christian doctrine," the general misunderstanding to which this statement would be liable, is in itself, the best confirmation of its truth. We commonly mean by "doctrine," something different from the proper Christian meaning of the word, and therefore, the charge of unduly limiting or extending it, would be also interpreted erroneously, and when so misinterpreted, would be easily refuted. "An undue limitation, and an undue extension of Christian doctrine," would be commonly understood to mean, "that certain doctrines necessary to salvation were not taught, and that others not necessary to salvation were taught as necessary;" but then by the term "doctrines" would be understood, "truths revealed in Scripture relating to the nature of God or to his dealings with mankind," as distinct from "truths relating to man's principles and duties." Now, from this erroneous idea of Christian doctrine, there have flowed the very evils of which I have spoken: it has been limited and extended unduly, because its nature has been mistaken, because its predominant character has been supposed to be "truth," whereas it is in fact, "efficacy as a means of moral good."

The object of Christianity is to save men's souls; and as this can only be done by changing them from evil to good; by altering their hopes and fears, and affections; so, the immediate object of Christianity is, to produce in men a moral and spiritual improvement, in

scriptural language, to create them after a new and better nature. Now, when this improvement is sought to be effected by direct precepts, Christian doctrine is no more than a law of duties, a statement of what we ought to do, and what we ought not to do. When it is to be effected by an appeal to our hopes and fears, Christian doctrine must be a statement of certain facts, tending to excite hope and fear; a declaration of some good to be gained, of some evil to be avoided. Further, when the improvement is to be effected by strengthening our moral powers, or by purifying and increasing our affections, Christian doctrine must teach us the way by which this moral strength may be gained, and present to our minds certain facts and objects fitted to be the perfect food of our best affections, to nourish them, to give them intensity, and to mingle in them no element of evil. Thus, while Christian doctrine will not be one in substance nor in kind, it will be one in object: its instruments will, in themselves, be varied, but, as regards the use which it makes of them, they will be similar; they belong to Christian doctrine only, so far as they all alike minister to the moral and spiritual improvement of man.

This Scriptural view of Christian doctrine exhibits it as no less admirable in its proportions than in the matter which it inculcates. The mixture of direct precept with the revelation of facts or characters calculated to produce a certain moral effect, seems to meet exactly all the wants of our nature; enlightening us, strengthening us, and enkindling us, all at once. But, instead of this view, another has been too generally adopted. First, all the direct precepts have been struck off from Christian doctrine, and put under another head, that of practical instruction; implying, that Christian doctrine had some other end than that of practical improvement. Secondly, doctrine thus reduced to the revelation of certain facts, was further corrupted by being made to declare these facts as simple truths, apart from the impression which they were meant to produce on men; and being thus brought to deliver theorems, instead of motives and principles of life, was again corrupted still more by being loaded with new truths, supposed to be deduced by a fair process of reasoning from certain expressions in the Scripture, but which being incapable of a moral bearing upon the heart and character, were no part of the real Christian doctrine, and therefore cannot be proved from Scripture with such clearness, as to prevent great doubts and exceptions from being made against them. And so it is, that Christian doctrine has been unduly limited and unduly extended; unduly limited, in having all the direct commands of the Scripture struck off from it, and classed under another head: and unduly extended, in being made to contain certain truths, which, as having no prac-

tical tendency, were never designed by Christ to constitute any part of it.

Now that Christian doctrine does properly include the direct practical precepts of our Lord and His Apostles may be shown without difficulty. As far as any stress may be laid on the use of a word, "doctrine," διδαχή, in the great majority of passages in which it occurs in the New Testament, signifies practical teaching, such as that of our Lord's parables, or His sermon on the Mount. And without referring to the word, it is clear that the substance of our Lord's teaching during His ministry, as well as that of His Apostles' teaching after His ascension, was of a practical character. Again in that invaluable picture of the proceedings of the early Christians, which is given in Pliny's famous letter to Trajan, it appears that a principal object of their assemblies amongst themselves was, to pledge themselves to one another to abstain from everything evil, and to live soberly, honestly, and godly. It must needs have formed no small part of their doctrine to explain and impress upon the new converts the nature and importance of the things which they thus pledged themselves to abstain from, or to do.

Again, there is an important benefit obtained by making the precepts of the Gospel a main part of Christian doctrine, that it shows how large a portion of this doctrine is received by all Christians with perfect unanimity. The differences of opinion as to the meaning and force of the moral precepts of Scripture are so trifling as hardly to deserve notice; and thus George Herbert says truly:

> "All the doctrine, which Christ taught and gave
> Was clear as Heav'n from whence it came;
> At least those beams of truth, which only save,
> Surpass in brightness any flame.
>
> "'Love God and love your neighbour. Watch and pray.
> Do as you would be done unto.'
> Oh! dark instructions, even as dark as day!
> Who can these Gordian knots undo?"

But George Herbert should have remembered that these "bright and saving beams of truth," as he well calls them, were excluded from the common meaning of the term "Christian doctrine" in its technical and corrupt sense; and that that doctrine was made to consist of many points far less bright and less saving; points which alone could offer any ground for the unbeliever's taunt, that Christians could not agree as to the tenets of their own religion.

Here the MS. breaks off.—The subject of the concluding chapter of it may receive

some further illustration from the following portion of a pamphlet, which, in 1835, he wrote but never published, "On the Admission of Dissenters to the Universities," in the form of a letter to the Rev. W. K. Hamilton; and which, though written with reference to the particular question of academical instruction, is evidently a development of the same thoughts which have been expressed in the foregoing fragment. See also letters to Rev. J. Hearn and Rev. A. Hare. May and August, 1833. "Life and Correspondence," and Sermon on "Christian Prophesying." *Sermons*, vol. vi.

Now it is this habit of completing Scripture, of altering the order and the proportions of its doctrines, which has led to the apparent differences in men's interpretations of it. There has constantly been a tacit reference to some other standard, to which some have laboured to make the Scripture conform, while others have striven to make it as different from it as possible. Thus men have come to regard it as impossible to interpret the Scriptures to persons of different religious opinions; and so it is impossible, as long as a foreign standard of interpretation is constantly before the eyes of all, and exciting in them the most opposite feelings. If you were to lecture on the first chapter of St. John to a class partly consisting of Unitarians, and were to dwell on it as proving the truth of the Nicene Creed, the party feelings of the Unitarians would be directly excited; they would take refuge in Lardner's interpretation of the passage, and would be perfectly insensible to its real and simple meaning. But dropping all thoughts of Trinitarianism and Unitarianism,—looking upon all around you as Christians, engaged with you in receiving the instruction of Christ's beloved disciple,—and considering no further deductions from the Apostle's words than he himself intended to follow from them, would not the words in their own simple force convey all that you wish, and if you forbore from making them controversial, would they not make their own way into a Unitarian's mind, and show him that he does not at present regard his Master with the same reverence that St. John regarded Him?

Suppose this to be carried on further; that the greatest part of the New Testament were thus simply interpreted, with no other end in view than that of impressing to the utmost on your pupils the particular view or feeling which each portion successively was designed to convey: at the same time that in all your lectures sound rules and habits of criticism are communicated, while Christian hopes and principles are continually brought forward, as naturally suggested by the study of the human mind under different influences and guidance: would your Unitarian pupils at the end of their three years be as much Unitarian as they were at the beginning? Would they not at any rate be perfectly ashamed of the ignorance and unfairness of their own pretended "improved" version of the New Testament,—would they not feel that Christ was not in their system what He was in the minds of the Apos-

tles, that if the language of St. Paul and St. John be not the wildest exaggeration, that of their own sect must be cold even to irreverence? I do not say that they would subscribe to the Articles of the Church of England—that they might feel to be going over to an opposite party—but their religion would be far more Scriptural and entirely Christian than it had been at their first coming to the University, and their influence in life, be it more or less, would soften and improve the character of their sect, or, at least, would act beneficially on their own children. They would have reason to look back upon Oxford with gratitude, and their teachers might thank God to the latest hour of their lives that they had been enabled to communicate truth and charity to minds, which, irritated by a system of exclusion, and trained up in sectarian narrowness, would have drunk deeper and deeper of error and of bitterness.

Or again, for the members of our own Church;—would they be injured by a similar system of instruction,—would they be worse christians, or members of the Church of England than they are likely to become under the influence of that spirit which is now but too prevalent among you? Worse Christians they could not be, if the Scriptures are indeed our standard of Christianity; nor would they be worse churchmen, unless a narrow spirit of religious and political party, perpetuating divisions, and thus hindering the Church from becoming national and effective, be a true zeal for the welfare of Christ's Church established in this kingdom. Their admiration of the Liturgy and Articles of our present constitution would be—I had almost said less idolatrous,—than it seems to be now; but it would be more sincere and abundantly better grounded. True it is, that knowing that both additions and omissions were made in the original Articles of the Church of England within ten years of their first publication, they would probably judge that the lapse of two hundred and seventy years must have made other additions and omissions expedient now; remembering that the Liturgy was altered several times in a Christian spirit, that the last nominal revision in 1661-2 was the mere mockery of a triumphant party, and that the revision attempted in 1689 by some of the best men in our church was frustrated by the influence of the same party, they would probably desire another revision in the spirit of 1689 to be carried into effect now. But they would preserve the substance both of the Liturgy and Articles as earnestly as they would revise and endeavour to improve them: they would feel deeply and thankfully the positive truth contained in the one, and the piety and wisdom and eloquence of the other; they would admire that rejection of errors on the right hand and on the left, in which the English Reformers so eminently displayed their fairness and their judgment.

Taking, however, a simpler view of the case, I believe that the religious instruction of every individual under-graduate would be far purer and more effectual than it now is, if the thirty-nine Articles were never presented to them as a subject of study, but the Scriptures were made the only text-book in what are called Divinity Lectures, whilst the Catechism furnished the outline for any more private and personal instruction than was given to individuals. There can be no more fatal error, none certainly more entirely at variance with the Scripture model, than to acquaint the mind with the truths of religion in a theoretical form, leaving the application to them to be made afterwards. On the contrary, the practical form is not only that in which they should be first communicated, but in many instances they should never be put into the abstract form at all, and if they are so put, they become misleading. An à priori religion is a very different thing from Christianity; the Gospel is founded on man's wants and weaknesses, and the revelations of God are exactly commensurate with these wants, and go no farther. Look at the first of our Articles, and compare it with the Scriptural way of putting before us the very same truths. Every thing in the Article is abstract, it contains a series of propositions precisely of that sort which the devils may believe and yet still be devils; the assent given to them need not have any thing of the character of Christian faith. Now if we turn to those passages of Scripture which would be referred to as authorities for the truth of the Article, the difference in the manner of putting the several propositions is remarkable. The unity of God which is so often insisted on, is taught as a corrective of Polytheism; we are not to worship a variety of superior beings with a divided worship; it is not that there is one God in Israel and another in Syria, that one Being made the world and another governs it; but all our religious feelings of hope and fear, of love and of honour, should be directed to One alone, the Lord of life and death alike,—the God of our first fathers no less than our own. Thus with regard to Christians, the unity of God should be taught as condemning all superstitious worship of saints or angels, and as a call to missionary labours: for God being the God of all the earth, all should be taught to know Him; but when put as a metaphysical fact with regard to the Divine nature, we have seen it actually lead to error, as in the case of the Unitarians. Again, "God is without body, parts, or passions." Most true certainly; yet even this is put differently in the Scripture,—not as a truth, but as a lesson: "God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." Yet more with the conclusion of the Article: does the Scripture ever speak of the Trinity as of a fact, so to speak, in the Divine existence? Does not its language al-

ways refer to the various relations of God with ourselves? In this respect the language of the Catechism is exactly Scriptural. "I learn to believe in God the Father who hath made me, in God the Son who hath redeemed me, in God the Holy Ghost who hath sanctified me;" that is to say, our notions of God should never for an instant be separated from our own personal relations to Him. And if the external evidence were less decisive against it, the internal would of itself be sufficient in my judgment to throw strong suspicion on the famous verse of the Three Heavenly Witnesses; the abstract declaration of the relations of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to one another, for their unity does not bear* upon their witness, but is mentioned as a thing by itself, appearing to me to be at variance with the character of the revelations of Scripture.

I am led to think that this distinction, between the putting of the doctrines of Christianity in the shape of abstract truths and conveying them as lessons, is one of no small importance, because I observe that the Scripture constantly adopts the latter mode, while the great disputes amongst Christians have manifestly arisen out of the prevalence of the former. For one of the most fruitful sources of dispute has been the habit of making deductions from Scripture; a practice which is reasonable or unreasonable, according to the nature and object of the Gospel revelations. If they are meant to declare the absolute existence of certain truths, then we may properly make deductions from these truths, exactly as we do in human philosophy. But if the truths declared are wholly relative and practical, then we may not make abstract deductions from them, because abstractedly nothing has been revealed about them, and we may only use them for the purpose for which they are used in Scripture, that is, as producing a certain particular moral impression on our minds,—not as declaring some positive truth in the nature of things. This is understood clearly with regard to parables, where we see at once that they convey a lesson and not a fact, and that beyond the special lesson intended to be communicated we can draw no deductions from them. But I think, that in proportion to our increased knowledge and study of the Scriptures, will be our convic-

* For when, on another occasion, the Father and the Son are spoken of as witnesses, they are purposely represented as *two* and not as *one*, in accommodation to our notion that the number of witnesses increases the credibility of the thing attested. "It is written in your law that the testimony of two men is true. I am one that bear witness of myself, and the Father that sent me beareth witness of me." But when the point aimed at is to produce entire trust in Christ's power, then His unity with the Father is declared, not as an abstract truth, but as a practical one. "I and my Father are one." 1 John v. 7. John viii. 17, 18; x. 30.

tion that something of this sort applies, and must apply, to all revelations concerning God and heavenly things; and that it is by so reading the Scripture that we derive the entire impression of the mind of the Spirit: not finding embarrassment, but rather great instruction and benefit in those passages, which, taken as declaring abstract truths, appear so opposite as to be almost irreconcileable, and which, therefore, have given support to the most opposite theories, when in reality none of them warrant our forming any general theory at all.—Sermons, Vol. III. and IV.

Again the study of articles of religion is injurious in this respect, that it confirms that narrow and unscriptural use of the term "doctrine" which has been too long adopted in common language. To speak of the doctrines of the Gospel, as opposed to its precepts, is unscriptural and mischievous. If you take the trouble to observe the signification of the words, διδαχὴ, διδασκαλία, διδάσκω, &c., in the various passages of the New Testament in which they are to be found, you will see that in the very great majority of instances they are applied particularly to what we call the precepts of the Gospel; in others they embrace the whole mass of Christian instruction,—Christian practice and feelings enforced on Christian principles; but that most rarely, I believe I might say "never," were I not always unwilling to assert a negative universally, most rarely do they signify what we technically call doctrines,—*i. e.*, general truths of religion. The Articles may contain a full view of Christian doctrine in this technical sense of the word, but in the Scriptural sense they contain a most meagre and imperfect view of it. Indeed it is to be observed that the only notice which they take of the great moral peculiarities of Christian doctrine, is to notice certain exceptions to Christ's general rules; so that in studying the Articles we do not find the Christian doctrine enforced, but only a protest entered against certain exaggerated views of it. But is it no mischief that a young man's attention should be only directed to the Christian doctrine concerning oaths, in order to teach him that some oaths may lawfully be taken; whereas no man can doubt that the exception had far better be neglected than the rule; and if the Christian doctrine against the principle of oaths in general, and therefore against the imposition of them by Christian governments, had been enforced as it should have been, Christian reform in these matters, which the Bishop of London is now so nobly advocating, would not have been delayed till the nineteenth century? The same may be said with respect to the Christian doctrine relating to war and capital punishments. The exceptions made in the Articles are true as exceptions, but by dwelling on them we have lost the benefit of the

rule ; and it surely better becomes the Christian Church to enforce with all its power the principle of its Lord's doctrine,—a doctrine so unwelcome to our natural evil, and so greatly needed,—rather than to content itself with a caution against pushing this doctrine into extravagance. If the Scripture itself be our text-book, we find all this given in its proper proportions ; but on the present system it is perfectly possible for a man to study carefully what we call Christian doctrines, and yet to have a most inadequate notion of Christian doctrine in the Scriptural sense of the term,—the doctrine of Christian feelings and Christian principles and practice." . . . .

THE STATE AND THE CHURCH.

Written in 1833, 34. See Letters to Archbishop Whately and Mr. Hull, in April and July, 1834. Life and Correspondence.

1. The relations of what are called the State and the Church to each other, have been more or less matter of dispute in every period of modern history. At this moment nothing is so vague as the opinions generally entertained respecting them : and such as are not vague appear to me to be only definitely erroneous. It may be very true abstractedly that the importance of the subject requires to be discussed at length ; but a long work upon it would find but few readers. Now the erroneous views entertained upon it are conveyed, not in long and detailed arguments, but in short addresses, which may be read through in half an hour. When error dogmatizes, truth may be allowed to do the same. If ever the propagators of error will venture to expound at length the grounds of their system, it will then be time enough for the grounds on which the truth rests to be stated at length in answer.

The great errors which I here purpose to combat are two : one relating to the State, and the other to the Church.

The first, as entertained by a far more numerous and powerful body than the other, is by much the most dangerous; in fact, the great danger of the other error consists in its tendency to lead practically to the establishment of this. Now this first error consists in lowering and limiting the duty and business of the State ; it teaches "that the State as such, is of no religion ;" "that its business is simply to look after the bodies of men ; to provide for the security of their persons and property ; and that, therefore it may and ought to leave the con-

cerns of religion to individuals, and to make no public provision for its maintenance." I do not mean to say that all who have held the premises here mentioned have also held the conclusion; on the contrary, Warburton held them, and contended strongly at the same time for the expediency of having an established religion; nor have there been wanting others who have taken a similar course. But the general tendency has been and is to hold the premises and conclusion together, nay, to value the premises chiefly for the very reason because they seem to authorize such a conclusion.

Now in determining what are the objects and business of a State in the abstract, history gives us little direct assistance. The actual origin of civilized society in every country, so far as we can trace it, belongs to circumstances much more than to design. And descending to later times, the objects of different governments have been so various, and pursued so inconsistently by the same government at different periods, that we know not where to look for our standard. But there is one attribute which seems essential to a State,—namely, sovereighty. A State has no earthly superior; the law which is the State's voice, is supreme over all the members of the State, and its sentence can take from them both their property and their lives. A power so extensive must necessarily reach to every part of human life; all our actions in every period of our existence must be done either by its command or with its permission.

When, therefore Warburton speaks of civil policy requiring the aid of religion, and entering into alliance with it because of its own necessary imperfections, such for instance, as its inability to reward virtue, or to punish every kind of moral evil, he might just as reasonably talk of its entering into alliance with medicine, or with agriculture, or with political economy, because human society requires the benefits of these and of all other arts and sciences. If we must speak in metaphors, the State does not ally itself with them, but employs their services: fixes their respective places, and when their counsels are at variance with each other, determines of its sovereign pleasure which it shall follow. The essence of a State is power; what is no more than advice when spoken by philosophy and religion, binding, so far as this world is concerned, only on those who choose to follow it,—that when adopted by the State, becomes law, and so far as this world is concerned, no man can disobey it with impunity.

An authority, then, so essentially sovereign over human life, controlling every thing, and itself subject to no earthly control, must naturally have a proportionate responsability. Standing as it were in the place of God, it should imitate God's government wherever the imper-

fections of humanity do not render such imitation impossible. It seems then an uncalled for assertion, to maintain that it should regard the bodies of men only,—that it should limit the exercise of its power to the prevention of attacks upon persons and property,—that its highest functions should be those of a minister of police. The doctrine of the old philosophers is surely better in accordance with its sovereignty. They taught that as its power extended over the whole of human life, so human happiness, in the largest sense of the word, was its proper object; not physical happiness only, and much less the prevention of outward violence, but that compound happiness which belongs to man as a compound being,—the happiness conferred by wisdom and virtue, no less than the comfort which is derived from food and clothing.

Warburton speaks as if civil society had been formally instituted with the avowed object of procuring some one definite end; which end, he tells us, was "security to the temporal liberty and property of man."* Now to speak of any such formal institution of society as a matter of fact, is as far from the truth as to speak of "an original compact between the magistrate and the people," as if such a compact had literally been signed and sealed between them. The actual beginnings of society neither conceived of its object that it was merely "security to temporal liberty and property," nor that it was "the highest happiness attainable by man." If political society ever grew directly out of patriarchal, the predominant notion attached to the office of king would be that undefined one of general dignity and dominion which nature attaches to the character of a father. If, as is more probable, it grew out of conquest, the notion again was likely to be that of dominion, without any distinct conception of the ends for which that dominion was to be exercised; the conquerors desired power, and the conquered to escape worse evils submitted to it. Afterwards, when sovereignty had thus arisen, its capabilities, whether for good or for evil, were gradually developed: good men found that it enabled them to promote the happiness of mankind by improving their condition physically and morally; bad men found it convenient for the purposes of their own rapacity or ambition, and converted it into a tyranny. But because some degree of security for liberty and property is the minimum of good which sovereignty can confer without being guilty of self-destruction,—for tyranny undoes itself if it opens to every one its monopoly of oppression,—therefore governments which have cared for no higher object have yet necessarily repressed indiscriminate violence amongst their people; and the lowest good attainable by society has,

*Warburton's Alliance of Church and State, book i. chap. 4.

as was natural, been more frequently pursued by States actually than the higher good which it may and ought to attain, but which implies that its rulers should be, what too often they have not been, men sensible of the excellence of wisdom and virtue.

Warburton allows, indeed, that the State is concerned with morals, so far as they affect men's outward interests; nay, even with* "the three fundamental principles of natural religion, namely, the being of a God, His providence over human affairs, and the natural essential difference between moral good and evil." "These doctrines," he goes on to say, "it is directly of the magistrate's office to cherish, protect, and *propagate*; . . . . Nor doth this at all contradict our general position, that the sole end of civil society is *the conservation of body and goods*. For the magistrate concerns himself with the maintenance of these three fundamental articles, not as they promote *our future happiness*, but *our present*, as they are the very foundation and bond of civil policy." So then the State may and ought to employ the services of philosophy and religion; but it must do so only to prostitute them both: it must uphold the essential difference of moral good and evil, so far only as it is morally evil to assault our neighbour's person or to rob him of his property, and morally good to abstain from doing so; it must teach that God is, and that He is a rewarder of them who diligently seek Him, only to show its people that they cannot with impunity swear a false oath on a trial or at the custom-house!

There are three points which seem particularly to have misled Warburton's mind into such conclusions as these. First, the confusion of the term "temporal" or "present happiness," with "security to temporal liberty and property;" secondly, "the inability of the State to reward virtue;" and, thirdly, "its punishing evil or other principles than those of pure morality and religion."

I. The confusion in his use of the term "temporal or present happiness," is apparent in the passage which I have quoted above. "Present happiness" is surely not synonymous with "the conservation of body and goods," nor is it necessarily opposed to "future happiness." The immediate object of every earthly society must be "present good," because "future good" can thus only be obtained. But man's highest† present good is the same in kind with his future good,—being the perfection of his intellectual and moral nature. This, however, is very far from synonymous with the "conservation of his body and goods," and although we may readily grant that the immediate object of a State

* Warburton's Alliance of Church and State, book i. chap. 4.

† [See Lectures on Mod. Hist. 3rd edit. p. 55.]

is man's present happiness, yet it would by no means follow from this that it was limited to the security of his body and goods from external violence.

II. The State cannot reward virtue, it must "borrow the sanction of rewards from religion." Now it is undoubtedly impossible for society to apportion happiness and misery to its members exactly according to their moral deservings. There are many things good and evil of which God keeps the distribution wholly to himself. I said above, therefore, that "the State should imitate God's government so far as the imperfections of humanity permitted." But it may be doubted whether Warburton is correct in understanding by "reward," "such as is conferred on every one for observing the laws of his country;" as distinguished from "such as is bestowed on particulars for any eminent service." For "laws," in the common sense of the term, prohibiting evil rather than enjoining good, the observance of them is no more than the bare abstaining from evil; and abstaining from evil has its fit return, not in "reward," but in "not being subject to punishment." Now if exemption from punishment be reward, then the State can and does reward those who observe its laws: but if reward mean, as it does naturally, "the bestowing of some positive good," then it is no imputation upon the State that it does not confer such positive good on the negative merit of not doing evil.

But if we choose to take the term "laws"* in the wider sense of the old philosophers, and understand by it, not such as are written only, but also the unwritten,—not such as merely forbid evil, but such as enjoin all good, then the State is capable of rewarding in some degree the observance of its laws; negatively, by repressing those wrongs and violences which obstruct the natural tendency of virtue to confer happiness; and, positively, by creating such a state of public opinion as shall ensure to every man in proportion to his goodness an adequate share of a great external comfort,—namely, the esteem, and regard, and reverence of his fellows.

Again, supposing that the State could in no sense reward virtue, it avails Warburton's argument nothing to say, that it must "borrow the sanction of rewards from religion." For in order to serve his purpose, "religion" must be synonymous with "religious society," *i. e.*, with the Church. But the Church is as destitute of the sanction of rewards as the State, since it has lost the miraculous gift of healing. All that it can give is that which does not belong to it in virtue of its being a society; not the sanction of rewards as conferred by itself now, but the

* Inaugural Lecture in the "Lectures on Modern History."

belief in such a sanction as to be manifested by God hereafter to all who have loved Him and worked righteousness. This "borrowing from religion" is of the same sort with the "borrowings from philosophy," "political economy," &c., which the State may have occasion for, without our confounding the nature of its sovereignty, or supposing that it must or can contract an alliance with a society of philosophers or economists.

III. "The State punishes evil on other principles than those of morality and religion." This, I think, is the main difficulty which has induced many persons to agree with Warburton in his low estimate of the objects of civil society. But the point to be considered is whether this imputation is one which peculiarly touches the State, or whether it does not arise from those imperfections of humanity which are incident to every society composed of human beings. For instance, when it is said that the State does not punish some kinds of sensual indulgences, it is merely saying that public opinion has never yet been sufficiently pure in such matters as to allow of their punishment. It is a fault incident alike to civil and to religious society when existing on a large scale, in other words when they do not consist merely of a small number of picked individuals. The reason which Warburton alleges, that by checking severely one class of offences of this description others of a worse character may be encouraged, applies exactly as much to the Church as to the State, if it be valid in either case. But the purity of morals actually obtained in one sex under present circumstances by the decided demand of public opinion, and the legal punishments actually inflicted on some particular sensualities, sufficiently show that there is no peculiar incapacity in civil society to enforce purity of morals,—but that men, and even Christians, have never yet generally estimated *all* offences against this purity after the measure prescribed alike by reason and revelation.

Again, generally, the State, it is said, punishes evil actions only in proportion to their malignant influence on civil society. The truth is, that the rule followed in practice has mostly been very capricious, as if governments had not been able to satisfy themselves respecting it. They have looked partly at the moral enormity of a crime, partly at its mischievous tendency; and thus the penal legislation of most countries exhibits an inconsistency in its several enactments. Again, it should be recollected that civil society has its indirect inflictions for the breach of its unwritten laws, no less real than the direct penalties by which it secures obedience to its written laws. There are some offences for which loss of character and a tacit exclusion from society are the fittest punishment; and the public opinion which inflicts this is one of

society's proper instruments, inasmuch as it is capable of being formed by the institutions and habits which society either enacts or adopts in its practice.*

But the true reason of such differences as have really existed between human laws and the language of philosophy and religion, is to be found in the fact, that philosophy and religion have exercised so feeble an influence over the bulk of mankind, and that actual governments have, therefore, as I said before, neglected very frequently the higher good which they might have effected, and have confined themselves to that lower sort which was much more generally appreciated. But in so far as they have sometimes, though irregularly and inconsistently, endeavoured after that higher good, they have left as it were on record their acknowledgment of that principle from which their practice, after the usual course of human infirmity, was too often deviating.

Supposing, however, that the influential majority in any State were good and wise men, desirous of promoting the moral and intellectual no less than the physical well-being of their community, their political wisdom, which is the sovereign of all sciences, would undoubtedly avail itself of religion and philosophy to promote the first of these ends, as it would employ political economy, military and naval knowledge, and the various branches of physical science to promote the last. For the sovereign science of human life is that science which is the proper accompaniment of sovereign power; and its business is so to employ the services of all other sciences, that, without interfering with one another, or trying one to exclude the other, they may by their combined efforts, mingled together in just proportions, raise the perfect fabric of human happiness. And therefore the State's sovereign power combined, in the case I am supposing, with the peculiar wisdom which belongs to it, chooses for itself the true religion, as it would choose also the truest system of political science in the lower sense of the term; and in adopting this religion, it declares its belief in its promises and its adherence to its precepts,—in other words it declares itself Christian. But by so doing, it becomes a part of Christ's Holy Catholic Church: not allied with it, which implies distinctness from it, but transformed into it. But as for the particular portion of this Church which may have existed before within the limits of the State's sovereignity,—the actual society of Christian men there subsisting,—the State does not ally itself with such a society,—for alliance supposes two parties equally sovereign,—nor yet does it become the Church as

* This argument is more fully developed in "Lectures on Modern History."

to its outward form and organization; neither does the Church on the other hand become so lost in the State as to become, in the offensive sense of the term, secularized. The spirit of the Church is transfused into a more perfect body, and its former external organization dies away. The form is that of the State, the spirit is that of the Church; what was a kingdom of the world is become a kingdom of Christ, a portion of the Church in the high and spiritual sense of the term; but in that sense in which "Church" denotes the outward and social organization of Christians in any one particular place, it is no longer a Christian Church, but what is far higher and better, a Christian Kingdom. It remains as before,—a sovereign society seeking after its highest happiness: but it has now discovered the true path, and its conceptions as to the nature of its happiness are corrected and exalted. It is changed into a better and a purer self, like *Kailyal when she had tasted the Amreeta cup of immortality.

To the view here taken, several objections are or may be made:—

First, That it interferes with the political rights of men, by making them to depend on their religious opinions; for if the State, as such, be essentially Christian, those who are not Christians cannot be members of it.

Second, That men being sure to differ in their religious opinions, the State must either become Christian in so vague and general a sense as hardly to deserve the name; or if it adopts the creed of any one particular sect, or frames one distinct and definite for itself, the existence of dissenters will soon embarrass the question, and it will be necessary either to exclude dissenters from their political rights, or to admit the solecism of their legislating for the concerns of the established religion while they do not hold communion with it.

* "She said and drank. The eye of mercy beam'd
Upon the maid: a cloud of fragrance stream'd
Like incense smoke, as all her mortal frame
Dissolved beneath the potent agency
Of that mysterious draught; such quality
From her pure touch the fated cup partook.
Like one entranced she knelt,
Feeling her body melt
Till all but what was heavenly past away:
Yet still she felt
Her spirit strong within her—the same heart,
With the same loves, and all her heavenly part
Unchanged and ripened to such perfect state,
In this miraculous birth, as here on earth
Dimly our holiest hopes anticipate."

Southey's Curse of Kehama, Book xxiv.

Third, The Church being essentially distinct from the State ought not to be confounded with it; it may be allied with it, or employed by it, but can never be identified with it.

1. The first objection stirs one of the greatest questions in politics: namely, what is the true bond of political society? or, in other words, what are the qualifications required in a citizen? It also involves another great question—what are the political rights of individuals? To both these questions there is a growing tendency to give an answer, which, as being anarchical and leading to the moral degradation of the human race, may be fitly called Jacobinical.

I need not say how various the qualifications for citizenship have been in different ages and in different countries. But was it ever held in the ancient world that a man gained a title to become a citizen by living in a country, acquiring a fortune in it, and paying taxes for the public service? His paying taxes was thought to be no more than a just return for the protection afforded him in a country on which he had no natural claim; nor would any length of time alter the condition of his posterity, unless by a special act of favour on the part of the government. Their services to the State, in bearing a share of the public burdens, could no more remove the natural diversity of their condition than a beast's usefulness to his master could give him a right to be regarded as a man.

Citizenship, in the common course of things, was a matter of race; he was a citizen who was lineally descended from a citizen, and had not forfeited his right by some crime. This was not a mere narrow-minded spirit of family pride. Particular races of men have their own peculiar physical and moral character. They preserved also, in the ancient world, their particular customs, particular moral principles on various important points, and also their particular religion. The mixture of races was accounted a monstrous confusion, introducing a discordance in the habits and principles of a people subversive of political union.

Individuals who obtained the rights of citizenship conformed immediately to the laws, civil and religious, of the country which had adopted them. Individuals might be thus admitted without danger; but the admission of masses of new citizens was considered highly mischievous, as it was likely to shake the existing institutions of the country.*

This showed a general feeling that the ends of civil society were something higher than mere security to life and property, or facilitating

* See Preface to the third volume of the edition of Thucydides. Hist. of Rome vol. ii., pp. 48–56.

the multiplication of capital. Citizenship implied much more than local neighbourhood, or an intercourse of buying and selling; it was an agreement in the highest feelings and principles of our nature; and certainly Christianity forms so broad a line morally between those who embrace it, and other men, that a man who is not a Christian is most justly excluded from citizenship in a Christian state, not merely on grounds furnished by Revelation, but according to the highest and noblest views of the nature of political society.

Again, we hear a great deal too much in the present day of the political rights of *individuals*;* this tendency, which is not essentially anarchical, is one of the most distinguishing features of modern civilization as distinguished from that of the ancient world.† That age of chivalry, whose departure Burke so much regretted, was in one respect the natural parent of that age of Jacobinism which he so much abhorred. Both breathe the spirit of lawlessness, encouraging men to look upon themselves as independent of their fellows; cultivating a proud and selfish idolatry of what belongs to them individually, whether it be personal honour and personal glory, as in the earlier form of the disease, or personal political liberty and equality as in the later. Both lead to what Bacon calls *bonum suitatis*, to the neglect of the good of the whole body of which we are members. Individuals, in a political sense, are necessarily members; as distinct from the body, they are nothing. Against society, they have no political rights whatever, and their belonging to society or not is a matter not of their own choice, but determined for them by their being born and bred members of it.

2. I approach the second objection with reluctance and shame; for is it not most humiliating that any circumstances should ever have given the slightest colour to the assertion that the term Christian must be vague and of little value, unless some sectarian peculiarities be added to complete the definition?—that to be of Christ is nothing, unless we further declare whether we are of Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas? But so it is; ignorant or dishonest zeal has ever slighted the substance, and idolized the shadow; it is called heresy or indifference to care little for this or that sect's interpretation of the Scriptures; but it is orthodoxy to say that unless some one or other of these interpretations be implicitly adopted, the Scriptures themselves will profit us nothing.

I call a State "Christian" when it declares its belief in the divine origin and supreme authority of the Christian Revelation as contained in the Scriptures; I call this United Kingdom, as yet, a Christian na-

* Hist. of Rome, vol. i., p. 260; and vol. iii., p. 426.

† For his later feeling on this point, see chap. x. of Life and Correspondence.

tion, although it be neither Episcopal nor Presbyterian, but establishes the one form in England, and the other in Scotland. I call Prussia a Christian nation, although it be neither Roman Catholic nor Protestant, but establishes the one form of Christianity in Westphalia, and the other in Brandenburg. In such cases there is no difficulty; the nation belongs to the Church of Christ; one part of it under one form, and another under another; and where the followers of these several forms are locally distinct from each other, the State may conveniently allow to each the management of their own concerns in all subordinate matters, only taking care that neither party encroaches upon the other, and neither presumes to excite ill-will against the other. But if either complain that the State is not fit to legislate for them because its supreme government consists indifferently of men of both parties, this supposes so strong a sense of the differences between them, as to render it proper that they should rather form a confederacy than a State. Neighbourhood and mutual interest may fit them for such a relation; but they differ too widely to be united together in so close a connexion as that of fellow-citizens.

Suppose, however, a far more complicated case:—that one particular form of Christianity is established over a whole country, and that this at first is the form adopted by a very great majority of the inhabitants; suppose that afterwards, from various causes, a large proportion of the people object to this form, and set up for themselves others of which they approve more fully; supposing that none of these different forms are locally distinct from one another, but that all exist side by side in the same district, and parish, and town, and street. What is to be done under these circumstances? Are the dissenters from the establishment to be excluded from the legislature? or are they to legislate for a communion to which they themselves do not belong? or may the concerns of the establishment be now safely left to the care of those alone who happen to be members of it?

Dissenters need not be excluded from the legislature; for, to speak generally, the differences between Christians are not on such great points of principle or practice as to hinder them from taking the same estimate of the great business of human life, and so to unfit them from walking through it as companions to each other. Their paths are one in the main, both for time and eternity; so that they may well be united with each other in political society. Yet still, if the dissenters be a small minority, and the members of the establishment conscientiously believe that the full rights of citizenship cannot be granted to them; although their exclusion may be unwise, and betray a narrow and unsocial spirit, yet it may not be called unjust. The right of society to

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

the public. A man may load his own carriage as he will, but let him set up a conveyance for passengers in general, and the law immediately interferes with his arrangements, and prescribes minutely what number he may carry, and how they are to be distributed.

3. "But the Church is essentially distinct from the State, and ought not to be confounded with it. It may be correct to say that they are allied together, but not that the State is actually the Church." This objection has been brought forward against a former statement of mine by Mr. Dickenson, the late Bishop of Meath, and it is urged with an ability, a fairness, and a courtesy, which cannot but deprive controversy of all its unkindness.

The difference between us seems to consist in this; that Mr. Dickenson conceives of the ideas of State and Church as expressing societies whose objects are *essentially* distinct, while I regard the distinction as only *accidental*. No doubt a man who thinks with Warburton, that the sole object of political society is "the conservation of body and goods," must regard the distinction between Church and State as necessary and perpetual; so must these also who think that the proper object of the Church is to keep up in their purity the ritual ordinances of religion, (*θρησκεία*,) such as public prayer, sacrifices, and the like. Now as we have seen above, that States, in practice, have very often confined their attention to the physical welfare of society; and as the greater number of religious societies or institutions have really been appointed for ritual services, it is not surprising that the objects of each should have been very often estimated unworthily. But define the object of the Church to be what Warburton calls it, "the advancement and improvement of our intellectual nature," * and it becomes as nearly as possible identical with what Aristotle declares to be the object of the State, namely, the happiness of society; happiness, as he expressly insists, consisting both in physical and moral good, but much more in the latter than in the former. † Now every State not being Christian seeks man's highest happiness with mistaken views; its pursuit of the true object is not according to knowledge; and every Church, before the State becomes Christian, seeks man's highest happiness, since the cessation of miraculous gifts, with deficient power. It is constantly thwarted by not possessing the sovereign control over human life, the

* The first object of religion, he observes, is to procure the favour of God; but for this object man had no occasion to constitute a society. The second object of *religion* is the first object of *religious society*, namely, the advancement and improvement of our intellectual nature. *Warburton, Alliance of Church and State*, book i. chap. 5.

† Aristotle, Politics, i. 1, vii. 1, 2, 3. 13.

power of outward dominion. But the State is capable of receiving the knowledge of the Church, whereas it cannot part with its essential attribute of sovereignty, nor is the Church fitted to exercise it. Thus the State * having been enlightened by the knowledge of the Church, becomes a society seeking the same end which the Church sought, and with the same knowledge, but with more extensive outward means of attaining it, because its inherent sovereignty gives it a greater power over outward things. And this was my meaning when I said that, in a country where the nation and government are avowedly and essentially Christian, the State or nation was virtually the Church.

I am not quite sure that the expression "national universities" is generally applied to Oxford and Cambridge. But suppose that the whole education of the country were conducted by law upon one system; that the smaller schools were placed under the control of the larger, and these again under the government of the Universities, this grand society for the purposes of education might certainly be called "national," or belonging to the nation, but it could not be *identified with the nation*, for this reason, that the object of such a society would be subordinate to that of the nation or State, and distinct from it, being limited to "the good education of the young." And further, all the members of the State would not be members of this particular society, but only those who were either educating others, or being educated themselves. And so of all other societies or institutions employed by the State, whose ends or objects are conducive to the object of the State, but subordinate to it, and only fulfilling a certain part of it.—*Sermons*, vol. iv. p. 413.

So far my statement as to the identity of the State and Church under certain circumstances may be intelligible, perhaps, whatever opinion be entertained of its truth or falsehood. But what becomes of this view where there exist within the same State different forms of Christianity, and still more when two forms are actually established at the same time in different parts of the same kingdom, as in England and Scotland? How can the State be at the same time identical with two different Churches, with the Kirk of Scotland, and with the Church of England? This will be a formidable objection to those who think that the essential character of Christ's Church is to be found in the peculiarities of any one particular denomination of Christians. But if these peculiarities are not essential, and if both the Church of England and the Kirk of Scotland are equally members of Christ's Church, then it is very possible for the State to be virtually the Church of Christ in

* Postscript to Principles of Church Reform.

those countries subject to its dominion, but yet to allow its members to adopt such particular rites and such a peculiar municipal government in different places as they may respectively judge convenient. And this is no more than exists continually in civil matters; different provinces and towns of the same State having frequently different customs and different municipal privileges, all of which the State acknowledges and authorizes, without feeling its own essential unity impaired by such varieties.

This also is agreeable to the notion implied in that expression, at which some are so fond of cavilling; "that Christianity is part and parcel of the law of the land." It is not pretended that "Christianity" means here "any particular form of Christianity," and, therefore attacks on the peculiar doctrines and discipline of the Church of England are not illegal; but attacks on the truth of Christianity in general are. I am not impugning or defending the propriety of the laws against blasphemy; I am merely noticing the distinction made between Christianity and any one particular form of it; and showing that the State may be Christian and yet may sanction or even establish within its dominions many particular societies of Christians, that is, in another and subordinate sense, *many different Churches*—though all in the higher sense of the term belong to *one and the same Church*,—that Church with which I have said that every Christian State is within its own dominions virtually identical.

And now I am come to consider that other great error with respect to the Church, which has so eternally embroiled the whole question; which has led men to talk of the alliance between Church and State in some instances, and absolutely to deny the sovereignty of the State in others; an error, however, which has produced far more and worse effects than these, having done more lasting injury to Christianity than any other perhaps which can be named. For, by a happy fertility in evil, it has suited the bad tendencies of two opposite descriptions of characters,—encouraging on the one hand superstition, fraud, uncharitableness and tyranny, and on the other hand leading to a general carelessness of principle, to profaneness and all licentiousness. This error is the confounding the Christian clergy with the hereditary priesthoods of Judaism and Heathenism: and thus conceiving of the clergy as of an order preserving its identity by perpetual succession, and being invested with certain indefeasible powers, which were neither derived from human authority, and which no human law can modify or take away. And the consideration of this grand error shall form the second part of the present discussion.

2. When Cyrus seated himself on the throne of the kings of Media,

the Magians, who composed the Median priesthood, were left in undisturbed possession of their sacred dignity. The king was from henceforth a Persian, and Persians naturally filled the principal military offices of the empire; but the priesthood was still confined to the Medes, and in religious matters their conquerors submitted to their discipline. Now this arrangement may be called with very little impropriety a real alliance between the State and the Church. The parties were in the outset independent of one another, the Magians not being the natural subjects of Cyrus; they were distinguished from one another by difference of race, and each stood in need of the other's co-operation; the Magians could not have resisted the sword of the conqueror, while he on his side found his Persian countrymen too ignorant to form a priesthood themselves, and hoped, besides, to conciliate his new subjects by preserving the sacred character of that order whom they had been so long accustomed to venerate.

Now when the German chiefs established themselves and their followers in the various provinces of the Roman empire, they treated the Christian clergy in many instances just as Cyrus had treated the Magians. Their own countrymen were visibly inferior in knowledge, whilst the Roman clergy had long been respected and loved by their people, and this influence might be made useful to the authority of the new sovereign. It may be said that here also there was an alliance between Church and State, which has subsisted ever since in virtue of this beginning.

Let us now observe the essential differences between these two transactions, apparently so similar. In the case of the Magians, as of the other priesthoods of antiquity, they constituted by themselves the whole of the religious society with which the conqueror allied himself; the people were never supposed to constitute a part of it. Again, the chief religious office was sacrifice, which could not be performed acceptably to the gods, unless by a priest; and, therefore, as the priesthood was hereditary, there was an essential act of religion inseparably connected with the Magians, which could be performed by none but themselves and their posterity. They thus possessed an inalienable property, so that it was worth the State's while to enter into a perpetual alliance with them, because the benefits derived from them were such as could at no future time be enjoyed unless through their instrumentality.

But in the case of the Roman clergy, they were not the Church, nor was any bargain formed with them for their advancement in wealth or dignity entitled to be called a covenant made with the Church. Nor, again, did they possess any inalienable and peculiar power, essential to the perfection of Christianity, so that their services would at all fu-

ture times be indispensable to the State, and could be supplied from no other quarter. Their knowledge, when once communicated, passed to the disciple in all the perfection in which it was enjoyed by the teacher, and the disciple could in the same way impart it to others. In such cases the original communicator of any knowledge may be remunerated by a certain definite reward, or may be invested with certain privileges for a limited term of years; but the State encroaches on the just sovereignty of future generations, if it confers a perpetual monopoly of any important office, which, after a lapse of years, may be filled as well by other citizens as by those who are thus put in exclusive possession of it.

It will not be improper to observe that the clergy, as if aware of this, laboured actually to represent themselves as standing in a position different from this real one. Language was so far abused, that "the Church," in common speech, was generally understood to mean "the clergy;" the "honour and welfare of the Church" meant no more than the "advancement and enrichment of the clergy." They also called themselves "priests," and, consistently with the name, professed that they were empowered and exclusively commissioned to offer sacrifice for the people, and to forgive their sins. And thus they tried to put themselves in the place of the ancient hereditary priesthoods, and to make *their order*, as distinguished from their knowledge, essential in all times alike to the perfect development of Christianity.

In short, all the arguments about the alliance of the Church with the State, its inherent independence, &c., &c., rest upon this supposition,—that the Church has certain governors unalterably defined by God himself, and that these governors possess certain inherent and essential powers which can only be communicated through their medium; in short, that Christianity has its priesthood, like other religions, invested with an indefeasible personal sacredness and authority.

The institutions, the writings, the practice, and the language of Christian Europe, for several centuries, have assumed this supposition to be true: not that in all cases it has been distinctly avowed, or even perceived, for then its falsehood would long ago have been detected; but it has been implied, and tacitly taken for granted. And yet never was there a notion more unsupported by any shadow of reason or of authority; never was there an error more deeply mischievous.

But here, as in other matters, this justice must be done to the Roman Catholics, that they have at least been consistent in their error. Their system is intelligible and harmonious; its symmetry is perfect, and its reasonableness would be unanswerable, if it were based upon a true foundation. It was reserved, not certainly for the Church of

England in its official acts, but for a powerful party of its individual members, to exhibit a far more melancholy proof of the perversity of the human mind. For these persons, while maintaining the erroneous conclusions of the Roman Catholics, have at the same time denied the foundation from which alone they could be legitimately derived; betraying a mind not only unstartled by a false opinion, but incapable of examining the reasons on which it might claim to be received; not only maintaining an absurdity, but maintaining it in contradiction to principles which itself avowed.

Before I enter, however, upon the question itself, there is one distinction most important to a right understanding of my argument, which I am anxious to impress deeply on my readers' minds: I am contending not against any office or institution in itself, but against a foolish, presumptuous, and schismatical claim set up by some of its weak or furious admirers. I am very far from arguing against episcopal government; on the contrary, I have recorded my earnest wish that it may* become more generally received, and more effectually enforced. But I am arguing against its being made an essential point in Christianity;—against the manifold confusions and superstitions, and insolent uncharitablenesses with which its cause has been embarrassed; against the mischiefs which threaten the Church of England from the outcry set up about the profanation of secular interference with sacred things. I am maintaining the self-same argument against the High Church superstition of the present day, which Hooker upheld, in his time, against the superstition of the Puritans, namely, the sovereignty of the Christian State over all its subordinate offices, whether ecclesiastical or civil. Or to appeal to a still higher authority, the argument here insisted on, and the calumnies to which it subjects its advocates, are precisely similar to the course followed by St. Paul with respect to the Jewish Law, and to the slanders and malignity with which the Judaizing Christians, the High Churchmen of those days, assailed him in consequence of it. For while he himself "walked orderly and kept the Law," while he even circumcised Timothy in order to conciliate, as far as he honestly could, the prejudices of the Jews, he was accused by the zealots of "teaching all the Jews to forsake Moses, saying that they ought not to circumcise their children, nor to keep their customs." But the falsehood had this foundation in truth, that St. Paul had struggled most earnestly against the unchristian pretension, "that the Law of Moses was an essential part of Christ's Gospel." It was not only harmless, but becoming to the Jewish Christians, so long as they observed it as a venerable institution handed down to them from their

* Principles of Church Reform.

forefathers; and formerly, under different circumstances, commanded by God himself. But it became injurious, nay, subversive of the souls of men, when it was put forward as necessary to salvation, and attempted, in the spirit of fanaticism or worldly ambition, to be forced upon the acceptance of all Christians. Nor could St. Paul forbear the language of the strongest condemnation when these Judaizers attempted to shake the lawful government of the Christian Church, because it had interfered with their selfishness and superstition. They disputed St. Paul's Apostleship as irregular, because he had not, like Matthias, received his appointment through the medium of the original Apostles of Christ; because, in defence of the essential liberty of Christ's Gospel, he had resisted the highest human authority, and reproved even Peter himself. Such is ever the nature of superstition,—anarchical at once and tyrannical; virulent in proportion to its ignorance, and lax in matters of principle consistently with its intolerant strictness on points of form. Such is that spirit which, incapable of comprehending the pure and loving bond of Christian union, spares no pains and scruples at no means to make proselytes to its own paltry party; and on which our Lord Himself,—who, in true zeal for God's service, as in every thing else, is alone our perfect pattern,—has pronounced one of His heaviest sentences of condemnation.

Let us see how much is implied in the undeniable truth, that Christianity acknowledges no earthly priesthood. People have no objection, at least in Protestant countries, to allow this as a fact, because they think that it means no more than that the practice of offering sacrifices is done away. But the particular rite of sacrifice seems to have been only an accident of the priestly character, although it is the best example of what was conceived essential to it. The proper notion of a priest is of a mediator between God and man, of one who, being purer and nearer to the object of his worship than other men, is the only medium through whom other men may communicate with their God. The notion of "teaching religion" is by no means a part of the priestly office, except so far as regards the enforcing of an exact observance of external rites. For he who teaches another religion in the higher sense, teaches him how he may please God by himself; whereas a priesthood supposes that a man cannot please God by himself, but requires another man to present his prayers and his worship for him, because he is himself unclean. Thus a priesthood implies an abiding superiority of one man or set of men over another in their relations to God; such a superiority, in fact, as argues a distinction of race; and therefore it was natural that no person of another race should be thought capable of holding it without pollution. This was the reason why it was so generally hereditary,

and a similar reason led to the establishment of the principle of hereditary succession in the monarchies of antiquity; the kings being supposed to belong to a nobler and higher race than those over whom they ruled. But where the monarchy was the creation of a later age, and was connected with no heroic or divine founder, as in the case of the Roman imperial government, there the throne was not necessarily hereditary, and could never be claimed simply by right of descent.*

The priesthood amongst the Israelites, being there ingrafted upon the true religion, presented undoubtedly some peculiar features. There the priests were known to be of the same origin with the rest of the people, nor were they supposed to be morally superior to them. But the Israelitish Religion required sacrifices, and a priesthood, as typical of the great sacrifice to be made by the true High Priest hereafter. Such peculiarities, therefore, of the priestly character were to be retained as should show that there was a real priesthood, according to the common notions entertained of the term, and yet should not interfere with the moral improvement of the people. A sort of ceremonial purity was attached to the priest, and his sacrifices were to procure an outward and ceremonial atonement. Thus far the race of Aaron were set apart from their brethren; thus far they were more holy than other men, and accordingly the priesthood was confined to them exclusively. It may be observed, also, that the constant succession of prophets, chosen from any tribe or family without distinction, from the lowest classes, as in the case of Amos, no less than the highest, and invested with a power over the concerns of life far greater than that of the priests, was a continual intimation that the instruction and improvement of the people in the great end of religion, holiness of heart, has no necessary connexion with an hereditary priesthood.—*Sermons*, vol. vi.; "The Disobedient Prophet."

To return, however, to general history: as experience disproves the perpetual moral superiority of one family or race over others; nay, as it is found that a race which carefully avoids all mixture with others, is, from that very cause, apt to degenerate, so an order of priests at first

* The monarchies of modern Europe became hereditary, not as offices, but as property: the king's son succeeded to his father's kingdom as to an estate, the possession of which involved, no doubt, certain duties towards the tenants or vassals who lived on it, but was obtained by no rule of political fitness, simply on the notion of inheritance. This is particularly shown in those countries where females are capable of succeeding to the crown; an exception to the universal rule in all other cases, if the royalty had been looked upon as the highest magistracy in the State, but regular and natural if it were regarded as an inheritance of property, which, like other properties naturally invested its owner with jurisdiction over those who lived on it.

strictly hereditary might be inclined to rest their power, in the course of time, on a more real superiority, by retaining to themselves the possession of superior knowledge. For this end it would be desirable to strengthen their body by the accession of individuals of other races whose talents or dispositions might make them useful auxiliaries, and who, being trained in their discipline, became, in fact, the adopted children of their race. Such was the system pursued by the Druids; their order was frequently swelled by the accession of young men who were not Druids by birth, but who were brought up in their schools, and admitted by them afterwards to share their power and privileges. But this was only a more effectual means of securing the essence of a priesthood, a superiority over the rest of the people. The Druids were very careful in teaching those who were to become Druids themselves, but they were as careful that the superior knowledge of their order should not be communicated to any who were without their pale; and with this view they made their instruction wholly verbal, no part of their knowledge was committed to writing. There was a reason, then, why they should constitute a distinct order, and why they alone should have the power of appointing those who were to be admitted to it, because by keeping their knowledge within their own custody they insured to themselves a perpetual superiority.

Thus there appears a perpetual connection between the notion of a priesthood and that of an order either absolutely hereditary, or possessing the exclusive right of appointing its own members. And this is further confirmed by the fact, that the Christian clergy, while they claimed the privileges of a priesthood, did, in fact, endeavour to show that they possessed also the inherent superiority of a priesthood. They made their order synonymous with the whole Church, as if, after the example of the heathen priesthoods, none but themselves were fit members of a religious society; they pretended that Christianity still retained the rite of sacrifice, which implied of necessity a priest to offer it; and in order to make their superiority real, they recruited themselves from all races and ranks of men indiscriminately, but were careful that the knowledge of religion should be as much as possible confined to themselves: and whereas this had been committed to writing already, and the written document might not be destroyed, still they trod in the steps of the Druids as nearly as they could, by preventing the people from getting access to it, and by setting up a vast mass of oral traditions, said to have been handed down amongst themselves, which they pretended were of equal authority.—*Appendix I. to Sermons;* vol. iii.

What has been thus far said will excite a strong presumption that the claims of the Christian clergy to exist as a distinct order, with the

exclusive right of admitting new members to their own body, and with powers and privileges not derived from any human law, have been grounded on the mistaken notion of their being a priesthood; because such claims do flow naturally from the essential notion of a priesthood, and have not been commonly made or allowed in other cases where no such notion has existed. It is very true that those Protestants of the Church of England, who, whilst allowing that they are not priests, wish to claim the privileges of a priesthood, are obliged to rest their claim upon a different ground; but assertions made and admitted in the first instance upon grounds which will not bear inquiry, are often defended afterwards upon other principles; principles too inconclusive to have ever established the conclusion originally, but which are fitted for the far easier office of inducing men to remain in that conclusion, when their habits and institutions have already been formed upon it. These afterthoughts, it must be confessed, are very apt to betray the urgent necessity which drove men to have recourse to them; they are arguments which none would ever have employed if they could have helped it. The ground then assumed by these Protestants who wish to keep the conclusions of the Roman Catholics after they have denied their premises, seems to be this, so far as it is possible to understand it—that the clergy derive their power by succession from the Apostles, and that they having the exclusive right of administering the Sacraments, and the Sacraments being essential to Christianity, so a clergy, as it is called, of pure apostolical descent, can never be dispensed with in the Christian Church, and that where there is no such clergy, then there is no part of Christ's Church.

I must remind the reader that the question in no degree turns upon the propriety or impropriety of the clergy possessing such and such powers, but simply upon the tenure by which they hold them. Nothing can be more proper than that the Sacraments should be administered by a regularly appointed ministry; nothing less to be desired than any alteration of the ordinances of the Church of England in these points. But are these ministers the officers of the Church, and appointed by its supreme government, or are they not its officers but its priests, and deriving their appointment, not from it nor its sanction, but from the purity of their spiritual descent? The question is evidently most important, inasmuch as it touches the question, whether the Church is or is not sovereign over all its members, or whether there are some who are not its members, but its hereditary masters.

When it is said that the clergy "derive their authority from their apostolical descent," I should like to know what is meant by the words. Is it meant that this apostolical descent conveys to them any real in-

trinsic gift, moral or intellectual, so that they may claim the power of priests, because they possess a real superiority over other men, or a higher degree of knowledge? Or is it meant that they are not a priesthood but an oligarchy, and that the Apostles fixed invariably the form of the government of the Church throughout all ages, without giving it withal any portion of that real virtue, which can alone render forms other than essentially indifferent and changeable? Was the object, in short, of this supposed apostolical institution spiritual or political?—"*Christian Duty of Conceding the Roman Catholic Claims.*"

When "the authority of the clergy" is spoken of, is it meant that this authority is absolute, or where is the power of limiting it? It is intelligible enough certainly, if the position maintained is this,—that the bishops as supreme, and the other clergy as their subordinate officers, have sovereign power over the Christian Church in all ages, independent of any human law: that they may alone fill up the vacancies in their own body, or may increase and diminish its numbers at their pleasure; that they may legislate for the Church as to doctrine, morals, and ritual, and punish disobedience to their laws by excommunication; that as no society can exist without something of a public purse or revenue, they may determine the amount of this revenue and the manner of its application: and, finally, that if they abuse their power the Church is without remedy, as they are amenable to none but God for its exercise. This is intelligible, but I much doubt whether any one will be found hardy enough to assert it. But if the authority of the bishops and clergy be limited, where are we to find its limits: are they fixed or variable? and who has the power of enforcing them? If the Church has a constitution, where are we to look for its provisions? Was it given complete at once by Divine authority, or has it been the gradual work of the Church itself in different ages, and therefore alterable by the same authority which enacted it? Or if partly divine and partly human, how are we to distinguish exactly between the one and the other? Above all, where is the sovereignty of the Church vested? that supreme power which must exist somewhere in every society, and by which all the concerns of the society are in the last resort regulated?

It would be well if those persons who venture to talk of the legislature committing "a dangerous infringement on the rights of the Church by remodelling the dioceses of Ireland" would attempt to answer these questions, and to show that they have some little understanding of matters of law and government, before they allow themselves to use language which is little less than seditious. Is it Christian conduct to endeavour to excite weak though well-meaning persons against the

supreme government of their country, by repeating to them a string of idle phrases about apostolical succession, without any definite notion of the meaning of the very words which they are echoing? One writer,* who, it seems, is very anxious to circulate his instructions as widely as possible, talks of our present bishops being "the heirs and representatives of the Apostles," and of having "the gifts of ruling and ordaining, of teaching, of binding and loosing." It is the most painful circumstance attending such foolish writing about the most sacred subjects, that, whilst putting it down as it deserves, we may be exposed to the charge of irreverence towards the high and holy things themselves which it has dared to profane. But is it the way to give any definite notion of the extent and dignity of the episcopal office in the Church of England, to say that the bishops are "the heirs and representatives of the Apostles?" Heirs and representatives to what, and in what? Does it mean heirs of their power,—so that the bishops may and can do all that the Apostles did? Or if it means "heirs of a portion of their power,"—will the writer tell us of what and of how large a portion, and by what authority it was or is defined? Again, "representatives of the Apostles" in what? Does he mean in all points? or if not, will he specify in what? The bishops have "the gifts of ruling and ordaining, of teaching, of binding, and loosing." Does he mean that they are *authorized* to exercise these functions, or *qualified to exercise them well?* The gifts of the Holy Spirit, spoken of in the Scripture, are certain enlargements of men's natural powers in order to enable them to do their several works in the Church more effectually; thus, the "gift of teaching" would signify "the gift of such knowledge and such powers of communicating it, as would make a man a good teacher." Does he mean that all our clergy possess such a gift of teaching? or, if by "the gift of ruling" he means only "authority to rule," then what is meant by the term "ruling?" Is it absolute rule, or limited? and if limited, how far and by what authority? Again, with respect to "the gift of binding and loosing." Does he mean that the bishops can forgive sins or refuse forgiveness? that they can declare with God's authority what things are lawful to be done by Christians, and what are unlawful? These are the two senses in which the terms "binding and loosing" are to be understood, where they occur in the Scriptures; and in both of these the Apostles had power to bind and to loose. Is it in these senses, or in either of them, that the terms are to be understood when applied to our present bishops?

* This and much of the argument in connexion with it, has reference to the temporary controversy with the Oxford Tracts for the Times, especially No. 7 of the series published October 29, 1833. Introd. to Sermons, vol. iv.

I have said that superstition is anarchical; and the language of the writer whom I have been quoting is a good example of this. He seems to think that if it were not for what he calls their apostolical succession, the clergy would have no authority to speak to the people in the name of Christ. Has the king no authority to rule; nay, does he not most truly rule by a divine right, because he derives his power from the law? So every man appointed by the law to minister in the Church, ministers by divine authority; the voice of the law is as the voice of God. Not that the law could make a man a *priest*, that is, it could neither give him superior purity nor superior knowledge, it could communicate no inherent personal virtue. But the law can make a *minister*, that is, can qualify a man legally to exercise those functions which naturally and personally any other member of the Church may be equally fitted to discharge; for it should be always remembered that the knowledge required for the ministerial office has been entrusted not to any one peculiar order of men, but to the whole Church; the minister takes of the knowledge thus committed to the society of believers, and communicates it to such individual believers as may stand in need of it; but with respect to the Church at large he is not a teacher, but a minister—he can tell the Church nothing more than it knows already—he is in possession of no mystery or secret of godliness which has not been imparted long since to all believers; and, therefore, the law of the Church may fitly appoint him to his ministerial office, and remove him from it; just as the law of the state in any heathen country may appoint its magistrates, its generals, or its professors of science and philosophy, because all these, though by possibility superior in the knowledge of their respective callings to every other individual in the state, have yet only availed themselves of that which lay equally open to other men, and which the state, therefore, considered in the abstract, may be considered to possess as well as they.

Let us here observe again the consistency and sagacity of the Roman Catholics in adapting their several doctrines to one another. Their notion of apostolical succession is accompanied by their belief in apostolical tradition. Thus according to them there is a knowledge entrusted to the successors of the Apostles, which is not accessible but through their medium; the written word of God is not complete without the addition of the unwritten. The Roman Catholics then may call their ministry a priesthood without inconsistency, because they maintain that it was made the exclusive depository of a part of the knowledge of God's will.

But the fundamental truth of Protestantism, that God's revealed will is known to us only through the Scriptures, deprives the Protestant

supporters of apostolical succession of the best justification of their belief. Shut out then from this reasonable argument, their resource, like that of some pretended philosophers of old, is in obscurity, and in assertions which relating to matters without the range of human knowledge, can neither be proved nor disproved. For when they say that the efficacy of the sacraments depends on the apostolical descent of those who administer them, the subject being altogether beyond our understanding, we cannot positively say that the assertion is false, but we are sure that it is most presumptuous, inasmuch as there are no grounds whatever for believing it to be true. It is just such another assertion as the Romish doctrine of Transubstantiation: which is not, as many suppose, a mere absurdity, but a statement about matters wholly incomprehensible; for when it is said that all which we know of bread is still left in the consecrated wafer, that is, its appearance, taste, smell, &c., but that the substance of bread is gone, and is succeeded by another substance, of which no faculty either of our body or mind can take cognizance; such a doctrine is not so certainly false in itself, as it implies the fondest presumption and folly in those who gratuitously maintain it. So with regard to the virtue of Christ's ordinance depending on the apostolical descent of its ministers, we can certainly say that such a doctrine has not been taught us by Christ or His Apostles; that it is inconsistent with the character of Christ's gospel, and gives occasion to many superstitions; and that as we have no reason whatever for believing it to be true, so its practical evil tendency justifies us in acting with regard to it as if it were certainly false.

Let not this fantastical and superstitious notion be confounded with the reasonable and reverent ordinance of the Church of England, that the sacraments should be generally administered by none but her appointed ministers. As a matter of order, propriety, and solemnity, nothing can be determined more wisely; but the whole question at issue is, whether these ministers have any authority or any inherent qualification for the administration of the sacraments independently of her appointment. In other words, whether the nonjuring clergy after their deprivation had any spiritual qualification to act as ministers; whether they did not become laymen by divine law as well as by the law of the land, until some particular Church or congregation of Christians should have again called them to the ministry. And, on the other hand, supposing the story of the Nag's Head Consecration of Archbishop Parker to have been true, whether he would not have been as truly an archbishop by divine right, and a genuine successor of the apostles, so far as any Christian minister can now be so, by virtue of his ap-

pointment from the supreme government of this Church of England.

Hitherto I have treated the question on general grounds. I have shown that as the Christian ministry are not a priesthood, as they neither possess nor can transmit any personal superiority, whether of holiness or of knowledge, there can be conceived no reason why they should constitute an exception to the general rule of all society; that the form of its government is fixed by law, a law in its origin framed by man, but becoming in its power of requiring obedience the law of God, because God in such matters, having given no express ordinance of his own by revelation, has vouchsafed his sanction to the ordinances of society, to prevent the mischiefs of individual lawlessness. Now the weakness of superstition has in this matter always served the cause of licentious wickedness. For it being its nature always to "desire a sign," to look for God in the whirlwind or in the earthquake or in the fire, it is slow to recognise the still small voice of His providence or of His Spirit; it complains, therefore, of the insufficient authority of law, and refuses its obedience to it, professing to follow an immediate direction from heaven. And wickedness, seeing it thus busied in undermining what is really of Divine authority, cares little for the phantom which it would introduce in its room; well knowing that such phantoms never hinder its own success, but most times greatly further it, by furnishing the better part of human nature with that which cannot nourish or strengthen it, yet by its fair show prevents it from seeking the true bread of life elsewhere, and so leaving the evil unchecked to take its own course, and to work greedily all manner of iniquity, and of uncleanliness, and of uncharitableness, and of ungodliness.

This general view of the nature of law and government is also essential towards a right understanding of those particular texts of Scripture to which an appeal has so often been made by the disputants on both sides of the question. And the High Churchmen of the present day, like the Puritan antagonists of Hooker, disregarding such general views altogether, are not aware of the difficulties, inconsistencies, and extravagances into which their interpretation of these texts involves them; nor are they less misled by their ignorance of the true way of applying the lessons of history. They appeal to the practice of the early Christian Churches as confirming their view of the divine authority of Episcopacy; whereas, even admitting the decisions of the early Christians to be our standard, their practice could but show the lawfulness of Episcopacy, not its indispensable necessity. Till the growth of the Italian republics, in the middle ages, Christians, had, with hardly a single exception, lived from the beginning of the Gospel

under monarchical governments. Is this an argument that no other form is consistent with Christianity? And it is worth observing, that the zealots for monarchy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did plead its great antiquity, and its universality in the earliest period of history, as reasons for preferring it to all other forms. History, according to the well-known saying is philosophy teaching by examples; but the apparent easiness of such a manner of teaching has hindered men from profiting by it. They appeal to examples before they understand on what the force of an example depends. Now as much of the most important part of history has been neglected by common historians, the knowledge of the accompanying circumstances under which any institution existed is not to be obtained without some research and some power of historical divination; that is, a power of filling up the fragments of direct information, which are often all that we can obtain; just as Cuvier's profound knowledge of comparative anatomy enabled him to divine the whole structure and habits of an extinct species of animals from the study of a single bone of any individual of it. Thus the simple fact of the existence of Episcopacy amongst the early Christians is pleaded as an example for Christians now, whereas it is, in fact, no example at all; first, because it remains to be proved whether so much of the institution as it is proposed to perpetuate was its essence, or only an accidental adjunct; secondly, because the circumstances of the two cases are different, and there are reasons why Episcopacy should have been universally adopted, *de facto*, then, which by no means prove that it must be adopted, *de jure*, now and for ever.

I now propose to examine what support or countenance is given by the Scriptures to the positions of the English High Churchmen, namely, that the Church ought always, and in all countries, to be governed by bishops, priests, and deacons; that these ministers derive their authority from their apostolical descent; that of these, bishops only may ordain other ministers, and bishops and priests may alone administer both the Sacraments; that where this succession is duly kept up, there the Church retains its identity, and is a true Church; where it is interrupted or neglected, there the Church loses its title to the name; and that without the concurrence of the successors of the Apostles, or the majority of them, no alteration can lawfully be made, either in Church discipline or doctrine. Let it be once again repeated, that the question is not about the lawfulness or expediency in any particular case of a system such as is here supposed, but about its necessity; not whether Episcopacy be the best form of government which any Church can establish, but whether it be unlawful to establish any other; and whether its powers have been so clearly defined by Christ and his

Apostles as to leave the Church no right of interference to modify or to limit them.

First, it is, I think, undeniable, that the general tone of the New Testament strongly discountenances the notion of an inherent purity, or knowledge, or authority, existing in any one order of the Christian Church, as distinguished from the rest. Nothing can be more adverse to the claims of a priesthood than our Lord's charge to his disciples,—"Be not ye called Rabbi, for one is your master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren." Matt. xxiii. 8. The obvious meaning of these words, especially when taken with the context, is to condemn the pretension of any Christian to teach his brethren with *authority*. He might teach them so far as his understanding or knowledge were superior to theirs, but no further. And to the same purpose are the words of Jeremiah, especially quoted in the Epistle to the Hebrews, viii. 11, as characterizing the Christian dispensation,—"And they shall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for all shall know me from the least to the greatest." It seems to me that this passage shows that an order of men set apart to teach their brethren is no essential and eternal part of the plan of Christianity. A ministry varying in its constitution and powers according to the wants of the Church, at various periods, is only a help towards the attainment of this perfect state; but a priesthood transmitted by succession, and endowed with powers indefeasible, would imply that no such state was to be aimed at; that it was a part of the original design of the Christian Religion, no less than that of Moses, that man should never draw near to God but through the mediation or assistance of another man. Again, the story of the man—Mark ix. 38; Luke ix. 49—who cast out devils in Christ's name, but was not one of His company, speaks as strongly as anything can speak, against insisting on the necessity of any point of outward form. The language of the disciples, "Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, and we forbade him, because he followeth not with us," has been repeated over and over again in later times, by Christians of various denominations, all alike insisting on their neighbour's agreeing with them, not only in spirit but in form; whereas Christ's answer blames them for insisting on such matters, as being in their nature wholly indifferent; and if he did not require that all should follow even Himself in outward society, which of His disciples shall dare to say that conformity with them in points of external arrangement is a thing indispensable?

These passages show merely the general spirit of Christianity, and of course it would be absurd to argue from them that no individual should submit to another's teaching, or that individuals may despise

and disobey all the regulations of the society to which they belong, if they relate only to points of form. But speaking in the mass, they do seem to prove that the Church of Christ is not to be subjected to the authoritative teaching of any of its members, nor to be tied to one model of outward organization. To the same purpose also may be quoted our Lord's directions, as to the course which His disciples were to follow in the case of their private quarrels. The command in the last resort is, "Tell it to the Church, and if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." The Roman Catholics have cut the knot boldly, and say, that "tell it to the Church" means "tell it to the Clergy." It may mean the clergy, wherever the Church has conferred on them the supreme government; but the very use of the general word "Church" seems to show that the society of Christians at large, and not any one order of men amongst them, has the power of determining in every particular age and country whom in practice it is to mean, that is to say, what is to constitute the supreme power in the Church, so that disobedience to it is disobedience to the Church itself, and justly involves exclusion from its communion.

It would have been impossible to suppose, had not experience proved it, that any one could have drawn an argument for the divine right of Episcopacy from our Lord's last charge to his disciples, as recorded by St. Matthew: "And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth, go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world."

One would have thought that a charge so solemn and a promise so comforting might have escaped the profanation of sectarian folly. "In one sense," says the writer, whose comment I allude to, "the Apostles were to be alive till He came again; but they all died at the natural time. Does it not follow that there are those now alive who represent them? Now who were the most probable representatives of them in the generation next their death? They surely whom they have ordained to succeed them in the ministerial work. If any persons could be said to have Christ's power and presence, and the gifts of ruling and ordaining, of teaching, of binding and loosing, (and comparing together the various Scriptures on the subject, all these seem included in his promise to be with the Church always,) surely those on whom the apostles laid their hands were they. And so in the next age, if any were representatives of the first representatives, they must be the next generation of

bishops, and so on. *Nor does it materially alter the argument*, though we suppose the blessing upon ministerial offices made, not to the Apostles, but to the whole body of disciples, *i. e.* the Church. For even if it be the Church that has the power of ordination committed to it, still it exercises it through the bishops as its organs; and the question recurs, how has the presbytery in this or that country obtained the power." I quote the passage at length to show the sort of interpretation and of argument to which those are driven who cling to the conclusions of the Roman Catholics, without retaining the arguments by which the Roman Catholics consistently maintain them. A part of this passage I have already noticed before; now let us consider the general drift of it. The words "I am with you always," refer to the Apostles. For a moment admit that they do, and what follows? "There are some now alive who represent them." Certainly, so far as to be able to apply to themselves in some substantial sense the promise originally made to the Apostles. "And these in the next generation were the persons whom the Apostles ordained." Undoubtedly they might have their interest in Christ's promise, but already in a different sense of the words; for although in many instances, perhaps in all, they had received from the Apostles the "gifts of the Holy Ghost" themselves, *i. e.* the gift of tongues, or of prophesying and preaching, or of healing, or of working miracles generally, or of knowledge, or of discerning of spirits, (See 1 Corinth. xii. 8–10, 29–30,) yet they had not the power of transmitting these gifts, (Acts viii. 14–17, compare Romans, i. 11,) and therefore the power of Christ was already with them in less measure. "And so in the next age, the representatives must be the next generation of bishops, and so on." In the next age the bishops would not only have lost the power of transmitting the gifts of the Holy Ghost, but they would be without them in their own persons: that extraordinary power of Christ's Spirit, which had been the fit warrant for the extraordinary authority enjoyed by the Apostles, and in a less degree by those on whom they had laid their hands, was now withdrawn, and the claim to extraordinary authority inevitably died with it. From that moment the ordinary principles of all government resumed their exercise; and there being no individuals in the Church whom Christ by His Spirit had Himself in a manner marked out for the ministry, giving them gifts which man could not give, the Church, as a matter of course, became entitled to appoint them herself, because the promises of Christ had now all centred in her, and her gifts were greater than those of her individual members. Thus the bishops in the third generation from the Apostles were in one sense their successors, as being the chief persons in the Church now, as the Apostles had been in their

time; but their power was infinitely diminished, and the tenure by which they held it was necessarily different. "Christ was with them" still, but no longer in the same manner. He was with them as members of His body, He was with them as labouring in His service, and doing his work. And the more solemn and important the work to which they had been appointed, so might they hope for a larger portion of His Spirit if they duly prayed for it, and were watchful. The power which remained with them was of two kinds, legal and moral; as ministers they might exercise such outward power as the law of Christ's Church gave them; and both as ministers and as men, their work would be blessed to God's glory and the salvation of their brethren in proportion to the measure vouchsafed them of the spirit of holiness or the spirit of wisdom. And so we doubt not that all faithful ministers of Christ's Church lawfully appointed to their ministry by those who have authority given them in their several congregations, will have "Christ" truly "with them, even unto the end of the world."

It shows how little the writer whom I am noticing is qualified to write upon such matters, when he says that "it would not materially alter the argument," though we suppose Christ's words to have been spoken not to the Apostles, but to the Church in general. According to his notion of the sense of the words as spoken to the Apostles, it would make the whole difference between a superstitious error and an important truth. For the question is, whether the Church has the power of ordination committed to it, to be vested in what hands she pleases, or whether one particular set of men hold it independent of the Church. Bishops ordaining as "the organs of the Church" constitute, as I believe, a Church Government most true in theory and most excellent in practice. Bishops ordaining in right of their apostolical descent, without reference to the authority of the Church, constitute a lame and inconsistent Popery, false in theory, and in practice inefficient.

In truth, however, it seems a narrow interpretation of Christ's promise either to understand it as addressed especially to the Apostles, or as having reference to the authority of Church Government. It appears to be the general blessing given to that Universal Church, which, in the words immediately preceding, our Lord had contemplated as the fruit of His Apostles' labours. It was surely that great multitude whom no man could number, brought into the kingdom of God out of every race and language, baptized into the name and service of God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and walking in the ordinances of Christ their risen Lord, with whom Christ promised by His Spirit eternally to abide. And to limit this promise to the right of ordaining or

ministering in the congregation, or to talk of it as addressed "to the episcopal body thus created, which is to last forever," is like the profaneness which understood by the Church "against which the gates of hell should not prevail," "the Church acknowledging the authority of the successor of St. Peter," or which limits its meaning now, to "the Church which preserves the true apostolical succession of episcopacy."

Great stress has been laid on the following words from St. Paul in his second epistle to Timothy, ii. 2. "The things that thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to faithful men who shall be able to teach others also." Let us consider the circumstances under which these words were written. In Ephesus and its neighbourhood, as in other places, there were growing up the most fearful corruptions of Christianity, partly in the form of superstition, partly in that of licentiousness, and partly of the two combined. The consequence was that, as St. Paul declares, "all those who were in Asia," the Roman province so called, "were turned away from him." He therefore urges Timothy not only to exert himself vigorously to check all this evil, but to provide others, on whom he could depend, to assist him in the work. The teachers of error were busy; it became Timothy to oppose them by appointing teachers who would love and enforce the truth. This was the more necessary, inasmuch as it is probable that some of the elders of the Church of Ephesus, Acts xx. 30, were themselves amongst the teachers of error, which would of itself be a reason why St. Paul should address himself particularly to Timothy and invest him with especial authority. We are not to suppose that in the first century of the Christian era all Christians acknowledged the authority of the Apostles, as it is universally recognised now. Humanly speaking, it was a struggle whether we should have Christianity, or whether Paganism was only to be supplanted by systems equally false and mischievous. How naturally in such a contest would the Apostles be anxious that those whom they ordained should themselves ordain others, to secure if possible, a succession of ministers who should retain the truth of the Gospel amidst the monstrous heresies which threatened to overwhelm it. And to any one who reads Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians attentively, it is evident that this is the cause of his insisting so earnestly on the apostolical succession of the Bishop of Corinth. It was to secure true and apostolical Christianity, by putting in the supreme government of the Church such men only as could be fully depended on for their attachment to the apostolical doctrine, and their knowledge of what that doctrine was. But this, which for one generation was a wise and most useful expedient, lost in the course of years both its necessity and its efficacy. Those who had lived with the Apostles might represent their principles

faithfully in the main, however mixed with some errors of their own; but these disciples of the Apostles retained the impression much more faintly and incorrectly, and in every succeeding age the security would be less and less, till at length it would vanish altogether. On the other hand it was mercifully ordered by God's providence, that as the personal and traditionary memory of the apostolical doctrine wore out or became corrupted, so all who called themselves Christians came to acknowledge the authority of the Apostles, and to refer to their written memorials as to a certain standard of divine truth. Thus on the one side the Scriptures became universally allowed as an authority, while on the other the possibility of preserving Christian doctrine uncorrupted, by mere personal recollection or tradition became continually more hopeless. The apostolical succession, most essential so long as it was confined to the period when the Apostles were personally remembered, and when another ministry not acknowledging the apostolical authority was striving for ascendancy in the Church of Christ, became an unmeaning name, so soon as they who called themselves the Apostles' successors had no better means of knowing their intentions and principles, and no greater inclination to follow them when known, than the general body of Christian believers. The paramount and exclusive authority of the New Testament, which would endure throughout all ages, came happily in the place of an authority of tradition, whose nature was essentially perishable. So that here, as in so many other instances, what was begun in most needful wisdom was continued out of habit, and perpetuated out of folly or fraud. The apostolical succession, which in the days of Clement of Rome was a most beneficial reality, was in the time of Cyprian become a phantom, and from that time onwards sunk more and more into a fond and pernicious superstition.

Be it again remembered, that the superstition consists not in giving the preference to an episcopal government, nor in feeling delight in the associations of antiquity with which it is connected;—but in insisting upon it as necessary, and in supposing that what is called apostolical succession is a transmission of any of the extraordinary gifts enjoyed by the Apostles. This is a superstition, and has the true character of all superstition, presumption, uncharitableness, and practical uselessness. Nothing is more ennobling, when rightly taken, than to be descended from an illustrious ancestry; but when men consider their nobility to be in itself a virtue, and that they inherit the merits of their forefathers by the mere circumstance of being born of their race, then what was elevating and improving becomes at once foolish and mischievous.

III.—LETTER TO CHEVALIER BUNSEN.

This is the first and only letter of a series, commenced about the same time as the Fragment on the Church. Letters to Mr. Marshall and Archdeacon Hare, January and October, 1840, in Arnold's "Life and Correspondence." It contains a brief summary of the Author's whole view of the subject.

I ADDRESS this letter to you, not only because the subject is one in which we both feel so deep an interest, and which we have so often discussed together both in conversation and in our letters, but also because your name will serve as an assurance to many that they need not fear to read what I have written;—and still more, because the thought of addressing you will at once animate me and make me careful whilst I am pursuing my work;—it will animate me, because I know that there will be much in it in which you will heartily sympathize;—it will make me careful, because there are some points on which we differ, and wherever this is the case, I well know that nothing but the fullest inquiry and most earnest thought would justify me in maintaining an opinion in opposition to yours.

Let me say at once, that my endeavour will be to arrive at the perfect theory or idea of Church and State, such as they may one day be actually, and such as we should earnestly desire to see them. But it may be that they never can be such universally, and that within no definite period will they be perfectly such anywhere. Still if we have got the true and perfect model, our attempts to copy it may approach at last infinitely near to it; and even now, in our own lifetime, some results may be obtained, if men begin to work steadily in the right direction, instead of doing nothing, or moving at hap-hazard, or going deliberately wrong.

The philosophers of the ancient world, seeing the perverse state of things around them, delighted in conceiving the theory of a perfect commonwealth,—not in the fond hope of seeing it at once or entirely reduced to practice; but because they knew that law and government were according to their nature the mightiest instruments for the improvement of mankind; and yet, according to their actual state, were most opposed to it. The power by which alone the wall could be built was actually employed in raising it;—it was most to be desired, then, if they could stay it from doing mischief, and convert its influence into good:—it might not and would not work for good with the whole force which it possessed, or in the best direction; yet still it might be brought to work for the attainment of its proper object, instead of neglecting it, or even opposing it.

But we see two powers, each capable of doing great good separately, but when combined, fitted to do the greatest good which we can either conceive or desire. Both have done good separately, that is, when each was working without any consciousness, so to speak, of the existence of the other. But when made aware of each other's presence, and each coming within the sphere of the other's influence, then, unless their mutual relations be properly adjusted, they embarrass and injure each other's efficacy. Then, if they are not combined, they run counter to one another, and each becomes corrupted. It is of the greatest importance, therefore, to discover the true theory of their union, even though we may never be able to effect it perfectly in practice. We may prevent much mischief and do much good, even though after all there should be some mischief left which practically we cannot hinder, and some good which we find it impossible to attain.

The State and the Church were reared apart from each other, but each was fitted to receive its utmost perfection only in union with the other. After a time they met, but there were obstacles to their being properly united. Still, as if feeling that they were framed for each other, they have gone on restlessly working, always attempting to fulfil their destiny, but always finding that their neighbourhood to each other led to collision rather than union. And now, tired of their unsuccessful attempts, each in despair would abandon the other altogether, and try to seek its own happiness alone. Yet it was a true instinct which brought them together;—they are designed by God to be one. And if we can clearly point out the misunderstandings that have perplexed them, and the treachery which under a show of friendship has beguiled them, may we not hope that even yet they will reject the thought of utter separation, that even in their age they may at last find that appointed end of their being, which they should have attained in their early youth, had not their misfortune and their fault together so long delayed it?

The confusion and perversion of their relations appears to me to be clearly traceable to the one or the other of the two following propositions, or to the influence of both of them together.

1. That the true Church of God is a society governed by bishops appointed in an unbroken succession from the Apostles: that these bishops hold their power by Divine right, and that none but they, and subordinately the priests or presbyters appointed by them, have a right to rule in the Church;—and that farther, in these bishops and presbyters so appointed, and by virtue of their lineal succession from the Apostles, there resides a spiritual and priestly power;—that they may absolve Christians from their sins or refuse them absolution;—and that

their ministry is essential in order to give to the sacraments their efficacy;—that where they do not minister, no spiritual benefit is imparted either by Baptism or the Lord's Supper;—and that where they minister, and through a certain virtue attached by God to their ministry, the water in Baptism and the bread and wine in the Communion acquire a super-human efficacy, so as to convey spiritual blessings to those who receive them, unless there is any positive and wilful sin in the recipient which destroys in his particular case, at least to a certain degree, the virtue of the sacrament.

2. That the State or civil society has for its principal, if not for its only object, the providing for the security of men's bodies and goods:—that therefore religion as such is out of its province,—and that it has no right to interfere with only spiritual matters. This doctrine, in order to be consistent, should maintain farther that the State has nothing to do with any moral matters, except so far as they may affect the bodies and goods of its people;—but its advocates shrink generally from avowing this conclusion,—and thereby they cut away the ground from under their feet, and can only justify their exclusion of religion from the care of the State on the supposition that religion is not moral, but merely ritual and mystic, or theoretical;—a supposition which has in fact been greatly countenanced by the language and practice of those who have held the first mentioned doctrines with regard to the Church.

Thus, while the first doctrine demoralizes the idea of the Church by making it a system ritual rather than moral, and mystic rather than spiritual, so the second doctrine demoralizes the idea of the State, by making it a contrivance for man's physical welfare only. And thus the Church and State, which if the true moral character of each be upheld are perfectly identical, are necessarily separated when each is made to assume a false and unworthy character, of superstition on the one hand, and of the lowest worldliness on the other. Nor is it necessary that both these doctrines should be held at once in order to destroy the true relations of Church and State; for the prevalence of either one of them is sufficient to effect it. Where the most just and elevated notions of the purposes and duties of civil society are entertained, the false doctrines with respect to the Church are a bar to the identification of the two societies in one, because they involve a system of priestcraft, which is incompatible with all good government, and with the moral and spiritual improvement of mankind. And where the character and duties of the Church are most truly apprehended, still if men conceive of the State as of a contrivance only for the security of body and goods, the Church could not identify itself with such a society without apostacy.

Thus Mr. Gladstone, in his work on "The State in its Relations

with the Church," while he entertains the most just and comprehensive notions of the end and duties of civil society, yet appears to regard the Church as a society with a divinely appointed government of its own, deriving its powers from a source higher than human law, and therefore not amenable to any government founded merely upon law, but capable of forming an alliance with the State, as one sovereign power with another. "The Church," says he, "professes to be an institution not deduced by human reason from any general declaration of God's will, but actually and (so to speak) bodily given by God, founded through His direct inspiration, and regularly transmitted in a divinely appointed, though human line;" p. 66. "It is a system," he goes on, "to which the State has itself yielded faith and homage, as of divine authority." Clearly then the divine must not yield to the human, and either the Church and the State must remain perpetually distinct, or else the forms of the latter, which are confessedly human and changeable, must give place to those of the former, claiming as they do the sanction of divine right, and Christians must be governed either by a Pope, or by a council or synod of Bishops.

On the other side there are many, the able reviewer of Mr. Gladstone's work in the Edinburgh Review being of the number, who see that the divine right of bishops is precisely on a level with that of kings, or parliaments, or the popular assemblies of a pure democracy:—that the notion of an indefeasible succession of ministers, deriving their power from their succession, is wholly unfounded and mischievous, even if these ministers are considered merely in the light of governors:—but that in fact the doctrine of succession is based upon the supposition that these ministers are priests, and possess certain mystical powers as such;—and that so regarded it is not simply mischievous, but is eminently false and even contradictory to Christianity, forming a system wholly at variance with and essentially destructive of Christ's religion and Church. But unhappily these same persons hold the doctrine that the State has only to provide for men's bodies and goods;—and thus they also render the identification of Church and State impossible; they assign to the greatest power upon earth objects so secondary, that when raised to this disproportionate eminence, they are actually evil;—for he who gives to the sovereign power of law no better purpose than the checking wrong offered to body and goods, encourages the opinion that body and goods are the most precious things in the world, since they are the exclusive object of what is confessedly the most comprehensive of human societies,—and the first in rank and in power.

By God's blessing we in England have recognised, although rather

by a providential overruling of our purposes than from a consciousness on our part of its full value, that great doctrine which is at once negative and positive; which, not content with denying and exposing falsehood, offers to us in the place of the falsehood so destroyed that divine truth in which is contained all goodness. This doctrine is that of the King's Supremacy;—which while it puts down the false claims of the pretended apostolical succession on the one hand, denies no less firmly on the other hand the notion that the State has only to look after men's bodies and goods. It declares the identity of the Church and State, when each has attained to its perfection; both desire to effect man's greatest good; but the Church during her imperfect state is deficient in power;—the State in the like condition is deficient in knowledge:—one judges amiss of man's highest happiness; the other discerns it truly, but has not the power on a large scale to attain it. But when blended into one, the power and knowledge become happily united; the Church is become sovereign, and the State has become Christian.

Historically, as you well know, the second of the two false principles mentioned above is but a recent reaction against the evil consequences of the first. It is so recent, that hazardous as it may be to assert a negative, we might, I believe, safely challenge any one to show that it existed in its complete and developed form before the eighteenth century. The germ of it, no doubt, existed much earlier, and is contained in fact in the assumptions of the first false principle. But that first false principle is all but coeval with the origin of Christianity; it has obtained such a hold on men's minds and on their language, that even in later days, when its practical results excited the liveliest opposition, men have rather tried to neutralize its evil by setting up that contrary and no less mischievous error about the exclusively physical objects of political society, than they have laid the axe to the root, and hewn down the poison tree which has not only cumbered but has tainted as with an influence of death the ground of Christ's vineyard. Yet once remove this first error, and all temptation to maintain the second vanishes;—once connect the Church with notions of free and just government, and no one would ever dream of restricting the care of such a government to the lowest part of our compound nature, our bodies, and our external welfare.

It is more satisfactory in all things to be constructive rather than destructive. Instead, therefore, of attacking in the first instance the two errors which have been noticed as interfering with the perfect development of Christ's Church, we will rather suppose them to have no existence, and exhibit the Church as it would or might be, if neither

of these errors interfered with it. In other words, we will suppose the doctrine of the King's Supremacy to be worked out to its proper conclusions, unembarrassed by the doctrines of Laud and his party on the one hand, or by those of Warburton and some modern writers who hold similar sentiments on the other. "Formam quidem ipsam et tanquam faciem honesti videbis, quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores excitaret sui."*

* In other parts of the Author's published works the subject of the preceding Fragments is treated. The theory of the identity of Church and State is set forth in the Postscript to the "Principles of Church Reform," and the "Letters on Church and State" which follow. That part of it which more especially relates to the State, is treated in the "Christian Duty of conceding the Roman Catholic Claims," the Preface to the third volume of the Edition of Thucydides, and in the "Inaugural Lecture," and the Sixth of the "Letters on Modern History;" Sermons, vol. ii. 29 to 33; vol. iv. Sermons 39 and 40; and vol. vi. That which relates to the Church, in Sermons, vol. iii. 11 and 20, and Appendix I.; and vol. iv. and Introduction, with Sermons 24, 28, 29, 30, and 38.

NATIONAL CHURCH ESTABLISHMENTS.

The following Essay was addressed by Dr. Arnold to the "Hertford Reformer," he also wrote on the relations of Church and State, which had been examined in some letters in the *same* journal under the name of "Augur," by Sir Culling Eardley Smith.—*Life and Correspondence.*

I.—Your correspondent "Augur" has entered upon a great subject, and he treats it like a man who has thought upon it much and well. No subject can be so important, for, in fact, it includes every other: moral evils are ever at the root of such as are physical and political; and for moral evil I know of only one cure, and that is Christianity, by its double influence as a Religion and as a Church. This double character of Christianity is continually forgotten: strip it of either of its two essential parts, and you destroy its virtue, although not in an equal degree. The Church without the Religion is, as we all see, worthless. I do not think we enough understand that the Religion without the Church is comparatively powerless—that it benefits comparatively only a few individuals, while for the mass of mankind it produces effects wholly unworthy of the promises which were bestowed on it.

Augur understands the way in which the Priesthood has superseded the Church: he speaks strongly of this evil; but he is mistaken, I think, in connecting the evils of a Priesthood with an Establishment. There is no natural connexion between them; for although where all men are beset with the heresy of the Priesthood, their Establishment, if they have one, will unavoidably bear the marks of their common error, yet the Church can never exist in its perfection without an Establishment, if men will but consider what an Establishment properly is, and what principles it involves.

The people of a certain country are, we will suppose, Christians; while at the same time they are politically sovereign; that is, they can impose taxes, make laws, and enforce them if need be by capital punishments. By being a sovereign society their control extends over every

part of human life; the education, habits, and principles of the several individuals of their society are matters in which they have a direct concern. But a Christian society with a general control over human life, with a direct interest in the moral welfare of its members, and a sovereign power of affecting this welfare by laws, rewards, and punishments, is already a church. It can only cease to be so by forfeiting, more or less, its Christian character; for it is manifest that a Christian government, acting in the name of a Christian people, is bound to shape its practice and its institutions according to Christian principles,—that is, in every thing that relates to moral good; it is bound to do the exact business of a Church, nor can it resign this high duty without being most deeply culpable.

It is bound therefore to provide for the Christian education of the young,—for the Christian instruction of the ignorant, and for the constant and public dissemination of Christian principles amongst all classes of its people. It is as much bound to do this, as it is bound to provide for the external security of society, or for the regular administration of justice.

Now by the actual law of England, there is a very large portion of the property of the country set apart for these objects; and it has been set apart so long, that it can in no sense be called a tax upon the private property of any single individual. What utter madness would it be to take this public property, and give it away to a certain number of individual landholders! It would be an act of folly unrivalled by the most wanton extravagance of the worst government on record;—it would be an act of direct robbery also;—for it is a robbery committed against society, when public property is given away to individuals;—it is a robbery against the existing generation and their remotest posterity.

That this portion of public property is not applied in the best manner for the fulfilment of its proper objects, may be, and I think is, perfectly true. It may have maintained a priesthood to the injury of the Church,—because the priesthood so long set up an unchristian claim to be the sole representatives of the Church. The rector of every parish was said to be "*persona ecclesiæ*;"—he is in law "a corporation sole," as it is called, because in his single person the rights of the church in that parish are held to be vested. Alter this in its proper measure;—do not let the priest continue alone to represent the Church;—but restore the true and living institution which has been corrupted;—and do not commit the fatal error of extinguishing disease by death: of removing the evils which have impaired the excellence of the best of all institutions only by destroying the institution itself.

I therefore hold it to be an especial blessing that we have in England two facilities for reviving the efficiency of the Christian Church

throughout the country, such as we most of all desire. 1. We have an ample portion of public property already devoted by law to the especial objects of the Church, independent of any tax upon individuals, or any voluntary subscriptions whatever. 2. In the great recognized principle of the King's or Queen's supremacy, which may truly be called the charter of the Church of England, we have the truth clearly established that the Church or Christian society has the complete power of self-government, and is not subject to any privileged caste of priests, whether they may happen to be few or many, or whether their government be called a Presbytery, a Synod, a Convention, a Council, or a Papacy.

II. THE STATE AND THE CHURCH.

I assure your Correspondent Augur, that however different the roads by which we may at present appear to be travelling, the point at which we are both aiming is I trust and believe one and the same. My views of the most perfect condition of the Church have no reference to mere worldly expediency; I love to entertain them, because the Church, as they represent her, appears to me best fitted to perform her appointed work, of bringing many souls to God.

Augur, as it seems to me, imagines that a Christian State and Church must differ from one another, because his notions of a State are too low, whilst the Church, such as he conceives it to be, is rather the Church perfected, than the Church as it ever has been, or as it ever can become, except, as I think, through that very system which in his judgment is so degrading to it.

Of course if the object of a State be merely, as Warburton represents it, the protection of men's bodies and goods, then the ideas of Church and State are necessarily distinct. And the same conclusion follows also if we hold that the object of a Church, either solely or principally, is to perform certain external ceremonies or to teach certain abstract opinions.

But these are the notions of sensualism on the one hand and of priestcraft on the other,—not of true philosophy and Christianity. The State has a far nobler end than the care of men's bodies and goods: the Church has a far nobler end than the performance of ritual services or the inculcating abstract dogmas—the end of both is the highest happiness of man; and this must be his moral happiness; but the dif-

ference between them has sometimes been, that the State when no Christian has pursued its object ignorantly: the Church has alway known how to pursue it rightly,—but it has not always acted accordin to its knowledge. The true object of the State, which the old philoso phers distinctly recognised and laboured to carry into effect, has bee as we know continually lost sight of through the evil passions of men insomuch that Government has come to be regarded as a mere neces sary evil, an encroachment upon individual liberty, not to be desire but endured; and of which the smallest possible dose, so to speak, i the most desirable. And the Church, through the same evil nature o man working in this instance by the system of priestcraft, has so falle short of *its* true object, and so turned aside after a false one, that it to has been regarded as an enemy to man's happiness, and the mos perfect school of all truth and goodness has been branded as the source of superstition and of folly.

If the object of the State and that of the Church be always in inten tion identical;—and if in a Christian State it is really identical;—tha is, the Christian State and the Church have precisely the same notion of man's moral happiness;—and if the State by virtue of its sovereig power can control men more effectually than any less sovereign society if again they have neither of them of necessity a distinct externa form, which cannot be made to assimilate to that of the other;—the the two institutions *may* be identical;—and that common object which both pursue will then be pursued most effectually when they *are* iden tical;—*i. e.*, when the State is Christian, or to express the same thing in other words, when the Church is sovereign.

A hundred fancied forms of evil, will I know start up in the minds o your readers when they shall have followed me to this point. One set o them imagines that a sovereign Church implies spiritual tyranny and persecution; another fancies that to mix the name of State with that of Christianity, is to secularize religion, or even to dethrone Christ from His headship of the Church, and to set up a king or a parliament in His place. I believe that my abhorrence of both these evils is as great as that of any man alive; but if you have patience with this dis cussion, and these letters are not occupying the room of more interest ing matter, it will not be difficult to show that the system which I am upholding implies neither of them, but rather repels them both.

For the present, I must consider Augur's arguments drawn from the addresses of St. Paul's Epistles, from which he thinks it follows that the early Churches consisted only of true Christians. Yet it is certain that those very Epistles notice evils existing in every one of those Churches quite inconsistent with such a supposition; and the particu-

lar expression translated in our Bible "Saints," on which Augur apparently grounds an argument, signifies not that those to whom it applied were personally holy, but that they were God's covenanted people now, as the Israelites had been formerly. For the proof that the utmost heterodoxy of belief as well as irregularity of practice were to be found amongst the members of the primitive Churches, and that they were therefore as much mixed societies as any existing Church is now, I would refer your correspondent to the following passages :—Romans, xvi. 17, 18 ; 1 Corinthians, iii. 1—3 ; vi. 7, 8, 15—20 ; viii. 9—12 ; xi. 17—34 ; xv. 12 ; 2 Corinthians, xi. 12—15 ; xii. 20, 21 ; Galatians, iii. 1—4 ; iv. 11 ; v. 7—15 ; Philippians, ii. 4, 20, 21 ; iii. 17—19 ; 1 Thessalonians, iv. 3—8 ; v. 14 ; 2 Thessalonians, iii. 11, 12 ; 1 Timothy, i. 6, 7—what is implied in the charge iii. 3 ; v. 22, 24, 25 ; vi. 9, 10 ; 2 Timothy, i. 15 ; iii. 6—9 ; Titus, i. 12, 13 ; Hebrews, iii. 12, 14 ; James, ii. 1—9 ; iii. 8—10 ; iv. 1—10 ; 1 Peter, iv. 15 ; 2 Peter, ii. per totum ; 3 John, 9—11. See also the character given to so many of the seven Churches in the first chapters of the Revelations. And above all, I appeal to the character given by our Lord Himself, not of the world only, but of His Church, the Kingdom of God, St. Matthew, xiii. 47—50. Yet this Church so described as containing alike both good and evil, is compared, v. 33, to the leaven which influences the whole mass ;—and this the Christian Church, with all its corruptions has done and will do ever.

Let Augur also consider the mixed multitudes of three thousand persons at a time who were sometimes admitted into the Church, exactly as was the case when Augustine first preached in England. Is it possible to conceive that all these men were deserving of the name of Saints, as implying personal holiness ? The system of the Apostles was not to set out with a select society, which if they had done, Christianity could never have triumphed as it did ; but to receive in the first instance all who were willing to come, and then by a gradual process to purify them more and more. And, in point of fact, the Christian Church at the end of the first century, and in the second, had a stricter discipline, and enjoyed generally a higher standard of truth and holiness, than it had done for some years after its first foundation.

I would gladly therefore include in the Church all nominal Christians, and by so doing we should greatly increase its efficacy, and it might be raised gradually, not in our days certainly, but in days to come, to as great a degree of purity as was ever attained by the smallest and most exclusive congregation. For we should remember how much of real evil will still lurk in the narrowest sect that most vaunts its purity ; all those bad passions of covetousness, envy, and uncharitableness,

which it is impossible for any human system of discipline to re strain.

I have expressed my conviction that the State and Church are the only in a perfect condition, when they are not allied, but identical; i other words, when the State is a Christian Society, and the Church Sovereign Society.

This was the doctrine of Hooker, however much it has been forgot ten by some of those who profess to be Hooker's warmest admirers Before I proceed to answer the objections which are commonly brough against it, let me notice the most remarkable of the other systems o the relations of Church and State which exist at present amongs us.

The two extreme systems in one point of view, are those which up hold respectively in the highest and lowest degree the principle of cen tralization; in another point of view the extreme systems are thos which uphold respectively the entire identity of Church and State,— and their total alienation and even opposition to each other. Betwee these come all the various forms of alliance, as it is called, establish ment, and endowment;—which also for the most part hold a middl place between the extreme systems in point of centralization.

1. The Roman Catholic system, taken in its full-blown develop ment, is the extreme of centralization, and also the extreme of identit in Church and State. It would have the whole world subject to on government; and it would have this government absolute. Now a absolute government virtually excludes not only all co-ordinate but ever all distinct subordinate power;—everything emanating from it an being accountable to it;—so the Papacy in its own proper form, as i was exhibited in the days of its greatness, was an identification of th State and the Church under the form of the latter. For the Christia world was the Church, and of this Church the Pope was sovereign and the so-called temporal princes, emperors, kings, and senates, were responsable to him as to Christ's Vicar, and exercised their function as subordinate parts of the great system of the Church.

Opposed to this extreme degree of centralization is the system of th Independents, which excludes centralization altogether. According t this system each congregation of Christians meeting in one place fo the purposes of worship is independent of all other congregations. Now as in modern times political centralization has nowhere been reduce to so low a point as this, the Independent system has practically im plied an entire separation of Church and State, inasmuch as the Stat has exhibited a centralization which the Church in its independen form has utterly repudiated. But if every distinct town were to be

sovereign commonwealth, as was sometimes the case in ancient Greece, then the independent principle, as such, need not be inconsistent with the identity of Church and State; for in that case the principle of centralization would be as much extinct in the political relations of the town, as it was before in the religious relations of its inhabitants.

2. The Church and the State are identical, when both consisting alike of Christians have one and the same supreme government. This government may be exercised under what is called the Church form, as in the Papacy; or under what is called the State form, as where the king is the head of the Church.

The Church and State are in opposition to one another, where the government and the mass of the nation, which constitute the State, are not Christian; where therefore the principles or laws of the State and of the Church are on many important moral points at variance with each other; and a true member of the Church cannot be properly a citizen of the State, but only a subject;—he obeys it actively in matters not opposed to the laws of the Church;—he obeys it passively, by submitting patiently to its penalties, in such matters as are opposed to the laws of the Church; but he cannot exercise a share in its government, for that were to make himself responsable for its principles;—and its principles are those of the world, and not of the Church.

3. Between these extremes are the cases of alliance, establishment, and endowment; which suppose the State to be distinct from the Church, and yet to be on friendly terms with it, and to give and receive from it certain services. How far a member of the Church can be a member or citizen of the State under such circumstances, depends on the nature of the reasons which hinder the State from identifying itself with the Church, instead of allying itself with it, or patronizing it. If it be merely owing to certain notions of Church government, there is then no objection; for the principles of the State may still be Christian.—But if it be on the ground that the State, as such, should be of no religion, then the State is in fact unchristian, and members of the Church can take no part in its government.

I must notice now the doctrine which on the one hand leads to the extreme of centralization; and on the other has prevented the true identity of Church and State, and has led to all the various schemes of alliance, establishment, or independence and alienation. This doctrine is that of a peculiar form of government existing in the Church *jure divino*, and therefore incapable of modification at any time or under any circumstances. And the difficulty has been still farther increased by representing this supposed divine form of government to be also a divinely constituted priesthood.

This doctrine leads to the extreme of centralization, because it represents all Christians in all parts of the world as subject to one government, which derives its title from a source foreign and far superior to the laws of the land,—and much more to the by-laws of any particular congregation. According to this view, if consistent with itself, the whole Christian Church all over the world must be subject either to a Pope or to a General Council: which of these two to be preferred is a very subordinate question, both being consistent, and alone consistent, with the notion of a divinely constituted Christian priesthood.

For the same reasons this doctrine prevents the identity of Church and State in all ages which have any just notion of good government. For a power neither derived from law nor responsible to law, such as that of a pretended *jure divino* priesthood, is so clear an evil, that no men in their senses, when arrived at that period of society at which mere might is taught to yield to right, would allow it to exercise dominion over them. The Papacy therefore is unsuited to an age which begins to have a sense of justice. On the other hand, the claim of divine authority in the priesthood will not yield to those offices which are derived from human law, and have only so far God's sanction. Thus as men's common sense will not allow the priest to be king,—and the belief in a priesthood equally interferes with the king's sovereignty over the priest, the Church and the State are kept of necessity distinct, and the connexion between them must be one of alliance, whether equal or dependent, or else there can be no friendly relation at all between them.

From this supposed divine right of a priesthood, flowed directly the distinction between the so called secular and spiritual powers: and farther between secular matters, as the phrase runs, and spiritual. This distinction striking as with a two-edged sword, and pulling asunder what God had joined, made common life profane and religious life formal and superstitious;—for what are all our business and our studies but profane, if not done in Christ's name? and what are our acts of religion but the extremest folly and falsehood, if they are not made to act upon our common life? Every act of a Christian is at once secular and spiritual:—secular, inasmuch as it is done in the body, in time, and on earth;—spiritual, as it proceeds from the mind and the heart, and therefore affects the soul, and reaches on to eternity.

Here then we have, in point of centralization, three systems. One which would subject all the Christian world to one government, namely to that of one or more persons of the pretended divine order of priesthood. Another, which rejecting the priesthood and the extreme of centralization, is not content with this, but rejects all centralization

whatever; bringing back society almost to its simplest element, that of a single town or village. Between these there is a third system, which adopts centralization as far as God's providence appears visibly to have sanctioned it, and no farther; not placing all the world under one government, nor yet making sovereignty ridiculous by ascribing it to what may be called social atoms: but taking the clearly marked and practical divisions of nations or commonwealths: so that the nation should be sovereign,—and not each particular town or village on the one hand,—nor on the other hand, the whole world.

Again, we have the system of a pretended priesthood, which, to be consistent, requires the system of extreme centralization, and that the centre should be itself. But being driven from this by the common sense of mankind, it has yet prevented the acknowledgment of any other centre, and has therefore been the fruitful parent of divisions, contradictions, and anarchy. It has given occasion to the notion of a Church in alliance with a State, or patronized by a State; and having thus led men to conceive of the State as of something not Christian in itself, it has tended to produce that system of extreme anti-centralization, which has renounced the ideas both of the Church and of the State together.

The question now at issue in the Church of Scotland is doubtless one of considerable importance. I do not feel enough acquainted with the constitution of that Church to enter into the legal points;—but I do not see how the present dispute affects the question of Church Establishments. It is surely perfectly feasible in a Church, as well as in any other society, to provide for the due appointment of the officers of the society: the right of patronage is held subject to such laws as may be required to qualify it. These laws may be at present too lax,—that is, they may not sufficiently provide against the appointment of unfit persons; if so, let them be made more stringent: for certain it is that it is the theory of a Church Establishment, as of all other institutions, that unfit persons should not be made its officers;—and this theory may be reduced to practice as nearly in the appointment of a minister of the Church as of a judge, or a governor of a colony:—it will never of course be perfectly acted upon owing to the faults of human nature.

Thus far then I should agree with Dr. Chalmers, that if by the actual constitution of the Scotch Church the choice of the individual patron is too unrestrained, so that in spite of the remonstrances of the proper Church authorities he may appoint an unfit and unworthy minister, then that constitution requires amendment, and undoubtedly it may be amended, if it be found expedient, without any injustice to the patrons;

for patronage is essentially a trust rather than a property, and as such may be, has been, and is, controlled by law.

But, on the other hand, if the Church of Scotland were to cease to-morrow to be an Establishment, I for one, if I were a member of it, should deprecate earnestly the language used by Dr. Chalmers, and I think also by Sir Culling Smith,—as assuming a power of judgment such as belongs to God alone,—and tending in practice either to a system of priestly tyranny, or to one of party and sectarian exclusiveness, most injurious to the spiritual welfare of the Church.

It is a grievance, according to Dr. Chalmers;—and your correspondent quotes the sentiment, I think, with admiration,—"that before a man can forfeit the privilege" of Church membership and access to the Communion, "there must be a *corpus delicti*,—some specific delinquency palpable enough for cognizance and condemnation by a bench of secular judges, at whose mandate the prostrate Church must receive into her inmost sanctuary men who in her own judgment, though living without any gross or definable immorality, are yet living without God in the world." I have no doubt that many of your readers will sympathize with this language. I have heard other good and sensible men, besides Dr. Chalmers, speak in this manner,—yet it seems to me either extremely vague and incautious in its expression, or else in a high degree unjust and unchristian. It is the misuse of the invidious term "secular judges," which deceives so many. If it be meant that heathens should not judge in a matter pertaining to the Christian Church, no one, so far as I am aware, disputes it. If it be meant that Christians, whether judges or bishops, clergy or layman, are sometimes rather worldly than spiritually minded, it is true, and to be lamented, but by no human power effectually remedied. If it be meant again that the courts of common law can only take cognizance of violations of that law, and that there are sins and vices which are not crimes, then such courts, acting on such a principle, would be unfit to judge of the propriety of a Church appointment; but their unfitness would have nothing to do with their secularity,—for courts martial, which I suppose are secular enough, can and do take cognizance not only of crimes but of vices, and even of things so undefined as "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." But Dr. Chalmers himself does not appear to charge the civil courts with proceeding on such a limited view of their duty as to consider nothing but legal criminality in a question of Church membership. His complaint is that they require "a *Corpus delicti*, some specific delinquency;" whereas the Church, or more properly the clergy, would exclude a man who was "living without any gross or definable immorality," because "in their judgment he was

yet living without God in the world." That is to say, that the civil courts require at least "a definable immorality" before they will exclude a baptized Christian from the communion of his Church;—but Dr. Chalmers and his brother clergymen would exclude him, "because in their judgment he was living without God in the world." If a Christian man's "living without God in the world" be not indicated by so much as any "definable immorality," by what power shall any human eye ascertain it? And are Christ's people, with no offence charged or chargeable against them, to be excluded from the Church because their brethren presume to judge, in spite of their baptism, in spite of their continued profession, in spite of their moral lives,—that they are "living without God in the world?"

Let me not be misunderstood. I know that they may be so living;—I know that there are evils of the heart which may exclude many even eminent and useful members of the visible Church from entering into Christ's perfected Church or kingdom hereafter. Let Dr. Chalmers, let us all, be deeply aware for our own selves, that there is one who seeth not as man seeth, who trieth the very hearts and reins. But no less earnestly do I deprecate the pretensions of any human judge to invade the peculiar province of Christ the judge of all;—it is for Him and Him alone to judge of the heart by itself and not from its actions; but we even in His Church must require "some specific delinquency:" "some definable immorality," or else our judgment will not be spiritual as opposed to secular,— but presumptuous, uncharitable and unjust, as opposed to what is wise and good and Christian.

This fond desire after an unattainable spiritual purity in the Church on earth is the great error of many of the best men amongst the Dissenters. I call it without hesitation an error, both because it is I think contrary to Scripture, wholly at variance with the practice of the early Church, and considered both theoretically and in its practical results, injurious to the interests of Christianity. St. Paul has no other idea of exclusion from the Church than as the punishment of open and scandalous sin;—"If any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolator, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner; with such an one, no not to eat." It is well known that the words, translated "covetous" and "an extortioner," mean much more than these English terms: and signify rather "one who defrauds," and "one who takes by violence." All these are provable and tangible offences, and as such are proper subjects for human judgment; with regard to these things and such as these the discipline of the early Church was strict, and that great strictness in such matters is by no means out of the reach of civil magistrates is shown, (to take one fa-

mous example out of the general practice of the ancient world,) by th severity of the Roman censorship. But the mischief of going farthe than this, and of attempting to punish what is called "living withou God in the world," consists in the opening a door to all uncharitable ness and to all party prejudice,—feelings whose favourite weapon i vague and unproveable accusation. And again, from the vagueness o the charge of a want of spirituality, and the impossibility of really proving this against a man, people are apt to set up various imaginary criteria of the offence, according to their various tempers and preju dices;—even look and manner are held to be indications of a worldly mind; again, opinions on all sorts of subjects are regarded as symp toms of the same thing, and thus a captious and narrow disposition is generated, and while worldly-mindedness is in vain attempted to be hunted out of the Church, other sins no less unchristian, such as malice, spiritual pride, and hypocrisy, are actually encouraged by the process.

A really strict discipline, such as the Christian Church once had, strict against open and proveable offences, but not pretending to judge the heart, is practicable and has been practised amongst large bodies of men, and even amongst an entire people. In proportion as public opinion is purified, discipline may rise with it; but public opinion in every Christian country would at this instant sanction a very consider able amount of discipline, if men would leave off confounding the Church with the clergy, and supposing that the legislation and govern ment of the Church rest not with itself, but with one particular order of men amongst its members.

Dr. Chalmers's letter is full of this confusion, which indeed the un happy constitution of the Scotch Church, in this respect agreeing uncon sciously with the original and inherent error of the Romish, does but too much encourage. But we in England have no excuse for being so be guiled. The foundation of our Church is laid in the great principle that the clergy are not its rulers but the King: the King, who is the repre sentative of the whole Church, and in whose supremacy the claims of popes, bishops, or presbyteries to be by divine right the rulers of Christ's people, have been by God's blessing both in principle and practice denied.

If a heathen government endeavour to invade the rights of the Christian Church, Christians should lay down their lives rather than abet such a sacrilege. But in England,—and would that it were so also in Scotland,—in any quarrel between the clergy and the govern ment, it is begging the whole question to talk of it as a dispute be tween the Church and the State. It may be so indeed, and then there is no doubt that the highest obedience of every Christian is due to the Church. But it may be also a dispute between the Church and the

clergy; and then also our duty is the same, and the sacrilege and profaneness is not in the supreme government of the Church, but in its inferior officers: not in the Crown but in the clergy.

If I understand the objections to an Establishment rightly, they resolve themselves into these three following: 1, That what is called the King's supremacy and the power of parliament over the Church is a profane subjecting of Christ's kingdom to a secular authority. 2, That the Church ought to be a congregation of good and holy men, and of such only: and 3, That an Establishment interferes of necessity with its becoming so.

It is impossible to argue all these points, and even if I could discuss them all satisfactorily, there would still remain the positive side of my argument: that Establishments are not only not sinful but are absolutely essential to the full manifestation of Christ's kingdom; and then again I should have to show how far our actual English Establishment realizes its theory or idea; and what are the causes which make it in any degree fall short of it.

My own views differ very widely I believe from those of the greater part of the defenders of Establishments. On their principles I could not maintain their conclusions. It is very likely therefore that although my view is perfectly intelligible to myself, yet that if stated briefly it may not be so to others: that it may be judged from the views of other writers who agree with me in my result, and that I may be supposed, therefore, unless I expressly state the contrary, to agree with them in their principles; so that I may appear to be holding inconsistent opinions, or some which lead to mischievous consequences, because such have been often held by those who in this question are, to speak in common language, engaged with me on the same side.

For instance, if I held the necessity of what is called the apostolical succession of bishops and presbyters, I must allow that the King's supremacy is an usurpation of the State over the Church; and such an usurpation I hold to be clearly contrary to Christianity. For if a government for the Christian Church has been fixed for all time by divine authority, and of this government the King forms no part, nor is mentioned in what may be called on this supposition the Church's constitutional charter, then he must be clearly an extraneous element, and his supremacy must be that of a stranger over the household of God.

But, it is just this one grand falsehood of the necessity or possible reality of such a succession, which from the earliest times has confused this whole question. The Church, like every other society, has varied practically in its government in different times and countries; and these varieties have all had their good as well as their evil. It must

have *a* government clearly; but whether this government shall be popular, aristocratical, or monarchical, has been no more fixed for it by divine authority, than for any other society in the world. As long as it is merely a subordinate part of any nation, the alterations of its government depend on other causes; but as soon as it becomes co-extensive with the whole nation, then its government takes the form which it found existing in that nation; being democratical in a democracy, aristocratical in an aristocracy, monarchical in a pure monarchy, and mixed under a mixed government like ours.

The Church, having no government fixed for it by divine authority, naturally assumes the form existing in the nation, when its members coinciding with the members of the nation, it expands into its higher character of a Christian commonwealth or kingdom. It is not of necessity that it should do so, the nation may assume the form of the Church government if it will: in other words, the members of the nation and the members of the Church being the self-same persons, may appoint for their supreme government whatever form shall seem good to them.

Now, having thus far shown that the doctrine of apostolical succession by divine right is inconsistent with the King's supremacy; in other words, that the King's supremacy is only to be defended as the form of government adopted by the Church for herself in her more perfect form of a Christian commonwealth, she having no form of government prescribed for her by divine authority for all times and countries. I come next to confess, no less fairly, that such an identity of Church and State as I have here supposed, identity be it observed, and by no means alliance merely, that this identity of Church and State, which I hold to be the highest perfection of each, and which Mr. Hallam and many others hold to be a notion fraught with mischief, is clearly false and impracticable if the doctrine first broached in the eighteenth or seventeeth century be true, namely, that the highest object of the State is the physical well-being of its members, or as Warburton expresses it, the conservation of body and goods.

Undoubtedly, if this be the true notion of a State, it never can be identical with the Church of Christ. But neither can there properly be an alliance between them, for they are as if this be really the highest object of the State, not different merely, but opposed to one another. The State is then "the World," which is not the ally of the Church, but its enemy. It is the very contrast exhibited in the account of our Lord's temptation; the Church declaring that man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of God: the State insisting that the stone shall be turned into bread.

And here we have before us in these two doctrines, that of the supposed apostolical succession of bishops and presbyters on the one hand, and that of the exclusively physical and external objects of government on the other, two principles utterly at variance as I think with any just views of an Establishment. If I held either of these to be true, I should be obliged to confess that an established Church in the full extension of the term could not and ought not to be.

But as I regard these two principles to be respectively types or representatives of the two great forms of evil by which the world has been cursed from the beginning, which apparently most adverse to one another have yet continually promoted each other's success, and have alike thwarted and persecuted the cause of good; those great forms of evil which may be called, the one idolatry and the other ungodliness; so the incompatibility of each of these with what appears on other grounds to be the perfect idea of the Christian Church, is, to my mind, a most encouraging and comforting circumstance; inasmuch as it affords no mean presumption that what these two arch and opposite falsehoods each repel with equal aversion, can be no other than the very pure and perfect truth.

The supremacy then of King and Parliament in a Christian nation, over bishops and presbyters, is the supremacy of no external or secular power over the Church, but of the sovereign power of and in the Church, over its subordinate officers; or, to speak more correctly, it is the assertion of the sovereignty of the Church as a whole over any one particular portion of its members; a principle which is the foundation of all good government, and which it were the strangest of all strange phenomena, did I not know the infinite confusions which possess men's minds on this question, to see disputed by English Dissenters.

The writers against Establishments, in the *Christian Reformer*, do not hold the doctrine of the apostolical succession in more respect than I do. But they hold, I fear, the other and not less mischievous doctrine, that the objects of civil society are purely physical and external. And the prevailing opinions and practices of the present age, in this country not less than in others, are likely no doubt to countenance them in it. But the accordant voice of all governments and of all philosophers, till within the last hundred and fifty years at the outside, is against them; and in no age or country has the doctrine of the merely physical objects of law and government been fully acted upon; for if it were brought out consistently in all its consequences, the common sense and conscience of mankind would at once reject it.

He who holds that government was instituted, I do not mean in his-

torical fact but according to its true idea, and God's purpose, for the general improvement and well-being of man; and that this object has been pursued more or less successfully according to the more or less correct views which have prevailed as to what man's well-being in the highest sense is; will see that government, when endowed with Christian knowledge, is then and then only in a condition to accomplish its object thoroughly, that then its object becomes identical with that of the Church; and two societies with the self-same object and the self-same members, must inevitably, unless there be a necessary hindrance in their formal constitution, blend together into one. The alleged apostolical succession would be such an hindrance, unless the society chose to take that form of government, and become a priestly aristocracy: but those who reject the pretended succession ought not surely to see any objection in point of principle to that perfected form of a Christian commonwealth in which the knowledge of the Church is blended with the power of the State, and both are combined to work out man's highest good.

III. WHAT CAN AND OUGHT TO BE DONE BY THE CHURCH?

This Reply to the Question was first issued in the Sheffield Courant, 1832.

It is now about 120 years ago since a Tory clergyman was impeached by the House of Commons for preaching a sermon full of the most violent doctrines of Toryism. During his trial the popular feeling ran so strongly in his favour, that as he passed backwards and forwards from his lodgings to the House of Lords, the populace obliged all persons to take off their hats to him: the members of the House of Commons who conducted the impeachment, were abused and insulted, the houses of the Whig ministers were attacked, and the Queen, who was supposed to have no great affection for her ministry, was greeted with shouts of "God bless Your Majesty *and the Church.*" Nor was this feeling confined to London: I read in the history of those times that *Birmingham*, *Bristol*, Norwich, and many other places were the scene of riots, in which the popular cry was "Down with the Whigs! High Church and Sacheverel for ever."*

* In his Letter on the "State of Parties," Dr. Arnold remarked—"The liberal governments of George the First and George the Second's reigns, had the steady support of the Crown, because so long as a Pretender was to be dreaded, resting his claim

But this was more than a hundred years ago. Well then, it is only just forty years since "Church and King" was again the war cry of a riot. In the year 1791, the Birmingham mob, with this cry in their mouths, committed the same or even worse atrocities than those which have been lately committed at Bristol; and as a dinner given to an Anti-Reforming Recorder was the excuse for the Bristol riots, so those at Birmingham were excited by a dinner given by a number of eminent liberals and reformers, to celebrate the anniversary of the first French Revolution.

It appears that a bishop has been lately burnt in effigy at Birmingham, on the very spot where Paine, the noted author of the "Age of Reason" and the "Rights of Man," had received the same tribute forty years before. But it is paying far too great a compliment to the actors in either of these burnings to call their acts an instance of the change of *public opinion!* They are merely an instance of the ease with which ignorant men are excited to violence, without knowing why or wherefore. The populace of 1709 shouted, "God bless the Church," with just as much reason as the populace of 1831 are shouting, "Down with the Bishops." And if there is any one fact undeniably certain, it is that the clergy of the English Church, far from having fallen off since the days of Dr. Sacheverel, were never so enlightened, never so zealous, never so generally exemplary in their lives, as they are at this present hour.

The Established Church has always had the fortune to be defended and attacked with equal violence and equal unreasonableness. At this day, when the cry is all against it, there is no subject of which popular writers are so profoundly ignorant. The writers for the public press, whether lawyers, or men in trade, or young men who live by their writings, know and can know next to nothing of the clergy. They seldom fall in their way, their habits and views of things are so different as to preclude much intimacy when they do meet, and while, from residing in large towns, they see a quantity of the evil which the Church has not prevented, they know little of the many thousand country parishes where it is daily more or less effective in doing direct good.

When men attack the Church it is very desirable to know for what reasons they dislike it. Many excellent men amongst the dissenters are unfriendly to it because they think it a hindrance to religion; but a greater number I fear hate it for the very opposite reason, namely

on Tory principles, the Crown was obliged to be liberal.—Had not Charles Edward sunk towards the end of his life into utter personal degradation, and had not he been the last of his race,—for his brother, the Cardinal, was out of the question,— George III. would not have dared to be a Tory."

because it recommends religion. Many good men complain of its tot want of discipline among its own members; but a notorious declaime against it in an adjoining county has been annoyed by what he think its over strictness. He is violent against Church abuses, because hi moral character in one particular is such, that the clergymen of hi parish will not visit him. I am always anxious, therefore, when I hea any attacks against the Church, to know what sort of a man they com from; for though a great deal that is said against it may be very true yet considering the principles of many of those who say it, I shoul exceedingly object to any remedy of their proposing.

The most general complaint against the Church turns upon the ex cessive amount, and the unequal distribution of its property, and espe cially upon the burdensome and impolitic nature of the tithe system There is also a strong popular feeling against the political opinions o the clergy, particularly of the bishops and other dignitaries among them; and this, with the evils of the tithe system is, I believe, the mai cause of their unpopularity among persons who are not ill affected t religion itself.

My conviction of the benefits of a Church Establishment arises fron this: that thus only, can we insure the dispersion of a number of wel educated men over the whole kingdom, whose sole business is, *to d good of the highest kind;* to enforce, in their public teaching, the pures principles and practice that mankind have ever yet been made acquainte with; and to exhibit these in their own persons in all their daily inter courses with their neighbours, instructing the young, visiting the sick relieving, advising, and maintaining the cause of the poor;—and spread ing amongst all ranks the wholesome influence of a good life, a culti vated understanding, and the feelings and manners of a true gentle man. For these reasons, I most earnestly admire and love a Church Establishment; and because it has in it the means of doing all thi better, I think, than any other sect of Christians, therefore I value and would most rigorously reform *the actual* Church Establishment. Nor are the needful Reforms so difficult as many persons imagine.

I will state them, even at the risk of seeming to dogmatize, because I have not space to state at length the arguments on which they rest.

1. A commutation of tithes, even if it can only be effected at a great loss to the Church, because it is far better that the Church should be somewhat poorer, if at such a price it can remove what is at present a great cause of offence.

2. An entire remodelling of the Episcopal Order, that many scandals may be removed, and the Church obtain an efficient government.—For this object it seems essential,—

1. That Translations should be made illegal.
2. That the incomes of the smaller Bishoprics be so increased out of the larger ones, as to supersede the necessity of annexing to them Deaneries, livings held in commendam, or any other ecclesiastical preferment whatsoever.

3. That the Dioceses be divided, so as to give the Church an efficient government.—For this purpose all Deaneries should be made Bishoprics, retaining their present incomes, and with no seats in Parliament. The Prebends should be annexed to underpaid livings in large towns, and the largest Church in all such towns should be erected into a Bishop's See; so that there should be no great town throughout England without its resident Bishop; who, without being raised to any undue elevation in rank and fortune, would yet in both be sufficiently respectable to maintain the just influence of the Church with the higher classes as well as with the poor.

4. That in all large towns and populous districts a sufficient number of new parishes be created, with a resident minister to each. Funds might be provided by annexing, for the future, every one of these new parishes to some valuable country living, if possible in the same neighbourhood or county. Any incumbent accepting such living for the time to come being bound to reside in his town parish nine months in the year, and to keep a resident curate on his benefice in the country.*

* The following paper was circulated by Dr. Arnold in 1841, and develops another part of his "*Principles of Church Reform.*" It is appended in this place as more suitable than when standing disconnected from its congenial subject.

ORDER OF DEACONS.—The want of a sufficient number of ministers of the Church is more or less felt everywhere; but in large towns, and in the extensive and populous parishes of the manufacturing districts, it is a most serious evil. To provide a maintenance for as many additional clergymen as are needed, is clearly impracticable. It has been suggested whether the desired end could not be attained by giving efficiency to the order of deacons; and restoring to them that importance in the Church which in ancient times belonged to them.

To get a sufficient number of deacons nothing seems wanted but the repeal of all laws, canons, or customs, which prevent a deacon from following a secular calling, and also of all such as subject him to any civil disqualifications, or confer on him any civil exemptions.

It is conceived that if this were done, many pious and active members of the Church would be very glad to be ordained deacons, and to take a part in the ministry. In all spiritual functions they would be under the direction and control of the presbyters of their respective parishes; but in temporal matters, such as the management and distribution of funds for charitable purposes, and in making provision for the bodily wants of the poor, they would form a council, of which the presbyter would be the head, and to which all such matters might be entrusted.

5. The Church government being thus rendered efficient, by reducing the size of the dioceses to what would be within the power of an individual to manage, a system of ecclesiastical jurisdiction should be framed, for the prompt punishment, not only of scandalous vice in the clergy, but of what may be called unclerical conduct and neglect of duty; so that the class of "*sporting clergy*," as they are called, should be gradually weeded out of the establishment.

These reforms would, I am persuaded, work a change in the usefulness of the Church, and in the state of feeling towards it, especially in the manufacturing districts, which would be well worth purchasing at the cost of far greater innovations. Of reforms of a more strictly religious character,—such as relate to the liturgy and articles of the Church, I have purposely said nothing. But there are some other points of a less serious nature, such as the relations of the Church with dissenters, and its excessively aristocratical character, which I shall notice.

XIII.—It happened to me some years since to be visiting at the house of a Scotch clergyman, the number of whose parishioners amounted to nearly five thousand souls. I asked him how he found it possible to look after so large a population without assistance. His answer was, that he *had* assistance: that there were three or four dissenting congregations in the town, and that the ministers of these were very

According to the present form of ordaining deacons, no deacon is authorized to preach, except he shall obtain the bishop's license to do so. This provision might be enforced, and the license to preach given only to such deacons as the bishop should judge expedient, and might be granted only durante bene placito.

It is conceived that besides the great benefit of increasing the number of ministers of the Church, other advantages might be looked for from allowing deacons to follow secular callings. A link would be formed between the clergy and the laity by the existence of an order partaking of the character of both. *The confusion of confining the term Church to the Clergy would be dispelled:* inasmuch as there would be not only members but even ministers of the Church who did not belong to the clergy considered as a profession. As the deacons of the Church would be expected to live in all things as became Christians, the same standard would be followed by them which general opinion requires the clergy to conform to, but which it does not always enforce in the laity; as for example in the case of duelling. The ministry of the Church would thus also be safely and most beneficially open to persons of inferior rank and fortune, who cannot afford the expense of an university education, and have no prospects of a maintenance by entering into the ministry as a profession, but who may have gifts which enable them to serve the Chuch effectually, and who may naturally and lawfully wish not to let these gifts lie idle. It does not seem improbable that many persons who now become preachers amongst the dissenters, without objection to any of the doctrines of our Church, but simply because they have no means of following what they feel to be their calling in our communion, would gladly become deacons on this system, and would thus be useful to the Church instead of being in some sort opposed to it.

useful auxiliaries to him, in providing both for the physical and spiritual wants of his parishioners.

The words of this answer, as well as the simple and natural manner in which they were spoken, have often recurred to my memory when I have noticed the totally different light in which the Dissenters are regarded even by some of the best of the clergy in England. With us, the notion of an opposition of interests between the Church and the Dissenters seems always paramount; and I have heard it said over and over again, when people were giving the highest praise to the zeal and general excellence of a Minister of the Establishment, that such a man would soon thin the meeting houses, and bring back the people to the Church.

Now we cannot doubt that the Scotch clergyman's feelings with regard to Dissenters is a far happier one than that generally entertained in England. It is a great misfortune that Christians should not all heartily co-operate with one another; and a still greater, that they should actually look on one another as rivals—almost as enemies. It is a most tremendous evil at a time when their most vigorous efforts, if strengthened by the closest union, would not be in any degree too great to meet the dangers which threaten them both in common.

But it is an evil which must be laid as much to the fault of the Dissenters as of the Church. They have been quite as intolerant, and talked quite as foolishly about the superstitions of the Church Services, as their antagonists on their side have talked of the sin of schism. And at this moment, if the government should attempt to effect an union between the Church and the Dissenters, there would be found quite as many obstacles to such a plan on the part of the latter as of the former. Nor is this wonderful, if we remember that the dissenting ministers, generally speaking, are men of inferior education and inferior rank to the Established Clergy, and have thus a less share of the two great antidotes to bigotry—a large acquaintance with the wisdom of ancient times on the one hand, and with various classes of living men, viewing things in many different lights on the other.

But it is far from my purpose to throw blame either on Churchmen or Dissenters. Thus much, however, is clear, that from the Church, as holding the vantage ground, ought to proceed the first advances to a reconciliation. Now, if uniformity be insisted on, reconciliation is of course out of the question. Two men of different habits cannot live together on friendly terms, if either be called upon to conform to the fashions of the other; and a compromise of our own opinions has always something about it so bordering upon meanness and insincerity, that no good fruit can be looked for from a seed so rotten.

One great cause of Dissent has been the utter inefficiency of the Church in populous towns, as a religious society. Men's feelings of Christian union, all their social propensities as Christians, desire some better satisfaction than to be members of a parish of 10,000 or 20,000 souls, half of whom must necessarily be strangers to the other half. It is impossible that they can have much personal knowledge of their Minister under such circumstances; and what sort of a society is it in which the members neither know one another, nor him who, in some respects, is their head? *In forming themselves into a distinct religious society when so situated, the Dissenters acquired a bond of charity more than they had before; but I know not what bond it was which their conduct violated.*

This cause of Dissent would cease if the parishes in our large towns were properly subdivided; and the same measure would remove another cause not less powerful, the actual want of room in the churches of the Establishment for the population which that Establishment professes to instruct. But other causes would still remain, and could not be so easily obviated. Some, however worldly their character, are in practice among the most difficult to overcome. I mean the property vested in the different Dissenting chapels, and the incomes actually enjoyed by their ministers. It would not be easy to purchase these, and this alone, therefore, would seem an indissoluble bar to such an union with Dissenters as should merely merge them in the Church Establishment, supposing that by some compliance with their religious objections the Establishment might become such as they would not on religious grounds alone object to join.

There is yet another cause of Dissent very deeply rooted. The established clergy must belong generally to the richer classes, because so long as a residence at the university is a necessary passport to ordination, none but the rich can afford to enter the Church. But separated as the richer and poorer classes are from one another in England, separated not only in manners, habits, and feelings, but actually in language also, who can wonder if the poor desire a religious instructor with whom they can more nearly sympathize than with their regular clergyman—an instructor, who by birth, station, language, and manners, is more nearly one of themselves. True it is that when the regular clergyman is at once a good man and a sensible man, his being a gentleman is all so much in his favour; for though a gentleman parson be a very bad thing if the gentleman be the predominant element in the compound, yet a good parson, who in education and feeling is a thorough gentleman beside, in the best sense of the word, inspires justly a degree of respect and confidence as well as of affection which the poor never can feel towards a man of coarser manners and less

education. But in the nature of things there will be always a great many of the clergy in whom the gentleman, *not in the best sense of the word*, is predominant over the parson; and then as far as the poor are concerned, the salt that had lost its savour was not more worthless than they find such a minister.

Besides these causes of Dissent there is yet another, which I am inclined to rank among the least really powerful of all. I mean the actual differences of opinion on matters of religion. But when I think *what* the points are on which we and the Dissenters disagree, except in the case of the Unitarians, I am fully satisfied that they ought not to hinder good men, while keeping firmly to what they themselves think the truth from co-operating in the great cause common to all Christians with those who hold the opposite opinions.

I see then some cause of dissent existing which a needful reform in our own Establishment would remove; others again are independent of any conceivable extent of reform; while a third class are indeed invincible obstacles to *uniformity*, but ought to be none to *union*. And he who knows the history of the Christian Church has too good cause to remember how fatally the pursuit of *this foolish phantom, uniformity*, has lured men from the attainment of *the real and substantial blessing, union*. Let us leave the Dissenters in the undisturbed enjoyment of their own organization, and government, and doctrines; but let us cease to call or think them schismatics or enemies. By reforming ourselves in those points which manifestly need it, we shall probably bring over many to our communion in the most honourable manner; and for those who remained, if we treated them as allies more valuable in their own independent manner of fighting, than if forced against nature to adopt ours—capable of meeting the wants of the poorer classes in the very points where the Establishment can least satisfy them, and affording an exercise for that natural and commendable desire after social organization, which a national establishment has less room for,—we should find the Dissenters most valuable friends and co-operators in that great work of Christian improvement which is, or ought to be, the one great object of every Christian society.

THE END.

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THE RIGHT

INTERPRETATION AND UNDERSTANDING

OF THE

SCRIPTURES.

No question can be of greater importance to every man, than that which regards the right use of the Scriptures. The volume of the Old and New Testaments is received by Christians as their rule of life: they look to it as the source of all their religious knowledge, and all their hopes and fears beyond the grave; and as to the supreme guide of their principles and practice in this world. But that which holds good of God's natural gifts, also holds good of the revelation which he has been pleased to make to us of himself and of his will. It is not available to our use, without some efforts on our part; its benefits may remain hidden, nay, we may pervert it into absolute poison unless we apply ourselves to it with a sound understanding and a sincere and teachable heart.

As with God's other gifts also, so it is with the Scriptures, that the difficulties in applying them rightly become greater in proportion to our power of mastering them. This is a part of our trial, whose severity increases as we are able to bear it. A very ignorant man, therefore, and one who has no time to cultivate his understanding, is saved from perceiving the difficulty, which, if he did perceive it, he would be incapable of solving. Such a man, with the blessing of good elementary teaching, if he proceeds to read the Scriptures with a devout spirit and an honest purpose, finds in them all that is required for his own personal wants in belief and in conduct. There is much in them which he does not understand,—many benefits which he cannot extract from them,—many beautiful proofs of their divine original

which he cannot discover or appreciate. But then he finds in them no perplexities,—he does not see the apparent incongruities out of which their perfect harmony is composed; if there is much which he cannot interpret at all, there is little which he misinterprets. This state, however, is one in which an educated man cannot remain. With greater powers and opportunities of discovering truth, he gains, unavoidably, a greater sensitiveness to apparent error or inconsistency,—a greater impatience of obscurity and confusion. It is vain for such a man to envy the peace of ignorance; God calls him to the painful pursuit of knowledge, and he must not disobey the call. Nor may he, as some do, strive to do violence to his understanding, and to the very nature of things, by trying to combine knowledge with an undisturbed tranquillity of belief, to enjoy the pleasures of a clear and active mind, without being subject to its pains. He may not say, "Here I will have the comfort of a reasonable belief, and here of a blind one." It must be all reasonable, or all blind; otherwise it will soon vanish altogether, and be succeeded by unbelief. Besides, he has not only himself to think of, but others. It is a fatal stumbling-block to many when they see a professed advocate of Christianity shrinking from inquiry, and manifestly replying to their doubts, and silencing his own, by considerations wholly inconclusive as to the point at issue.

But I wish to consider particularly the case of the great majority of young men of the educated classes of society;—of all those, in short, who do not choose the ministry of the Church for their profession. Consider these men in the present age of intellectual activity; how much they will read, how much they will inquire, with what painful accuracy they will labour after truth in their several studies or pursuits. A mind thus disciplined, and acquiring, as it generally does in the process, an almost over-suspiciousness of every thing which it has not sifted to the bottom, turns from its professional or habitual studies to that of the Bible. I say nothing at present of the existence of any moral obstacles to belief; let us merely consider the intellectual difficulties of the case. From his own early education, from the practice of the Church, from the common language of Christians, a young man of this description is led to regard the volume of the Old and New Testaments as containing God's revelation of himself to mankind; he is taught that all its parts are of equal authority: but in what sense the revelation of the Old and New Testament is *one*, and all its parts of equal authority, he has probably never clearly apprehended nor thought of inquiring. He takes it then as *one*, in the simplest sense, and begins to read the Bible as if it were, like the Koran, all

composed at one time, and addressed to persons similarly situated. His habits of mind render it impossible for him to read without inquiry: obscurities, apparent contradictions, and still more, what he would feel to be immoralities, cannot pass without notice. He turns to commentators of reputation, anxious to read their solution of all the difficulties which bewilder him. He finds them too often greatly insufficient in knowledge, and perhaps still more so in judgment; often misapprehending the whole difficulty of a question, often answering it by repeating the mere assertions or opinions of others, and confounding the proper provinces of the intellect and the moral sense, so as to make questions of criticism, questions of religion, and to brand as profane, inquiries, to which the character of profaneness or devotion is altogether inapplicable. When the man is thus intellectually perplexed, undoubtedly all the moral obstacles within him to his embracing the Gospel beset him with tremendous advantage. I speak not only of positive obstacles, but of such as are negative;—the absence of devotional habits, and the want of an experimental knowledge of the power and living truth of the Gospel. There may be,—and how often is there!—an absence of these, without any hostile disposition towards Christianity;—or with a general reverence and regard for it. For the time being, in many cases such as I have supposed, the struggle is mainly an intellectual one: the difficulty lies in the understanding, not in the heart. No doubt every day that this struggle continues, the foundation, at least, of moral difficulty is being laid: the heart cannot long hold aloof from being with Christ, without being seduced to turn against him. But for the time, the heart might be firmly won if the intellect were satisfied; or more properly, if without being fully satisfied, it were at least put in the right way of becoming so. Above all, it must be satisfied on those points where its difficulties have assumed a moral character; for here it feels itself warranted in requiring satisfaction: and even if it acknowledge the duty of submission on other points, it will insist that it never can be right to call evil, good,—or to ascribe the encouragement of evil to God. It seems to me, then, to be a work of great usefulness to endeavour to meet the wants of a mind so circumstanced,—to present such a view of the Scripture revelation as may enable a young man to read his Bible not only without constant perplexity, but with immense and increasing comfort and benefit.

I. In the first place, then, it should be remembered, that a command given to one man, or to one generation of men, is, and can be, binding upon other men, and other generations, only so far forth as the circumstances in which both are placed are similar. A commandment of eternal and universal obligation is one that relates to points in which

all men at all times are alike, and which there is the same reason, therefore, for all obeying equally. Other commandments may be of a transitory nature, and binding only upon particular persons, or at particular times; but yet, when they proceed from the highest authority, their indirect use may be universal, even although their direct use be limited. That is, from knowing what was God's will under such and such circumstances, we may gather, by parity of reasoning, what it will be in all other circumstances; namely, the same when the circumstances are the same; analogous when the circumstances are analogous; and absolutely contrary, when they also are contrary.

It is these two rules, taken together, which will enable us to use the Old Testament, and indeed, every part of God's revelation to man, at once fully and rightly. For while, on the one hand, they will prevent us from applying to ourselves commandments which we were never intended to obey; so on the other hand, they will hinder us from neglecting any part of God's dealings with men, as if it was of no concern to us; whereas it is, in truth, of concern to us; and where it does not teach directly, it yet teaches according to the analogy of circumstances,—that as we should do the same under the same circumstances, so we should act analogously under analogous circumstances, and oppositely when the circumstances are opposite.

If it be said that all this renders the application of the Bible exceedingly difficult, and opens the door to a great deal of evasion, I answer, that undoubtedly the application of many parts of the Bible is difficult; and this is sufficiently proved by the discordant and unsatisfactory manner in which different persons have actually applied them. And as to wilful evasion of God's commandments, that will ever be easy; I may add, that God designs it to be easy to all those who, at their own peril, choose to practise it. That the word of God should furnish a ready occasion of perversion to those who wish to pervert it, can surely surprise no one who has a moderate acquaintance with God's manner of dealing with us, either as declared in the course of his providence, or in his own revelation.

But for those who really seek to know God's will, this method of discovering it will be exceedingly useful, inasmuch as it leads directly to an accurate knowledge both of the Scriptures on the one hand, and of themselves and their own condition on the other. Every one must have observed the difficulty which persons in general feel in bringing home to themselves what they read, even in the New Testament. They have but vague notions either of the state of things to which Christ's words applied in the first instance, or of those points in themselves to which they apply no less forcibly now; whereas the

principle on which I have laid so much stress, requires of us a very exact and lively perception, of all the features of the case to which the Divine command originally was addressed, and of all the particulars of our own. It obliges us to consider carefully the purpose of the commandment when first given, what evil it was intended to check, and what particular form the evil at that time wore. Thus separating what is essential in it from what is accidental, we learn what is God's will; and then by looking into ourselves and around us, and observing what is the actual form in our own case of the evil opposed to his will, we discover exactly to what parts in our own character or conduct his commandment is virtually and really directed.

II. The revelations of God to man were gradual and adapted to his state at the several periods when they were successively made. And on the same principle, commands were given at one time which were not given at another: and which, according to God's method of dealing with mankind, not only were not, but *could not have been given*. This brings us to the famous doctrine of *accommodation*, which having been carried by some persons to an extravagant and offensive length, has fallen consequently, with many good men, into great suspicion. No doubt a man may abuse this doctrine, as the Nicolaitans did, and maintain that all God's commandments were but accommodations to man's imperfect state, which, in his riper knowledge, he might safely violate. But I am not considering how a wicked man may pervert this doctrine, but how a good man may profit by it. The principle of accommodation is so expressly allowed by Christ himself, when he declares the liberty of divorce to have been given to the Jews, "on account of the hardness of their hearts," that the question amongst Christians respecting it can only be one of degree. But perhaps it will be desirable to show more fully how *accommodation* must exist in every relation from God to man, unless it were God's pleasure to change this world from a state of imperfection to one of perfection: in other words, he who argues against accommodation, as inconsistent with the Divine attributes, is but approaching unawares that great question of the origin of evil, which never has been solved by man, and probably never can be, until he be removed to a state where the *experience* of evil is no more.

In any communication between a Being of infinite knowledge and one of finite, it is obvious that the former must speak sometimes according to the views of the latter, unless it be his pleasure to raise him almost to his own level. In short, unless revelation be universal; that is, unless it extend to the removal of all error, and the communication of all truth, there must be an accommodation in it to the opin-

ions of mankind, on all points where those opinions are not meant to be specially corrected. When God chooses a being of finite knowledge to be the medium of his revelations, it is at once understood that the faculties of this being are left in their natural state, except so far as regards the especial message with which he is entrusted. But perhaps we do not enough consider how, in the very message itself, there must be a mixture of accommodation to our ignorance;—for complete knowledge, on any one point, could not be given without extending itself to other points;—and the very means by which we receive all our knowledge, that is, language, and the observations of our senses, are themselves so imperfect, that they could not probably convey to the mind other than imperfect notions of truth. This again is allowed for, at least professedly, in interpreting those expressions which the Scripture employs to describe the dealings of God with men: the "wrath," "jealousy," "repentance," &c., of the Divine Being; and, much more, his "sitting on high in heaven," his "right hand," "eyes," "ears," &c., are acknowledged to be accommodations; that is, to convey to us, not the very reality, but something as near the reality as God sees it expedient for us to know. But in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, the necessity of this accommodation becomes more evident. When God dwelt among us, and vouchsafed to converse daily with us, it is manifest that infinity, thus communing with his finite creatures, must have adapted himself to their notions, or else he would have altered their nature to something far above humanity. He must have often spoken as a man who possessed no greater knowledge than the men of that time and country. We cannot, therefore, argue that all the opinions which Christ did not contradict he sanctioned with Divine authority;—for he must have used himself the common language of men, if it were a point on which no revelation was intended to be made. And to say that this is to mislead mankind, is untrue, as well as irreverent, unless we are prepared to show how otherwise God could possibly have communed with mankind without making his revelation extend to every thing.

This then is accommodation, so far as regards our knowledge.—Another sort of accommodation regards our practice.—That God has not thought proper to raise mankind at once to its highest state of moral perfection, any more than individuals are born at once to their maturity, is a matter of actual experience. Why he has so willed it, is a question which it is vain to ask; and because vain, presumptuous. —The human species has gone through a state of less fulness of moral knowledge, of less enlightened conscience, as compared with its subsequent attainments, just as every individual has done. Now this

less perfect state being a part of God's will, the training applied to it must have been suited to it; that is, it must have taken it as imperfect, and dealt with it as such; not anticipating the instructions of a more perfect state, but improving it in its imperfection; not changing spring into summer, but making of spring the best that could be made of it. At the same time the progress of mankind was to be provided for; perfection was to be prepared for, although not immediately made attainable. While, therefore, general principles of duty were given, all the conclusions which follow from them, with regard to our particular relations in life, were not at the same time developed; and men did not at once develope them for themselves. Their notions, therefore, on many particular points of practice, were really irreconcileable with the principles which they acknowledged; but the inconsistency did not strike them; and revelation did not as yet interfere to make it palpable. This was an imperfection which belonged to their state of moral inexperience: and this imperfection God allowed, and treated individuals as good and just persons, notwithstanding their participation in it, if up to the extent of their knowledge they endeavoured to do what was right.

But further, this imperfect moral knowledge on many particular points of practice being allowed, if an action on any one of these points was capable of strengthening their moral principle generally, or tended to serve any other useful end, it would properly be commanded to *them*, however inconsistent it might be with more enlightened notions of particular duty. It might be commanded them, because it could do *them* no moral harm, but probably the contrary; and because, being a command in a particular case, and not a statement of a general principle, it could not justly interfere with the acquisition of purer views by future generations, when the dispensation of the fulness of time was come. And, therefore, not only would practices be tolerated by God in early times, but actions would positively be commanded, which, in a more advanced state of knowledge, men would be taught of God to shrink from as evil.

Now, from God's way of dealing with the childhood and youth of the human race, we may expect to derive a lesson for ourselves, in our treatment of the childhood and youth of an individual. We find exactly the same state of mind; that is to say, sound general principles acknowledged, but the application of them to particular cases of practice not yet made, and therefore, the notions of right and wrong, in particular branches of conduct, confused and faulty. And our object being the formation of a perfect character in manhood, we must not mar this prospect by seeking to forestal it; we must not be too anxious

to enlighten the conscience ere it be sufficiently strengthened; it being much more important to keep up the habit of obeying conscience implicitly, than to extend unseasonably its nominal dominion, at the risk of weakening its real hold upon the mind. Of course, the aids offered by Christianity enable us to enlighten the conscience earlier and more fully than we could dare to do without it, because they render obedience to conscience a matter of less hopeless difficulty. Still, while inculcating on a child's mind the principles of Christianity in all their purity, I should hesitate to press upon him all the deductions which follow from those principles, with regard to the various points of his own daily life. I should feel that he would not be able to bear them; that is to say, that his character would not have strength enough to conform to so pure a standard, and that it would be injurious to his future excellence, were I to familiarize him to the habit of acting constantly against his sense of duty.

A similar forbearance of instruction, amounting sometimes to an actual prohibition of what would be a duty in a more advanced state of moral proficiency, is practised also for another reason. When an action, right in itself, is almost sure to be performed from a wrong motive, we feel bound to prohibit it altogether; when an action, wrong in itself, is yet likely to be abstained from with a moral injury to the character, while its commission, owing to the unenlightened state of the conscience, would be attended with no harm at all, we should be afraid to see it forborne. Who dares do otherwise than forbid his children to inform him, unasked, of the faults of one another?—Who would not be sorry to see a boy submitting passively to all sorts of ill usage from his companions, since, with a boy's notions of right and wrong, resistance would involve no breach of duty, while passiveness would imply and tend to encourage the habit of cowardice?

Undoubtedly the principle here spoken of is one of most difficult application; because, as the standard of duty may not be too high for the strength of the character to bear, so on the other hand, unless we are careful gradually to raise it, that excellence which is the object of education, will never be attained at all. Still, however liable to be misapplied, it is a principle which God's dealings with the earlier ages of the human race strongly sanction, and which, though liable to abuse in our hands like every other rule of conduct, was employed by him with unmingled usefulness.

These two considerations then,—That commandments given to persons differently circumstanced from ourselves, while they are not directly binding on us so far as this difference extends, are yet a most valuable guide indirectly and by analogy; and that God's revelations

to man, including in this term both communications of knowledge and directions for conduct, were adapted to his state at the several periods when they were successively made, so that actions may be even commanded at one period which, at another, men would have learnt to be evil, and which never therefore could be commanded to *them*;—these two considerations will enable a young man, not only to read the Bible without perplexity, but to find in all of it, in the older dispensation no less than the new, a consistent and all-sufficient guide for his daily living.

To exemplify these two principles fully, would be to write a commentary on a large portion of the Old Testament. But, in order to illustrate my meaning, I will give one or two instances of the application of each, to which an attentive reader may easily add others in the course of his own study of the Scriptures.

1. The second commandment of the Decalogue forbids the making any representation whatever of the object of our worship. The principle of this commandment was to prevent us from forming unwarranted, and therefore necessarily unworthy, notions of God. Compare Deuteronomy iv. 15—19: "Ye saw no similitude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire:"—no similitude therefore was warranted to them by God, and none might be lawfully imagined by them for themselves. The spirit of this commandment is eternal; man may never image to himself an object of worship, without the warrant of God. They then violate this commandment most flagrantly, who think of God otherwise than his revealed word authorizes;—who imagine him to be less pure and holy, less severe against sin, less requiring perfect goodness in his creatures, than he himself declares himself to be. They also violate it, who dare to image, in any bodily form, the invisible and incomprehensible Father of all things.* And they too seem to violate it, who, not believing of God as he teaches us, would fain approach him through the mediation of his creatures, and go to him by another way than that only one which he has appointed, the mediation of his Son, Jesus Christ. But most assuredly they do not violate it, who represent him, who think of him, who worship him under an image which he himself has sanctioned,—the human form of the man Christ Jesus. For *this* similitude of God, we have God's warrant;—he showed no likeness of himself when he spake in Horeb out of the midst of the fire; but he

* Though some of the best Christians have allowed themselves to do it, I cannot but think that to speak of the Holy Spirit as a dove, from a misapplication, and even a misinterpretation of a passage in Scripture, is a violation of the spirit of this commandment.

has shown one to the Christian Church, when "the express Image of his Person" took upon him the nature of man, in order visibly to declare Him who, in his own essence, is invisible. And therefore to object to this warranted similitude of God, and to deny ourselves the benefits which it was graciously intended to furnish,—to turn from the image of Christ crucified* which God himself has given us, because we may not make images of our own devices,—seems to me an instance of the great mischief of applying to ourselves, directly, what was commanded to men under different circumstances, and with especial relation to that difference. While on the other hand, to speak of the commandment as altogether obsolete, and to exclude it altogether from the Decalogue, as the Roman Catholics do in their popular catechisms, is an irreverent rejection of God's law, which must be eternal in its direct purport, so far as the circumstances are the same; and most useful indirectly, even where the circumstances are different.

2. God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac; and Abraham's ready obedience is one of the most striking instances on record, of self-devoting faith. A writer in the "Morning Watch," while combating the view taken of the Old Testament by a writer in the Edinburgh Review," speaks of this as "God's approbation of an act of infanticide." He chooses, I suppose, to use the offensive term *infanticide*, in order to express his belief that virtue and obedience are synonymous terms, and that what God commands, be it what it may, becomes instantly our duty to perform. A far more cautious and wiser writer, and one never to be named without respect, Bishop Butler, has made a wide distinction between principles and habits, and individual actions. "God," he says, "could not command us to cultivate habits of deceit and cruelty; but he may command us to take away life in particular cases, because that is not in itself necessarily wrong." This is perfectly true; but though all taking away life is not wrong, yet can it be otherwise than wrong, according to an enlightened view

* I say the image of "Christ crucified," because representations of our Lord as a *child*, appear to me unwarranted, and only to have been introduced for the sake of the representation of the Virgin, which always accompanies them. Nor do I deny that where the New Testament is kept out of the people's hands, and their knowledge of Christianity is corrupted with many superstitions, the crucifix may be often an object of superstitious worship; so that, very possibly, the English reformers were right at that time in doing away with the use of it. But I cannot conceive it otherwise than useful where the Scriptures are generally circulated, and where Christianity is truly known; and as it may be most dangerous where men are most attached to it, so I think it is most wanted where the feeling against it would be the strongest, as in England at this moment, and still more in Scotland.

of our duty, for a father to take away the life of his innocent son, and to imagine himself, by such an act, offering an acceptable sacrifice to God? And the question is, whether our notions of God himself are not rather derived from those notions of goodness which he has implanted in us, than our notions of goodness derived from our idea of God: whether, therefore, it is not a contradiction to imagine God as commanding an act which, to our best reason, appears evil; and whether, in our ignorance of the unseen world, any vision, dream, or revelation whatsoever, so commanding us to evil, can bear with it an external attestation of its coming from God, sufficient to counterbalance the internal evidence that it does not come from him:—whether, in short, a sane mind is not bound to consider such a suggestion or command as coming from an evil spirit, and permitted by God for the trial of his faith, rather than as the real will of God for the guidance of his conduct. I confess that if we suppose the external and internal evidence, with respect to any message professing to come from God to be thus opposed to one another, I see not how the human mind can escape from the agony of such a conflict but through insanity.

But now apply to the case of Abraham the principle which has been developed above; and not only does every difficulty vanish, but the story remains fraught with instruction for God's people in every age, let their advancement in moral knowledge be what it will. Human sacrifices, and particularly the sacrifice of children by their parents, were notoriously practised by the nations of Canaan. Deut. xii. 31. By the Moabites they were considered as the greatest possible mark of devotion, and performed therefore in circumstances of extraordinary peril, as the means of obtaining deliverance when every less precious offering was unavailing. Compare Micah vi. 7, and 2 Kings iii. 27. So many years before God had declared his abhorrence of such sacrifices, in a time and country where they were practised as the most solemn rite of religion, and with the natural feeling so strongly prompting us to think that God will be propitiated by that which it costs us most to offer,—what reason is there for thinking that the command to sacrifice his son Isaac was received by Abraham in any other light than as a command to a most painful duty, severely trying indeed to his feelings, but in no way startling to his conscience?—And this is exactly the trial of faith which has been given to so many of Abraham's spiritual children; not that they have ever been commanded to do what they thought evil, but what they knew was severely painful,—to part with what they loved most dearly for God's sake. The particular sort of sacrifice commanded to Abraham could not indeed be commanded to us, because *we* have learnt from God that such offerings are

an abomination which he hateth: but analogously the trial is often repeated now, and fathers are still called upon, from time to time, to sacrifice their children's fairest earthly prospects, in order that they may obey the will of God.

I know there are some persons who cannot bear to suppose that Abraham was less aware than we are of the wickedness of human sacrifices in general, because they believe that, in all points of duty, he was no less enlightened than the most enlightened Christian. Do they think then that polygamy is a matter of indifference; or do they imagine that Abraham, judging of it as Christians do, yet lived habitually in known sin? Or what is the meaning of our Lord's declaration, that the least in the kingdom of God was greater than John the Baptist, than whom there had arisen, among all that were born of women, no greater prophet? Or how should the prophets and righteous men of old have desired, and desired in vain, to see and hear what Christ's apostles saw and heard, if they already had known as much as Christ, or his Spirit, could have taught them.

I proceed to another example of the same principle,—the command given to Saul, to destroy the Amalekites utterly, and his punishment for disobeying it. In this case, as in the command to extirpate the Canaanites, the precise point of difficulty is often misapprehended. Undoubtedly the destruction effected by an earthquake or a pestilence is just as unsparing and indiscriminate, without being thought to impeach the goodness of God. The difficulty relates not to the sufferers in this destruction, but to the agents of it; because to men, in an advanced state of moral knowledge and feeling, the command to perpetrate such general slaughter,—to massacre women and infants, the sick and the decrepit, could not fail to be mischievous; or rather, it would be so revolting, that they could not, and ought not to think that God could possibly be the author of it. To men in the Christian stage of their moral progress, a command to trample the feelings of humanity under foot, and to acquire that brutality which is the inevitable result of such a conquest, could not be injurious; at an earlier stage, or at a more advanced one, the case is different; half-civilized men, who have not risen to those feelings, or glorified saints, who need them not, because they are arrived at a state above the passions of humanity, may be the executioners of God's judgments; but the disciples of the Son of Man must, like their Master, not destroy men's lives, but save them. Now in Saul's time, and long afterwards, the laws of war, if so they may be called, were so thoroughly barbarous, that no amount of slaughter, committed against enemies, was likely to shock the feelings of any one. Every one knows the passage in Homer, Iliad VI. 55—

62, in which the poet expresses his approbation of the advice given by Agamemnon to Menelaus, not to spare a single Trojan, young or old, even to the babe in its mother's womb. In such a state of feeling, when lives were spared, it was not from humanity, but from avarice or lust; and therefore, the command given to the Israelites under Joshua, and again to Saul, when attacking the Amalekites, to destroy every thing, and take none of the spoil to themselves, so far from hurting their notions of right and wrong, was in fact a trial of their self-denial; it called upon them to renounce the ordinary fruits of victory, the slaves, the female captives, the cattle, and the silver and gold, and to act merely as men who fought for God, and not for themselves. This command Saul could not persuade himself to obey: he spared the best of the spoil, of the sheep and of the oxen, for the purpose of having a great sacrificial feast; he spared Agag, to have the glory of exhibiting a captive king eating bread under his table. He could not certainly plead humanity as his motive, inasmuch as the women and children had been destroyed, so far as appears, without any scruple felt or pretended. In short, the command was no more shocking, from its requiring the Amalekites to be slaughtered rather than kept as slaves, than it would be now, if a general were ordered to destroy the cannon and baggage that he had taken, instead of keeping them as a source of prize-money. Such an order might be very disappointing, and might be a hard trial to his obedience; but certainly could not be objected to, as commanding what he could scruple, on conscientious grounds, to execute.

These instances will sufficiently explain my meaning, and will show how completely the principle which they illustrate will remove all the principal difficulties of the Old Testament. One more I will notice, because it was quoted by Carlile, some years ago, in his defence on a charge of blasphemy. He read aloud in court, the seventeenth and eighteenth verses of the thirty-first chapter of Numbers, containing the command of Moses to spare only the virgins among the women of Midian, and to destroy all the rest. And he then asked if it was possible to believe that a book, containing such atrocities, could ever have proceeded from God. Certainly God would never give such a command to any one whose moral feelings would be shocked by it; but they to whom it was addressed felt it only as a restraint on their self-indulgence; they were not allowed to plunge into those sensual excesses to which the grown up women of Midian were addicted, as a part of their religious rites.

How little men, at a much later period, were likely to scruple morally at the act of putting such a number of women to death, may

be judged of from the sweeping execution of all the female slaves of their household, by Ulysses and Telemachus, in the Odyssey, and by the utterly indifferent, or rather almost exulting manner, in which the poet describes their sufferings.

What have been now given are general rules of interpretation, which should be constantly borne in mind throughout the study of the Scriptures, and which will remove some of their principal difficulties. Others however still remain; and it is of importance to know how they should severally be dealt with, for the treatment which they require is by no means uniform. They may be mostly divided into three classes: first, such as are decidedly of a religious character; second, such as are mixed; and thirdly, such as are not religious at all, but belong solely to the critic, the historian, or the antiquary.

Of the first sort, by far the most important is that which has been already noticed; namely, that we find the Bible ascribing to God certain commandments which appear inconsistent with sound notions of right and wrong. Other difficulties have rather led men to adopt strange and unwarranted interpretations of the Scripture text, than to deny its authority; they have, in other words, produced heretics rather than infidels. I am speaking now of such passages as bear upon the leading doctrines of Christianity, or upon the great question of free-will and the Divine foreknowledge, which belongs properly to natural religion. There being sects within the Christian Church itself who maintain the most opposite opinions on these matters, yet alike acknowledge the authority of the Scripture, an individual who is perplexed with the obvious meaning of the Bible, takes refuge with those whose difficulty has been the same as his own, and learns from them to find another way of explaining it, without renouncing his Christian belief altogether. And as the mind is apt to be convinced of what it wishes, so a very sincere belief in the Scriptures has been found united with the most violent misinterpretations of them; and the consequence has been thus far beneficial, that many parts of them, not connected with the disputed point, have yet influenced the heart and conduct, while, had there been no such refuge as heresy for the doubting mind, it would have been driven into complete infidelity. As these matters therefore do not constitute an objection to the Divine authority of the Scriptures, but only to the common interpretation of them, they need not be noticed here.

The remaining difficulties of a purely religious character are but variations of the oldest recorded expression of unbelief, "Ye shall not surely die;" that is, they either relate to the declarations so often made in Scripture of the final and undying wrath of God against the

evil doers, or to those passages which speak of God as hardening the hearts of the wicked, and purposely withholding from them instruction, that they might perish in their sins. Now, if an objection to these statements be made with any thing of a careless spirit, or in a time and place unfavourable to moral impressions, it is impossible that it should ever be satisfied. The objector, under such circumstances, becomes himself an evidence of the very truth which he disputes; his difficulty will not be lessened, but rather increased upon him; and God will vouchsafe to him no other answer than such as may blind his eyes and harden his heart more entirely. But if any one were to express to me, privately and seriously, his uneasiness under these doctrines; and if this uneasiness should appear, so far as man could judge, to be purely intellectual, I would then press upon his mind some such considerations as the following,—considerations addressed to him morally and personally, to dispose him with God's blessing, to receive the truth of God, and not in any degree to alter, in this matter, the truth of God, that it might please him.

"As a Christian," I would say to him, "you are aware that the doctrine of Christ crucified is the great foundation of Christianity. Now this doctrine tells us that there are two things which we never can estimate highly enough,—God's abhorrence of sin, on the one hand, and his love for sinners on the other. Both of these were shown to the utmost, in his giving his only Son to die for us. If the Scriptures seem to dwell upon this as furnishing particularly a proof of his love for sinners, it is because his abhorrence of sin is necessarily implied in it, as it is this only which rendered so great a proof of his love needful. Now here too, as in his life, Christ affords a lesson to us. His death exhibits a perfect union of the two qualities which are together the perfection of man's nature,—the hatred of sin, and the love of sinners; in other words, the love of God, and the love of our neighbour. Our love of Him whom we have never seen nor can see, must consist chiefly in striving to be like Him; that is, in abhorring evil, and showing love to those whom we have seen, even our human brethren. In neither of these points are we ever nearly perfect; it is rarely that they are laboured after equally. Rude times tempt to zeal without charity; more civilized times, ours more particularly, are apt to encourage charity without zeal. To us, therefore, the severer aspect of God's countenance is especially salutary: all that shows his abhorrence of sin is a lesson which we greatly need. His judgment can pronounce—what we dare not—when, and in what cases, love for the sinner must give place in His dealings with Him, to His abhorrence of his sin. He declares that there *are* such times and such cases, to

warn us lest ours be one of them. Death is one of these periods, when mercy's work is finally ended: but it may be that spiritual death may sometimes anticipate the death of the body. That this *is* so in any particular case, whether our own or others, we never are warranted to say or to think; but we may and should notice all those symptoms, which, if not stopped in time, may lead to it. God sometimes sees fit to harden the heart of a sinner: it is one of the laws of His providence, that evil persisted in should grow more inveterate; that opportunities misused or rejected should be worse than negatively lost; that falsehood wilfully tampered with should at last actually persuade him who uttered it; that truth resisted by any one carelessly or dishonestly, should seem at last to be as untrue as he at first insincerely asserted it to be. So God withholds instruction, and leads men to believe a lie: so he hardens their hearts that they should not repent and be saved. Of all desperate follies, to kick against this truth is the fondest: embrace it, and no lesson can be fraught with diviner power of healing. Not only every downward step taken, but every upward step delayed, is a beginning of this blinding and of this hardening. Murmur against the justice of this process, and its operation becomes the surer and the speedier. Pray to God to save you from it, through Jesus Christ, and its grasp instantly becomes relaxed, and hope, and faith, and love, will soon deliver you from it altogether. But yesterday it was God hardening your heart, lest you should believe and be saved: to-day it is, 'God willeth not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be converted and live.' "

III. I proceed to notice those scripture difficulties which are of a mixed character; that is, partly religious, and partly critical, historical, or scientific. And this brings us to the objections taken against the scripture miracles, and to the manner in which it has been attempted to obviate them. I call those difficulties of a mixed character, because they rest partly upon an unwillingness to admit the reality of miracles at all, and partly upon the alleged improbability of any particular miracle, either from the low degree of external testimony in its favour, or from the circumstances of the case. It is greatly to be wished, that every man who objects to any of the scripture narratives, would clearly understand and express how far his objection rested on one of these grounds, and how far on the other. If it be founded on the alleged impossibility of all miracles, it is idle to discuss the degree of evidence belonging to any one miracle in particular; for no one, I suppose, would prove the general proposition, that miracles are impossible, by the accident that all those hitherto reported rest on insufficient evidence. Recourse would rather be had to *à priori* ar-

guments,—that they were impossible from the nature of things, and that therefore the degree of evidence alleged in their favour, in any particular case, was a matter of absolute indifference. But on the other hand, if a man allows that miracles are possible, and that they are therefore credible, if well attested, the question, as far as religion is concerned, turns wholly on the truth of a single miracle,—the resurrection of Jesus Christ. If this be false, the truth of all the other miracles recorded in Scripture would not warrant our faith as Christians;—if it be true, the falsehood of all the rest would be no excuse for our renouncing the Gospel. It is true that if St. John's account of the raising of Lazarus could be proved to be false, it would be a strong argument against our believing his account of the resurrection of Christ; but supposing for a moment that all the other miracles in his Gospel were proved interpolations,—so that his testimony went only to prove our Lord's resurrection, and that for this it was judged sufficient,—then the falsehood of all other miracles recorded in Scripture would not overthrow our Christian faith, so long as we had the internal evidence afforded by the Scripture prophecies, doctrines, and principles of life, together with the one single fact, that Christ rose again from the dead. For, after all, the great question of faith or unbelief is this, —"May I hope that my sins are forgiven, that my evil nature will be corrected, and that I shall be happy forever with God? May I trust Christ, that if I lose my life for his sake,—that is, in doing what he commands, I shall find that my loss is my eternal gain? If I may hope this, and safely trust Christ's word, then my Christian faith stands sure; if I may not, then my faith is vain, I am yet in my sins, and without hope beyond the grave." On the other hand, if a man would rather have no prospect beyond the grave,—if he cares not for being left *in* his sins, so long as he is not obliged to renounce them,—if he only wishes to be assured that by seeking his life in this world he shall not lose it eternally, he has gained nothing, unless he can disprove the fact that Christ died and rose again from the dead. His proving every miracle in the Old Testament to be untrue would no more justify his unbelief, than his being able to disprove all the alleged miracles of the dark ages. For unbelief can never be innocent, unless it were inevitable; every difficulty in the Scriptures may be an excuse for it, if we are seeking for excuses; but he who loves God and virtue will cling to them, not till he can find an excuse for quitting them, but till he finds it impossible to abide with them.

As for the general argument against all miracles, I never have been able to comprehend its force, except on grounds of atheism or epicurism. Of course, it is self-evident, that if there is no God, or if he

regards not the affairs of men, there can be no miracle ; and it is, I believe, on these assumptions, tacitly made though not avowed, that the main opposition to miracles has been founded. But on deistical grounds, the objection is absurd, which indeed may be said of every other deistical argument against Christianity. The real question is between God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and no God at all, or an epicurean one. The occasion for miracles is simply this,—that without them all our notions of another life must be no better than guesses. Neither the ideas of perfect wisdom and goodness, nor yet the idea of infinite power make up, by themselves, our idea of God ; but their union produces it instantly. Doctrines and principles of life, however perfect, therefore, may command our belief and obedience on account of their truth and excellence ; but they do not bear upon them the mark of such an immediately divine original, as to satisfy us that he who delivers them can really tell us anything of that which eye has not seen nor ear heard ; namely, what will befal us after death. But a miracle, which implies supernatural power, when wrought by one whose life and doctrines are good and pure, completes our notion of God being really with him. And if God be with him, he may be believed when he speaks of those things, of which we otherwise could not have obtained more than a mere conjecture. This use of miracles applies to the most enlightened man alive, as well as to the most ignorant ;—to the purest lover of virtue for its own sake, no less than to him whose knowledge of duty is least clear, and his attachment to it most wavering. But take the bulk of mankind, and they need authority not only for things which man's loftiest faculties cannot discover, but for those also which, without being really doubtful, have yet been constantly doubted of and disputed,—for those truths which, though discoverable, have not been in fact discovered. It might have pleased God to leave us to ourselves on these points, nor could we have justly complained if he had done so. But that he should have graciously interposed to aid us, and that he should have vouchsafed by manifestations of superhuman power to give that *authority* to the language of truth which from our weakness it needed, is a great instance of his abundant love to us, but cannot surely be regarded as inconsistent with the perfections of his nature, or with the wants of ours.

Now, with regard to the truth or falsehood of the several miracles of the Old Testament, as the very fact of discussing the evidence of any one alleged miracle is a tacit admission that miracles are not universally impossible, so the conceivable results of disproving any one or more of these can be no more than the following :—1. To disprove

not the general truth, but simply the *inspiration* of the particular book, or portion of a book, in which the account of the alleged miracle occurs. 2. If the book be ascribed to a writer who, from his means of information, could not have given a false account ignorantly or from misinformation, but must have knowingly intended to deceive, then the disproof of any statement contained in it tends either to disprove its being really the work of that writer, or if it be, to shake his general credibility. 3. If the miracles supposed to be disproved are alleged by the writer of the narrative as the attestation of the divinity of certain commandments and doctrines, then the truth of the revelation may be thought to be disproved also, as resting upon a prop which has been discovered to be rotten. 4. If the truth of the revelation so disproved be necessarily implied by a subsequent revelation, so that if the former be false the latter must be false also, then the disproof of the former involves in itself the disproof of the latter; and if these two be the only alleged revelations in existence, then the disproof of the first of them is equivalent to the disproof of all actual revelation whatever.

It is manifest that the last of these results is the only one which concerns our own personal Christian faith; and here it is that I should apply what has been said above, that this faith depends on the truth or falsehood of one miracle only—the resurrection of Christ. For it is now a question, not as to miracles universally, but as to the evidence of certain ones in particular; if therefore the evidence for the resurrection be completely satisfactory, the truth of the former revelation, notwithstanding its disproved miracles, may as fairly be concluded from the truth of the latter one, as the falsehood of the latter, notwithstanding its proved miracle, may be argued from the falsehood of the former one. And if we suppose the external evidence to be balanced, then a good man's faith will be upheld by his strong sense of the internal evidence, and he will be reasonably a Christian; while a bad man will have got an excuse for resisting the internal evidence, and will refuse the offer of salvation more obstinately. So that the utmost conceivable result of the disproof of the Old Testament miracles would be only to make belief and unbelief more palpably moral qualities; they would become respectively, in a more eminent degree than ever, the signs of those who were saved, and those who were lost.

I should therefore dispute the practical force of the fourth result, even if I allowed the third: but I should deny the third altogether. Again, taking my stand on the truth of Christianity, as proved by the fact of the resurrection, and considering the prophecies of the Old Testament, its doctrines, and its commandments, together with the undisputed historical facts relating to the Jewish nation, I should argue,

that the Jewish dispensation was of divine origin; that the Jewish people were chosen by God for certain great purposes connected with the spiritual improvement of mankind; that he had given to them the knowledge of himself and of his will, and had declared through his prophets, the promise of a future Redeemer, even though all the miracles contained in the book of Exodus could be proved to be exaggerations or inventions. If this could be proved, it would follow indeed that Moses, or the author of the statement contained in Exodus, if he were any other than Moses, had committed a pious fraud; that the Israelites, not content with the internal evidence of Divine interposition manifested in their escape from the superstitions of Egypt, and in their receiving a law so pure from *priestcraft*, so righteous and so wise in its ordinances, and conveying notions of God so infinitely above those entertained by all other nations, had magnified certain natural phenomena into direct miracles, and had been persuaded by their lawgiver that he had received his law, written on tables of stone by the finger of God, whereas he had in fact received it written on his heart and mind by that God who is the Author of all wisdom. The divinity of the Mosaic dispensation would then rest to our minds on its own intrinsic evidence, crowned as it is by Christianity; nor would its truth be affected because it had been once asserted and believed on fictitious grounds, any more than the truth of Trinitarianism is shaken because it was received in Spain as the national faith, on the authority of a pretended miracle performed in proof of it by the Catholic clergy.

But the same considerations which would make me still believe in the divinity of the Mosaic dispensation, *even if its miraculous evidence could be disproved*, tend forcibly to remove the objections against that evidence, and to render the miracles themselves in no way improbable. To us who see the scheme in its whole completeness,—who are actually tasting the fruit of the seed then sown, and who from our far more extensive experience of human nature, are more surely able to judge what knowledge under any given circumstances is above the reach of man's unassisted faculties,—to us the evidence of external miracles may not be required to prove its divine origin. But to those who saw it at its commencement only, it could have no other attestation:—to believers and unbelievers the "mighty works," by which it was accompanied, were then the most intelligible sign that it was "the Lord's doing." And what if, in some instances, the miracle consists to us in the *adaptation* of a natural phenomenon to the time and place when its effects were needed, while they who saw it, believed from their inexperience that not only that particular occurrence of it, but its whole existence was a special interposition of God,—does this really lessen

the miraculousness of the case, or impeach the value of the narrative that records it?

Again; even the second supposed result of the disproof of any of the miracles of the Old Testament does not follow so clearly as we might have at first sight imagined. For a false statement of a miracle in confirmation of what the writer believes to be a valuable truth, is precisely a pious fraud; and it is hard and unjust to say, that the general credibility of a narrative is shaken, because its author does not scruple at a practice, which in one form or other has commended itself to the consciences of many good men, even in enlightened times, and which in an age of ignorance the ablest men, as well as the best, have been found to sanction. I shall not be supposed to be inclined to defend it, or to insinuate that there is any ground for imputing it to the sacred historians: I only wish to urge, that *even though they could be proved to be guilty of it*, yet it would be a disregard to truth of a particular kind, and on one particular point, which might be perfectly compatible with strict veracity on other occasions. To judge otherwise would be something like the folly of Whitaker, who impeaches the general credit of Tacitus as an historian, because the speech which he has ascribed to the Emperor Claudius, in favour of admitting the Gauls to the rights of Roman citizenship, has been proved to be fictitious, by the accidental preservation of a record of the speech actually delivered.

The first result, however, would follow undoubtedly, not only from the disproof of a miracle, but from any error or exaggeration in the detail of any event whatever. It would follow clearly that the narrative into which any error, however trifling, had found its way, could not have been written by divine inspiration. I do not mean that, if the history of a divine revelation were incorrect in any trifling point, we could argue that the revelation itself must be false:—far from it; the revelation may be truly a revelation; but it would be clear that the history of it could be no more than a human production, and, as such, not incapable of error, even though substantially true.

Now it will appear that the remaining difficulties in the Scriptures, such namely as are not of a religious character, together with the objections urged against particular miracles, on the ground of some alleged improbability in the narrative of them, are of a nature, for the most part, not to invalidate the *truth of revelation*, but merely the *inspiration of the historical record of it*. It is only the *inspiration* of the books of the Scripture, and not their general *truth*, and far less the truth of the revelations recorded in them, that is, or can be, affected by the great majority of objections, critical, scientific, historical, and chronological, which have been brought at different times against

various parts of the Bible. By the eagerness with which they have been urged and repelled, one would imagine that our Christian faith depended upon their issue, whereas in fact it has been wholly unconcerned in the dispute. For instance, the authority of the Acts of the Apostles as a trustworthy history, has been most satisfactorily made out, both from the general tone and character of the narrative, and from numerous instances of the author's very accurate knowledge of the state of things at the time of which he treats. Is it then to be overthrown by the discovery of *three* inaccuracies, supposing them to be so—that is, a mistake as to the circumstances preceding and accompanying the death of Judas; an anachronism as to the story of Theudas, in the speech ascribed to Gamaliel; and an oversight in the speech of Stephen, as to the person of whom Abraham bought his burial place? No man would ever dream of attacking the authenticity of a good history on grounds so frivolous; but they become important if we make the authenticity of the Scripture History synonymous with its inspiration; for as God is incapable of the minutest error, as much as of the gravest, any one of these mistakes, if made out to be such is sufficient to prove, that the history in which it occurs could not have been written by inspiration.

There seems to have been such an inveterate confusion in men's minds between the character of the events recorded, and that of the narrative recording them, that I must express myself intelligibly on this point, even at the risk of some repetition. I have seen it urged as an argument for the *inspiration* of some of the historical books of the Old Testament, that they contain a *record* of many true prophecies. Now, undoubtedly, if a man *utters* a true prophecy, it is a very good reason for thinking him inspired; but what has this to do with his *recording the fact* of the utterance of such prophecies by another? And is it not as absurd to argue the inspiration of the history from the truth of the facts contained in it, as to argue the falsehood of the facts from the history not being inspired?

I am well aware that the subject of the inspiration of Scripture is one of too great importance, as well as too great difficulty, to be discussed fully on the present occasion. But this much seems to me clear; first, that by far the greatest part of the objections, not of a religious character, which have been brought against the Scriptures, affect *the inspiration of the historical books*, and that only. And secondly, that the *credibility* of those books does in no way depend upon their *inspiration*, unless we maintain, that the testimony of all uninspired narratives may be rejected without blamable scepticism.

One particular class of those difficulties, which are not of a religious

character, relates only indirectly either to the *inspiration* of the books of Scripture, or to their *authenticity;* what it affects directly is their *genuineness.* It will be remembered, that a book is *genuine,* when it is really the production of its professed author; or if it be anonymous, when its real author was in the same circumstances in which the nameless writer gives us to understand that he was. Strictly speaking, I should not call a book *not genuine* merely from the book itself having been ascribed by others to a wrong author, if the real author had done nothing himself to encourage the mistake; for in denying the genuineness of a book, we mean, to a certain degree, to impeach its authenticity; that is, in proportion to the deceit practised upon us by the writer, in misleading us as to his name and circumstances. But take for instance, the little work on the government of Athens, which has been commonly ascribed to Xenophon. It is probably not Xenophon's; but I should not call it the less *genuine,* because the writer has given us no reason to think that he was Xenophon, and it is hard that his credit should suffer merely from a mistake of his readers. I think this is an important distinction; as otherwise, the disproof of a book's *genuineness* may often be a very ambiguous expression, and may convey an impression unfavourable to the truth of the book, for which there is not the slightest ground. And this is the more important in scriptural criticism, because most of the objections brought against the *genuineness* of the several books, as it is called, affects their genuineness only in what I consider the improper and nugatory sense of the term. For instance, the last six chapters in the Book of Zechariah are thought, by some persons, not to be the work of that prophet: but as they do not at all profess to be so, I should avoid saying that they were *not genuine,* lest I should seem to attach to them something of the notion of a forgery, or intentional fraud, and so impeach their *authenticity;* whereas in fact, if they are not Zechariah's, they have been ascribed to him through no fraud of the writer, but simply from a mistake of his readers or editors.

Such questions as these come to be regarded as difficulties, and as dangerous to religion, chiefly, I am persuaded, through the mistaken fear with which the advocates of religion regard them. As things now are, a man cannot prosecute a critical inquiry, as to the date and authors of the books of Scripture, without the fear of having his Christian faith impeached, should his conclusions, in any instance, be at variance with the common opinion: this deters some men from attempting it, and provokes others to do it in a spirit of bitterness, against what is called the orthodox party, and thus really to change a critical question into a polemical one. A young man of intelligence

and critical habits, when commencing his biblical studies, is placed accordingly under great disadvantages, because he finds a critical spirit considered, by one party, as nearly synonymous with a profane one, and actually rendered so by some of the writers of the opposite party in their own case. If unable to understand the necessity of this union, he persists in examining the books of the Scripture critically, he finds himself immediately thrown upon the study of writers who are accused, whether truly or falsely, of latitudinarianism; if falsely, it makes him indignant against the party from which the charge proceeds; if truly, it may really impair his spirit of devotion. In either case, the impartiality of his judgment becomes endangered: dislike of the orthodox party is a temptation to him to reject their conclusions, and a spirit of profaneness blinds him to one most important part of the evidence in all spiritual questions; the harmony of such and such doctrines and principles with the general spirit of God's revelations. In his own case then, his critical study of the Scriptures is likely to injure his faith; and if he feels this in time, and is saved from the evil of unbelief, a violent reaction is sometimes the consequence, and he joins the orthodox party in that very outcry against the dangers of a spirit of criticism, to which the existence of those dangers had been, in his own experience, mainly owing.

In connexion with this subject, I cannot but express my deep regret at the general neglect of the study of Hebrew in this country; and especially, that it is neither required of candidates for ordination, nor as a qualification for degrees in theology at the Universities. How far it may be studied by individuals, it is of course impossible to know; but this I do know, that many clergymen, deeply engaged in the practical duties of their profession, must find it impossible then to begin it; although, had they been obliged in earlier life to make a certain progress in it, they might afterwards have carried it on to a high degree of proficiency. At any rate, the *publications* of English Hebrew scholars are not numerous, and men in this study, as in so many others, are attracted by the high reputation of the German writers, to put themselves under their guidance. Whether this reputation be well founded or no, I know not, as I have to regret my total ignorance of Hebrew; but judging from the indefatigable industry, and exceeding ability of the distinguished writers of Germany on other subjects, I should suppose that no man there could acquire a high character, in any branch of learning without deserving it. But it is said that the Hebrew philologists are deeply infected with that same spirit which has characterized so many of the German theologians; and, if it be so, no devout man can use their works habitually in his study of the

Scriptures without great pain, or possibly without great danger. For the mere intellectual fault of over scepticism he may indeed have been prepared, by his acquaintance with the German commentaries, and illustrations of profane literature: but there is in the rationalists a coldness and irreverence of tone, and so apparent an absence of all feeling of their own personal relations to God, as men and as sinners, while they are discussing, like indifferent spectators, his dealings with mankind in the abstract, that their intellectual fault is greatly aggravated by these moral defects. And if we look for the cause of these defects, we shall find it in their exclusively literary habits, and in their want of Christian intercourse with their fellow-men, and especially with the poor; so that the Bible has presented itself to their minds more frequently in connexion with their studies than with their practice. The English clergy, on the contrary, enjoy such great moral advantages in the daily exercise of their parochial duties, that with them the deepest and boldest spirit of critical and philological research would be tempered by the healthy state of their spiritual affections, and would be alike secure and profitable to their readers and to themselves.

My object, in the foregoing pages, has been to distinguish carefully between that Christian faith, which is the guide and comfort of our lives, and a variety of questions, historical, critical, scientific, &c., connected with parts of that Volume from which the grounds of our faith are derived. With Christian faith there must be no tampering; we cannot afford to propitiate an adversary by sacrificing the points to which he objects; we dare not describe the method of salvation as different from what God has appointed; we dare not content ourselves with any lower standard of holiness than God's perfect law. We must indeed "render unto God the things that are God's;" but we must also "render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," that intellectual wisdom, which exercises over this world more than imperial dominion may not be denied her lawful tribute. It is within her province to judge of all questions of science, of history, and of criticism, according to her own general laws; nor may her decisions on those matters be disputed by an appeal to the higher power of spiritual wisdom, who leaves such points wholly to her lower jurisdiction.

If it be said that this is a mere truism which nobody dreams of disputing, I have only to answer, that whether disputed or not in theory, it is by no means rare to see it violated in practice. When a writer, not more distinguished for ability and learning than for his moderation and piety, published, a few years since, an "Inquiry into the Origin of Sacrifice," he was immediately assailed with a cry of the *dangerous*-

ness of his doctrines, and an historical question was represented as a matter of theology: and we know the vehemence with which some of the conclusions of geology, drawn from geological phenomena, have been resisted, as if they interfered with our belief in revelation. In truth, it is no hard thing to make a rationalist, or an anti-rationalist,—meaning by this term one who is afraid to trust himself in the pursuit of truth, and who talks of the danger, perhaps of the profaneness of an inquiry, though its subject be strictly within the province of the intellect; but to make an enlightened, yet humble Christian,—one who feels the comparative worthlessness of all merely intellectual exercises, yet follows them steadily and fearlessly, in full faith that no truth can ever separate him from the love of the God of Truth,—this is hard to the extreme of difficulty. Deeply impressed with the profound knowledge of human nature exhibited in the Scriptures, and with the adorable wisdom of God's manner of dealing with it;—"convinced of sin and of righteousness," of his own indwelling evil, and of the perfect remedy for that evil provided by the death and resurrection of Christ;—living in the daily consciousness of possessing the earnest of the Spirit, and hoping therefore the more boldly for the full enjoyment of those promises whose pledge and foretaste is so abiding a source of peace and joy;—such a man's faith is far too deeply rooted to need the paltry aid of ignorance and fear. "He that is spiritual judgeth all things:" all things, save the very principles of that spiritual wisdom from which his power of judgment is derived. With neither the unbeliever's prejudice on one side, nor on the other the prejudice of a faith not duly aware of its own immovable foundations, and approaching therefore, with secret fear, to the examination of questions really powerless to affect it; he will seek truth only, sure that whatever it may be, it must turn to the glory of God, and according to the promise, with all other things, will work together for good to those who love God.

THE END.

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
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